FHSMUN 39 GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIFTH COMMITTEE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF PEACEKEEPING IN ALL ITS ASPECTS

FHSMUN 39 GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIFTH COMMITTEE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF PEACEKEEPING IN ALL ITS ASPECTS Authors: Brian D. Sutliff & Casey Morell The broad and complex mandates of today s multidimensional peace operations reflect the varied civilian, military and police capabilities required to provide support to political transitions and assisting in the development of political structures, helping to restore State authority and promote public security, strengthening rule of law institutions and supporting judicial and legal system reform, ensuring humanitarian assistance, protecting reform and the holding of elections, and putting in place the beginnings of economic recovery. 1 Introduction The United Nations (UN) System was created to prevent war as well as to assist societies torn apart by violent conflict in their rebuilding efforts. This most high-profile role for the UN System is complicated by the fact that UN commands no military forces of its own but must instead depend on its member states to supply for peacekeeping, and at times peace enforcement, missions. The demands for peacekeeping missions and troops have increased greatly in the 70+ year life span of the UN System; at the end of 2017, approximately 100,231 peacekeeping personnel were deployed across 16 missions. 2 While there have been important successes, as well as several high-profile controversies, casualties on peacekeeping missions have risen to nearly 3,700 total killed over the past 70 years and the UN System must do all in its power to reduce both peacekeeping and civilian casualties As the international community confronts both old and new peacekeeping challenges, the UN and its partners, including national governments and regional organizations, must correct learn from and, whenever possible correct, previous mistakes, build upon past successes, and embrace new roles. As the UN System and its international partners seek to improve the logistical and operational aspects of peacekeeping operations, they must ensure that special attention is focused on several key elements: the cumbersome and time-consuming process of authorizing missions; establishing, and revising when needed, appropriate mandates; appealing for funding, personnel and equipment; and deploying personnel and equipment in the field. Peacekeeping requires 1 Ban Ki-moon, Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/627, December 28, 2007, p. 19 2 United Nations Peacekeeping, Monthly Summary of Military and Police Contributions to United Nations Operations, December 31, 2017. Found at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/msr_31_dec_2017_0.pdf 1 P age

constant attention and flexibility on behalf of the UN System, including the Secretary-General, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and the Security Council, as mandates must be revised, including in some instances to peace enforcement missions. The UN System must also devise a more effective system for working with regional organizations engaged in peacekeeping as this hybridization of missions will likely continue. The UN System must also incorporate effective engendering of peacekeeping missions while simultaneously protecting UN personnel and civilians from misconduct by peacekeepers, including sexual violence and exploitation. Peacekeeping, then and now UN peacekeeping missions were originally envisioned as being temporary, interpositional missions with (mostly) unarmed and/or lightly armed observers patrolling safe areas between parties that had ceased fighting and had agreed to the peacekeepers presence. During the Cold War (1945-1991), relatively few UN peacekeeping operations were authorized but after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the Security Council authorized a comparatively greater number of missions, often with larger personnel complements. Originally, the UN s founding fathers envisioned some kind of international army, but all proposals for a standing UN have foundered partly because of political objections to giving the UN too much power, partly because of the political difficulties of recruiting, training and paying for such a force. 3 Realizing that a permanent UN military force was unlikely to be approved by the Permanent Members of the Security Council, the UN eventually devised the current system of authorizing peacekeeping missions and then requesting that countries volunteer their forces. The Economist argues that this system has created a two-tier structure: powerful countries decide the missions (and pay for them) while poor countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Jordan supply the soldiers. 4 As of the end of 2017, the five largest contributing countries (Ethiopia; Bangladesh; India; Rwanda; and Pakistan) accounted for over 28% of all peacekeeping forces deployed while the Permanent Members (P-5) of the Security Council contributed just over 4% of all military and police peacekeeping personnel, and with the People s Republic of China accounting for 62% of that total. 5 In 2006, then Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno noted that it was time to acknowledge that peacekeeping was not an exceptional emergency measure, but a flagship of the United Nations Organization, and that it required a sustained and comprehensive approach. 6 Then Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon echoed the calls of his predecessors as well as millions of people around the world for greater peacekeeping participation by highly developed, wealthy countries, including the United States and its NATO 3 The Economist, Call the blue helmets, January 4, 2007. 4 The Economist, Call the blue helmets, January 4, 2007 5 United Nations Peacekeeping, Monthly Summary of Military and Police Contributions to United Nations Operations, December 31, 2017. Found at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/msr_31_dec_2017_0.pdf 6 A/60/19, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group at the 2006 substantive session, March 22, 2006, p. 4. 2 P age

allies. European countries contributed 7,000 soldiers to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) following the 2006 was between Israel and Hezbollah 7 and there are at least 14,000 NATO personnel still deployed in Afghanistan today. While these contributions have certainly been noted, and at times praised, the General Assembly Fifth Committee must recognize that developing countries contribute the clear majority of peacekeeping personnel and that distributing these responsibilities more equitably is critical for increasing sustained political support for these missions. Operational effectiveness may also be increased; better-financed militaries typically provide better equipment for their soldiers and police personnel, including more sophisticated communications technologies and vehicles. As UN peacekeeping has become institutionalized, the need for more effective procurement and mobilization systems has become increasingly apparent. Peacekeeping missions were originally envisioned to last for relatively short periods of time, but many peacekeeping missions have lasted for many more years than originally planned. The peacekeeping mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP) will enter its 55 th year of operation in March 2018. The duration of peacekeeping missions is not the only consideration for the UN System; mandates are becoming increasingly assertive as well. Then Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted in 2006 that the expansion of peacekeeping mandates has made it more important than ever to clearly define and articulate what peacekeeping can do, and equally important, what it cannot do. 8 In 2006, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations stressed the need to ensure, in the formation and implementation of mandates, adequate resources, congruity between mandates, resources and realizable objectives. Furthermore, when changes are made to an existing mandate, commensurate changes should be made to the resources available to a peacekeeping mission to carry out its new mandate. 9 The peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) 10 s mandate was made more robust, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in response to increased violence in the eastern provinces of the country, including the targeted killing of UN peacekeepers. 11 Providing peacekeeping soldiers with more assertive mandates may improve their operational effectiveness but the local people may see view these mandates as compromising the peacekeepers impartiality. And in the most tragic irony of all, peacekeepers may accidentally end up endangering, harming and/or killing the very civilians they are charged with protecting. As UN member states demand more of the organization overall, they are also demanding more from peacekeeping missions. Since 1991, peacekeeping operations have had the task of assisting national authorities in establishing new policing institutions or in building the capacity 7 Ban Ki-moon, Overview: Excerpts from the Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, A/62/1, September 2007, Paragraph 54. 8 Kofi Annan, Peace operations 2010 reform strategy: excerpts from the Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/696, February 24, 2006, Paragraph 11. 9 A/60/19, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group at the 2006 substantive session, March 22, 2006, p. 9. 10 MONUC transitioned to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) on July 1, 2010. 11 Patrick Jackson, When the gloves of peace come off, BBC News, April 18, 2007. 3 P age

and integrity of existing structures in 25 countries. 12 There were approximately 13,000 police personnel from 90 different countries deployed as of June 2016 and 129 different countries contributed police personnel to UN peacekeeping missions between 1990 and 2015. 13 These police personnel are frequently charged with (re)training and reconstituting policy forces as well as improving the training of corrections officers in various host countries. In addition to this increased emphasis on assisting in the reconstitution of police and correctional staff, civilian peacekeeping staff is increasingly involved in post-conflict planning and administration of conflict and post-conflict situations, such as in Namibia and Kosovo. The UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) mission in Namibia from April 1989 through March 1990 is often considered one of the most important successes in UN history; delegates to the General Assembly Fifth Committee may wish to reexamine this particular peacekeeping mission for ideas on how to enhance the likelihood of successes in current and future missions. 14 Improving protection of UN peacekeepers and related staff is an essential component of any comprehensive review of peacekeeping operations. Since 1948, 3,692 peacekeepers have died/been killed while deployed and in 2017 133 peacekeepers died. 15 Protecting peacekeepers and related staff is fundamental to the success of any peacekeeping mission. In 1994, after 10 Belgian peacekeepers were murdered at the very beginning of the Rwandan genocide, the Belgian government removed all its remaining peacekeeping forces, dramatically reducing the size and effectiveness of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) at the exact moment when these peacekeepers were needed most. The need for reform? The process for authorizing peacekeeping missions is straightforward: the Security Council authorizes a peacekeeping mission, typically for 6 months to one year at a time, with a projected maximum number of soldiers, police and related personnel and a mandate for what the peacekeepers expected to achieve. Crucial difficulties often emerge in financing and then deploying these peacekeeping missions; in fact, the first UN peacekeepers typically do not arrive for at least 6 months after the mission has been authorized. The approved peacekeeping budget for the fiscal year July 1, 2017 through June 30, 2018 is $6.8 billion USD, representing a 7.5% decrease from the previous fiscal year and amounting to less than one half of one percent of global military spending. 16 The United States contributes over 28 percent of the peacekeeping budget, followed by China and Japan at approximately 10 percent each, and Germany, France and the United Kingdom each contributing approximately 6 12 Ban Ki-moon, Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform: Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/659-S/2008/39, January 23, 2008, p. 8. 13 United Nations Peacekeeping, UN Police, 2016. Found at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/un-police 14 Please see: http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untag.htm 15 United Nations Peacekeeping, Fatalities, 2018. Found at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities 16 United Nations Peacekeeping, How We Are Funded, 2018. Found at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-weare-funded 4 P age

percent for fiscal year 2017-2018. 17 UN regulations mandate that the Permanent Members (P-5) of the Security Council contribute larger shares towards the peacekeeping budget due to their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, but other member states contributions are determined by the General Assembly, particularly the General Assembly Fifth Committee, which takes into account a variety of factors when assessing peacekeeping dues. 18 Even though the entire costs for all UN peacekeeping missions represent a tiny fraction of global military spending, many member states delay sending their peacekeeping contributions for months, and in some cases years, thereby hamstringing the UN at crucial junctures. Despite repeated requests for prompt payments of peacekeeping dues, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations estimated that as of December 31, 2013, approximately $2.2 billion in peacekeeping dues were still owed; unfortunately, recent trends do not indicate that UN member states are, as a whole, improving the timeliness of their payments. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations notes that the UN System has reduced the cost per peacekeeper deployed by 17% since 2008 19. While these savings are likely to be welcome news to member states, national governments must bear in mind that demanding impressive and timely results on shoestring budgets may result in serious problems now and in the future. Staffing peacekeeping missions also often involves logistical nightmares. While there are six official languages for the UN System, English and French are the working languages of the UN, particularly in field offices and operations. Ensuring that all peacekeeping staff can communicate effectively with each other is not always easily accomplished, given that the UN must depend on member states volunteering their personnel. Furthermore, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations urged then Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to ensure a fair representation of troop-contributing countries when selecting personnel for such staff positions. At the same time, troop-contributing countries need to ensure that prospective staff have the required professional background and experience. 20 Troop-contributing countries need to further ensure that proposed staff members for peacekeeping missions have not previously committed serious crimes and/or human rights violations. In the wake of horrific Nepalese peacekeepers transmission of cholera in Haiti and the subsequent, preventable, 10,000 deaths and hundreds of thousands of people who suffered severe illness, the UN System must address these additional concerns. Ultimately, though, while the UN System strives to improve its operational capacities to evaluate employees and related staff, it will continue to depend on its member states to recommend appropriate staff. In 2009, the UN formed the New Horizon Initiative with the hope of developing the future of peacekeeping operations. Noting the aforementioned issues concerning the overreliance on the developing world to provide staff and materiel for these missions, the New 17 United Nations Peacekeeping, How We Are Funded, 2018. Found at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-weare-funded 18 Role of the General Assembly, https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/rolega.shtml 19 UN Peacekeeping, Home, 2018. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en 20 Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, A/62/627, December 28, 2007, p. 30. 5 P age

Horizon Initiative sought to improve dialogue between UN member states and the UN Secretariat in the hopes of streamlining the process by which missions are developed and contributions are decided and delivered. New Horizon suggested reforms in peacekeepers strategies for protecting civilian populations, arguing that peacekeeping forces too often lack a universal system to ensure civilian safety when deployed. The New Horizon Initiative also suggested redefining the differences between peacekeeping, which often seeks to maintain and build upon a status quo situation in a particular area, and peacebuilding, which involves assisting in developing an area s and/or country s institutional capacities. Further aims included streamlined chains of command for field operations, greater planning and oversight been the UN, the area and/or country where peacekeeping operations take place, and increased transparency and accountability to reduce mistakes as well as to ensure institutional learning from mistakes. 21 The Responsibility to Protect In December 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released its long-awaited report, The Responsibility to Protect. Scholars and world leaders solemnly asserted that there were both theoretical and practical limits to state sovereignty and that crimes against humanity, including genocide, could never be justified by reasons of state. The Commission articulated its essential position in the core principles at the beginning of their report; indeed, the very first principle neatly summarizes the collective wisdom distilled in the Commission s report: state sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for protection of its people lies with the state itself. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. 22 Gareth Evans, one of the co-chairs of the ICISS, has sought to clear up what he considers to be significant misconceptions about the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), noting specifically that the real innovation of R2P is its emphasis on prevention of conflict and that R2P is not just another name for humanitarian intervention. 23 The Commission s Report critically distilled the concept that state sovereignty is in fact earned as a result of the state meeting its responsibilities to protect and meet the needs of its own population. 24 If humanity could ascend to Heaven based strictly upon the angelic nature of rhetoric, the Commission s report would be a true godsend. The stark truth is, however, that actions do speak far louder than words; during the worst atrocities in recent memory, the P-5 countries have been far too silent. With the recent and/or ongoing humanitarian and security crises in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Libya, Mali, and Syria, the justifications for, and the substance of, 21 The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. 2, December 2011. Found at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon_update02.pdf 22 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect December 2001 p. 13. The report may be found in its entirety at: http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/commission-report.pdf 23 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come and Gone?, International Relations, No. 22, 2008, p. 290. 24 Frank Chalk, Roméo Dallaire, Kyle Matthews, Carla Barquiero, & Simon Doyle, Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership to Prevent Mass Atrocities, McGill-Queen s University Press, Montreal, 2010, p. 5. 6 P age

R2P are confronting serious challenges. Jennifer Welsh notes that although the humanitarian rationale for the use of force has developed rapidly and gained legitimacy, the consensus around this legitimacy particularly through the rationale s modern incretion, the principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P) has remained both fragile and narrow. 25 Welsh further emphasizes that the ICISS drew important distinctions between the broad principle of R2P and the narrower and contested practice of humanitarian intervention, with R2P encompassing a much broader range of responsibilities and options than humanitarian intervention. While the generalized principles of R2P have gained at least limited acceptance, one of the most vexing questions is when exactly does the international community assume the responsibility to protect civilian populations in states and/or regions that are manifestly unable and/or unwilling to do so? Responsibility While Protecting The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has frequently been criticized by a variety of developing countries as well as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) for legitimizing military interventions by Western, particularly NATO, countries such as France, the UK, and the US. Considerable anger and mistrust arose after what many countries saw as NATO s exceeding of Security Council resolution 1973 s mandate in the spring of 2011. Resolution 1973 s (S/RES/1973) emphasis was to protect Libyan civilians in the wake of targeting of civilians in the city of Benghazi by the Libyan government. Quickly, though, a number of countries, including the 4 initial BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, all of whom held seats on the Security Council at the time, concluded that NATO countries, particularly France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, were more focused on regime change and the removal of long-term dictator Muammar al-gaddafi than on the protection of Libyan civilians. Brazil in particular called for requiring more explicit Security Council authorization regarding the use of force in situations of humanitarian crisis. Developing a rapid response capacity One of the most enduring and disturbing criticisms of UN peacekeeping missions is that in grave humanitarian crises, peacekeepers only arrive in the crisis zones after large numbers of civilians have been killed. In the worst instance, the Rwandan genocide of 1994, UNAMIR s initial peacekeeping force of 2,500 was quickly pared down to 300 within 6 weeks, at the same time that 300,000 Rwandan civilians were slaughtered. Providing the UN with a rapid response capability, particularly including vehicles and communications technologies, as well as a more robust mandate allowing peacekeepers to protect Rwandan civilians might have saved several hundred thousand Rwandans. General Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian force commander of UNAMIR during the months leading up and during the genocide, noted that rapid response capabilities as well as vastly improved logistical capacities are necessary for effective crisis response. When writing about the troop-contributing countries for UNAMIR 2, Dallaire argues that despite the personal courage of the peacekeepers, the lack of logistical capabilities weakened the operational effectiveness and credibility of UNAMIR. None of the nations that eventually 25 Jennifer Welsh, The Responsibility to Protect: Dilemmas of a New Norm, Current History, Vol. 111, No. 748, November 2012, p. 2. 7 P age

stepped forward had the capacity for the massive reinforcement that might have brought the UN credibility in the eyes of the belligerents. 26 As the UN System explores options for improving its rapid response capabilities, it must seek to maintain and stockpile appropriate equipment as well as to improve cooperation with troop-contributing countries that are willing to send peacekeepers into hostile situations with relatively little advance notice. Working in close consultation with member states, the UN established the United Nations Standby Arrangements System, now known as the United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (UNPCRS), to improve its rapid response capability. Cooperating member states agree to train and maintain specific military, police, and support units and their related equipment, and to lend them to the UN for crisis response missions. These peacekeeping units and their equipment are available to the UN within 60 days after Security Council approval of a peacekeeping mission. The Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (UNPRCS) is expected to be fully operational in early 2018 and delegates to the General Assembly Fifth Committee (GA5) may wish to examine its early proceedings and work. Recruitment and retention of personnel The UN System remains concerned with the need to recruit and retain expert personnel to work in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The crucial knowledge that has been learned, analyzed and transmitted over the past 70 years needs to be institutionalized and implemented effectively. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has established a Peacekeeping Best Practices Section to retain and implement this accrued knowledge. This Best Practices Section is funded almost entirely through voluntary contributions from donor states; encouraging member states to begin, continue, and/or increase contributing to the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section would be a legitimate and vital goal of this session of the General Assembly Fifth Committee (GA5). Forging partnerships with regional organizations Then Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted that a central dilemma facing the Integrated Training Service is the problem of scale: it cannot provide training for the more than 100,000 personnel in the field. Thus, the Service collaborates closely with Member States and other partners who also engage in United Nations peacekeeping training. 27 Ban continued, stating that enhancing strategic partnerships with multilateral and regional organizations has become a high priority for the burden-sharing of peacekeeping. 28 Hybridization of peacekeeping missions in the Darfur region of Western Sudan through the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and with the European Union (EU) in the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) called for intensive collaboration and 26 Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Random House Canada, Toronto, 2003, p. 375. 27 Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, A/62/627, December 28, 2007, p. 12. 28 Ban Ki-moon, A/62/1, September 2007, Paragraph 60. 8 P age

would prove especially challenging, according to then Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno. 29 The need for creating hybrid peacekeeping missions has become clearer the longer that humanitarian crises, such as the previous situation in Darfur, last. The African Union (AU) authorized a peacekeeping mission of almost entirely unarmed observers in 2005 and relied almost exclusively on Nigeria and Rwanda to supply the 7,000 AU peacekeepers deployed in a region the size of France. Om July 31, 2007, the UN Security Council authorized the creation of a hybrid force of up to 26,000 AU and UN peacekeepers but by early 2008, only 9,000 peacekeepers had been deployed in Darfur. 30 The hybrid mission (UNAMID) was authorized, at least partly, because of continuing attacks on the AU peacekeepers by the Sudanese government, its proxy, the Janjaweed militia, and several of the estimated 13 different rebel groups then operating in Darfur. At the end of September 207, 10 Nigerian peacekeeping soldiers were killed in another large-scale attack and at least 40 more were wounded. 31 China, Sudan s most important customer and ally on the Security Council, sent 135 peacekeepers to assist this mission, although not officially in any frontline capacities. 32 Ultimately, with major refugee exoduses into Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) and continuing cross-border raids, armed conflict, and proxy warfare, in addition to the logistical and financial hurdles that the African Union (AU) confronted in Darfur and Somalia, the Security Council sought out additional partners for MINURCAT. Given France s alliance with then Chadian President Idriss Deby as well as its continued involvement in both the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad, the humanitarian intent and neutrality of the EU force was frequently queried. 33 Obtaining the financial, logistical, and operational advantages of 3,700 well-equipped EU peacekeepers was vital for the UN in 2007-08 but the long-term costs of potentially compromising the impartiality of peacekeeping missions may be incalculable. Engendering peacekeeping Engendering the UN means engendering peacekeeping. Then Secretary-General Ban Kimoon asserted that women peacekeepers also serve as role models and catalysts to increase the participation of local women in post-conflict processes. Moreover, the increased participation of senior women peacekeepers strengthens the credibility of the United Nations to more effectively advocate for democratic and inclusive governance in post-conflict countries, by serving as a standard-setter, including through the composition of its own personnel. 34 The pace of engendering peacekeeping missions remains rather slow, unfortunately; as of December 31, 29 Department of Public Information (DPI), Momentous Year for United Nations Peacekeeping as it Mounts Two Unique Operations in Africa, Sustains 18 More, Restructures Department, Fourth Committee Told, GA/SPD/382, October 31, 2007, p. 2. 30 BBC News, Peacekeepers attacked in Darfur, January 8, 2008. 31 The Economist, The worsening violence in Darfur, October 10, 2007. 32 Michael Bristow, China s dilemma over Darfur, BBC News, February 13, 2008. 33 The Economist, A peacekeeping puzzle for Europe, December 13, 2007. 34 Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, A/62/627, December 28, 2007, p. 10. 9 P age

2017, just under 5% of all military and police personnel were women, with less than 4% of military personnel and approximately 10% of police personnel comprised of women. 35 The Security Council has taken steps to make peacekeeping more welcoming to women. Resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 and 1889 (both 2009), and 1960 (2010) specifically addressed the integration of women into discussions of peace and security. Security Council resolution 1889 (S/RES/1889) urges the UN System to include more women in leadership positions in peacekeeping operations as amongst support staff, while resolutions 1820 (S/RES/1820) and 1888 (S/RES/1888) mandate that peacekeepers protect civilians from sexual assault and violence, and request that a special representative be appointed to focus on what peacekeeping forces can and should do to assist victims of sexual violence. These and related resolutions also strongly encourage the Secretary-General and those managing and/or directing peacekeeping operations to include relevant statistical data concerning rape and sexual assault against both the civilians ostensibly being protected and against UN staffers. 36 Preventing and punishing misconduct by UN peacekeepers The UN s reputation is always damaged when personnel either directly employed by the organization or associated with it are accused of corruption, human rights violations, and/or sexual abuse and exploitation. In November 2006, then Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jane Holl Lute acknowledged to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) that exploitation of vulnerable populations had been a problem since the inception of peacekeeping. 37 After high-profile incidents in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Haiti, and Liberia, the UN has strengthened its internal systems for reviewing allegations, established stronger rules against fraternization by peacekeepers with local populations, and established systems to provide counseling and assistance to the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers and related personnel. In December 2006, many UN entities endorsed the Statement of Commitment on Eliminating Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by the United Nations and non-united Nations Personnel, which designates 10 priority actions for the UN System, including background checks preventing the rehiring and/or redeployment of peacekeepers who have committed acts of sexual exploitation or abuse. 38 The code of conduct for peacekeepers was introduced in 1998 and the UN System is requesting that each Troop Contributing Country (TCC) submit a legal framework for deployed contingents to date 42 countries have submitted these legal frameworks. 39 35 UN Peacekeeping, Summary of Troop Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations by Mission, Post and Gender, December 31, 2017. Found at: http://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/summary_of_troop_contributions_to_un_peacekeeping_operations_by _mission_post_and_gender.pdf 36 Women, peace and security, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/wps.shtml 37 BBC, Press Release: Evidence of sexual abuse by peacekeepers uncovered, November 30, 2006. 38 Statement of Commitment on Eliminating Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations and non-united Nations Personnel, December 4, 2006. 39 UN Peacekeeping, Standards of Conduct, 2018. Found at: http://peacekeeping.un.org/en/standards-of-conduct 10 P age

Allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse have fallen since their high of 127 in 2007, with 103 reported in 2013, with 47% of these allegations concerning incidents before 2015. 40 While these declines in claims of exploitation and abuse may be the result of improved behavior, any allegation of these types of abuses create serious concerns for peacekeeping operations around the world. The UN System notes that its current strategy of mitigating these allegations consists of widespread, mandatory training initiatives to teach peacekeepers and their support staff about cultural norms, issues of sexual assault and battery, local and international law, and local campaigns to encourage civilians to report these crimes, as well as requiring UN staff to remain in uniform when off-duty so that civilians may readily identify UN and related staff. The cholera outbreak in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti is another situation that must not be repeated. A class-action lawsuit filed against the UN in a US federal court alleged that peacekeepers knowingly dumped untreated wastewater from their base into a local water supply, causing the outbreak. In December 2016, after over 6 years of denials and legal wrangling, then Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon apologized to the Haitian people for the role that Nepalese peacekeepers played in transmitting cholera and pledged a total of $400 million for medical treatments as well as initiatives to prevent future cases of cholera. Unfortunately, donations from member states to this New Approach trust fund have been coming in very slowly; in March 2017, Ban s successor and current UN Secretary-General António Guterres reiterated the need to accelerate donor funding for these initiatives. 41 Integrated planning and anticipating future needs As the demand for peacekeeping remains high, and as the complexities and accompanying mandates increase, it becomes ever more incumbent on the UN System to plan effectively for each peacekeeping mission and to anticipate potential future needs. The UN System s emphasis on collaboration is exemplified by its contemporary approach to peacekeeping planning. The Security Council, General Assembly, Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), regional organizations, national governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and related civil society partners all collaborate in peacekeeping planning. The UN System also strives to incorporate relevant perspectives from international financial institutions (IFIs), including the World Bank Group and regional development banks, in peacekeeping planning as well as post-conflict transitions. Conclusion Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of peacekeeping missions is critical to the UN System and the international community s obligations to prevent and resolve conflicts as well as to protect civilians from harm. Reforming the UN s processes and procedures for recruiting and retaining qualified personnel, financing and equipping peacekeeping missions, improving the 40 Allegations for all categories of personnel per year, http://cdu.unlb.org/statistics/allegationsbycategorypersonnelsexualexploitationabuse/allegationsforallcategories ofpersonnelperyearsexualexploitationandabuse.aspx 41 Rick Gladstone, After Bringing Cholera to Haiti, U.N. Can t Raise Money to Fight It, New York Times, March 19, 2017. 11 P age

UN s rapid response capabilities, forging lasting partnerships with regional organizations, engendering peacekeeping, and preventing and punishing misconduct by peacekeepers and related personnel are all necessary elements of peacekeeping reform. Effective public relations and communications is a vital part of supporting operations, protecting the investment of the international community in peacekeeping and ensuring the safety and security of the United Nations personnel. 42 Guiding Questions: Does your country currently contribute to UN peacekeeping missions? Has your country done so in the past? If so, in what capacities? If not, why not? Does your government prefer and/or promote the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP), or a different approach? What actions has your government taken to implement either of the two specified doctrines, or alternate and/or hybrid approaches? Is your country affiliated with the United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (UNPCRS)? If not, why not? If not, is your country considering affiliating with the UNPCRS soon? How can the UN System more effectively engender peacekeeping missions and post-conflict transition planning? What additional steps does the UN System need to undertake to ensure that peacekeepers maintain their impartiality and do not commit abuses against civilian populations, including sexual exploitation and abuse? Resolutions: United Nations General Assembly resolution 72/266, (A/RES/72/266), Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations, December 24, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 72/260, (A/RES/72/260), Financing of the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti, December 24, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 72/259, (A/RES/72/259), Financing of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, December 24, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 72/199, (A/RES/72/199), Restructuring of the United Nations peace and security pillar, December 20, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 72/131, (A/RES/72/131), Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel, December 11, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 72/112, (A/RES/72/112), Criminal accountability of United Nations officials and experts on mission, December 7, 2017. 42 Ban Ki-moon, A/62/627, December 2007, p. 5. 12 P age

United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/314, (A/RES/71/314), Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, July 19, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/309, (A/RES/71/309), Financing of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, June 30, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/308, (A/RES/71/308), Financing of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, June 30, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/307, (A/RES/71/307), Financing of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, June 30, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/306, (A/RES/71/306), Financing of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, June 30, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/305, (A/RES/71/305), Financing of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, June 30, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/304, (A/RES/71/304), Financing of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, June 30, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/303, (A/RES/71/303), Financing of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, June 30, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/301, (A/RES/71/301), Financing of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, June 30, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/300, (A/RES/71/300), Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, June 30, 217. United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/299, (A/RES/71/299), Financing of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, June 30, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/298, (A/RES/71/298), Financing of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, June 30, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/297, (A/RES/71/297), Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, June 30, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/296, (A/RES/71/296), Triennial review of the rates and standards for reimbursement to Member States for contingent-owned equipment, June 30, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/295, (A/RES/71/295), Support account for peacekeeping operations, June 30, 2017. United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/294, (A/RES/71/294), Financing of the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, June 30, 2017. 13 P age

United Nations General assembly resolution 71/293, (A/RES/71/293), Financing of the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda, June 30, 2017. Peacekeeping Documents: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Summary of the Action Plan to Implement the Report on Improving Security of Peacekeepers, 2018. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations(DPKO), Improving Security of Peacekeepers, December 19, 2017. Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: The future of United Nations peace operations, A/70/357-S/20/682, September 2, 2015. United Nations, Report of the Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnerships and people, A/70/95-S/201/446, June 17, 2015. Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General: Partnering for peace: moving towards partnership peacekeeping, S/2015/229, April 1, 2015. United Nations, Performance Peacekeeping: Final Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in Peacekeeping, December 22, 2014. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), A New Partnership: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, July 2009. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Practices, 2008. United Nations Panel on Peace Operations, A55/305-S/2000/809, Report of the Panel of United Nations Operations, 2000. 14 P age

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