IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA 500 SOUTH DUVAL STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399 STYLE CIVIL NEGLIGENT CASENO.:SC04-2104 DCA; 1D03-5465 GEORGE W. CANNADY Vs. PETITIONER KARL SINCLAIR. FRANZ, M.D. AND JACKSON HOSPITAL RESPONDENT ON APPEAL FROM THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA PETITIONER S INITIAL BRIEF FOR PETITIONER ; MR. GEORGE W. CANNADY 4785 HWY. 71 NORTH GREENWOOD FL. 32443 (850) 594-7741 PRO-SE
A TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Table of Authorities with case listed alphabetically i i 2. Statement of the case and facts 1-9 3. Summary of argument 1-2 The Lower Court ERR is not Granting a Rehearing to ( i ) Redress the issues of Chapter 766.103 (2) that showed the Petitioner had Complied with Chapter 766 Florida Statute. (i i) DCA Court was in ERR by invalidating Fla. Statute 766.103 (2) by not redressing the issues of the Statute after Respondents Confuted with Appendix 1-3 which acknowledged my case was a Negligence case and not a Malpractice Case. (iii) The Lower Court prejudged and Challenged the evidence as a jury for the his favorite side, the Respondents. 4. Argument with regard to each issue 1-2 5. Conclusion 1 Certificate of Service 1 Certificate of Compliance 1
A TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Pages Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Watking 97 Fla. 350. 121 4 11 So. (1929). Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 917 F.2d 266, 269 3 (6 th Cir. (1990). 3 rd DCA Estevez v. Montero 662 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 3 rd 5 DCA 1995). Florida v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1973). 5 10 Mendez v. West Flagler Family Association, 303 So. 2d 1 2 13 (Fla. 1974). Summers v Baptist Medical Center, 91 F. 3d 1132, 2 6 1137 (8 th Cir. 1996 ). Florida Statute 395.1041 2 3 4 5 6 7 Florida Statute 766.103 (2) 1 2 4 5 6 8 10 12 13 14 Florida Statute 768.13 (2) (b) (1) 2 3 6 7 9 10 12 13 14 Florida Statute 768.81 (4) (a) 2 Article (1) section 21 1 11 12 Article V section 3 (b) (1) and (7) 1 10 12 Section 20 Schedule 20 to Article V 1 10 12 SU Code Title 42, 1395dd ( EMTALA). 2 3 4 6 7 Florida Rule of App. Pro. 9.030 1 10 12 Florida Rule of App. Pro. 9.110 1 2 10 13 12 Transcript of proceeding taken May 20,2003. 4 5 7 8 9 11 13
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS I am The Petitioner, George W. Cannady and Represent myself Pro-se. This is a tort of negligent case with a demand for jury trial on all issues. The First D.C.A rendered a Opinion September 14.2004, Pre Curiam Affirmed by ERVIN, PADOVAND and LEW. JJ. CONCUR. Rehearing was filed Sept. 21, 2004. Order October 18,2004 denied rehearing.(this Case is Appealed to The Supreme Court Under the Following). FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030 (a) (1) (A)(ii)(B). RULE 9.030 (a) Jurisdiction of Supreme Court (1) Appeal Jurisdiction. (A) The Supreme Court Shall review, by appeal (ii) Decision of district court of appeal declaring invalid a state statute or a Provision of the state constitution, The Florida Statute (Declaring invalid is 766.103 (2) and a provision of State Constitution). Article (1) Section 21 Access to Court. Rule 9.030 (ii) [2] Rule 9.110: Appeal Proceedings: Final Orders. 9.110 (a)(1) (2)(b)(d) (j) (k), Rule 9.110 (a) Applicability (1) invoke the appeal jurisdiction of court described in rule 9.030 (a)(1) and (2) seek review of order that finally determine a right. (b) Commencement (d) Notice of Appeal (j) Appeal Proceeding from District Court of Appeal (k) Review of Partial Final Judgment. Except. and Article V Sec. 3 (a) (b) (1)(7) May issue writs of prohibition to Courts and all writs necessary to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction. Article, 1 Section 21 Declaration of Right, Access to Court, The court shall be open to every person for redress of any injury and justice Shall be Administered without sale, denial or delay. Section 20 Schedule to Article V. (a) (b) (c) (1) The Supreme court shall have the jurisdiction immediately theretofore exercised by it, and it shall determine all
proceeding pending before it on the effective date of this article. Section 22 Trial by Jury, The Right of trial by shell be secure to all and remain inviolate the qualification and the number of jurors, not fewer than six shall be fixed by law. RULE 9.110 (k) Committee Notes Paragraph 14. See Mendez v. West Flagler Family Association, 303 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1974). The Petitioner s Response of August 5, 2003, to the Court on a Case that didn t require Judgment on the order to Appeal. The Respondents Alleged that the Petitioner had fail to comply with chapter 766. Florida Statute. The lower court and D.C.A. validated the lower court ruling on the Dismissal on the Petitioner case. Petitioner Alleges that Chapter 766.103 (2) did interpret that the Petitioner had complied with chapter 766.103 (2). The Petitioner finds Florida Statute 766.103 (2) directed the Petitioner to Florida Statute (768.13 (2) (b) (1) where these Respondents weren t immune from civil liability. The Lower Court and D.C.A. has Invalidated these Statutes by not reversing the Lower Court s order. Florida Statute 768.81 (4) (a) interpreted that the court must look to the substance of the action and not the conclusive terms used by the parties. The Court Has Invalidated Florida Statute 766.103 (2) that Refers to 768.13 (2) (b) (1), 2003 which Refers you to a tort of Negligence 42 U.S.C. s.1395dd, s. 395.1041,s. 395.401, or 401.45. See Summers v. Baptist Medical Center, 91 F. 3d 1132, 1137 (8th Cir. 1996). Title 42, Chapter 1395dd (a) Medical Screening Requirement, For the Emergency department to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition (within the meaning of subsection (e) (1) of this section ) exists. (e) Definition (1) the term Emergency medical condition (A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in (i) Placing the health of the individual in jeopardy, (ii) Serious
impairment to bodily function, (Blood flow is a Bodily function) and (nerve damage). Florida Statute 395.1041 is a tort untried Negligence that was Copied from (EMTALA). Overlooked Emergency Room Cause of Action, Section 395.1041, Florida Statute Section (3) (a) (1) Any person requests emergency services and care. (3) (2)(b)(d) Arrangements for transfers must be made between hospital emergency services personnel for each hospital, unless other arrangements between the hospitals exist. (3) (d)1 Each hospital shall ensure the provision of services within the service capability of the hospital, at all times, either directly or indirectly through an arrangement with another hospital. See Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 917 F. 2d 266 269 ( 6th Cir. 1990). Florida Statue 395.1041 (4) (2) requires Hospitals to keep Medical records. Where are the records showing the Petitioner s request for transfer to another hospital. (5)(b) Any person who suffers personal harm as a result of a violation of this section or the rule adopted hereunder may recover, in a civil action against the responsible hospital administrative or medical staff or personnel, Etc. The Petitioner has suffered personal harm as a result of a violation of not providing emergency services and care for a emergency medical condition. Dr. Franz was on the medical staff in 2001. Florida Statute 768.13 (2)(b)1 Shall not be held liable for any civil damages as a result of medical care or treatment unless such damage result from providing, or failing to provide medical care or treatment under Circumstances demonstrating a reckless disregard for the consequences so as to affect the life or health of another. Petitioner Alleged the unreasonable failure of the Respondents not Providing medical care under the Circumstances would demonstrate a reckless disregard so to affect the life or health of the Petitioner. There is a 95 % chance of dying, If the Petitioner has the artery replaced, within the first nine days or have my hand cut off, lessons the chance of dying. And there is no guarantee
that the nerve damage will heal from cutting my hand off. The Petitioner Alleges the lower Court Prejudged the Petitioner s case before hearing Petitioner s side. (The record Page 6 or R- 72 - line 6 9 Transcript of proceeding) Quotations of R 72 -Line 6 9 THE COURT: Let me make sure I ve got you straight. Essentially your client and you have no evidence that you ever received the necessary notice of intent. Page 6 or R- 72 Quotation R-72 - Line 11-13 THE COURT: And there s nothing in the file to indicate that he sent it, and it got sent to the wrong place or anything else? There s just nothing there. Transcript of proceeding record page 11 or R- 77 line 5-6 (The Petitioner) Well my complaint actually don t stipulate malpractice, In other words. (Actually) Definition Presently in fact. (Stipulate) Definition require as a condition. See Motion To Squash Defendant s Motion To Dismiss, (of Dr. Franz) (Not rebutted) (Negligence) In Tort law Civil Misconduct of a Defendant toward a Plaintiff capable of supporting a cause of action, failure to exercise the degree of care required under the circumstances, resulting in injury. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Watking 97 Fla. 350. 121 So. 95 (1929). Florida Statute 766.103 (2) or 768.13 (2) (b) (1), 2003 or 42 U.S.C. s. 1395dds. or 395.1041 or 401.45. No Notice of intent require as a Condition to sue the Respondents. The lower Court dismiss of the Petitioner case was in ERR. Quotations R- 77- Line 7 THE COURT I Understand.. Page 15 or R-81 Line 18-20 Quotation of Petitioner I went to both of them trying to get assistance to prevent an injury, and they both didn t care, didn t care whether I lived or died. See the Complaint For Injuries and Damages No 7 and 9-10 See - R 4 Jackson Hospital Emergency Department R- 6 ( Dr. Franz Medical record). Although the lower tribune could have been confused by issues in the complaint, There is new discovery evidence that
changes the word intern to a Employee that jabbed the artery in my hand, Also supervisor changes to R.N. nurse, Also No. 9 the prescriptions was for the G.I. test results. No treatment to the puncture of the artery. One might argues that Dr. Legg at Bay Walk In acted in the same circumstances. Dr. Legg wasn t a member of Jackson Hospital, But He told the petitioner to go to Emergency room and I told him I had been there before I came here. So he said you better get Dr Franz to put you in the Hospital to keep the blood from clotting. The Petitioner told Dr. Franz that Dr Legg had recommended that the Petitioner be Hospitalized and monitor to prevent blood from clotting. Also In Amended Motion To Squash Defendant s Motion to Dismiss Alleged that the unreasonable failure of both Defendants fail to comply with Florida Statute 766.106 (3) (a) (4) would justify dismissal of Respondents defenses Page 7 or R- 73- Line 3-10 is established law. See 3rd DCA Estevez v. Montero. 662 So 2d 1268 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1995). Quotations of page 7 or R-73 Line 13 The Court, This is just a hearing on the law--. The Court Page 10 or R 76- line 14-17 The Honorable William L. Wright, believe Hospital has certain right to be notified in the correct manner. (The Law doesn t require Notice intent in negligent cases of anti-dump). This is not a Malpractice case. 766.103 (2) didn t Govern it as a medical Malpractice case. The Petitioner would argue that there is no necessity for any construction or interpretation of the statute, and the court need only give effect to the plain meaning of its terms. See Florida v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1973) ( Where the legislative intent as evidenced by a statute is plain and unambiguous. In the initial brief in the Summary or Argument on page 3 Weighing of the Evidence of this case Florida Statute 395.1041 prevail and The Respondent Jackson Hospital First reply brief was rejected by the Court by order
on March 8,2004 it had only 1 Appendix. And Dr Franz didn t filed a Reply Brief until April 29, 2004. Dr Franz waited 70 days from the Petitioner Initial Brief to ask for a extension of time, March 31,2004. Rule 9.210 (f) allow 20 days after to file a answer brief. See Response to Letter of the Court May 17, 2004.The 70 days after extension was granted April 21, 2004.The Petitioner filed a reply brief February 26, 2004 showing Florida Statute 766.103 (2) didn t Govern this case.. The issue of Florida Statute 766.103 (2) is that it doesn t Govern a Medical Malpractice case. The Respondents use Appendix 1-3, In the Amended Reply Brief, which confuted with D.C.A. s dismissal of the first appeal for lack of Judgment on Order. On a case that didn t require Judgment on the order to Appeal. The Petitioner doesn t find any Court ruling on Florida Statute 395.1041. But (EMTALA) 42 U.S.C. 1395dd has a Court ruling on it. See Summers v. Baptist Medical Center, 91 F. 3d 1132, 1137 (8 th Cir. 1996). These Respondents has acknowledged that this case is a Negligent Anti-dump case, By the Respondents response of their Appendix 1-3 which confuted with D.C.A. s dismissal of the first appeal for lack of Jurisdiction on the first Appeal Order, The Respondent, Dr. Franz, alleges that (R.10-11) was a attending physician for his patients This is a Lie. If this was the case Dr Franz office would have referred the Petitioner to him. Attorney for Dr. Franz said Florida Statute Chapter 766 is a question of law in Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Insurance Company 819 So. 2d 732, 734 (Fla. 2002). Florida Statute 766.103 (2) is not a question of law it is law that shows this case was not a medical malpractice case. The Respondents wasn t immune from civil liability under Florida Statute 768.13 (2) (b) (1) that directed the Petitioner to Florida 395.1041 that didn t require a notice of intent nor an Affidavit to sue the Respondents. The Petitioner complied with chapter 766.103 (2). Quotation of 766.103 (2) In any medical treatment
activity not covered by s. 768.13,entitled the Good Samaritan Act, this act shall govern. See Florida v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1973) ( Where the legislative intent as evidenced by a statute is plain and unambiguous, then there is no necessity for any construction or interpretation of the statute, and the courts need only give effect to the plain meaning of its terms. ). Quotation of s. 768.13 (2) (b) (1) Any health care provider, including a hospital licensed under chapter 395, providing emergency services pursuant to obligations imposed by 42 U.S.C. s. 1395dd,s. 395.1041,s. 395.401,or s. 401.45 shall not be held liable for any civil damages as a result of such medical care or treatment unless such damages result from providing, or failing to provide medical care or treatment under circumstances demonstrating a reckless disregard for the consequences so as to affect the life or health of another. The Transcript of proceeding taken May 20,2003 page 2-17 is number 1-25, the Respondents altered a copy of the proceeding in reply brief Appendix 4. No care was provided on.march 20, 2001. The Artery that was puncture has a Blood Clot now and is shortening the blood supply to the nervous system and causing the upper part of my body to go numb and is very - very painful. This injury could ve been prevented if Jackson Hospital s Dr. Griffin had given me a blood thinner or referred me to another Hospital or a hand specialist, (As I Requested on March 20,2001). Or if Dr. Franz had given me a blood thinner and Hospitalized me to monitor the blood clot when he return on March 26,2001, (As I Requested on March 26 and 28,2001). Failure to treat injury has cause a blood clot that caused nerves damage and muscle lost, a 95% chance of death if the artery is replace or the removal of my hand and this may not solve the nerve damage where the nerves didn t get blood. The Petitioner disputed the lie of Jackson Hospital in the Amended Reply Brief, Respondent Jackson Hospital alleged Dr. Franz was testing on his hand this is a
lie. The Respondents in Reply Brief Alleged this action arising out of medical services and treatment, this is a lie no medical services and treatment on the Petitioner hand. The Respondents Alleged that the Petitioner didn t complied with chapter 766. this is a lie, The Petitioner had complied Chapter 766.103(2) That show this case was not a Medical Malpractice Act (R. 1-11-16-18-25-27- 61-66- R-77 line 5-6 ( The Court I understand line 7). DCA filed an Opinion Oct. 24,2003, it was dismissed because judicial labor appeared to remain in the lower tribunal with the Appellee Dr. Franz.. Final Judgment order was filed in L.T. Oct. 30,2003. Motion For Rehearing in DCA filed Nov. 3 rd 2003 with Final Judgment order. The Rule of Appellate Procedure (9.030 invoked the jurisdiction with Final Order But the Appeal was Dismiss. The Order didn t state why Rehearing was Denied. The L.T. Court interred Final Judgment without a Rehearing. Motion For Rehearing was filed in the L.T. Nov, 5, 2003. The Motion Confuted with the L.T. on All issues of the dismissal of my case. Rehearing in the L.T. was denied Dec. 4 th 2003, The Order was Reappealed To D.C.A. Dec. 18 th,2003. Amended notice of appeal filed Jan. 16 th,2004. The Appeal was accepted by order of the Court March 11,2004. The Petitioner Alleges the Court was not open to the Petitioner for redress of the injury the Lower Tribune or D.C.A.. The Court Prejudged the hearing and The Petitioner case presently in fact at hearing of May 20, 2003, No Notice of intent require as a Condition to sue the Respondents, The Respondents Appendix 1-3 in Reply Brief which confuted with D.C.A. s dismissal of the first appeal for lack of judgment on the order. On a case that didn t require judgment on the order to Appeal. The Petitioner by reinterpreted of Florida Statute 395.1041 (5) (b) don t require Judgment on a order to Appeal it. Quotation Any person who suffers personal harm as a result of a violation of this or the rules adopted hereunder may recover, in a civil action against the
responsible hospital administrative or medical staff or personnel, damage, reasonable attorney s fees, and other appropriate relief. (The word any person who suffers personal harm may recover in a civil action.) (No Judgment). The Petitioner would State that the Court, as a non Jury, hearing the evidence of a case is not allow to challenge the evidence presented at a hearing on the evidence, As the Court did in this case (R-72 line 6-9 Let me make sure I ve got you straight, Essentially your client and you have no evidence that you ever received the necessary notice of intent. and (R- 72 line 11-13. The Court was tainted and should be a mistrial (R-73 line 24-25-R-74 line 1 Quotations I went to the Hospital and asked for treatment, your Honor, and I should have gotten this treatment. Did the Court offer to challenge the Petitioner about being dump? (No). Did the Court challenge the Petitioner about R-77 line 5-6? (No.)Well my complaint presently in fact don t require as a condition a notice of intent. The Complaint was filed under Chapter 768 Florida Statue and Chapter 768.13(2) (b) (1 ) Govern it to be a negligence case. Chapter 766 doesn t Govern it to be a medical malpractice case so no notice of intent was required to sue Respondents. The Lower Court Dismissal was in ERR. Issues to be Judged 1. The Respondents can t show chapter 766 Governs this case as a Medical Malpractice case. 2. The Respondents can t show chapter 766 Governs this case as a Medical Negligence case. 3. Is the Court allowed to challenge the evidence as a Jury for one side? 4. The Respondent Dr. Franz fail to rebut the Motion to Squash the Defendant s Motion to Dismiss. 5. The Respondent Jackson Hospital waited from May 20, to June 10 to send order to the court, Court signed order 6 /12 /03, this is 23 days after the court signed the order. This order would be void. (Rule allowed 10 days for Rehearing)
A SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The Petitioner has invoked the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review D.C.A. s Final orders. The Respondents Confuted with D.C.A. s Dismissal of the Petitioner s first Appeal showing the case didn t require judgment to Appeal it. D.C.A. has invalidated Florida Statute 766.103 (2) by not reversing their order and the lower Court order. Florida Statute 766.103 (2) is very plain and is not necessity for any construction or interpretation of the Statute, and the court need only give effect to the plain meaning of its terms. See- Florida v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1973). The Court only looked at the Respondents conclusive terms used by the Respondents. Florida Statute 768.81 (4)(a) interpreted that the court must look to the substance of the action, and the Substance of this action is the Petitioner was dump at the Emergency room and by Dr. Franz. The Respondents Alleges the Petitioner fail to complied with chapter 766 Florida Statute. The Petitioner finds that the Petitioner had complied with chapter 766.103 (2) that directed the Petitioner to a tort of Negligence case that was Govern by Florida Statute 768.13 (2) (b) (1). Motion for Rehearing was filed in the Lower Tribune court that rebutted the failure to comply with chapter 766 Florida Statute. Florida Statute 395.1041 is Govern by Chapter 768.13 and 768.13 (2) (b) (1) Governs this case, a dump case. The Respondents didn t rebut the Motion for rehearing in the L.T. Court (Rehearing was denied by LT.Court). This case was Appealed to D.C.A again and the Respondents Brief used Appendix 1-3 which confuted with D.C.A. s dismissal of the first appeal for lack of judgment on Dr. Franz order. This case didn t require judgment on the order to Appeal. D.C.A. has Invalidated Florida Statute 766.103 (2) by not reversing their dismissal of the first Appeal and the lower Court Ruling.
The Petitioner Alleges, the Respondent, Dr. Franz didn t rebut the ruling of Negligence in the Motion to Squash the Motion to Dismiss which stated in tort law, civil misconduct of a Defendant toward a Plaintiff capable of supporting a cause of action and failure to exercise the degree of care required under the circumstances, resulting in injury. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Watking 97 Fla 350. 121 So. 95 (1929). The Petitioner would Alleges the lower Court didn t look at substance of the Motion to Squash. (R-77 The Court Said (I understand). The Petitioner Alleges under Article, 1 section 21 Declaration of Right, The Court wasn t open to redress of the injury and no justice was administered without delay. The Petitioner Alleges the Respondent s, Jackson Hospital, Order would be void for waited 23 days for the Court to signed it. (Rule allowed 10 days for Rehearing). The Petitioner Alleges the lower Court Challenged the Respondents Evidence (R 72 of the Motion to Dismiss). As a jury, the court is to hear the evidence not Challenge it as a jury did in the Scot Peterson case. The foreman of the jury was replaced for challenging the evidence in the Peterson case. The Petitioner Alleges that the Court Challenged the evidence or prejudged the evidence at the hearing of May 20,2003 and this Court should Rule a mistrial for the Challenging or Prejudging of this case. The Petitioner Alleges that under the circumstances the Petitioner didn t receive a fair hearing on May 20, 2003.
ARGUMENT WITH REGARD The Petitioner has invoked the Jurisdiction of the Supreme court to review DCA Orders. (ii) DCA Court was in ERR by invalidating Fla. Statute 766.103 (2)` By not redressing the issues of the Statute after Respondents Confuted with Appendix 1 3 which acknowledged my case was a Negligence case and not a Malpractice Case. The DCA denied my appeal for the Respondents Confuting with D.C.A. s ERR of dismissal of the first Appeal And in doing so, D.C.A. Court Invalidated Florida Statute 766.103 (2) that showed that this case was not a medical malpractice case. Florida Statute 766.103 (2) directed the Petitioner to Florida Statute 768.13 and under 768.13 (2) (b) (1) was a tort of Negligence case that showed the Petitioner had complied with Florida Statute chapter 766. which confuted the Lower Court Ruling on the dismissal of my case. D.C.A. Court fail to redress the issue of Florida Statute 766.103 (2) in the Appeal or Rehearing. (No Reason on Order). The Petitioner Alleges the D.C.A.Court pre Curiam Affirmed the Lower Ruling because they didn t want to redress the issue. In doing so they invalidated chapter 766.103 (2). The Petitioner has showed that the orders of the D.C.A. Court is void and the Lower court order as well and this court should Rule that the orders is to be voided as previously stated. The Respondent, Dr. Franz, didn t rebut the issue of Negligence in the Motion to Squash Under Negligence. The Respondent s, Jackson Hospital, order on June 12,2003 signed by the court should be Voided as well. The lower Court prejudged and Challenged the evidence. (iii) The Lower Court, ERR prejudged and Challenged the evidence as A jury for his favorite side, (The Respondents). This would call for a mistrial on prejudged & Challenged evidence.
The Petitioner Alleges that the evidence alone showing in the record would call for a mistrial. The Petitioner believes that the Supreme Court has the right to review this and remand it back to the D.C.A. Court to hear the issues. Respondents doesn t dispute the occurrence of the Complaint or the issue of something they done to the Petitioner. The lower Court in final order said The function of a motion for rehearing is to present something that the court overlook or fail to consider that renders the judgment erroneous. 12/03/03. (i) The Lower Court ERR is not Granting a Rehearing to Redress the issues of Chapter 766.103 (2) that showed the Petitioner had Complied with Chapter 766 Florida Statute. On Oct 30.2003 the lower Court rendered a Final Judgment Alleging that the Petitioner fail to comply with Chapter 766, Florida Statute. The Petitioner Alleges that he had complied with Chapter 766.103 (2). That referred to Florida Statute 768.13 (2) (b) (1) Respondents weren t immune from civil liability for the failure to prevent injury of a preventable injury by not providing medical care which showed a reckless disregard for my life. Which referred to Florida Statute 3951041 where the Rehearing was filed. If this wasn t the case Respondents would have rebutted the issues in the brief instead of confuting with Appendix 1-3 with dismissal of the first Appeal. To the Petitioner this is Acknowledging that the Petitioner was right by the interpretation of Chapter 766.103 (2) Florida Statute. The Respondents Altered a copy of the transcript of procedures of the hearing May 20,2003 in Appendix 4 so that it would confuse the record of the Court where the Court prejudged and challenged the evidence (R-72. The Petitioner rebutted the notice of intent ( R-77. The Petitioner ask this court to correct the final judgments under rule 9.110(k), Paragraph 14, also Mendez v. West Flagler Family Association,
The Petitioner ask this court to accept my appeal and redress the issue of Florida Statute 766.103 (2) and give me the opportunity to argue the issue present. A CONCLUSION This Court should reverse the error of DCA Court for invalidating the Fla. Statute 766.103 (2) that showed the Petitioner had complied with chapter 766 Florida Statute. The Respondents has acknowledged this case as being a Negligence case when they Confuted in their Appendix 1-3. to DCA Court. Florida Statute 766.103 (2) refers you to Florida Statute 768.13 (A tort of Negligence ) and 768.13 (2) (b) (1) refers you to Fla.395.1041 that shows this case is a Negligence case. Petitioner was not given Medical care to prevent injury and the Petitioner is the Pro-se in this case.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing response has been furnished to George, Hartz, Lundeed, Fulmer, Johnstone, King & Stevens, P.O. Box 14500, Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4500 and Hill, Adams Hall & Schieffelin P.A., P.O. Box 1090, Winter Park,Florida 32790-1090 by Certified U.S. Mail this_24 th_day of Nov. 2004 attention Britt Thomas Heidi J. Livingston George.W Cannady 4785 Hwy. 71 N. Greenwood Florida 32443 (850) 5947741 Pro-se
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA 500 SOUTH DUVAL STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399 CASE NO.: SC04-2104 DCA CASE NO. 1DO3-5465 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I THE PETITIONER, BY HEREBY CERTIFYTHAT THE ORIGINAL AND SEVEN COPIES OF THIS FOREGOING INITIAL BRIEF CONTAINING LESS THAN 50 PAGES OR LESS IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH FL. RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.210 IN THE CASE OF GEORGE W. CANNADY, PETITIONER v. KARL S. FRANZ M.D. AND JACKSON HOSPITAL RESPONDENTS AND HAS BEEN FURNISHED TO SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA, 500 SOUTH DUVAL STREET, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399, IN AND FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA. HEA DING 1 TIMES NEW ROMAN 14 LINE SPACING 1.5 GEORGE W. CANNADY 4785 HWY 71 NORTH GREENWOOD FLORIDA (850) 594-7741 32443 PRO -SE