Chairman of the European Union Military Committee Panel Discussion at the European Security Seminar-South (ESS-S) Managing the Dissolution of Order in the Southern Flank: Strategic Responses? George Marshall Centre, 12 May 2016 Part III (b): Opportunities and Limits of Regional and International Intervention Panel Subject: Instruments of Stabilization Dear Ralf, Thank you very much for your kind introduction and for giving me the opportunity to address this highly recognized and very demanding audience. Europe finds itself surrounded by a "ring of fire". Especially in its southern neighbourhood, where flux and instability have become almost the norm. What we are witnessing is the dissolution of order and a clear threat of moving from "failed states" to "failed regions". Europe has to shape a strategic response to this threat. In this context, events like the present one, where frank exchange of views among experts is taking place only serve this goal and contribute to the shaping of a spherical view and a clear understanding of the subjects discussed. They also enable well informed positions and decisions in the Institutions we represent here. The strategic importance the countries of the Middle East and North Africa have for the European Union has been recognized, early on. First attempts to institutionalise the relationship between the Union and specific countries of interest can be traced back in 1992, to the creation of the Euro-Maghreb Partnership. The proclaimed intention of this partnership was to promote stability and prosperity. The tools that were to be used were the tree "M"s, standing for Money, Mobility and Markets. This Partnership gradually evolved and was integrated into the European Neighbourhood Policy of 2004. Here again, the European
-2- Union's stated objectives were "to support and foster stability and prosperity", with the inclusion this time of security as well. The same tools as before were envisaged, despite the addition of "Security" as an objective. What we witness again in this case, is the European Union applying its "Soft" power to promote its interests. The financial support offered, the trade agreements, the arrangements for easier travel, they were all regarded as an incentive for these countries that would lure them into self-transformation and reformation in a way that would mirror European countries. This would be in the sense of respect to European principles and values and adherence to rules-based governance. The "more for more" rule governed the bilateral relationships with the subject countries. It goes beyond saying that the European Union's carries a great deal of "soft" power. Its combined diplomatic, economic and cultural capital exceeds the sum of the respective capitals of the 28 Member- States. At the same time, the prevailing geopolitical outlook in that period favoured the resort to the use of political, financial or even cultural instruments in the international relationships. So, in retrospect, the Union used its comparative advantage to promote its strategic interests, allocating huge amounts of money to support its strategy. The problem is that this strategy was based on an assumption that proved to be problematic. Stability is a prerequisite, for any development instrument to be effectively applied, as it provides the fertile ground for development to flourish. Stability in these countries was taken as a given, even though it was profoundly challenged in certain cases. In the past twelve years, there have been radical changes in the MENA region. Conflict, rising extremism and terrorism, human rights violations, uprisings and revolutions, they all have altered the geostrategic landscape of reference. Protracted conflicts and their osmosis to neighbouring areas through porous borders continue to hamper development in the region. Security reminded us of its importance and its "sine-qua-non" substance, through its sudden collapse. Nevertheless, European Union's way of engaging with the region remained unchanged. The emergence of the security issue highlighted the usefulness of a rather neglected and underused instrument of foreign policy: the Military. The fourth "M" that was missing. The "Hard" power. The structural element of "Smart" power, without which, this power is doomed to be less effective than its potential suggests. "Hard" power
-3- may not provide development effects "per se" but I argue that it functions as a "multiplier" or a "denominator" of sorts. When it is applied, it sets favourable conditions for the other instruments to deliver on their respective objectives. The higher the prevailing security feeling is, the more the output gets. On the contrary, when the security feeling diminishes the effectiveness of the development efforts, the expected results become wishful thinking. The Comprehensive Approach, European Union's flagship or trademark is the joined-up deployment of all the policies, tools and instruments at its disposal, spanning the diplomatic, security, defence, financial, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid fields. These instruments can be summarised with three "D"s: Diplomacy, Development and Defence. Defence here should be regarded not with its traditional definition, the "resistance against danger, attack, or harm", but in a broader concept. The European Union is not a collective defence organization, neither does it wish to be one. Our concept is different. It is the concept of "forward defence" by Capacity Building. Why "forward"? I will come to this later. What we are trying to achieve is to build the local capacity to produce security and through that, stability. The enabling of local security Institutions to assume the ownership of their respective Nation's security is of paramount importance. It will forge relationships and cooperation. It will build self-confidence and trust. Potentially, it will allow investments to come. And, equally important, it will remove any faint suspicion of recolonization policies that may arise, bringing to surface old fears and triggering reflexes. Our aim is to support these countries in their effort to be transformed from security consumers to security providers, at least to their citizens. Succeeding in that, it will also promote the European interests and the European security. To determine the perfect mix of the instruments Europe has in its Comprehensive Approach is quite the challenge. To paraphrase Leo Tolstoy, "Every fragile or failed country is fragile or failed in its own way." There is no textbook answer, no "one size fits all" answer to that. Every country that reaches out to Europe for assistance and I will come back to this as it is very important; every country presents a unique situation. Some of the challenges different countries, neighbouring countries face may seem identical. But it would be fundamentally wrong to assume that the appliance of a program, proven successful elsewhere, would provide the same results again. Going back to the notion of "reaching out", I consider this to be very important. This is because,
-4- First of all, it displays sovereignty and thus, the ownership of the agreed program, Second, it demonstrates its decision to apply reforms and address shortcomings in order to improve its resilience and Third, it entails commitment from its side to constructively and genuinely cooperate towards reaching the mutually agreed objectives. What is of utter importance is the wise and calculated use of every tool or instrument in the Union's disposal, in an inclusive, coherent, thoroughly planned and well-orchestrated way, with no exemptions or aphorisms. I would argue that the European Union should exploit more its Hybrid character. The unique characteristic it incorporates and makes Europe such a complete international actor. Political, economic, diplomatic character predominantly, but defencerelated as well. A hybrid character that makes us well-positioned to counter contemporary hybrid threats. And yet, the military is an instrument that has been modestly used until now. Today, we run six military Operations and Missions in the South of the European Union, one of them close to our borders (EUNAVFORMED Sophia), others not that close (EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM Somalia). They all have proven to be successful. These are low visibility, small footprint Operations and Missions but the impact of the results they produce is far reaching. It exceeds the narrow limits of the military scope and is diffused throughout the local societies. Most Europeans do not know that we operate in three African countries, Somalia, Mali and the Central African Republic as well as in the Indian Ocean. They have subconsciously linked the military with explosions and destruction in the news. We do not do explosions and fighting and we do not make it in the news. Which is a good thing considering! And yet, we are there, in these distant countries. Because by operating or training people some thousands kilometres away of Europe, we are "extending" our borderline, expanding our "Safe and Secure area". This is our "forward defense". We try with the use of "Soft" power and security, to create favourable conditions for the local population to stay home. We do not provide a "Safe and Secure Environment" per se. We train people to provide that to themselves and their countries. We therefore create a new, far-away from us, borderline, which we "defend" not with walls and fences and bunkers, but by building security and prosperity through training and development. By restoring hope.
-5- In the past we failed to do so. We left the pain, the poverty, the despair and all the war-related problems to reach our physical borders in Southern Europe and we discovered that we had been overtaken by the facts and overwhelmed by the situation. And then we tried, as we do today, to find solutions by using, to an extent, warships, fences and army patrols. Too little, too late. The contemporary challenges we face in our southern neighbourhood call for a response that incorporates a larger military element than before. This is a reality that we cannot ignore any longer. The debate now should be about the shape this military element should take, in order to be relevant. In my opinion, the European Union has accumulated vast experience in Capacity Building Operations and Missions. This experience should guide our approach to any possible future engagement with countries in our close vicinity. In Libya, for instance, there could be a role for the military, in helping the local security and law-enforcement institutions build their own capacities. Responding to a formal request from the internationally recognised Libyan Government, such a development would also serve European Union's best interests as it would have a huge impact in combating smugglers and human traffickers and in controlling the flows of migrants from the Libyan coasts. Other forms of applying the military instrument to foster stability in fragile States may also include the change of the prevailing mind-set and rooted behaviours of our local colleagues. Education and training on the organization, leadership, military conduct, the rule of law, gender equality together with the limits to acceptable wartime conduct ("Jus in bello") may be used to alter the behaviour of the governmental forces and thus their image towards the society, building trust and removing fear. We try to change the ethics and tradition of their warfighting. And in the short term, this probably will not happen. But they will have no excuse for any future behaviour against the International law. However, patience, persistence and commitment are required in order to impose the necessary reforms. And reforms in this fast developing world are necessary for any organization which intends to survive. We believe that in doing so, we serve the European Union interests, one of which is to promote and defend our principles and values.
-6- Deeper coordination with the civilian Missions, ongoing or future, has also to be sought. Currently, seven such Missions are deployed in our southern neighbourhood. As we are all aware, politics is very complex. And politics among 28 Member-States is a quite challenging task. Consensus achievement on any major issue demands the devotion of considerable time and effort. This is also true when the issue in question is of military nature. 28 Member States, they all bring to the table their own sensitivities and reservations. It is obvious that this reality does not help for quick decision-making and timely responses to crises. And this only pays tribute to another characteristic of the military instrument: its ability to be flexible and adaptable to the changing conditions on the ground. The military instrument can provide an added value in this endeavour. Caution has to be used in its appliance: the military is never the ultimate solution to political problems. A clear mandate with unequivocal political objectives has always to be issued by the political leadership. After all we always have in mind, thank you Carl von Clausewitz, that our Operations and Missions are launched in order to achieve political objectives. Allow me to wrap up: Comprehensive Approach is our trademark. It is "Smart" power and includes "Soft" power and "Hard" power - us. We are very proud of it Our forward defense by Capacity Building is based on our "forward borderline" concept, which includes the expansion of a Safe and Secure Environment thousands of miles away from our physical borders. To the European Union, southern borders are in the Sahel region. European Union's actions and toolbox are of hybrid character and this makes the Union the most capable Institution to counter hybrid threats. Our usefulness and importance is based on that. We will keep working on this in the near future. Thank you. Edited by: Captain (Hellenic Navy) Vasileios Loukovitis