A Story on the Economic Consequences of Repatriations

Similar documents
The Employment Effects of Mexican Repatriations: Evidence from the 1930 s

The Employment Effects of Mexican Repatriations: Evidence from the 1930 s

Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies, Fall 2013

Computerization and Immigration: Theory and Evidence from the United States 1

14 Pathways Summer 2014

Online Appendix. Table A1. Guidelines Sentencing Chart. Notes: Recommended sentence lengths in months.

IMMIGRATION AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY. Giovanni Peri UC Davis Jan 22-23, 2015

Rethinking the Area Approach: Immigrants and the Labor Market in California,

THE DEMOGRAPHY OF MEXICO/U.S. MIGRATION

The Wage Effects of Immigration and Emigration

Do (naturalized) immigrants affect employment and wages of natives? Evidence from Germany

California Economic Policy Day Labor in the Golden State Web Appendix B

Texas Republican Presidential Primary Poll 2/29/16. Sponsor(s) Fox 26 Houston; Fox 7 Austin; Fox 4 Dallas-Fort-Worth.

The Impact of Immigration on Wages of Unskilled Workers

Silence of the Innocents: Illegal Immigrants Underreporting of Crime and their Victimization

Does Immigration Reduce Wages?

Apprehensions of Unauthorized Migrants along the Southwest Border: Fact Sheet

The Labor Market Effects of Reducing Undocumented Immigrants

The task-specialization hypothesis and possible productivity effects of immigration

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES MEXICAN ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A COMPARISON OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT IN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES

History of Immigration to Texas

What Happens to the Careers of European Workers when. Immigrants "Take their Jobs"?

Immigration and The Economic Crisis: Does recession make a Difference?

Illegal Immigration. When a Mexican worker leaves Mexico and moves to the US he is emigrating from Mexico and immigrating to the US.

Consulate General of Mexico in New York Consular Activities. Mario Cuevas Consul of Protection

The Economic and Political Effects of Black Outmigration from the US South. October, 2017

Benefits and Challenges of Trade under NAFTA: The Case of Texas

Immigration and the US Economy:

Research Report. How Does Trade Liberalization Affect Racial and Gender Identity in Employment? Evidence from PostApartheid South Africa

Did Operation Streamline Slow Illegal Immigration?

Brain Drain and Emigration: How Do They Affect Source Countries?

ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION. and Enforcement Along the Southwest Border. Pia M. Orrenius

ARTNeT Trade Economists Conference Trade in the Asian century - delivering on the promise of economic prosperity rd September 2014

MANAGING TEMPORARY MIGRATIONS: CALIFORNIA, US AND THE WORLD. UC Davis IFHA Symposium Oct, 7 th 2013

FOREIGN FIRMS AND INDONESIAN MANUFACTURING WAGES: AN ANALYSIS WITH PANEL DATA

Immigration and Internal Mobility in Canada Appendices A and B. Appendix A: Two-step Instrumentation strategy: Procedure and detailed results

Independent and Third-Party Municipal Candidates. City Council Election Reform Task Force April 8, :00 p.m.

Volume 35, Issue 1. An examination of the effect of immigration on income inequality: A Gini index approach

THE EVOLUTION OF WORKER S REMITTANCES IN MEXICO IN RECENT YEARS

211 Remesas: Sending Money Back

Immigration and the U.S. Economy

Immigration and property prices: Evidence from England and Wales

Quantitative Analysis of Migration and Development in South Asia

Plessy versus Ferguson (1896) Jim Crow Laws. Reactions to Brown v Board. Brown versus the Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas (1954)

The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 42, No. 1, Spring, 2011, pp. 1 26

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES SCHOOLING SUPPLY AND THE STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION: EVIDENCE FROM US STATES Antonio Ciccone Giovanni Peri

U.S. Immigration Policy

The Determinants and the Selection. of Mexico-US Migrations

Econ 196 Lecture. The Economics of Immigration. David Card

Is Social Mobility Spatial? Immigrant Destionation Choice and Second Generation Outcomes, and

The Labor Market Effects of Reducing Undocumented Immigrants

Do immigrants take or create residents jobs? Quasi-experimental evidence from Switzerland

Online Appendix to "Immigration and Wage Dynamics: Evidence from the Mexican Peso Crisis"

INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYMENT IMMIGRATION ISSUES

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF REDUCING THE NUMBER OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS. Andri Chassamboulli Giovanni Peri

Skill Classification Does Matter: Estimating the Relationship Between Trade Flows and Wage Inequality

Discussion Paper Series

The Effect of Immigration on Native Workers: Evidence from the US Construction Sector

Is emigration of workers contributing to better schooling outcomes for children in Nepal?

UNAUTHORIZED & UNINSURED: Medical Insurance Coverage in the California Endowment s (TCE s) Building Healthy Communities (BHC) Sites

A Profile of U.S. Children with Unauthorized Immigrant Parents

Creating Good Jobs in Our Communities

The Impact of Foreign Workers on the Labour Market of Cyprus

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES. THE DIFFUSION OF MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS DURING THE 1990s: EXPLANATIONS AND IMPACTS. David Card Ethan G.

Migration and Labor Market Outcomes in Sending and Southern Receiving Countries

Illegal Immigration: How Should We Deal With It?

THE IMPACT OF TAXES ON MIGRATION IN NEW HAMPSHIRE

Remittances and the Brain Drain: Evidence from Microdata for Sub-Saharan Africa

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES FOREIGN STEM WORKERS AND NATIVE WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT IN U.S. CITIES. Giovanni Peri Kevin Shih Chad Sparber

Impact of Immigration: Disruptive or Helpful?

Characteristics of the Ethnographic Sample of First- and Second-Generation Latin American Immigrants in the New York to Philadelphia Urban Corridor

Labor Market Consequences of Immigration. Econ/Demog C175 Economic Demography Prof. Goldstein Spring 2018, UC Berkeley

New Patterns in US Immigration, 2011:

Abstract/Policy Abstract

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION

Do Recent Latino Immigrants Compete for Jobs with Native Hispanics and Earlier Latino Immigrants?

Does Immigration Harm Native-Born Workers? A Citizen's Guide

Changing Dynamics and. to the United States

WILLIAMSON STATE OF THE COUNTY Capital Area Council of Governments

Impacts of International Migration on the Labor Market in Japan

Farm Labor Outlook from the Viewpoint of Sacramento. Bryan Little Farm Employers Labor Service

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE EFFECT OF IMMIGRATION ON PRODUCTIVITY: EVIDENCE FROM US STATES. Giovanni Peri

How do regulated and unregulated labor markets respond to shocks? Evidence from the Great Recession

The Economic Impacts of Immigration: A Look at the Housing Market

THE STATE OF THE UNIONS IN 2007: A PROFILE OF UNION MEMBERSHIP IN LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA AND THE NATION 1

Are Immigrants Stealing American Jobs?: A Study of Unauthorized Immigration and Unemployment in the Southwest United States

U.S. Border Enforcement and the Net Flow of Mexican Illegal Migration

The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program Alan Berube, Fellow

FIVE KEY TRENDS STRUCTURING L.A. S FUTURE AND WHY 2GEN MAKES SENSE

IMMIGRATION AND THE ECONOMY LABOR MARKETS, EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY

Economic aspects of Croatian emigration

Inequality in Labor Market Outcomes: Contrasting the 1980s and Earlier Decades

Online Appendix for The Contribution of National Income Inequality to Regional Economic Divergence

Poverty Reduction and Economic Growth: The Asian Experience Peter Warr

Contents About this Report September 2017 Border Summary Housing

Impact of Realignment on County Jail Populations

What Happens to the Careers of European Workers When Immigrants Take Their Jobs?

Presidents and The US Economy: An Econometric Exploration. Working Paper July 2014

The China Syndrome. Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States. David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H.

CHC BORDER HEALTH POLICY FORUM. The U.S./Mexico Border: Demographic, Socio-Economic, and Health Issues Profile I

Transcription:

A Story on the Economic Consequences of Repatriations Giovanni Peri 1 UC Sacramento Center Conference, February 8th, 2018 1 UC Davis and NBER

Motivation Apprehension/Deportation of Undocumented Immigrants as a way of giving jobs back to Americans was one of the talking point of Candidate Trump. Recently he has been acting on it (repeal of DACA, toughening enforcement). It is a deeply rooted idea used over and over again to motivate Removal. This is not the first time it is proposed. It was pursued on large scale in the past, at the end of the Bracero Program 1960-1965 (Clemens et al 2017). This paper asks: Can we learn from past history of forced repatriations?

Quotes connecting deportation and Jobs A Trump administration will stop illegal immigration, deport all criminal aliens,...establish new immigration controls to boost wages and to ensure that open jobs are offered to American workers first. (candidate Donald Trump, 2015-16 Campaign) The effect of this unilateral executive amnesty (DACA)...denied jobs to hundreds of thousands of Americans (Attorney General Sessions, cited on CNN, September 5th 2017) Large alien population is the basic cause of Unemployment. (Congressman Martin Dies, Texas, 1931)

Question and Approach Is there any evidence that local labor markets where apprehension/removal of undocumented was larger enjoyed higher employment or higher wages for unskilled US workers? Economists consensus is that immigration does not hurt wages. Immigrants compete but also also create jobs, attract firms and do jobs that are different from those of natives. But most economic analysis is based on inflows of immigrants. We will look at the opposite: apprehension and removal

How aggressively have countries enforced immigration restrictions? Undocumented immigrants are always present in many countries. Once a large group of undocumented stays a long time in a country two options arise: regularization or Apprehension/deportations. Have democratic countries ever undertaken large Deportation campaigns? What are their consequences?

The great Mexican Repatriations of 1930-35 Repatriation of 400,000-500,000 Mexicans and US-born Mexican American (Gratton and Merchant 2013). But some sources (Balderrama and Rodriguez 2006) say up to 1 million. Net decline of Mexican population by about 350,000 people between 1930-40 (close to one third of its size which was about 1.2 Million in 1930).

History: Before 1929 Large immigration of Europeans, 1890-1924. The Immigration act of 1924, then, introduced very strict quotas immigration from the Americas was exempt from quotas. Mexicans immigration peaked in 1924-29. Mexicans were the more recent immigrants, more ethnically different, hence as the depression started they were targeted.

Images from the Repatriation Campaign, 1929-1936

Awareness of this Campaign History book keep the information on this campaign rather scant. But there is abundant evidence. It involved three to six times more people than the Japanese internment campaign (100,000-120,000). Los Angeles was a city where raids on Mexicans were very widespread and brutal. The Mexican Government often helped. The state of California was the first state to apologize when it passed the Apology Act for the 1930s Mexican Repatriation Program in 2005, officially recognizing the unconstitutional removal and coerced emigration of United States citizens of Mexican descent. Kevin Johnson (2005) helped!

Mexican Repatriation 1930-1940, relative to 1930 Population, US state economic areas The units of observations are state economic areas

Cities as units of analysis: Correlation between Intensity and Native Employment Change Regression line has coefficient=0.02 and standard error =0.15

Measure of intensity of Mexican repatriation in the local Labor Market The change in the number of Mexicans in working age over the period 1930-40 relative to the total population in working age, in city c as of 1930. This defines the local intensity of Mexican repatriation: MEX c E c,1930 = [ MEXc,1940 MEX c,1930 MEX c,1930 ] MEX c,1930 E c,1930

Highly correlated with the repatriation intensity Variation in Repatriation Intensity First term likely very correlated with local labor market changes Second term is predetermined. Not random, but, controlling for initial conditions not necessarily correlated with labor market performance 1930-40.

Large Variation and large repatriation intensity in the top 15 cities State City Shock TX Del Rio -0.24 TX San Benito -0.24 TX Brownsville -0.22 TX Laredo -0.18 TX El Paso -0.18 TX Harlingen -0.13 AZ Tucson -0.12 CA Brawley -0.11 TX San Antonio -0.09 TX Corpus Christi -0.08 IN East Chicago -0.08 CA Anaheim -0.07 TX Sweetwater -0.06 TX Big Spring -0.06 NM Roswell -0.05 CA Fullerton -0.05 CA Redlands -0.04 AZ Phoenix -0.03 TX San Angelo -0.03 IN Gary -0.03 CA Bakersfield -0.03 CA Santa Monica -0.03 CO Fort Collins -0.03 OH Lorain -0.03 CA San Bernardino -0.03 CO Pueblo -0.02 NE North Platte -0.02

Instrumental Variable, based on variation in Mexican share 1930 To reduce correlation with local labor market characteristics we: (i) Control for several 1930 characteristics (ii) Control for 1930-40 policies. (iii) Use the following Instruments: ( MEXc ˆ ) E c,1930 Alt [ ] MEX1940 MEX 1930 = MEX c,1930 MEX 1930 E c,1930

Mexican repatriated more than any other nationality, especially over 40 years of age

We estimate the following Cross sectional regression in Changes using 2SLS y j c = φ s + β j y MEX c E c,1930 + γx j c + ε j c Where y j c alternative changes in labor market outcomes for natives and X j c are controls. Basic estimates with errors clustered at the state level, weighted by the city population in working age (16-65) in 1930.

Economic Framework: Interesting because it is a reverse flow Repatriation of Mexican helps employment and/or wages of natives, if they are mainly competing workers and/or there are decreasing returns. Negative estimated coefficient! It depresses, on average, employment/wages of natives if they are differentiated/complementary to natives or there are increasing returns/externalities. Positive estimated coefficient! Disruption, mistrust may have also hurt employment.depression was hurting all cities.

Specialization of Native, Mexicans and Other Immigrant Occupation Mexican Native Other Foreign-born Mean Wage Professional, Technical 1.10% 7.39% 3.33% 3.50 Managers, Officials, and Proprietors 0.58% 4.26% 3.40% 3.89 Clerical and Kindred 1.51% 13.17% 5.24% 3.15 Sales workers 2.64% 9.13% 6.64% 3.29 Craftsmen 6.25% 14.30% 21.50% 3.35 Operatives 11.72% 15.76% 22.63% 3.02 Service workers (household) 4.64% 5.79% 6.61% 2.05 Service workers (non-household) 3.90% 5.68% 8.51% 2.82 Farm laborers 29.50% 11.83% 3.73% 2.46 Laborers 38.08% 12.51% 18.30% 2.80

First Stage Regressions: Size of Mexican community predicts size of population loss Table 1: Dependent Variable: Change in Mexican Employment, 1930 1940 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Basic Weighted Weighted Control: Control: Control: Applying & State FE 1930 Bartik IV New Deal constant charact. & Police & Weather rate MEX c /P c 0.414*** 0.415*** 0.396*** 0.399*** 0.398*** 0.395*** 1.014*** (0.060) (0.069) (0.073) (0.079) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) Bartik 0.012 0.016 0.012** (0.015) (0.015) (0.006) Police -0.382-0.221-0.081 (0.300) (0.389) (0.138) 1st stage F 46.87 36.46 29.55 25.35 25.09 24.55 161.61 State FE X X X X X Weighted X X X X X X Observations 894 893 893 893 893 868 868 R-squared 0.791 0.720 0.792 0.798 0.798 0.800 0.932

Validity check: It does not predict pre-1930 employment growth Table 2: Correlation between Pre-1930 trends and Mexican share in 1930 (1) (2) (3) Empl. growth Unempl. growth Occ. Wage growth 1910 1930 1910 1930 1910 1930 Share Mexicans -0.329-0.061-0.134 1930 (0.540) (0.054) (0.139) State FE X X X Observations 580 580 580 R-squared 0.414 0.417 0.175

Repatriation Intensity and local native employment change (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) State FE Control: Control: Control: Control: TargetedDropping citiesapplyingoccupations Older Long-run & 1930 Bartik New Deal Pre-trend States with inflow constant with largest natives 1930 195 WeightedCharact.& Police& Weather only of Mexicans rate shocks (age 41-65) Panel A: Changes in Employment MEX c /P c 0.145 0.306 0.285 0.277 0.468** -0.132 0.092 0.074-0.103* 0.101* -0.392 (0.220) (0.216) (0.215) (0.236) (0.221) (0.246) (0.238) (0.201) (0.057) (0.055) (0.954) Bartik 0.205* 0.307*** 0.100 0.536** 0.150 0.314*** -0.066*** 0.052** 0.191 (0.107) (0.096) (0.119) (0.244) (0.137) (0.096) (0.021) (0.022) (0.858) Police -0.763 2.575-3.303 25.991** 1.346 2.405 1.923*** -0.157 38.907 (3.690) (3.242) (3.378) (12.290) (4.368) (3.254) (0.747) (0.892) (44.837) 1st stage F 29.55 24.73 24.65 24.33 21.65 20.83 20.85 164.22 24.33 24.33 131.10 State FE X X X X X X X X X X X Weighted X X X X X X X X X X X Observations 893 893 893 868 540 224 466 868 868 868 92

Is there evidence of complementarity? Effects by occupation group (1) (2) (3) Dependent Low-skilled Intermediate-skilled High-skilled Variable: natives natives natives MEX c /P c -0.089* 0.278*** 0.337** (0.051) (0.095) (0.133) Bartik -0.075*** 0.295*** 0.275*** (0.018) (0.059) (0.039) Police 2.036*** -2.346-1.800 (0.681) (2.028) (1.580) 1st stage F 24.33 24.33 24.33 State FE X X X Weighted X X X Observations 868 868 868 R-squared 0.241 0.402 0.448

Did other Immigrants took their jobs? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) State FE Control: Control: Control: Targeted Dropping cities & 1930 Bartik New Deal States with inflow Weighted Charact. & Police & Weather only of Mexicans MEX c /P c -0.020 0.017-0.012-0.018-0.036-0.038 (0.013) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.028) (0.025) Bartik 0.141*** 0.140*** 0.112*** 0.152*** (0.020) (0.020) (0.037) (0.029) Police -4.730*** -4.326*** -3.915* -3.628*** (0.903) (0.927) (2.196) (1.222) 1st stage F 29.55 24.73 24.65 24.33 20.83 20.85 State FE X X X X X X Weighted X X X X X X Observations 893 893 893 868 224 466 R-squared 0.632 0.691 0.745 0.710 0.726 0.700

Most Affected sectors Table 3: Sector effects, 1930 1940 (2SLS) (1) (2) (3) Dependent Agriculture Agriculture & Other Variable: Manufacturing industries MEX c /P c 0.272** 0.261*** 0.049 (0.133) (0.089) (0.069) Bartik c -0.002 0.068 0.205*** (0.011) (0.049) (0.075) Police -0.523-2.746-7.647** (0.622) (2.737) (3.085) 1st stage F 29.79 29.79 29.79 State FE X X X Weighted X X X Observations 868 868 868 R-squared 0.204 0.272 0.231

Occupational Wage effects on natives: Downgrading The large departure of Mexicans in the occupations at the bottom of the wage ladder may have produced some downgrading of natives. If so occupational wage of natives would experience negative changes. Fix occupation wage at 1940, and then calculate the occupational wage in 1930 and 1940 and see if the change is positively correlated with repatriations.

Occupational Wage downgrading effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) State FE Control: Control: Control: Targeted Dropping cities & 1930 Bartik New Deal States with inflow Weighted Charact. & Police & Weather only of Mexicans MEX c /P c 0.321** 0.198* 0.169 0.155 0.183 0.129 (0.125) (0.113) (0.112) (0.119) (0.129) (0.124) Bartik 0.206*** 0.243*** 0.350*** 0.281*** (0.036) (0.036) (0.073) (0.045) Police -3.012** -1.280 2.177-1.073 (1.445) (1.449) (3.789) (1.699) 1st stage F 29.55 24.73 24.65 24.33 20.83 20.85 State FE X X X X X X Weighted X X X X X X Observations 893 893 893 868 224 466 R-squared 0.575 0.648 0.665 0.660 0.370 0.705

Summarizing Repatriation of 1/3 of all Mexicans in the US between 1930 and 1940, it was a traumatic and very disruptive experience on the Migrants. There is no evidence that it was accompanied by positive labor market effects for natives. Higher repatriation of Mexican by 1% of local population reduced medium and high skilled jobs for natives and hurt agriculture and manufacturing. Occupational downgrading for Natives.