The 8 th Annual Joint Workshop on Socio-Economics Sustainable Development Co-sponsored by Fudan University, University of Paris 1 and FERDI Paris, Maison des Sciences Economiques, Friday 24 June 2016 MSE, 6 th floor conference room Program Each presentation is 20 minutes, followed by 10-minute discussion. 9:00-9:05. Welcome introduction by Professor Jean-Claude Berthélemy 9:05-10:05. First morning session. Chair: Jean-Claude Berthélemy (Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne) Zhao Chen (Fudan University), with Zhikuo Liu (SUFE) and Sandra Poncet (Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne): Smog city : how the Olympic Games affect air quality in Beijing. Discussant: Mathilde Maurel (Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne) Joël Cariolle (Ferdi): "Insights from a multi-level analysis of bribe prevalence in developing countries". Duscussant: Jean-Pierre Laffargue 10:05-10:20. Coffee Break 10:20-11:50. Second morning session. Chair: Ping Hua (Cerdi) Yu Liu (Fudan University): Political economy of tax enforcement in China. Discussant: Thomas Vendryes Rémi Bazillier (Université d Orléans), with avec Francesco Magris et Daniel Mirza: Pro-immigration policies increase outmigration: Evidence from Schengen Agreements". Discussant: Anthony Edo (CEPII)? 1
Antoine Marsaudon (Paris School of Economics and Hospinnomics), with Josselin Thuillez (Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne): Does democracy reduce the HIV epidemic? Evidence from Kenya. Discussant: Sulin Sardoschau (Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne) 11:50-12:00. Group Photos 12:00-13:30. Lunch on the 6 th floor terrace 13:30-15:00. First afternoon session. Chair: Zhao Chen (Fudan University) Jinfeng Ge (Fudan University), with Zheng (Michael) Song (Chinese University of Hong Kong) and Yangzhou Yuan (Stockholm University): The syndrome of China s service sector. Discussant: Jean-Claude Berthélemy Jean-Claude Berthélémy (Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne): Dualism, Poverty Exits and Growth Accelerations Discussant: Haibo Xu Thomas Vendryes (Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne and Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan), with Li Shi (Beijing Normal University): Real estate activity, democracy and land rights in rural China Discussant: Zhao Chen 15:00-15:15. Coffee Break 15:15-16:45. Second afternoon session. Chair: Jean-Pierre Laffargue (Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne ) Haibo Xu (Fudan University), with Kaiwen Leong and Huailu Li: Economics of organized crime: evidence from a drug selling gang in Singapore. Discussant: Joël Cariolle Sandra Poncet (Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne): How effective are VAT export taxes? Evidence from China, with Julien Gourdon (CEPII, Paris), Laura Hering (Erasmus University, Rotterdam) and Stéphanie Monjon University Paris-Dauphine) Discussant: Yu Liu Ping Hua (Cerdi): "Impact of real exchange rates influence the manufacturing in China". Discussant: Jinfeng Ge 16:45-17:00. Closing remarks Note: Soon, we will open a webpage with the papers, the photos, etc. Its address is: http://www.univ-paris1.fr/diplomes/psme/joint-workshop-on-socio-economics/ 2
Abstracts Rémi Bazillier (Université d Orléans(Université d Orléans), with avec Francesco Magris et Daniel Mirza: "Pro-immigration policies increase outmigration: Evidence from Schengen Agreements". Abstract. This paper shows that policies which favor (im)-migration may actually provoke unexpected consequences by increasing the outows of previously settled migrants. To do so, we set a 3-country theory where already settled migrants in one country of residence respond to economic and policy incentives making them move back to their country of origin or a third country. In particular, we show that outmigration from the residence country increases with a unilateral openness of that country to new migrants. Outmigration increases even further with a multilateral openness to migration of all countries. The theory has an important implication for Schengen agreements: it predicts that openness of borders through Schengen should unambiguously increase the exit of previously settled migrants. We use the implementation of these agreements as a quasi-natural experiment, exploiting the different timing in their implementation. We use recently available data on outmigration from the OECD and a difference-in-difference approach to show that the bilateral adoption of Schengen is estimated to increase out-migration by one-third. Jean-Claude Berthélémy (Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne): Dualism, poverty exits and growth accelerations. Abstract. We propose in this paper a simple theoretical model to study the dynamics of an economy where individuals move out of poverty as a result of transition from low productivity (traditional) activity to high productivity (modern) activity. This dynamics is characterized by growth acceleration and temporarily growing inequalities. This model may help understand growth acceleration episodes observed repeatedly in developing and transition economies. We provide stylized facts based on income distribution data produced by the World Bank, which suggest that a large majority of the recent acceleration episodes fit our theoretical predictions. Although poverty exits may result from income growth in the traditional sector, we provide some evidence of a reverse causality, as we find in a number of cases autonomous poverty exits, which on average are responsible for close to 1 percentage point of annual growth in those cases. Joël Cariolle (Ferdi) "Insights from a multi-level analysis of bribe prevalence in developing countries". Abstract. Corruption results from individual choices, but these choices are also influenced by holistic factors that go beyond individual motivations. Because of shared norms of ethics, trust, and coordination prevailing in a given society or a social group, corrupt individual decisions may be related to each other. In micro empirical analysis, this interdependence of corruption decisions can be addressed through multi-level modelling of micro corruption data. Exploiting a large sample of 34,358 bribe reports of firms from 71 developing and transition countries, I use a three-level estimation framework to re-examine five controversies on the determinants of corruption: the economic and human development processes, the alleged oversize of the State, trade openness and democracy. Estimations support that multi-level modelling of bribery data refines the diagnosis on corruption determinants, and helps avoiding spurious conclusions regarding the direction, the significance and the strength of some relationships. 3
Zhao Chen (Fudan University), with Zhikuo Liu (SUFE) and Sandra Poncet (Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne): Smog city : how the Olympic Games affect air quality in Beijing. Jinfeng Ge (Fudan University), with Zheng (Michael) Song (Chinese University of Hong Kong) and Yangzhou Yuan (Stockholm University): The syndrome of China s service sector. Abstract Cross-country comparison reveals a underdeveloped service sector in China. Using firm-level data from China s 2008 economic census, we.find two facts that speak to a novel channel through which the sectoral allocation of resources gets distorted. First, China s service industries are far more concentrated than its manufacturing industries, and second, markups increase in.firm size. A higher industry concentration can thus increase average markups, lower output and employment in that industry. To identify and quantify the extent to which preferences,.firm productivity distributions and discriminatory policies affect concentration and, then, sectoral misallocation, we build up a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous.firms, variable markups and distortions. We find that markups of Chinese service firms are, on average, twice as high as markups of their counterparts in manufacturing. Moreover, XXX of the markups difference can be explained by policies favoring certain large service.rms. The preference heterogeneity over manufacturing and service goods turns out to be quantitatively unimportant. When reducing the distortions for service firms to the extent observed for manufacturing.rms, the model predicts a XXX percentage point increase in the service employment share and a welfare gain of XXX percent. Ping Hua (Cerdi): "Impact of real exchange rates influences the manufacturing in China ". Abstract. China as the world largest manufacturer has been looking for new world market from developed countries in 1980 and 1990 to African and Latino American countries since 2000. The implication of the One Belt, One Road strategy should give now opportunities. However, the recent decreasing growth rate of manufacturing value added strongly worried the Chinese government which proceeded several devaluation of the renminbi. No study has analyzed the impact of real exchange rate on manufacturing. The objective of this study is to complete this gap by analyzing the impacts of real exchange rate and its transmission channels through which it exerts on China s manufacturing value added using the data from 1981 to 2014. The obtained results showed that if the renminbi real appreciation improves the efficiency of workers and staff and thus increases manufacturing value added, this positive effect is too small to offset its negative effects on manufacturing investments and FDIs, leading a net negative effect on manufacturing value added in China. Yu Liu (Fudan University): Political economy of tax enforcement in China. Antoine Marsaudon (Paris School of Economics and Hospinnomics), with Josselin Thuillez (Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne): Does democracy reduce the HIV epidemic? Evidence from Kenya. Abstract. Does democracy help Kenya citizens in their struggle against the HIV epidemic? We leveraged individual surveys conducted in Kenya to estimate the effect of democratization on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection. Using a difference-in-difference design that drew upon the effects of pre-existing geographic variations in HIV intensity and cohort s exposure to 4
democracy, we find that a person living under a democratic regime has a decreased likelihood of having an HIV infection. Further, we find some ethnic favoritism: individuals belonging to same minority tribes as the government chief appear to be preferred during periods of non-democracy. Motivated by the political economy literature, a democracy in this paper refers to the combination of multiparty elections and chief executive change. Sandra Poncet (Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne): How effective are VAT export taxes? Evidence from China. Abstract. Compared to most countries, China s value-added tax (VAT) system is not neutral and makes it less advantageous to export a product than to sell it domestically. However, the large and frequent changes to the VAT refunds which are offered to exporters have led China to be accused of providing its firms with an unfair advantage in global trade. We use city-specific export-quantity data at the HS6-product level over the 2003-12 period to assess how changes in the VAT export tax have affected Chinese export performance. We find that eligible export quantity for a given city-hs6 pair declines by 7% following a one percent rise in the VAT export tax. We show that the efficiency of this export tax policy is magnified when it applies to products with denser links with the local productive structure. Hence export benefits from VAT rebates are greater for activities for which the necessary capabilities and resources are available. Thomas Vendryes (Centre d Economie de la Sorbonne and Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan), with Li Shi (Beijing Normal University): Real estate activity, democracy and land rights in rural China Abstract. Land-related conflicts have recently become a primary cause of social unrest and a major political issue in China. Indeed, as is generally the case in the course of development, the process of institutional change, which also affects land rights in rural areas, generates tensions and frictions. Using survey data on land practices and governance in Chinese villages and national statistics about investment in the real estate sector, we confirm the results of the handful of empirical studies on this topic in China, by showing that practices such as administrative reallocations of land by village leaders positively depend on the level of real estate activity but that this effect is mitigated by the development of village-level democracy. We thus bring empirical evidence on the factors behind the evolution on land rights in China s rural areas and the related conflicts, as well as, more generally, on the dynamics of institutional change that accompanies development. Haibo Xu (Fudan University), with Kaiwen Leong and Huailu Li: Economics of organized crime: evidence from a drug selling gang in Singapore. 5