Frozen conflicts and the EU a search for a positive agenda

Frozen conflicts and the EU a search for a positive agenda Jaap Ora Director of Division, Policy Planning Department Introduction During the last couple of years the so-called frozen conflicts in Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Armenia and Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) have attracted the increasing attention of the international community. The main aim of this essay is to examine the ways the European Union has contributed to the finding of solutions and to also analyse where there is more potential for constructive engagement by the European Union. All four conflicts erupted during the demise of the Soviet Union and froze about simultaneously, in the years 1992 1994. Out of the immediate post-cold war agenda, these conflicts are some of the issues, concerning which the least progress has been made. Throughout Europe, countries affected by the cold war dividing line have achieved success in transition and European integration, albeit each at its own pace. Compared to this, the countries affected by the frozen conflicts have been in a disadvantaged situation and have yet to make up for all the lost years. Taking all conflicts together, we can speak of a sizeable number of casualties, refugees and IDPs 1. An additional feature is continuing human suffering of the people from the affected regions, many of them unable to return and living in temporary accommodation. The unresolved conflicts hamper not only the development of each individual country but also are an obstacle to the development of the whole region affected by the conflicts, by hampering the necessary development of markets, infrastructure etc in the region 2. In the last few years, countries affected by the conflicts have taken a course on transformation. The governments of Georgia and Moldova have appealed for international assistance to help resolve the frozen conflicts, in order to realise the full potential of the reform efforts in these countries. The international community must take advantage of this new positive dynamics regarding the conflicts. The countries affected by the conflicts have been on the verge of failure, and the international community can not afford to return to this situation. The main problem with international engage- 50

FROZEN CONFLICTS AND THE EU A SEARCH FOR A POSITIVE AGENDA 2006 ment is the wavering attention that is paid to these conflicts, as other problems seem more urgent. Consequently, the frozen conflicts are not as high on the agenda as they deserve to be. There is a need for a more positive agenda, and a reactive approach should be replaced with strategic thinking. Although similar instruments can be used to address all of the conflicts, it is important to remember that each conflict is different. The historical and legal circumstances, as well as the current challenges regarding the conflicts vary. The conflict settlement mechanisms differ in many aspects. Therefore, no international case (like Kosovo) can be treated as a precedent for a solution. The EU s role 3 The EU security strategy states that conflicts in the neighbourhood pose a threat to stability and commits the EU to dealing with them. Various circumstances have caused the EU to look closer at the countries and regions affected by the frozen conflicts. In 2003 2004 Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine opted for a renewed reform agenda, turning to Europe as a model and a source of support. The way these countries started to approach their challenges has made it possible for the EU to adopt on its part a qualitatively different and much more substantive policy towards them. The enlargement has brought the EU geographically closer to the region and enhanced its knowledge about the countries concerned. Furthermore, the energy issues of the Caspian and Black Sea region have gained increased significance. The positive transformation agenda that the EU is pursuing in its neighbourhood inevitably involves a closer look at the frozen conflicts. The serious involvement in handling these conflicts is not a problem-free enterprise. Yet it is a completely manageable exercise it is important to remember that the EU has been willing to take on security tasks that are far more challenging. If the EU had avoided any external challenges, it would be a dwarf in security policy terms and we could not speak of the CFSP as we know it today. Many international actors are involved in the search for solutions, including the OSCE, the UN, the United States. Several countries of the region (Ukraine, Turkey, Russia) have an important role in resolving the conflicts. Yet the EU has the means to contribute to the solution, and the conflicts are a test for the EU as a leading security policy actor on the European continent. The advantage of the EU is that it can combine a wide range of instruments and policies. It can offer a coherent and structured approach in the day-to-day assistance to improving the situation in the affected countries, and should also possess the political authority to push at the highest level for an agreement to end the conflicts. The EU has in recent years significantly increased its contribution to the resolution of the frozen conflicts. All of these countries have now joined the European 51

2006 ESTONIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YEARBOOK Neighbourhood Policy and Action Plans have been agreed with all of them (signed with Moldova in February 2005, with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in November 2006). One of the necessary conditions for the resolving of the conflicts is that the countries involved are stable, prosperous, democratic, strongly committed to the rule of law, human rights and minority rights. One of the aims of the ENP is to contribute to this process. The Action Plans contain also specific commitments regarding the frozen conflicts. The EU has appointed Special Representatives to Moldova and to the South Caucasus. The EUSRs play an important role in ensuring that various EU activities contribute to the resolution of the conflicts. They can contribute to an EU role as a facilitator and honest broker. 4 The EU has also two ongoing field activities that are relevant to the conflict resolution: the EU Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine and Moldova and the Border Support Team in Georgia, both functioning since 2005. The EU has rejected the referenda in the breakaway entities and has urged Russia to remain committed to the principle of the territorial integrity of Moldova and Georgia. In the coming years, the ENP will remain one of the most important instruments of the EU s support to the countries concerned Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. In this context, the communication from the Commission from December 2006 on strengthening the ENP is very welcome. It has singled out areas where closer cooperation is necessary. Progress in these areas travel, trade, people-to-people contacts, political cooperation, regional cooperation will help to promote the development of the partner countries. Moldova: Transnistria The adoption of the ENP AP, the appointment of the EUSR, the opening of the office of the Commission in Chisinau in October 2005 and the decision to open visa facilitation negotiations are an indication of the intensified contacts between the EU and Moldova. It is important that Moldova would retain its motivation to stay on the reform track and actually implement the Action Plan. Moldova s European orientation is the best chance since the end of the Cold War to secure the future of the country. In this effort, Moldova needs consistent support and attention from the EU. The EU was in October 2005 invited to join together with the USA the mediation process of the Transnistrian conflict, thus the negotiating mechanism transforming into the 5+2 format. It is the only frozen conflict where the EU is part of the settlement mechanism. Participating as an observer enables the EU to support the OSCE mediation efforts, a great deal of which is currently directed at urging the parties to resume the 5+2 talks in the full format. A major contribution of the EU is the Border Assistance Mission, functioning since December 2005 on the Moldova-Ukraine border. Helping Moldova to ensure control of its borders and customs territory is a key issue for the settlement. If the EU could find ways to promote the rule of law, civil society 52

FROZEN CONFLICTS AND THE EU A SEARCH FOR A POSITIVE AGENDA 2006 and democracy in Transnistria, this would help prepare ground for the settlement. Until now, unfortunately, there have been only limited opportunities in this regard. Estonia has been actively supporting Moldova s reform efforts and also the EU s endeavours to advance the settlement process. Moldova is one of Estonia s development assistance priority countries, with our aid focused on strengthening the state institutions and assisting in the European integration process. Estonia has since the beginning provided personnel to EU-BAM, currently with three border guard and two customs officers. Yet, irrespective of the successful transition process of Moldova and any possible incremental changes in Transnistria, the agreement to cease the conflict is a political one. Formally, it would be a matter for Moldova and Transnistria to settle, yet admittedly Russia has a strong leverage over Transnistria. The EU has expressed its concern over Russia s support for Transnistria s leadership 5. A sustained international diplomacy is required to motivate Russia to utilise its influence over the Transnistrian leaders in the interests of a resolution. A continued dialogue is also needed with Russia to ensure the fulfilment of the Istanbul commitments (withdrawal of Russia s troops and munitions). The current peacekeeping mission (Russian, Moldovan and Transnistrian troops in equal shares) is not meeting any international standards and not the requirements of the current situation either. Therefore, there is a need for an alternative. The main function of a new stabilisation mission would primarily be, with the consent of the two parties, to ensure trust between the parties, and provide for law and order. What is important, that planning for such a mission would go hand-in-hand with the efforts to reach a political solution to the conflict. A quite obvious option, if we look at the nature of the conflict and the closeness of the region to the EU, would be an EU (or EUled) mission. This would not exclude the participation of Russia. Some observers have argued that Transnistria is a potential model case for EU-Russia cooperation in crisis management, yet the EU-Russia dialogue so far has not produced the desired results. Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia The EU s involvement has considerably increased since the 2003 Rose revolution in Georgia. This brought to power a government which is committed to transformation, and is prepared to take difficult decisions in the interests of modernisation and European values. It is inevitable that such a deep reform agenda includes also the issue of the frozen conflicts. The European Union has responded to the aspirations of the new Georgian leadership. The Georgian reform course compelled the EU to invite Georgia and also other South 53

2006 ESTONIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YEARBOOK Caucasus republics to join the European Neighbourhood Policy. The ENP Georgia Action Plan includes all the main points of the Georgian reform agenda, including the issue of the frozen conflicts. After one year in office, the mandate of the EUSR was upgraded in 2006 to enable more active involvement in the search for the resolution of the conflicts. The European Union has offered a substantial contribution in the area of post-conflict rehabilitation. Much of the EU s financial contribution has been directed towards the restoration of the normal functioning of the economic and social infrastructure in the conflict areas. The EC is the largest donor in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Since 1997 the EC has committed 25 million euros to Abkhazia; the EC assistance programmes to South Ossetia amount to almost 8 million euros 6. The EUSR Border Support Team assists the country with reforming its border management system. Georgia is one of the priority countries of Estonia s development cooperation. We support a wide range of Georgia s reform efforts. Estonia is also supporting the EU endeavours. One Estonian border guard has served with the BST since the beginning, and recently Estonia allocated 100 000 euros to the EUSR Border Support Team. It is important to encourage Georgia s leadership to focus on reforms and to see to it that the frozen conflicts have as little impact as possible on the successful implementation of the reform agenda. Yet to ensure the success of this approach, in parallel a strong international commitment to resolve the conflicts is needed. The possibilities for the EU to contribute to the solution of Georgia s frozen conflicts have not been exhausted. Currently, the main positive influence of the EU has been realised in its contacts with Georgia. Georgia s European aspirations, strong sense of ownership of the transformation agenda and motivation to learn from Europe s experience mean, that it is possible to have a frank dialogue with Georgia and to offer constructive solutions. The EU can further utilise this influence if it offers more from its side, for example by upgrading the EU-Georgia political dialogue and starting of the visa facilitation negotiations between the EU and Georgia. More efforts are required in relation to the breakaway regions. This includes the conducting of a search for ways to open up the conflict areas and to restore their ties to Georgia. Another aspect is the promoting of a dialogue between the Georgian government and the leaderships of the breakaway regions. More direct bilateral dialogue may help break the deadlock in the negotiations. It is also worth considering how to enhance the EU s ties with the people of the breakaway regions without compromising the EU s stance on Georgia s territorial integrity. The EU should send an emphatic message to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, that the various prospects of increased European cooperation will be open also to them as they will resolve their dispute with 54

FROZEN CONFLICTS AND THE EU A SEARCH FOR A POSITIVE AGENDA 2006 Georgia. To be a part of Georgia s European project is by far the best option for the people of these two regions. Furthermore, the EU should continue keeping this issue on the agenda of the political dialogue with Russia, in order to engage Russia in a substantive search for real solutions. Being completely frank with Russia would only confirm the EU s reputation as an honest broker. A major issue is how to address the fact that the mechanisms that at one time were effective in ensuring the end and prevention of the re-emergence of hostilities have now become part of the problem. The current negotiating formats have not for over a decade produced the desired results. Georgia has requested the EU to take a closer role in facilitating and observing the negotiations. If we would match the respect and authority the EU has acquired as a donor with a higher political profile, this could possibly contribute to a positive dynamics regarding the frozen conflicts. Another important question is the format of the peacekeeping forces. A peacekeeping force must satisfy both parties of the conflict and today this clearly is not a case. Therefore it is not possible to dismiss Georgia s request for a change. The EU s message to Georgia has been not to make any hasty unilateral decisions 7. Yet the international community must make efforts to find an alternative to the current peacekeeping formats in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, in the form of stabilisation missions, that would facilitate an end to the conflict rather than perpetuate it. It is not obvious that it should be a EU mission there are other alternatives yet with its authority and interests in the region the EU should participate in the search for change and provide its support constructive solutions. Unfortunately the autumn crisis between Russia and Georgia has not benefited the conflict resolution process. Instead of having a meaningful and constructive talk at the EU summit with Russia concerning the steps ahead, we had to concentrate on calling on Georgia and Russia to calm down, and making our concern clear regarding the Russian measures (deportations, economic blockade etc). This setback is to the benefit of only those who would not see and end to the conflict. Nagorno-Karabakh The ENP Action Plans create new prospects for cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan and Armenia. The EU is not directly involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement process and has expressed its strong support to the Minsk group (OSCE) settlement mechanism. The Minsk group (OSCE) format seems to have worked well, creating an environment where a dialogue is possible between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The EU has a strong interest that a solution will be found, that will satisfy 55

2006 ESTONIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YEARBOOK both sides. The hope is that the parties involved can take advantage of the current positive dynamics it is not wise to anticipate that time would work in the interest of either side. The EU is ready to consider ways to further strengthen its engagement in conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation, depending on the extent that this is requested by Armenia and Azerbaijan. Currently, more potential is seen in the EU involvement in post-conflict rehabilitation. Contributing to a peaceful solution of the conflict is one of the priority areas of the EU-Armenia and EU-Azerbaijan Action Plans, envisaging increased diplomatic efforts (including through the EUSR), increased support to the Minsk Group efforts, and the encouraging of people-to-people contacts. EU-Russia partnership The common neighbourhood contains an obvious potential for EU-Russia cooperation in foreign and security policy and crisis management. This aim has been stated in the EU-Russia PCA, and it is expected to be reiterated in the new agreement to replace the PCA. During the signing of the Common spaces agreement in May 2005 there was hope that it could lead to EU-Russia cooperation regarding the conflicts of Moldova and Georgia 8. Russia has an important role in resolving the frozen conflicts. There is no point in denying that either implicitly or explicitly, consideration of Russia s interests is an element of EU decision-making regarding the common neighbourhood. The EU would like to see Russia s constructive involvement, but this does not include Russia s veto on the EU s decision-making. There are many, including quite authoritative observers, who ascribe the lack of overall progress being made in the solving of the frozen conflicts to Russia s role. They argue that Russia sees as the best way for it to control and influence its neighbours by maintaining the ambiguous situation regarding the conflicts and by de facto increasing its links with the breakaway regions. In this way, it is argued, Russia is creating a shadow empire 9. Before subscribing to this analysis, it is important to make sure that other, more benign explanations are not applicable. It is difficult to accept that Russia would see it being in its interests to maintain continuous instability near its borders, tensions between and with its neighbours, with the accompanying risks of criminality, armed conflict etc. If one country would choose this kind of nineteenth century power politics, it would most probably ultimately fail anyway. Therefore it is justified to give Russia the benefit of the doubt. It means taking Russia at its word regarding the respecting of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of its neighbours, allowing ourselves be guided by the constructive content of the written texts of the EU-Russia agreements. If the EU- Russia partnership would fail this test, if the predictions about Russia s wish to create a shadow empire would prove true, it would put into question a great deal of the work to build up the strategic partnership with Russia since the 1990s. How to respond to this kind of development has not been thoroughly and honestly discussed within the EU. 56

FROZEN CONFLICTS AND THE EU A SEARCH FOR A POSITIVE AGENDA 2006 If we try to pinpoint some fundamental faults in the mutual perceptions between the EU and Russia, a major one is the question of spheres of influence. The EU by its foundations is not guided by this concept. The EU s involvement in Aceh, its stabilisation efforts in the Middle East or the Balkans cannot be explained by this concept, neither can the EU s engagement in its Eastern neighbourhood. We must be persistent in persuading our Russian partners that this is so. The EU is guided by the need to create stability, prosperity and security for all in the neighbourhood, and also by the need to support the neighbours who have chosen European values and the European model of development. Conclusion The EU has expressed its strategic interest in contributing to the resolving of the frozen conflicts. The EU is getting closer to the affected countries geographically and also in terms of values and aspirations. Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have urged the EU to step up its contribution. As the other conflicts of Europe are being left behind, the frozen conflicts of the CIS stand out as some of the main regional security concerns in Europe. They require consistent attention and a strategic approach. The EU s contribution so far has been considerable: rehabilitation efforts, assistance to reforms, sorting out the border and customs issues. Among the further priorities is delivering the message about Europe to the breakaway regions, and restoring the ties between the countries and their breakaway regions. The EU does well to advise the countries affected by the conflicts to concentrate foremost on reforms, and to allow the frozen conflicts to disrupt this agenda as little as possible. As the European Neighbourhood Policy will be developed further, it is right to pay attention to increased trade, travel, political contacts, regional cooperation and people-to-people contacts between the EU and its Eastern neighbours. The EU has a potential to figure stronger also in the sphere of political dialogue with all affected parties and in the search for the best format of stabilisation operations. The EU s political profile should match its role as a donor and also its ambition as a leading actor in resolving regional security issues. The EU s contribution is needed in both processes incremental changes that prepare ground and create the right conditions in the regions, and efforts to find the political will necessary to take the decisive steps and reach an agreement. The EU and Russia have over the past years expressed increased ambition to cooperate in addressing the regional security issues. Working constructively to resolve the frozen conflicts is the best way to prove that these ambitions are earnest. 57

2006 ESTONIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YEARBOOK Notes 1 According to some estimations, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict claimed 25000 lives, the Abkhazia conflict about 10000, South Ossetia conflict several thousand and Transnistria over a thousand. The overall number of refugees and IDPs may exceed a million people. Georgia: avoiding war in South Ossetia. International Crisis Group Europe Report no. 159, 26 November 2004; Abkhazia Today. International Crisis Group Europe Report no. 176, 15 September 2006; Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Available at Reuters Alert Net, http://www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/nk_con.htm?v=at_a_glance 2 See, for instance, Peacebuilding in the South Caucasus: what can the EU contribute? International Alert, September 2006, pp 2 7, http://www.conflictprevention.net/library/documents/europe/eu_south_ caucasus.pdf 3 For examples of independent analysis on the EU role, see Dov Lynch, Why Georgia matters. European Union Institute for Security Studies. Chaillot Paper no. 86, February 2006; Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: the EU s Role. International Crisis Group Europe Report no. 173, 20 March 2006; Nico Popescu, The EU in Moldova Settling conflicts in the neighbourhood. European institute for Security Studies. Occasional Paper no. 60, October 2005; Jos Boonstra, From a Weak State to a Reunified Moldova: New Opportunities to Resolve the Transdniestria Conflict. NATO Research Paper no. 23, October 2005 4 See EUSR Peter Semneby s presentation at Bled Strategic Forum 28 august 2006, http://www.bledstrategicforum.org/speech-semneby.doc 5 Benita Ferrero-Waldner. Frozen conflicts : Transnistria, South Ossetia and the Russian-Georgian dispute. Speech at the European Parliament Plenary, Strasbourg, 25 October 2006. 6 Delegation of the European Commission to Georgia, http://www.delgeo.cec.eu.int/en/programmes/ rehabilitation.html 7 Minister for European Affairs Paula Lehtomäki at the European Parliament on 25 October 2006: Transnistria; South Ossetia, http://www.ue2006.fi/news_and_documents/speeches/vko43/en_gb/1161797679184/ 8 EU-Russia pact can melt frozen conflicts foreign affairs chief, http://www.europeanvoice.com/archive/ article.asp?id=22877 9 Ana Palacio and Daniel Twining, Russia s Shadow Empire. Washington Post, 11 March 2006. An example of a sceptical view of Russia s involvement is also Graeme P. Herd, Moldova ja the Dniestr Region: Contested past, Frozen Present, Speculative Futures? Conflict Studies Research Centre, Central and Eastern Europe Series 05/07, February 2005 58