BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

E-Filed Document Jun 7 2017 13:01:12 2016-KA-01507-SCT Pages: 19 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI EVERETT MOORE APPELLANT V. NO. 2016-KA-01507-SCT STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT W. Daniel Hinchcliff, MS Bar No. 2470 INDIGENT APPEALS DIVISION OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER Post Office Box 3510 Jackson, Mississippi 39207-3510 Telephone: 601-576-4290 Fax: 601-576-4205 Email: dhinc@ospd.ms.gov Counsel for Everett Moore

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI EVERETT MOORE APPELLANT V. NO. 2016-KA-01507-SCT STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons have an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made in order that the justices of this court may evaluate possible disqualifications or recusal. 1. State of Mississippi 2. Everett Moore, Appellant 3. Honorable John W. Champion, District Attorney 4. Honorable Robert P. Chamberlin, Jr., Circuit Court Judge This the 7th day of June 2017. Respectfully Submitted, INDIGENT APPEALS DIVISION OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER /s/ W. Daniel Hinchcliff W. Daniel Hinchcliff, Appellant Counsel i

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS................................. i II. TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................. ii III. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES............................................... iii IV. STATEMENT OF ASSIGNMENT........................................... 1 V. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES............................................. 1 VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............................................. 1 VII. FACTS................................................................. 2 VIII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT......................................... 5 IX. ARGUMENT............................................................ 6 ISSUE NO. 1 : WHETHER THE TRIAL ERRED IN GIVING AN INSTRUCTION ON SECOND DEGREE MURDER OVER OBJECTION WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE?......................................... 6 ISSUE NO. 2 : WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE A CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE INSTRUCTION?.......................... 8 ISSUE NO. 3 : WHETHER THE COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN ALLOWING THE FORENSIC PATHOLOGIST TO TESTIFY TO AN EXPERT OPINION WHICH WAS NOT HIS OWN?.................................... 9 ISSUE NO. 4 : WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING HEARSAY EVIDENCE WHICH WAS EVIDENCE OF MOTIVE, INTENDED AS TRUTH OF THE MATTER, AND NOT NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THE POLICE INVESTIGATION?.............................................. 11 X. CONCLUSION......................................................... 13 XI. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE............................................. 14 ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES FEDERAL CASES Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed. 2d 177 (2004).......... 9, 11 Mississippi Gaming Commission v. Imperial Palace of Mississippi, Inc., 751 So. 2d 1025 (Miss. 1999)..................................................... 8 United States v. Olano, 113 Southern Ct. 1770,1776, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)................. 11 STATE CASES Armstead v. State, 196 So. 3d 913 (Miss. 2016)..................................... 11 Bailey v. State, 960 So. 2d 583 (Miss. App. 2007)................................... 13 Christian v. State, 207 So. 3d 1207 (Miss. 2016)..................................... 11 Grim v. State, 102 So. 3d 1073 (Miss. 2012)........................................ 10 Johnson v. State, 956 So. 2d 358 (Miss. App. 2007).................................. 12 Mallett v. State, 606 So.2d 1092 (Miss.1992)........................................ 6 McGowen v. State, 859 So. 2d 320 (Miss. 2003)..................................... 10 McInnis v. State, 61 So. 3d 872 (Miss. 2011)........................................ 9 Stringfellow v. State, 595 So. 2d 1320 (Miss. 1992)................................... 8 Young v. State, 891 So. 2d 813 (Miss. 2005)...................................... 6, 13 STATUTES Miss.Code Ann. 97-3-19 (Supp.1987)........................................... 6, 7 U. S. Const. Amend. VI; Miss. Const. Art. 3 26..................................... 9 iii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI EVERETT MOORE APPELLANT V. NO. 2016-KA-01507-SCT STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT STATEMENT OF THE ASSIGNMENT This cause is properly before this Court. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ISSUE NO. 1 : WHETHER THE TRIAL ERRED IN GIVING AN INSTRUCTION ON SECOND DEGREE MURDER OVER OBJECTION WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE? ISSUE NO. 2 : WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE A CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE INSTRUCTION? ISSUE NO. 3 : WHETHER THE COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN ALLOWING THE FORENSIC PATHOLOGIST TO TESTIFY TO AN EXPERT OPINION WHICH WAS NOT HIS OWN? ISSUE NO. 4 : WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING HEARSAY EVIDENCE WHICH WAS EVIDENCE OF MOTIVE, INTENDED AS TRUTH OF THE MATTER, AND NOT NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THE POLICE INVESTIGATION? STATEMENT OF THE CASE This appeal proceeds from the Circuit Court of DeSoto County, Mississippi, and a judgement of conviction for the crime of murder, second degree, against Everett Moore, following a jury trial commenced August 15, 2016, the honorable Robert P. Chamberlain, Circuit 1

Judge, presiding. Appellant Everett Moore was sentenced to a term of forty (40) years with ten (10) suspended on post-release supervision, and a fine of $3,043.00. Everett Moore is presently incarcerated in an institution under the supervision of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. FACTS Norris Junior Smith was shot dead while in the drivers seat of a white Nissan Altima while stopped at an intersection near the location of his new work place. Security videos for local businesses recorded some angles of the event. A white SUV pulled beside the Nissan and temporarily blocked it. Over a short period of time, some kind of interaction occurred between the occupants of the vehicles. Then the Nissan proceeded through the intersection, went down the road for a distance, before leaving the road and crashing into the side of a building. When bystanders got to the Nissan, they found a man shot dead in the drivers seat. Local security video showed a white SUV was present at the possible time of the shooting. Olive Branch policeman Walter Medford was dispatched to a commercial park where there was an accident with injuries. When he arrived, he found a man slumped in the seat of a white Nissan. Medford observed a bullet wound to the man s head. (T. 128-129). The incident involved both Olive Branch, and DeSoto County, and the Sheriff s office was notified. (T. 130). It was just after noon. As the area was a commercial park, surveillance video were available, and were collected. Each video was authenticated by a representative from each company. (T. 139-155). According to Roger Hutchins, an investigator with DeSoto S.O., the investigation into he videos showed a white Nissan Altima, with a driver. The vehicle came across an intersection toward the park, veered off the road and came to a stop in the side of a warehouse building. The occupant of the vehicle was identified as Morris Smith by his employee identification from Syncreon Industries.. 2

He had been shot. (T. 157-162). The Syncreon video showed Morris Smith parked in the parking lot, blocked by a white SUV. There appeared to be a conversation with another man. (T. 162-163). During the conversation, the other man leaned against the Nissan, where Hutchins later checked for prints. (T. 171). Glass from the broken window in the Nissan indicated where the driver had been shot. (T. 169, 174). Inside the car, a bullet fragment was recovered, and apparent blood. The driver had been shot in the head and chest. (T. 171). Hutchins contacted the wife of Norris Smith and was told the driver was Eric Moore. Without objection, he testified he was familiar with Moore, that there had been ongoing trouble. (T. 185-186). Investigator Hutchins had learned that Moore was accusing Norris Smith of having an affair with his wife. Moore and his wife had a white SUV. (T. 186-187). Moore was contacted and turned himself in. (T. 187-188). Moore made a statement, after being Mirandized, which was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. (T. 188-189). In his statement, Moore said that it was him that had been in the white SUV and that had blocked Smith s car. He confronted Smith over communication with his wife, and thought Smith was visiting her at work. She worked at Syncreon, where Smith had just become employed. But then he left. A juror complained that he could not understand much of the tape. (T. 196-197). Investigator Hutchins agreed the tape was difficult to understand at times. (T. 200). A spent.9mm shell was admitted that had been collected from the scene, along with the partial projectile from Smith s car and the projectile recovered from Smith s head wound. The evidence was not connected. (T. 206-209). A search of the white SUV driven by Moore revealed only that it was clean, and 3

contained some cleaning materials. (T. 211). A sponge was not tested for gunshot residue. (T. 225). Norris Smith had been seeing various women. Moore, during his interview, spoke of a text from his wife about loving another man. (T. 219-220). The forensic pathologist who testified as to cause and manner of death had not supervised, much less performed, the autopsy. He testified from the report to the opinion of the crime lab, and not to his own conclusions. (T. 233-248). Q. And, Doctor, has the Medical Examiner s office generated an opinion as to a reasonable degree of medical and scientific certainty as to the cause of death of Norris Smith in this case? A. Yes, Sir. Q. And what is that? A. Multiple gun shot wounds. ***** Q. And has the Medical Examiner s office generated an opinion as to the reasonable degree of certainty and scientific certainty as to the manner of death? A. Yes, Sir. The manner is homicide. (T. 248). A man who worked in the commercial park, Ronnie D. Shuldt, saw the Nissan car run a light, jump the curb and go down an embankment. He went to the car and saw a man slumped over in the drivers seat with a head wound. The drivers window was shattered. (T. 250-254). Esau Faunt, also worked in the park. He heard two shots and saw a white Honda Altima come across the intersection. He also observed broken glass and a man who had been shot. (T. 255-259). Jonathan Young was driving near the scene when he had a near collision with a white SUV. He knew as the guy drove past him that something was up. He saw the vehicles license 4

was from Benton County. Although he testified to a stocky white male, he identified Moore as the driver of the SUV that almost hit him, then sped away. He thought the SUV was a Lincoln Navigator or a Mercury Mountaineer. (T. 268-272). The State s final witness, Steve English, with the DeSoto County Sheriff s department, had viewed the videos and made a map. He said the defendant s SUV had been parked for 30 minutes on the shoulder near the scene. English played and narrated the videos. He opined to Norris Smith, his whereabouts and movements, as he did with Everett Moore. But he did not say that at any point the videos showed Moore shoot Smith. (T. 277-295). He agreed the Moore never appeared to be looking for Smith s vehicle. The first space he parked was three to four spaces from Smith. His movements were not hurried, and he walked calmly. (T. 301-302). Upon these proofs, the case was concluded, with the State resting, and then the defense. (T. 309, 319). In the motion for directed verdict, the defense pointedly argued that there had been no eyewitness. Everett Moore seemed confused about his right to testify. He felt he really did need to take the stand, but finally said he would not testify. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT The case was circumstantial. The jury, being improperly instructed, reached an improper verdict. The trial court was required to grant a circumstantial evidence instruction, and improperly allowed the State to offer an instruction on second-degree murder, which was not supported by facts. The right to confrontation of a witness was denied Appellant Moore, where the State used an expert to give testimony on report he had not made, and to give an opinion other than his own opinion. Finally, the trial court allowed hearsay evidence which was clearly used as truthful proof of facts establishing the State s theory of the case. 5

ARGUMENT ISSUE NO. 1 : WHETHER THE TRIAL ERRED IN GIVING AN INSTRUCTION ON SECOND DEGREE MURDER OVER OBJECTION WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE? Everett Moore was indicted for the crime of first-degree murder, the indictment alleging that the act had been done with deliberate design to affect the death of Norris Junior Smith. ( C. P. 7, R. E. 3). The State submitted an elements instruction, which contained lesser offenses of second-degree murder, and heat of passion manslaughter. The instruction for second- degree murder was objected to by trial counsel. (T. 321-322). Counsel correctly pointed out that the facts necessary for a second-degree murder charge, specifically that it be done in the commission of an act eminently dangerous to others is not to be found in the proof offered herein. It may be argued that this language has been as having been coalesced into the statute. Regarding instruction S-1a, Young argues that the trial court erred when it allowed a depraved heart murder clause to be added to the deliberate design instruction. Because the indictment was for deliberate design, Young claimed that this was akin to amending the indictment and specifically objected to it because they were not informed of it by the indictment. In Mallett v. State, 606 So.2d 1092, 1095 (Miss.1992), this Court approved just such an instruction, holding that as a matter of common sense, every murder committed with deliberate design is by definition done in the commission of an act imminently dangerous to others, evincing a depraved heart. This conclusion was based on the fact that [t]hese two versions of murder are taken straight from the statute, Miss.Code Ann. 97-3-19 (Supp.1987) and [o]ur cases have for all practical purposes coalesced the two so that Section 97-3-19(1)(b) subsumes (1)(a) Young v. State, 891 So. 2d 813, 820 (Miss. 2005). But the Legislature has corrected this melding of different crime elements, and has provided a new statute separating these elements into two distinct crimes, as distinct as capital murder is. 6

Miss. Code Ann. 97-3-19 97-3-19.Homicide: murder defined; first-degree murder; second-degree murder; capital murder; lesser included-offenses. (1) The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be murder in the following cases: (a) When done with deliberate design to effect the death of the person killed, or of any human being, shall be first-degree murder; (b) When done in the commission of an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved heart, regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual, shall be second-degree murder; (c) When done without any design to effect death by any person engaged in the commission of any felony other than rape, kidnapping, burglary, arson, robbery, sexual battery, unnatural intercourse with any child under the age of twelve (12), or nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with mankind, or felonious abuse and/or battery of a child in violation of subsection (2) of Section 97-5-39, or in any attempt to commit such felonies, shall be first-degree murder; (d) When done with deliberate design to effect the death of an unborn child, shall be first-degree murder. Miss. Code. Ann. 97-3-19. The two definitions are now separate and distinct, and constitute two different offenses. The legislative separation, even in the statutory heading, prevents merger of first-degree murder and second-degree murder. The elements are distinguished. The Legislature saw fit to separate the two elements into two different crimes, punished by two distinct punishments. This intent of the law should be given its clear meaning. In determining legislative intent we first look to the words used in the statute. [w]hatever the legislature says in the text of the statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent. 7

Mississippi Gaming Comm'n v. Imperial Palace of Mississippi, Inc., 751 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Miss. 1999). The one time notion that it is common sense that an act deliberately done, such as shooting a person point blank, is an act that is also an eminently dangerous act, is now distinguished. The eminently dangerous act is now, as it should be, an act of negligence or carelessness, that can merit a charge of murder, but only in the second degree. Moore was indicted for willfully shooting Norris Smith with the deliberate design to effect his death, not for shooting into a car and perchance striking him. The defenses for the two distinct acts would be different defenses. Accordingly, this cause should be reversed. ISSUE NO. 2 : WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE A CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE INSTRUCTION? No one saw the shots. No one admitted shooting. The case was a circumstantial case. The defense tendered a circumstantial evidence instruction, which was refused by the court. ( C.P. 86, R.E. 4, T. 327, 334). Thus, the court committed reversible error. The rule in Mississippi is that a circumstantial evidence instruction should be given only when the prosecution can produce neither eyewitnesses or a confession to the offense charged...thus, a circumstantial evidence instruction was appropriate. ***** We hold, therefore, that the lower court committed reversible error by refusing a circumstantial evidence instruction. The case is reversed and remanded for a new trial. Stringfellow v. State, 595 So. 2d 1320, 1322 (Miss. 1992). The circumstantial evidence herein might be considered as leading to a logical conclusion, but, that is of no matter. Here, there is, none the less, no direct testimony, nor admission of who fired the fatal shots. We begin our discussion by defining circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is evidence which, without going directly to prove the 8

existence of a fact, gives rise to a logical inference that such fact does exist. McInnis v. State, 61 So. 3d 872, 875 (Miss. 2011). The court, in denying the instruction, delineated the very basis for giving it. The court agreed no one saw the actual shooting, nor admitted to the shooting; but found the interpretation of the evidence to be linear and thus logical to the court. The evidence, according to the court was subject to an interpretation as circumstantial, but took the duty of interpretation from the jury and decided upon the reasonable conclusion itself. All the while admitting there was no eyewitness, nor admission. (T. 334). A circumstantial evidence instruction was thus required by law and critical to the defense theory of the case, but was denied by the court. Accordingly, this cause should be reversed. ISSUE NO. 3 : WHETHER THE COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN ALLOWING THE FORENSIC PATHOLOGIST TO TESTIFY TO AN EXPERT OPINION WHICH WAS NOT HIS OWN? It is a fundamental right that in criminal prosecutions, the accused has a constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U. S. Const. Amend. VI; Miss. Const. Art. 3 26. Hearsay, or a witness s out-of-court testimony against a defendant is thus inadmissible unless the witness is at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed. 2d 177 (2004). In the instant matter, the autopsy of Norris Smith had been performed by Dr. Lisa Fuente and not by the pathologist testifying, Dr Brent Davis. Q. Doctor were you called upon to be involved in an examination of the decedent, Norris J. Smith, in September of 2015? A. I was not, my colleague was. 9

Q. Let s talk about that. Who was the actual person who performed the autopsy? A. Dr. Lisa Fuente performed the autopsy. (T. 235). Dr. Davis went on to say that each autopsy is then reviewed by the office, and signed off on. (T. 236). Dr. Dr. Hedged as he testified that [i]t could be fair to say he was an reviewing examiner. He then testified to the results of the autopsy done by Dr. Fuente. It has been held by the Mississippi Supreme Court that testimony is permissible by someone other than the expert performing an autopsy or scientific tests if that person has intimate knowledge of the particular report, even if the witness was not the primary analyst or did not perform the analysis firsthand. McGowen v. State, 859 So. 2d 320, 340 (Miss. 2003). Under a two-part test, McGowen holds that a supervisor, reviewer, or other analyst involved may testify in place of the primary analyst where that witness was actively involved in the production of the report and had intimate knowledge of analyses even though [he or] she did not perform the tests first hand. But, that does not end the inquiry. The witness testifying must then testify to their own conclusion or opinion. This third prong is what validates an expert s testimony and gives it stature which causes it to rise above mere hearsay. The testifying analyst had reviewed the work of the analyst who had performed the DNA tests, had conducted her own analysis of the testing, and had reached her own conclusions. Grim v. State, 102 So. 3d 1073, 1080 (Miss. 2012). Yet the testimony herein is quite to the contrary of the opinion being that of Dr. John 10

Brent Davis. He does not say that it is his opinion. Instead, he agrees that it is the consensus opinion of the Medical Examiner s Office. He testified it was the Medical Examiner s Office that had generated this opinion and findings. He is thus not doing anything more than presenting hearsay of an opinion of a report generated by an office. Such hearsay opinion is exactly what is decried in Crawford, supra, and its progeny. In Mississippi it is permissible for an expert to testify to results and give an opinion, so long as he has knowledge from reviewing the work, but only if they then reach an independent conclusion that is subject to cross examination. Therefore it is essential that the testifying witnesses offered their own independent conclusions. Armstead v. State, 196 So. 3d 913, 920 (Miss. 2016). This principle has been recently affirmed in the matter of an autopsy: [W]hile Dr. Barnhart did state that she had reviewed the notes, she indicated that her expert opinions were her own and would have been the same had she relied solely on the autopsy photographs. Christian v. State, 207 So. 3d 1207, 1213 (Miss. 2016). The right being affected, the right to confrontation, being fundamental, and the law being well enunciated; it is consequently plain error for the trial judge to have allowed expert testimony that was not given as that witnesses expert opinion. United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770,1776, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). An office cannot be subject to cross examination, only an individual. Thus, this cause must be reversed. ISSUE NO. 4 : WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING HEARSAY EVIDENCE WHICH WAS EVIDENCE OF MOTIVE, INTENDED AS TRUTH OF THE MATTER, AND NOT NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THE POLICE INVESTIGATION? While it has been held on occasion, that otherwise hearsay testimony made by a police 11

officer, may, when limited in scope, be admissible to allow the officer to show why he took ceratin steps in an investigation. This is so, but only for that purpose. It should never be allowed where it goes to proof of a critical and contested matter. [R]eference to anonymous tips did not divulge the substance of what was said in those conversations, did not divulge the identity of any of the callers, and was offered only to give information as to how and why [a suspect] was developed as a suspect. ***** Defendant's objection would have been appropriate had the contents of the telephone conversation been admitted for the truth of the matters asserted therein. Johnson v. State, 956 So. 2d 358, 368-369 (Miss. App. 2007). This applies directly to the present case. Investigator Roy Hutchins, with the DeSoto Sheriff s office made contact with Norris Smith s wife/girlfriend. She gave Hutchins a name. If his testimony had only gone thus far, and been only used to explain how Everett Moore became a suspect, it would have not violated Miss. Rules of Evidence, Rule 801. However, the testimony, despite objection did not stop there. Instead the State continued on to develop critical evidence of motive and character. A. Well, once we questioned her as to why Eric Moore or Everett Moore, she stated there had been ongoing - - there had been ongoing trouble with him and - - BY MR. WATSON: I m going to object to that at this time. It s hearsay. BY THE COURT: Response, Mr. Morris? BY MR. MORRIS: It s not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. It s offered to show a furtherance of the investigation of how they were able to proceed with an identification of Mr. Moore. (T. 185-186). The fallacy of that argument is contained with in the colloquy. Everett Moore was already identified. But the trial court alloyed the State to further exploit this violation of the hearsay rule. 12

A. She stated that there had been an ongoing problem with Mr. Moore accusing Norris Smith, the victim, of having an affair with his wife. And according to her, that day she stated that he had made several threats verbally towards Norris Smith as far as to the alleged affair... (T. 186). This is obviously well beyond the limited scope of admitting what would otherwise be hearsay, for the very limited purpose of showing what prompted steps in an investigation. This is offered as proof of the State s theory of the case and is asserted for the truth of the matter. It is therefore error. Young v. State, 908 So. 2d 819 (Miss. App. 2005). All without the calling of the proponent as a witness. The State, had it desired could have called the wife/girlfriend as a witness, but chose not to. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. M.R.E. Rule 801(c). It follows then that hearsay is not admissible except in certain instances provided by law. M.R.E. Rule 802. We find that the trial court correctly refused to allow hearsay testimony from the officer regarding what the inmates told him... Had [counsel] wanted to inquire about these alleged statements, he should have called the inmates themselves to testify. Bailey v. State, 960 So. 2d 583, 591 (Miss. App. 2007). The State clearly exceeded the boundaries of exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, and the trial court impermissibly allowed it. For that reason, this cause should be reversed. CONCLUSION Appellant respectfully submits, premised upon the foregoing arguments, that the judgement of conviction in this cause be reversed and the case rendered, or in the alternative, remanded for a new trial Respectfully submitted, 13

EVERETT MOORE, APPELLANT /s/ W. Daniel Hinchcliff W. Daniel Hinchcliff, Appellant Counsel CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, W. Daniel Hinchcliff, Counsel for Everett Moore, do hereby certify that on this day I electronically filed the forgoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT with the Clerk of the Court using the MEC system which sent notification of such filing to the following: Honorable Jason L. Davis Attorney General Office Post Office Box 220 Jackson, MS 39205-0220 Further, I have this day caused to be mailed via United States Postal Service, First Class postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the above to the following non- MEC participants: Honorable Robert P. Chamberlin, Jr. Circuit Court Judge Post Office Box 280 Hernando, MS 38632 Honorable John W. Champion District Attorney, District 17 365 Losher Street, Suite 210 Hernando, MS 38632 Everett Moore, MDOC #105682 Mississippi State Penitentiary Post Office Box 1057 Parchman, MS 38738 14

This the 7th day of June 2017. /s/ W. Daniel Hinchcliff W. Daniel Hinchcliff, Appellant Counsel W. Daniel Hinchcliff, MS Bar No. 2470 INDIGENT APPEALS DIVISION OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER Post Office Box 3510 Jackson, Mississippi 39207-3510 Telephone: 601-576-4290 Fax: 601-576-4205 Email: dhinc@ospd.ms.gov 15