Reconsidering minimum deterrence in South Asia: Indian responses to Pakistan s tactical nuclear weapons

Contemporary Security Policy ISSN: 1352-3260 (Print) 1743-8764 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fcsp20 Reconsidering minimum deterrence in South Asia: Indian responses to Pakistan s tactical nuclear weapons Frank O Donnell To cite this article: Frank O Donnell (2016): Reconsidering minimum deterrence in South Asia: Indian responses to Pakistan s tactical nuclear weapons, Contemporary Security Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2016.1236470 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1236470 Published online: 13 Oct 2016. Submit your article to this journal View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalinformation?journalcode=fcsp20 Download by: [University of Plymouth] Date: 14 October 2016, At: 01:05

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, 2016 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1236470 Reconsidering minimum deterrence in South Asia: Indian responses to Pakistan s tactical nuclear weapons Frank O Donnell Department of Strategic Studies and International Affairs, Plymouth University at the Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, Devon, UK ABSTRACT India s nuclear doctrine and posture has traditionally been shaped by minimum deterrence logic. This logic includes assumptions that possession of only a small retaliatory nuclear force generates sufficient deterrent effect against adversaries, and accordingly that development of limited nuclear warfighting concepts and platforms are unnecessary for national security. The recent emergence of Pakistan s Nasr tactical nuclear missile platform has generated pressures on Indian minimum deterrence. This article analyzes Indian official and strategic elite responses to the Nasr challenge, including policy recommendations and attendant implications. It argues that India should continue to adhere to minimum deterrence, which serves as the most appropriate concept for Indian nuclear policy and best supports broader foreign and security policy objectives. However, the form through which Indian minimum deterrence is delivered must be rethought in light of this new stage of regional nuclear competition. KEYWORDS India; Pakistan; deterrence; nuclear weapons; nuclear doctrine Pakistan unveiled its Nasr (Hatf-9) 60-km range tactical nuclear missile platform on April 19, 2011 (Government of Pakistan, 2011). The underpinning logic for the Nasr s emergence was officially confirmed in October 2015 as intending to lower the bilateral nuclear threshold with India to now deter a greater range of Indian conventional operations, and specifically conventional cross-border limited war planning that has been recently occupying Indian military thinking (Iqbal, 2015). The Nasr and the strategic thinking behind it poses multiple challenges to Indian security and previous Indian conceptions of how nuclear deterrence operates in South Asia. While the Nasr is assessed by external analysts to be in very early stages of deployment, it is nevertheless driving Indian debate on its impact on national security (Kristensen & Norris, 2015, p. 5). CONTACT Frank O Donnell frank.odonnell@plymouth.ac.uk 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

2 F. O DONNELL India s traditional philosophy of nuclear thought has long been closely aligned with minimum deterrence, a concept organized around the assumption that a small number of nuclear weapons creates sufficient risk in adversary threat assessments to have deterrent effect. The alternative maximalist concept that nuclear deterrence is achieved only through guaranteeing numerical and destructive superiority against adversary nuclear capabilities, alongside development of a range of warfighting platforms has found little ground in Indian nuclear doctrine development and force planning. Nuclear weapons have largely been seen within India as having primarily political rather than military purposes, and to be used only as a last resort, with most other defense contingencies falling to conventional force resolution. The arrival of the Nasr, however, is not just another nuclear delivery platform to join those that Pakistan already points at India. It has been explained as the symbol of a new Pakistani nuclear concept of full-spectrum deterrence (Government of Pakistan, 2016; Kidwai & Lavoy, 2015). Full-spectrum deterrence is built upon the underlying Pakistani premises that India both enjoys conventional superiority over Pakistan an assumption disputed by external analysis (Ladwig, 2015, pp. 729 731) and intends as part of its reported Cold Start military doctrine to quickly invade and hold parts of Pakistan territory up to a depth of 80 km. This Cold Start military doctrine has never been authorized by the Indian government, but appears to influence elements of Indian proactive military exercises, which similarly aim to rapidly enter and hold elements of Pakistani territory. In response, full-spectrum deterrence intends to move Pakistan s nuclear threshold with India several rungs down the bilateral escalation ladder; deter India from planning and conducting proactive conventional operations; and restore general deterrence against India (Iqbal, 2015; Kidwai & Lavoy, 2015). From the perspective of New Delhi, these developments appear to threaten India s abilities to deter Pakistan and Pakistan-sponsored attacks, and to control conventional and nuclear escalation in a conflict involving Pakistan. India s political leaders, military and strategic elite are responding to this Nasr challenge in different and, at times, partly conflicting ways. Indeed, the Nasr challenge has become a primary prism through which much of the Indian debates on the nuclear doctrinal and force structuring requirements for establishing deterrence in the 21st century are being conducted. This topic has substantial relevance for contemporary understanding of general and South Asian nuclear deterrence. Academic literature on Western deterrence has identified a tension between perceived nuclear force requirements and foreign policy objectives (Gerson, 2010; Sagan, 2009). A particularly visible form of this tension concerns the incohesion between American resistance to adopting a no-first-use commitment and foreign policy objectives of reducing the international salience of nuclear weapons.

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 3 This study develops this literature by exploring similar tensions in the specific Indian context, and whether these issues would be magnified or reduced by the implementation of specific Nasr responses as suggested in this debate. A second major contribution is to scholarly research on South Asian nuclear deterrence, which lacks a detailed study of contemporary Indian understandings of the validity of its current deterrence approach as influenced by the Nasr challenge. The relevant literature has hitherto concentrated upon questions of the ultimate stabilizing effects of nuclear force possession for regional security (Ganguly & Hagerty, 2005; Kapur, 2008); the overall nuclear postures of India and Pakistan (Narang, 2014; Sultan, 2012); the significance of institutions and challenges of adopting new technologies in nuclear policy-making (Krepon, 2013; Sankaran, 2015); and the opportunity for new arms control measures in this context (Hagerty, 2014). This article provides an original assessment of the effects of Nasr development on Indian perceptions of regional stability; analyzes proposed Indian Nasr responses with reference to their reinforcement or destabilization of India s nuclear posture and regional security; and assesses the actual level of interest within India for adopting new arms control initiatives as recommended in this extant academic literature. The article argues that India should continue to adhere to a minimum deterrent concept and logic, when compared to developing warfighting capabilities and concepts that instead flow from maximalist deterrence logic. However, the form in which Indian minimum deterrence is delivered must be revised in light of the Pakistani full-spectrum deterrence challenge and its implications as perceived by Indian strategic elite nuclear discourse. In order to retain greatest Indian public confidence in the continued validity of minimum deterrence, this review of policy must also encompass Indian responses to Pakistani challenges in the conventional and subconventional domains, as well as relevant Indian foreign policy objectives. In particular, this article recommends that this more holistic conception of minimum deterrence incorporate a restatement of India s no-first-use pledge and redefinition of Indian posture to ensure assured rather than massive retaliation. This review should also replace proactive cross-border conventional military strike planning with a new approach focused on defensive eviction of invading forces. New Indian bilateral or unilateral initiatives to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in regional security should be developed. As the most likely scenario involving Nasr use is in a crisis triggered by a Pakistan-sponsored subconventional attack in Indian territory, a further supportive measure would allocate increased resources and political attention toward strengthening India s intelligence and domestic security infrastructure to prevent such subconventional strikes. This overall policy approach would most effectively reinforce India s minimum deterrence concept. This new

4 F. O DONNELL approach would also be in greatest alignment with Indian nuclear and regional foreign policy objectives of assuming a greater leadership position in the global nuclear order as a recognized responsible nuclear power, and of reducing regional security tensions that threaten economic growth potential. This article will first explore the contributions of this study to the literature on general and South Asian deterrence. It will next outline the conceptions of minimum and maximalist deterrence in nuclear strategic thought, and highlight the strong historical Indian adherence to minimum deterrence. It will then investigate the two official and three strategic elite Indian principal responses to the Nasr, assessing their implications for Indian nuclear and defense policy and broader Indian foreign policy objectives. Significance of India s Nasr challenge to deterrence literature This section will highlight how the article substantially develops general and regional research on deterrence. The article firstly illuminates a tension between some Indian perceived requirements for deterrence credibility and foreign policy objectives of promoting regional stability and a stable nuclear order. The academic literature on this issue has primarily focused on its impact on Western deterrence debates. Indeed, it attains particular prominence in the recent scholarly debate on prospective American adoption of a no-first-use doctrine. Opponents of such a reform to implement no-first-use tend to base their argument upon a perceived higher deterrence credibility of the existing doctrine, which is more ambiguous on conditions of nuclear use (Payne, Halperin, Tertrais, Subrahmanyam, & Sagan, 2009). While rebutting this claim that no-first-use entails a reduction in deterrence credibility, academics in favor of no-first-use tend to justify their approach by introducing a second argument: that such a pledge would more directly support American foreign policy objectives of reducing the global salience of nuclear weapons. These academics emphasize that retaining an ambiguous doctrine involves accepting a greater tension between U.S. nuclear strategy and these foreign policy goals, with reduced prospects of progress toward the latter (Gerson, 2010; Sagan, 2009). While this issue has been well documented in the contemporary academic discourse on no-first-use and American nuclear strategy, this article highlights its salience in the contemporary Indian debate on nuclear policy. The debate involves some recommendations to apply maximalist logic in developing Indian nuclear forces and doctrine. These conflict with the concurrent Indian efforts to assume a greater leadership position in the global nuclear order and promote regional security. This article develops the deterrence literature by illuminating this general tension between nuclear force

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 5 requirements and foreign policy nonproliferation commitments in the Indian context. Specifically, it explores how this factor would be magnified or reduced according to each recommended Nasr response in current Indian nuclear discourse. As well as this contribution to the general literature on tensions between state nuclear force requirements and foreign policy objectives, this article also builds the literature on South Asian nuclear deterrence. This literature is mainly focused upon theorizing the overall nuclear postures of India and Pakistan and the role of specific institutions and emerging technologies within their nuclear policy-making systems. However, as we will see, the literature lacks a rigorous analysis of the forms and implications of specific Indian official and strategic elite responses to Pakistan s Nasr challenge. The relevant literature firstly focuses upon the proliferation optimist/pessimist question of whether the overt declaration of nuclear force possession in 1998 by India and Pakistan has provided stabilizing effects for regional security (Ganguly & Hagerty, 2005; Kapur, 2008). Referring to the 1999 Kargil war, proliferation pessimists posit a stability instability paradox. This concept involves nuclear rivals assuming that mutual nuclear deterrence permits greater flexibility for initiating conventional conflict, based upon a calculation that the other rival will be deterred from escalation by fear of nuclear consequences (Kapur, 2008). This article provides new empirical insight to understanding the contemporary South Asian stability instability paradox, through examining efforts in India to develop limited conventional strike plans and concepts against targets within Pakistani territory. These initiatives are founded upon an assumption that more ambitious conventional interventions can be conducted against Pakistan than previously in the post- 1998 context, despite the heightened risk of nuclear escalation posed by the emergence of the Nasr. A second major theme of the extant literature seeks to categorize the nuclear postures of India and Pakistan (Narang, 2014; Sultan, 2012). Narang (2014) describes Pakistan s nuclear posture as asymmetric retaliation, which intends to pose a credible nuclear first-use threat against adversary conventional strike plans. This posture description usefully explains the Pakistani logic leading to Nasr development. India s posture is described as assured retaliation, focused upon minimum deterrence concepts of developing a small survivable second-strike nuclear force and largely eschewing nuclear warfighting concepts. This article builds upon these useful definitions by investigating contemporary Indian responses to Pakistan s asymmetric retaliation logic, focusing specifically on reactions to the Nasr as a product of that logic. As the article will highlight, some Indian responses, such as interest in developing warfighting capabilities and ending the no-first-use pledge, signify potential departures from assured retaliation logic.

6 F. O DONNELL A third principal area of the literature seeks to understand the threats to South Asian regional stability posed by new nuclear force technologies. A particular area of focus is on the challenges Pakistan faces in deploying Nasr units. These include ensuring secure command-and-control, sufficient Nasr force protection, the disputed availability of effective Nasr targets, and managing escalation control with Nasrs in the field (Krepon, 2013; Sankaran, 2015). This literature, however, lacks a detailed analysis of how the Nasr s emergence is nevertheless affecting Indian strategic perceptions of Pakistan, which this article provides. Finally, a fourth area of the literature surveys this South Asian strategic environment and concludes that there are substantial opportunities to develop confidence-building and arms control measures between New Delhi and Islamabad, a point that this article agrees with (Hagerty, 2014). Rather than merely articulating similar recommendations, my article also develops this literature by uniquely evaluating the extent of actual interest in these initiatives in the various Indian responses to the Nasr challenge. Nuclear deterrence conceptions and India s choice In planning nuclear doctrine and force development, a central question for states is to determine which declaratory policy, force structuring and numerical and destructive strength options will establish nuclear deterrence against adversaries. This question has been succinctly framed as what deters? While this is one of the core academic and policy concerns regarding nuclear deterrence, answers to this question fall into two principal streams of thought. One maximalist stream, given fullest scholarly expression by Albert Wohlstetter and policy implementation in U.S. nuclear planning, is organized around the assumption that nuclear deterrence is only achieved against an adversary on the basis of proving numerical and destructive force superiority. This stream has tended to recommend and produce large nuclear forces that are diversified in order to be able to fight and win limited as well as strategic nuclear wars. The second stream, particularly represented in academic discourse by P.M.S. Blackett and McGeorge Bundy, and in policy expression by the nuclear deterrence approaches traditionally employed by India and China, can be termed minimum deterrence. This latter stream holds that nuclear deterrence is achieved by possession of only a limited number of warheads and delivery vehicles, which create sufficient nuclear retaliatory risk in adversary decision-maker perceptions to achieve deterrent effect. This particularly differs from maximalist deterrence in its assumption that deterrence is created without necessarily securing numerical or destructive superiority against adversary nuclear capabilities. Minimum deterrence postures are thus less sensitive to the force size and structure of adversaries. Following this logic,

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 7 the minimum deterrence concept tends to recommend smaller nuclear forces, and largely rejects development of limited nuclear warfighting concepts and force capabilities (Basrur, 2014; Bundy, 1969, pp. 1 20; Wohlstetter, 1958). India has traditionally aligned with this second stream of minimum deterrence. An Indian government security planning committee, led by Chief of Army Staff K. Sundarji, was commissioned in 1985 to recommend a prospective future Indian nuclear force policy. A second committee, established in 1990 by Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister V.S. Arunachalam, studied potential Indian responses to an adversary nuclear attack. A leading defense expert and member of both panels, K. Subrahmanyam, described the underlying philosophy of their proposed responses as minimum deterrence. These committees assumed that India would only employ nuclear weapons in response to adversary first use, and as such did not explore potential doctrinal or force development options for Indian first use or limited nuclear war (Rajagopalan & Mishra, 2014, pp. 17 18, 43). Following India s 1998 nuclear tests, the draft nuclear doctrine produced by the Indian National Security Advisory Board (Government of India, 1999) established pledges of no-first-use, punitive retaliation to adversary first use, and a force posturing concept of credible minimum deterrence. This concept can be read as meaning the construction of a small nuclear force that is nevertheless able to deter those of adversaries as the latter evolve. The Indian Defense Minister announced in July 1998 that India would avoid developing tactical nuclear warfighting concepts and capabilities, as India s nuclear force role would be limited to that of a strategic deterrent (Dhar, 1998). Speaking in November 1999, the External Affairs Minister affirmed a core concept of minimum deterrence, that parity (of forces) is not essential for deterrence (Arms Control Today, 1999). These minimum deterrence characteristics of Indian nuclear thought and practice were largely continued with the issuance of India s first public official nuclear doctrine in January 2003. This doctrine retained the no-first-use pledge, although loosened its criteria to now also permit a nuclear response to adversary biological or chemical attack on Indian territory or Indian forces operating anywhere (Government of India, 2003). As the most recent public iteration of Indian nuclear doctrine, the 2003 document is still aligned more with the minimum deterrence rather than the maximalist school of thought. The doctrine is described as credible minimum deterrence, and a no-first-use policy and unilateral testing moratorium remains in force. Having analyzed the dominant minimum deterrence tradition of Indian nuclear thought and practice, this article will now turn to explore how Indian civilian policy-makers, military planners and experts in Indian strategic elite discourse are responding to the Nasr challenge to Indian security.

8 F. O DONNELL It will assess the implications of these responses for Indian nuclear deterrence and relevant foreign policy objectives. Indian official responses Indian civilian policy-maker responses: nuclear conservatism The Indian government has recently faced domestic pressure to revise its 2003 nuclear doctrine, with the Nasr and general numerically growing nuclear forces of Pakistan and China as a core factor driving this public concern. In April 2013, Ambassador Shyam Saran (2013), then head of India s National Security Advisory Board, delivered a speech on Indian nuclear policy that has been widely perceived in India as a description of current policy-maker perspectives. Saran directly addressed the Nasr challenge to Indian nuclear doctrine and especially to its massive retaliation pledge, given that Pakistan now threatens to render Indian massive retaliation incredible in its lack of proportionality as a response to limited Nasr use. Saran defended the existing Indian nuclear doctrine, arguing that India continued to draw no distinction between adversary tactical and strategic weapons and would issue a massive retaliatory response to any adversary nuclear use. Indian policy-makers reportedly conducted an assessment of the Nasr and implications of its use for India s massive retaliation commitment in 2011, concluding that these developments did not merit changes to the nuclear doctrine (Singh, 2016). There are indeed few signs that the above premises of Indian nuclear doctrine will be imminently revised in light of the Nasr challenge (Senior Indian official, personal communication, June 2015). However, such thinking does not appear universal within Indian official circles. National Security Advisor Ajit Doval recently referred only to credible deterrence in describing India s future posturing intentions, omitting any reference to the minimum deterrence concept (Iyer-Mitra, 2014). An Indian analyst has claimed that this intervention reflects a growing official interest in demonstrating the destructive credibility of Indian nuclear forces rather than continued focus on their minimum status and roles (Iyer- Mitra, 2014). Focusing solely on credibility could entail building a numerically larger and more technically diversified Indian nuclear force, with a higher readiness level than would be required under a minimum deterrence perspective. This would make reactive nuclear force expansions by Pakistan and China more likely than under the present Indian minimum deterrence concept. These outcomes would undermine relevant declared Indian foreign policy objectives of advancing a global image as a responsible nuclear power with a minimalist conception of nuclear weapons, and of ensuring a stable South Asia conducive to economic growth (Government of India, 2013, 2014).

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 9 The balance of publicly available evidence still suggests that the Indian civilian policy-maker response to the Nasr will entail continued adherence to the 2003 nuclear doctrine and its underlying minimum deterrence logic in the near term. However, the emergence of Pakistan s full-spectrum deterrence concept has nevertheless placed pressures on Indian nuclear doctrine that appear to be subjecting its core logic to internal civilian policy-maker debate. Indian military responses: fighting toward and through adversary nuclear attack The Indian Army has in recent years focused on development of offensive conventional concepts and related operational planning in order to pose a rapid conventional strike threat to targets within Pakistan. The major stimulus for these initiatives constituted the attacks on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 by Pakistan-sponsored militants, and the perceived following inability of the Indian military to quickly mobilize conventional forces to potentially strike Pakistani targets before counter-mobilization could occur. The Indian Army developed its initial response to this challenge with its 2004 doctrine. This doctrine refocused planning attentions toward converting its major strike corps into a greater number of smaller integrated battle groups, able to quickly mobilize, enter and hold limited areas of Pakistani territory within 72 hours of the issuance of political authorization (Ladwig, 2008). This approach contrasts with the strict rules of engagement against crossing the Line of Control, borne of Indian fears of nuclear escalation, which had characterized the Indian response to the 1999 Kargil war. By comparison, this new concept reflects a greater military confidence that Indian forces can indeed fight and win a conventional war on Pakistani territory safe from nuclear escalation. The extent to which the exact recommendations of the 2004 Army doctrine such as building integrated battle groups characterize current Army planning is unclear. However, its underlying concept that the Army should now focus particularly on rapid conventional strikes to destroy targets and seize and hold territory within Pakistani territory has visibly informed recent Army exercises, and is now titled the proactive war strategy (Pandit, 2016). The emergence of the Nasr has now given added impetus to these planning initiatives, as the Nasr is specifically designed to halt any Indian proactive attack through tactical first nuclear use. The Indian Army has conducted several major exercises to test new proactive maneuvers and scenarios. Exercises have focused upon retaining cohesion and achieving mission objectives despite adversary NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) attacks. The most recent Shatrujeet exercise, concluded in April 2016, was conducted to ensure the Army with Air Force support

10 F. O DONNELL could sustain the momentum of a proactive operation throughout a scenario involving adversary NBC use. Army planners estimate substantial room on the escalation ladder for Indian conventional operations against Pakistan. The chief of Threat Assessment and Strategic Operations in the Indian Army Perspective Planning Directorate outlined in 2014 a five-rung escalation ladder of predicted Pakistani nuclear escalatory responses to a military crisis involving India. The lowest rung on this ladder involved nuclear warnings delivered through media, followed by a more explicit nuclear threat as the second rung. The third rung constituted a demonstration nuclear explosion, proceeding to a fourth rung of use of tactical nuclear weapons on Pakistani soil. The final rung features Pakistani nuclear attacks on Indian cities. This ladder evidently anticipates first Nasr use against Indian forces only at the penultimate rung (Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, 2014). This further highlights Army confidence in its ability to fight conventionally on Pakistani soil undeterred by the full-spectrum deterrence threat of tactical nuclear use. Army commissioning projects also signify preparation of forces to conventionally fight though adversary NBC strikes. Indian Army tanks, vehicles, artillery and surface-to-air missile system units are being equipped with NBC defensive shielding and air filtration systems. Other assets in Army possession include command nuclear field shelters, individual NBC protective suits, radiation dosimeters and decontamination equipment (Ghoshal, 2015, pp. 7 8). Commissioning plans also include the induction of the Prahaar and Brahmos short-range missiles. The possible nuclear missions of some of these missiles present and future are unclear and openly debated. However, it is notable that the Prahaar in particular is frequently viewed within Pakistan as constituting India s equivalent to the Nasr (Khan & Khan, 2016, p. 144). A Pakistani nuclear official included tactical missiles in detailing specific Indian capabilities that exacerbate Pakistan s nuclear threat perceptions in May 2016 (Dawn, 2016). Indian operations under this new proactive approach therefore carry much greater nuclear escalatory risk if implemented in the next crisis, as compared to the defensive posture and rules of engagement that characterized the Indian 1999 Kargil war response. Indeed, Indian proactive concepts and planning are partly driving Pakistani demand for tactical nuclear weapons and strategies even before such Indian initiatives have been applied in actual conflict (Iqbal, 2015; Kidwai & Lavoy, 2015). Indian replacement of the proactive concept with one focused on defensive eviction of invading forces would therefore help reduce South Asian nuclear tensions, and accordingly Indian and regional demand for larger and more technically diverse nuclear arsenals. This approach would thus more effectively bolster India s minimum deterrence nuclear concept, while supporting

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 11 Indian foreign policy objectives of obtaining global recognition as a responsible nuclear power and of reducing regional security tensions that threaten economic growth potential. This exploration of Indian civilian policy-maker and military responses to the Nasr challenge has identified substantial support for continued adherence to India s minimum nuclear deterrence concept. However, it has also highlighted that there also exist revisionist pressures the civilian interest in credible deterrence and military proactive concept development and planning that heighten regional nuclear escalatory risk and thus undermine Indian minimum nuclear deterrence and major foreign policy interests. Having surveyed official responses, this article will now turn to evaluate the meaning of the Nasr for Indian minimum nuclear deterrence as perceived by experts within non-governmental Indian strategic elite discourse, and the implications of their following recommendations for Indian deterrence and foreign policy objectives. In assessing the below opinion streams, the article does not advance a causal claim that dominant nuclear opinion streams directly generate policy outcomes. However, it recognizes that Indian decision-makers are attentive to strategic elite opinion, and that this discourse thus provides one among many inputs into the policy-making process (Baru, 2014, pp. 32, 99, 136, 180, 204 205, 229). It is therefore relevant to study opinion streams as constituting an input into the nuclear policy-making process. Indian strategic elite discourse Stream one: minimum deterrence with deepened conventional proactive strike planning While none of the following three opinion streams represent a full rejection of minimum deterrence policies, they are labeled according to their emphasis on minimalist or maximalist logic in their policy recommendations. The first and most popular stream of strategic elite opinion argues that the Nasr and the prospect of Pakistani full-spectrum deterrence should not compel an Indian deviation from its traditional focus on minimum deterrence and current nuclear doctrine and posture. In line with this perspective, experts also agree that India should not develop its own tactical nuclear weapons as a response. Nevertheless, these analysts also claim that the Nasr does point to significant shortcomings in Indian nuclear and conventional deterrence, and that India should take measures to enhance its nuclear readiness and the credibility of its conventional strike capability. This stream of opinion is built upon two principal pillars of argument. The first is that a substantial revision of Indian nuclear doctrine in response to the Nasr, including ending the no-first-use pledge, developing Indian tactical

12 F. O DONNELL nuclear weapons, and generally assigning nuclear weapons a broader role in Indian defense policy, would constitute too much of a departure from the Indian tradition of minimum deterrence to be seriously considered. The principal recommended revision is to replace the massive retaliation commitment with one of assured retaliation or punitive retaliation. Analysts tend to highlight that the massive retaliation commitment has credibility issues, as it formally commits Indian decision-makers to launch a devastating widespread nuclear attack in response to even a single localized Nasr strike. The parallels with similar credibility criticisms regarding the 1950s US massive retaliation pledge are occasionally highlighted in the Indian debate. The latter punitive and assured terms would permit Indian decisionmakers more flexibility to guarantee an unacceptable response to the adversary, including flexibility for this response to be conventional in delivery (Joshi, Manoj, Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, personal communication, February 2015; Menon, Raja, former National Security Advisory Board member, personal communication, November 2013; Singh, 2015). These proposals form the extent of Nasr-driven nuclear doctrinal revisions suggested by this stream of opinion, and its overall nuclear perspective can be characterized as bolstering Indian minimum deterrence in this new context. The second pillar of argument within this stream is to highlight the impracticality of limited nuclear war in the South Asian context. This often includes highlighting the extreme proximity of major population centers such as Amritsar and Lahore to the border areas that would likely constitute the tactical nuclear battlefield. In this reading, Indian efforts to develop limited nuclear warfighting capabilities and related doctrinal concepts would therefore not just be jarring from the standpoint of its traditional approach to nuclear strategy, but also pointless in geographical terms (Rajagopalan, Rajeswari, Head of Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative, Observer Research Foundation, personal communication, February 2015; Mishra, Sitakanta, Research Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, personal communication, February 2015). While analysts in this stream therefore argue for nuclear doctrinal and posturing conservatism, this does not extend to suggesting that India should not adjust its general defense policies in any way to challenges posed by the Nasr and full-spectrum deterrence. Indeed, several experts in this stream have emphasized that India should focus additional attention and resources on developing proactive conventional strike capabilities and on improving nuclear readiness. One strand of this argument suggests that a proactive cross-border attack into regular Pakistani territory may now be too dangerous a prospect in a battlefield now potentially featuring Nasr units. Rather than considering the ultimate value of proactive offensive concepts in a nuclear South Asia, analysts

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 13 instead argue that India refocus such concepts on targets within Pakistan-governed Kashmir, as Pakistan might find it more politically difficult to use nuclear weapons on territory it claims than on its regular territory (Rajagopalan, 2014, pp. 201 202). Another form of increased focus on proactive conventional operations has been made by a retired Indian nuclear force commander, who proposes air strikes to eradicate all Pakistani tactical nuclear missiles immediately prior to an Indian cross-border ground offensive (Shankar, 2014b, p. 34). However, these suggestions would expand the proactive planning that is presently being conducted by the Indian military, and thus continue to build regional nuclear escalatory risk. A second suggested reform is to publicly emphasize India s nuclear retaliatory credibility and command chain resilience. Specific proposals in this regard include publicizing details of peacetime nuclear force command review meetings, announcing the developmental intentions and purpose of specific nuclear force capabilities, and building communication mechanisms with the Pakistani nuclear force command. Such measures will also underline that the political will does exist in India to order and execute a retaliatory nuclear strike (Chandra, 2014; Sethi, 2016, p. 67; Shankar, 2014a). Nevertheless, adopting these policies together would have the ultimate effect of deepening Indian proactive strike planning while emphasizing nuclear readiness. This could have an escalatory effect on Pakistani threat perceptions and propel further efforts to strengthen and develop new nuclear forces in response. These actions would in turn undermine Indian official and public confidence in the integrity of its extant conventional and nuclear deterrence concepts, producing additional demand within India for a more maximalist nuclear concept and associated force structure and policies. In generating these outcomes, these initiatives would also undermine Indian foreign policy objectives of promoting regional stability and of proving its status as a responsible nuclear actor. As the largest stream of Indian strategic opinion regarding responses to the Nasr, the strong support of analysts in this stream for continuing minimum nuclear deterrence policies highlights the underlying strength of this deterrence conception in Indian strategic thought. Nevertheless, some of the recommendations of authors within this stream to bolster perceived shortcomings in Indian conventional force capabilities and nuclear resilience contain potential escalatory implications that could undermine Indian minimum deterrence. Stream two: minimum deterrence with new arms control commitments Analysts in this second stream share the assumption of the first stream that, despite the new nuclear threats to India posed by Pakistani full-spectrum

14 F. O DONNELL deterrence, India s nuclear doctrine and posturing approach must remain that of minimum deterrence. Indeed, experts within these two streams have a largely similar analysis regarding the paths India should avoid in responding to the Nasr. These include conclusions that no-first-use and ensuring unacceptable retaliatory damage, although not necessarily massive damage, should remain the Indian doctrine; that tactical nuclear weapon development would be irreconcilable with India s traditional conception of minimum nuclear deterrence; that geographical proximity renders limited nuclear war impossible in the South Asian context and that nuclear weapons generally have primarily limited political rather than diversified warfighting roles (Basrur, 2014; Biswas, 2015a; Ghoshal, 2015; Gupta, 2014). Experts in this stream also agree with those of the first stream that maintaining effective conventional defenses should constitute a primary element of the Indian response to the Nasr. However, they begin to diverge on the form that this conventional planning should take. While the dominant tendency of scholars in the first stream is to emphasize deepening proactive concept development and extending its strike planning toward Pakistan-governed Kashmir, those in this second stream tend to evidence generally less appetite for such ambitious operational concepts. Indeed, a common conclusion in this stream is that proactive conventional operations are ultimately too destabilizing to plan for in nuclear South Asia. As military responses are burdened by excessive risk, India should instead reorient its conventional forces around principally defensive missions (Basrur, 2011, p. 2; Biswas, 2015a). This stream is therefore differentiated from the first stream by its more conservative approach toward conventional force planning in post-nasr South Asia. A second major difference is an increased emphasis within this stream on new Indian arms control measures as a core element of its preferred Indian response to the Nasr. Specific frequent proposals in this regard include improving strategic dialog with Pakistan; agreeing non-deployment or banning of short-range nuclear-capable delivery vehicles and a bilateral nofirst-use policy with Pakistan; and greater Indian commitment toward finalizing an international Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, so as to cap regional fissile material production and thus ultimate nuclear force sizes (Basrur, 2011, p. 2; Ghoshal, 2015, pp. 8 9; Gupta, 2014). Such a dedicated and well-publicized Indian arms control outreach to Pakistan could reduce bilateral nuclear threat perceptions and arms development, as compared to the alternative emphasis of the first stream on strengthening Indian cross-border conventional strike planning and nuclear readiness. This would also support Indian foreign policy efforts to be viewed as a responsible nuclear power and build regional stability conducive to economic growth. Indeed, if talks with Pakistan on these proposals do not

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 15 progress, India also has the capability to declare many of these policies on a unilateral basis (Rajen & Vannoni, 2005, pp. 100 102). Adopting such a response is not without its own challenges, however. Indian defense planners and commanders would need to visibly reassure the Indian public, through exercises and declarations, that conventional deterrence can be achieved against Pakistan without a proactive stance and with a primarily defensive posture. Already a difficulty due to military technology and ammunition shortfalls, this would become additionally challenging in the wake of another major Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attack within India, or reports of growing Nasr deployments. Nevertheless, adopting the overall approach recommended by this stream of opinion would be in closest conformity with India s nuclear minimum deterrence logic. Implementing this approach would also more closely support Indian foreign policy goals of advancing efforts to promote regional stability and bolster its qualitative policy record as a responsible nuclear state. Stream three: adopting maximalist nuclear logic The first two streams of strategic discourse have tended to mostly adhere to India s traditional minimum deterrence concept, largely differing on whether substantial proactive strike capabilities are needed to secure general deterrence in the Nasr age, and on the merits of new Indian arms control initiatives. However, a third stream has recommended a more radical departure for Indian nuclear doctrinal and force planning in light of the Nasr. While the first stream remains the most popular school of thought, this stream, as the most revisionist toward India s minimum deterrence concept, is notable for the number of former senior officials with experience of foreign and nuclear policy-making in its membership. The unifying assumption propelling the arguments of this stream is that the Nasr, combining with the general growing nuclear forces of Pakistan and China, has produced an overall strategic environment that India s 2003 nuclear doctrine is no longer appropriate for. Restoring Indian deterrence in this context will necessitate an expanded role for nuclear weapons in Indian defense than is permitted under the current Indian nuclear doctrine. The recommendations of this stream notably do not include calls for nuclear numerical and destructive force superiority over Pakistan, and thus do not constitute a complete break with minimum deterrence. Nevertheless, in its views of future Indian nuclear force roles, this stream places the greatest comparative emphasis on maximalist deterrence logic of the major Indian responses to the Nasr surveyed in this article. A nuclear expert close to Army doctrinal discussions has argued that Indian deterrence would be better delivered if the massive retaliation pledge was removed to permit a new approach of flexible retaliation. This new

16 F. O DONNELL nuclear policy should be combined with development of Indian tactical nuclear weapons and additional military planning to fight either through conventional or nuclear operations through a nuclear war. These reforms would end a traditional and unwarranted distinction between the nuclear and conventional spheres in India. By allowing greater doctrinal and operational flexibility to plan and conduct conventional, nuclear or combined operations at multiple escalatory levels of conflict as the situation requires, the overall credibility of Indian general deterrence would in this view be enhanced (Ahmed, 2015, pp. 18 20). Additional contributions have been made in this vein, arguing that India should retain the no-first-use policy, but that deliver a more proportionate and limited, rather than massive, nuclear response to adversary first use. This can be alternately achieved by development of a new Pakistan-specific long-range nuclear cruise missile, or by assigning a new general counterforce targeting strategy to existing Indian nuclear platforms, rather than the massive retaliation targeting focus on adversary population centers (Biswas, 2015b, pp. 683 695; Sawhney, 2014). However, maintaining this distinction between the nuclear and conventional spheres lies at the heart of minimum deterrence logic: that nuclear deterrence is achieved by possession of only a small and retaliatory nuclear force and not through a diversified suite of tactical and strategic weapons. As previously discussed, this distinction is built into Indian s assured retaliation nuclear doctrine, in its no-first-use commitments and refusal to differentiate between adversary tactical and strategic nuclear use. In this way, arguments in this stream are the most revisionist toward Indian nuclear doctrine and begin to apply the assumptions of maximalist rather than minimum nuclear deterrence thought. Other voices in this stream evidence assumptions that India s no-first-use policy must be either significantly undercut or formally replaced in order to restore a perceived loss of Indian deterrence against Pakistan. A panel of influential retired senior Indian foreign, defense and military officials, writing a new proposed nuclear doctrine in 2012, recommended that the no-first-use policy be retained, but would redefine adversary first use as now including mating component systems and deploying warheads with the intent of using them if required. This would therefore permit an Indian nuclear attack in response to intelligence that adversary nuclear-capable forces were being alerted, prepared or even moved (Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2012, p. 6; Joshi, 2015). Implementing this new version of no-first-use would likely require significant Indian investment in early warning and counterforce nuclear targeting capabilities and delivery platforms, alongside a higher general level of nuclear alert to ensure readiness to strike in response to perceived suspicious adversary force movements. These are the kinds of policies that are normally

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 17 more reflective of an overall policy of flexible use rather than no-first-use, and have indeed been advocated by a former Indian nuclear forces commander to support his preferred transition from no-first-use toward an ambiguous nuclear threshold (Nagal, 2014). These proposals by authoritative former officials have been joined by other senior policy-maker voices making similar, albeit more veiled, arguments. A former National Security Advisor and retired Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee have separately argued that India will need a suitable strategy to respond to the Nasr, including a robust discussion of no-first use; and that no-first-use should be given reflection at the highest level in light of the Nasr (Narayanan, 2015; Prakash, 2014, p. 4). A former official with confidence in the wisdom of a policy commitment is unlikely to publicly call for robust discussion of it. These latter suggestions therefore share the overarching assumption of this stream that credible Indian nuclear deterrence in the Nasr age now requires development of credible limited nuclear warfighting platforms and concepts, rather than continuing to limit the Indian nuclear force posture and role to that of assured retaliatory credibility toward Pakistan at minimum nuclear force levels. As the most substantial departure from India s tradition of minimum deterrence nuclear thought, adopting this approach would mark the most significant change to Indian nuclear policy since the conduct of nuclear tests in 1998. India s nuclear concept would adopt a greater reliance on maximalist logic, and require a numerically larger force with a greater range of tactical and strategic delivery platforms than at present. Building such an arsenal would necessitate increasing military fissile material production. The commissioning of new nuclear platforms with potential associated warhead miniaturization would place additional internal pressure to end India s nuclear testing moratorium, given reliability assurance needs for the new platforms. This would overall entail a greater role for nuclear weapons in general Indian defense. These developments would further heighten the salience of nuclear weapons in India-Pakistan strategic competition, and create additional imperatives for Pakistan to further escalate its nuclear force production to counteract these Indian initiatives. This could also produce similar pressures on Chinese nuclear force sizing and policies. Finally, this approach would also ultimately not remove the Pakistani tactical nuclear threat, but instead deepen it by introducing equivalent Indian weapons into the region with the attendant complications and dangers that tactical nuclear weapons bring to the operational environment. While being counterproductive to Indian security, these actions would also undermine Indian foreign policy objectives. Effective removal of the no-firstuse pledge, tactical nuclear weapons development, a greater prospect of new ballistic missile and nuclear tests, and a numerically expanding nuclear