Synopsis Policy Paper for Danish-Palestinian Partnership 2016-2018 DRAFT VERSION 07-10-2014 1
Table of Content 1 Overall Vision... 3 2 The National Context... 3 2.1 Political Context... 3 2.2 Economic Context... 5 3 Strategic choices... 6 4 Suggested areas of interventions... 7 4.1 Political relations... 7 4.2 Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance... 9 4.3 Commercial Assistance... 11 5 Results... 12 6 M&E framework... 12 7 Communication... 13 Annex - Process Action Plan... 144 2
1 Overall Vision The overall objective of the Danish engagement in Palestine is to support the realization of a two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, encompassing the State of Israel and an independent, democratic sovereign and contiguous State of Palestine living side by side in peace and security. This entails working actively to establish the foundation for a Palestinian state, including the necessary state and municipal structures as well as a stronger economic basis. In addition, Denmark will work to counter developments that further undermine the prospect of a two-state solution, not least the continued Israeli settlement activity. The latter has continued, despite repeated warnings over the years that the window of opportunity for a two-state solution is rapidly closing. In parallel, the other key objective of Denmark s engagement is to help improve the human rights and daily living conditions for Palestinians. The basic principles of non-discrimination, participation and inclusion, transparency, and accountability will be guiding these efforts. Until a negotiated two-state solution has been reached, Israel, as the occupying power, bears the primary responsibility for guaranteeing the human rights of the Palestinian population in the occupied territories However, Palestine has also clearly signalled through the accession to a wide range of international human rights conventions and treaties, without reservations that it wants to be measured against the highest international law and human rights standards on issues, where it exercises control. The political split between the key Palestinian factions, PLO/Fatah and Hamas, remains a significant challenge. Denmark, in line with the rest of the EU, has consistently supported intra-palestinian reconciliation on clear and certain terms. Any Palestinian government should uphold the principle of non-violence, and remain committed to achieving a negotiated peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict accepting previous agreements and obligations, including Israel s legitimate right to exist. On that basis, reconciliation is an essential element in reaching a two-state solution and ensuring genuine, democratic elections for all Palestinians. The increased threat from extreme groups in parts of the Arab world makes the need for progress on the Middle East peace process all the more urgent. Among Palestinians, especially the younger generations, there is a risk of radicalization if the conflict remains unsolved. The vast majority of Palestinians can be expected to reject extreme measures, but it only requires small groups with a radical agenda to change the dynamics of the conflict. In the broader picture, the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also used in the propaganda of extremist, militant groups in other parts of the region. A peaceful resolution to the Middle East peace process is therefore also in Denmark s direct own interest. The conflict in Gaza during the summer of 2014, the third war in less than six years, clearly illustrated the tragic consequences of status quo, both for Israelis and Palestinians. Due to both the dynamics between Israel and Palestine, and the intra-palestinian challenges, the future is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. Multiple different scenarios can be envisaged. Accordingly, it is important that the Danish engagement contains a sufficient level of flexibility and that a wide range of political and developmental tools are applied. Denmark must be able to react if opportunities that can help advance the overall two-state perspective and improve the daily conditions for Palestinians suddenly arise. 2 The National Context 2.1 Political Context The core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is political. A conflict focused on territory. The solution requires a comprehensive political solution which takes into account the interests of 3
the parties, the wider region and external stakeholders. For Denmark and the EU, the basic parameters for a comprehensive, just and lasting solution are based on UN resolutions, including all relevant Security Council resolutions and in particular 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 1515 (2003), as well as on EU policy, most notably the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 8 December 2009, 14 May 2012 as well as 12 May and 22 July 2014. Developments on the ground have made the achievement of a two-state solution increasingly difficult. Enhanced geographical fragmentation is a consequence of the continued Israeli occupation and expansion of the illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank incl. East Jerusalem. More than 150 settlements, as well as approximately 100 so-called settlement outposts, have been established in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. It is estimated that more than 500.000 settlers now live in this area. In addition, extensive restrictions on Palestinian movement, and the reservation of land in the West Bank for settler roads, training areas for the Israeli security forces, nature reserves etc., significantly limit the Palestinian access to and influence over the Palestinian territories. Palestinians are only allowed to use 1% of area C for spatial development. The separation barrier in the West Bank and East Jerusalem where the planned route leaves approximately 85 per cent of the wall on the Palestinian side of the Green Line is part of the challenge. The administrative division of the West Bank into areas A, B and C still constitutes the politicalgeographical framework under which development takes place. Israeli control over security enforcement and planning processes in Area C and East Jerusalem gives rise to a number of concerns. This especially relates to the number of demolitions of Palestinian structures, the often limited follow-up to acts of settler violence, denial of building permits for Palestinians and the increased number of unilaterally revoked residency rights for Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem. To this can be added the restrictions related to the blockade of Gaza imposed by Israel in 2007 which limits the freedom of movement of the population and essentially cuts off the Gaza Strip from its traditional export markets in Israel and the West Bank. Another challenge is the very limited faith among Palestinians in the peace process between Israel and Palestine. Several rounds of unsuccessful negotiations have in Palestinian eyes mainly led to continued settlement expansions. In other words, a continuous change of facts on the ground. Consequently, an increasing number of Palestinians prefer unilateral steps such as pursuing membership of UN agencies as well as bringing forward cases against Israel before the International Criminal Court. For many Palestinians the UN track does not constitute an alternative to negotiations. The track is rather seen as an empowerment strategy, where it is one of the only ways to improve the Palestinian bargaining position. However, despite the suspension of the latest US led peace talks, the majority of Palestinians still favour a two state solution to a one state scenario. Internal Palestinian factors also constitute a significant challenge. Not least the split between PLO/Fatah on one side and Hamas on the other. This has led to an increasing democratic deficit created by the absence of parliamentary and presidential elections and a nonfunctioning Palestinian Legislative Council. It has also prevented the Palestinians from presenting a unified position internationally thus further harming the Palestinian cause. The EU therefore considered it a positive step when a reconciliation agreement between the movements was signed in April 2014 and a technocratic, consensus government was formed shortly after under the leadership of President Abbas and with a commitment to the so-called Quartet Principles including the principle of non-violence and recognition of Israel s legitimate right to exist. This does not mean that the long standing rivalry between especially PLO/Fatah and Hamas will suddenly disappear. There are many challenges ahead, including the integration of fiscal systems, harmonisation of legal framework and the reintegration of security services and administrations. Setbacks are to be expected, since spoilers on both sides will be ready to 4
undermine the fragile process. Even in a best-case scenario trust will have to be built gradually. However, as the 2014 Gaza-conflict has clearly shown, there are no military solutions to the challenge posed by Hamas and other militant groups in Gaza. A viable, longterm solution must be based on an inclusive Palestinian political process that fully allows the legitimate Palestinian Authority to return to Gaza. 2.2 Economic Context Palestine falls in the lower middle income category and is thus part of the poorest part of the Middle East and North Africa region. Overall, the economy can be characterized by economic stagnation, fiscal fragility and mass unemployment. According to the World Bank, political uncertainty and Israeli restrictions on movement and access are the main reasons why the Palestinian economy is unable to take off. Since the formation of the Palestinian Authority 20 years ago, growth in the Palestinian economy has been closely linked to the inflow of donor funds, especially budget support. The period of high economic growth that the West Bank and Gaza enjoyed in the period of 2007-11 has, however, come to a halt, and growth started to decrease in 2012. During the first quarter of 2014 the economy went into recession at an overall rate of -1 per cent, especially due to the Gaza economy shrinking at -4 per cent as a result of the closing of the tunnels. In addition to the restrictions on movement and access and the political instability, the fragmented regulatory business environments and the divide between Gaza and the West Bank have led to slow real growth and thereby high unemployment. The economy is concentrated on services and construction, which constitute about two thirds of the economy, whereas productive sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing only make up around 4-5 per cent of GDP, respectively. The blockade of Gaza imposed by Israel in 2007 has led to what the UN characterises as dedevelopment of the area. In 2013 Gaza exported less than 200 truckloads of agricultural produce compared to 15,000 in 2000. The outlook for economic growth is bleak reflecting the economic impact of the latest Gaza conflict, such as the ruining of most of Gaza s farm land and destruction of factories and fishing boats, as well as the continuing stagnation in the West Bank. For 2015, IMF expects the real GDP growth per capita to decrease both in Gaza and in the West Bank. In 2013, labour force participation stood at 44 per cent with close to 70 per cent for men, but only 17 per cent for women. The 2013 unemployment was close to 20 per cent in the West Bank and 33 per cent in Gaza, but has gone up, especially in Gaza. Youth unemployment is soaring, particularly in Gaza, where 60 percent of young people in the workforce were unemployed, as opposed to close to 30 percent in the West Bank. Female unemployment stood at 35 per cent. Unsurprisingly, poverty levels are high with one in four being food insecure. In Gaza 80 per cent of the population receive some kind of food assistance. PA is facing a very serious fiscal situation with budget deficit higher than expected, while external budget support is falling. PA is making a concerted effort to strengthen its fiscal position, including steps to raise domestic revenues and control expenditures. Nevertheless, the Palestinian Authority is building up arrears to the private sector and is resorting to domestic borrowing to finance its huge deficit, estimated at USD 350 million for 2014. This policy undermines economic activity and tax collection efforts, and it has a negative impact on private sector productive investments. In addition, the Palestinian Authority has only limited control of its revenues, as Israel controls the clearance revenues (import duties, external taxes, etc.). The IMF has warned that fiscal risks for the Palestinian Authority are on the rise and, if they materialize, would raise the financing gap further. The current trend of economic 5
decline and reduction in donor aid is likely to further aggravate the Palestinian fiscal situation, potentially jeopardizing gains made in recent years in institution-building. Denmark concurs with the repeated World Bank assessments that if Palestine and the PA maintain their current performance in institution building and delivery of public services, it is well positioned for the establishment of a state at any point in the near future, when it comes to administrative and governance aspects, particularly within the West Bank. However, without a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict there is a risk that these achievements will be undermined. 3 Strategic choices The Danish engagement aims to support the realization of an independent Palestinian state within the framework of a two-state solution with a robust economy, sustainable institutions and good governance at national and municipal level as well as to improve the human rights and daily living conditions for Palestinians. However, in order to be seen as a serious cooperation partner with sufficient clout, the Danish support must focus on a limited number of key objectives and be carried out in close cooperation with other partners. 1. EU a cornerstone in the Danish engagement: The cooperation within the EU is a cornerstone of the Danish engagement in Palestine and in the Middle East Peace Process. Both within the political and developmental spheres. Denmark will operate within the general framework set out by international law and EU policies. Within this framework, Denmark will be able, as has been the case in the past, to launch new initiatives either independently or with a small group of countries when it is seen as advancing the overall objectives. Special focus will be given to critical issues, such as East Jerusalem, Palestinian access to Area C, lifting of the blockade of Gaza, the illegal Israeli settlements, and the improvement of human rights for the Palestinian population. In addition, it is essential that the Palestinian Territory is considered one entity comprising of the West Bank, incl. East Jerusalem, and Gaza. Denmark will continue to closely monitor the situation on the ground and its broader implications for the realization of the two-state solution, and will act accordingly. 2. Build on existing development cooperation: The Danish development cooperation with Palestine will to a large extent be based on a continuation of the priorities and activities set out in the Danish-Palestinian Strategy paper 2014-15. The latter strategy included two immediate objectives: (i) Palestinian state-building and citizens rights and (ii) the advancement of equal economic opportunities. In order to have an impact in complex areas like these, a long-term, sustained engagement is needed. Therefore, the country program for 2016-18 will build on previous activities, achievements and lessons learned in these areas. The findings from the on-going evaluation of the Danish assistance to Palestine 2009-13 will be taken into consideration, when formulating the country program for 2016-18 and new opportunities for meaningful activities will be examined. The impact of the development cooperation will be enhanced by forging strategic alliances, especially joint approaches with like-minded countries, IFIs, the UN and civil society, thereby contributing to a less dispersed donor landscape and to supporting stronger checks and balances. It should, however, also be noted that the Danish assistance is based on the assumption that a two-state solution can be achieved. If this prospect disappears, it would lead to serious questions regarding how to support the Palestinian cause. In the policy paper for 2016-18, support for human rights, while always an integral part of Danish assistance to Palestine, will be) added as a third immediate development objective. It is an important principle for the Danish engagement that the ongoing 6
dialogue with the duty-bearers, is complemented by concrete activities to help improve the situation and strengthen human rights organisations, as the representatives of the rights holders. The aim is to achieve increased influence by being an active partner in this field. An increased emphasis will be placed on the efforts to stimulate economic growth and create jobs in line with PA priorities. In addition, new activities aimed at strengthening local democracy will be developed. During the current phase 2014-2015, Denmark joins the EU initiative of supporting interventions in Area C and this support will be continued in follow up to relevant FAC conclusions. 3. Flexible approach necessary: The development potential of Palestine is considerable, but it can only be fully realized through a sustainable political solution to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. Danish development assistance to Palestine will in the short and medium term continue to be subject to the dominant political framework conditions, resulting from the effects of the occupation, especially continued settlement construction and the growing territorial integration of the West Bank, in particular East Jerusalem and Area C, into Israel. The uncertainty regarding the internal Palestinian reconciliation process is also a factor. The strategic approach to Danish-Palestinian development cooperation must therefore be flexible enough to accommodate different future scenarios and allow for quick action if windows of opportunity suddenly arise. It is, however, essential that the activities supported by Denmark will provide benefits for Palestinians irrespective of the outcome of future peace talks. Finally, it must be taken into consideration that the number of Palestinian refugees both within the Palestinian territories and abroad is higher than the number of Palestinian nonrefugees. Danish material support to the Palestinian refugees in all five fields Gaza, West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, via financial support to UNRWA will therefore be continued as part of the international community s commitment to the two-state solution and its commitment to the UNGA mandate 302 (IV), which created UNRWA. There is also a continued need for humanitarian assistance in response to UN appeals as well as the support provided by Danish NGOs active in Palestine, which often complements official development cooperation, thereby enhancing the Danish foot print on the ground. 4 Suggested areas of interventions 4.1 Political relations Within the framework of UN resolutions and EU council conclusions, described in section 2.1, Denmark will work for: The implementation and enforcement of all relevant UN and EU obligations, rules, principles and guidelines pertaining to the situation, including the EU Guidelines on International Humanitarian Law. The parties will be expected to engage in the peace process in good faith. This includes exercising restraint and avoiding unilateral action which may further undermine the peace efforts and the viability of a two-state-solution, such as continued settlement expansion. The EU has emphasised that it will continue to monitor the situation closely and its broader implications and act accordingly. Maintaining the viability of a Palestinian State, based on the pre-1967 borders. This entails working to oppose and reverse the ongoing territorial fragmentation of Palestine. It will influence the Danish policy response that Israel, despite strong international pressure, has continued its settlement expansions, and that the number of settlers 7
within the West Bank, incl. East Jerusalem, has increased significantly over the last decades. Denmark considers all these settlements illegal under international law and an obstacle to peace. Denmark will continue to voice its strong concern over Israeli settlement activities in its political dialogue with the Israeli authorities. Special attention will be given to areas around East Jerusalem and Bethlehem, incl. E1 that could effectively separate these cities from each other and cut them off from the rest of the West Bank. A full and effective implementation of existing European Union legislation and national arrangements applicable to settlement products and guidelines for business in settlements. If these measures do not lead to the intended results other initiatives targeting settlement products and activities might be considered. Improving the daily living conditions of Palestinians. The parties respect for international law and human rights is essential. Israel, as the occupying power, bears the main responsibility. However, Palestine has also clearly signalled that it wants to be measured against the highest human rights and international law standards. Denmark will work to ensure the respect of Israel and Palestine for the human rights of the Palestinian population and address grave violations by both parties both bilaterally and in relevant multilateral arenas. Israeli-Palestinian issues will thus be one of Denmark s priorities in international human rights fora. A long-term solution to the unsustainable situation in the Gaza Strip that leads to the lifting of the blockade while ending the threat to Israel posed by Hamas and other militant groups in Gaza. Denmark will continue to work towards this end, including by urging the Israeli authorities to lift the blockade on Gaza and stressing the need for the PA to resume control of Gaza. The Gaza Strip constitutes an integral part of a future State of Palestine. A long-term Gaza solution is inextricably linked with the realization of the two-state solution. Denmark is ready to contribute to international monitoring and verification mechanisms that might be established to facilitate this objective. Improved Palestinian access to and development of Area C in accordance with the EU Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions of May 2012. In order to implement the Danish development programs in the West Bank, incl. East Jerusalem, reasonable conditions are needed. This includes access for both humanitarian and development actors both when it comes to monitoring and implementing projects. The Israeli permit regime constitutes a particular challenge in this regard. Preserving the viability of Jerusalem s final status as the capital of two states. In accordance with international law, Denmark regards East Jerusalem as occupied territory and has never recognized the Israeli annexation of the city. Israeli settlement activities in East Jerusalem are of particular concern and have been met with condemnation by Denmark and the EU. Denmark supports attempts to enhance Palestinian presence in East Jerusalem among other things through the reopening of Palestinian institutions in accordance with the Road Map. The maintenance of status quo regarding Haram al-sharif is also a Danish priority. As stated previously, the cooperation within EU will be essential for the pursuit of these policy goals. However, when considered necessary Denmark can take bilateral initiatives. The regular Danish policy dialogues with Israel and Palestine, respectively, will be utilized to advance the policy goals. With regard to the Danish-Palestinian dialogue issues related to human rights, rule of law and good governance, intra-palestinian reconciliation and enhancement of democratic structures will be among the focus areas. 8
4.2 Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance The Danish development cooperation with Palestine will to a large extent be a continuation of the strategic outline in the Danish-Palestinian Strategy paper 2014-15 as translated into the Transition Program 2014-2015 encompassing support to state building and economic development, in addition to support to the human rights area 1. All of these areas are still considered relevant in light of the existing challenges and opportunities. I Support for State-building Consolidation of PA s public finances Challenge: Restrictions on Palestine s import and export, affecting production in the occupied areas, and control of taxes and duties related to external transactions effects PA s revenue. Coupled with the on-going state building process, where a full-fledged tax system is not fully developed yet, the PA remains dependent on external budget support for operating. The budget deficit in 2013 stood at USD 350 million. The deficits are covered by building up arrears and by domestic borrowing, thereby squeezing out the private sector s financial need for productive investments. Opportunity: In recent years, fiscal reform efforts have led to improved public revenue, although the overall picture is bleak due to a substantial drop in donor funding by approximately USD 500 million. The PA has also undertaken several measures, such as a freeze on net hiring of civil servants, and has demonstrated a commitment to continuing reforms. Risks: The continued occupation, the internal political split as well as possible donor fatigue resulting from the lack of a political horizon are the main risks. Proposal: It is proposed to continue providing earmarked financial support via the EU PEGASE mechanism for salaries and pensions as well as for funding the treatment of Palestinians in East Jerusalem hospitals. 2 The East Jerusalem hospitals are the remaining Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem, thereby allowing the PA to maintain a certain political presence there. Further financial and political support is necessary for sustaining PA s operating capability, and hence the prospects for a two state solution. PLO s Negotiation Affairs Department (NAD) Challenge: The split between PLO/Fatah and Hamas has for years been a challenge for Palestinian unity in the peace negotiations with Israel and vis-à-vis the international community. Public support for negotiations among the Palestinians has declined after the suspension of the US led negotiations in April 2014 while support for the multilateral track has increased. Opportunity: The creation of the reconciliation government in June 2014 provides a more solid basis for furthering joint political positions. According to the Palestinian leadership the decision to pursue the UN track is meant to support negotiations towards a two state solution. Risk: Break-up of the reconciliation government could render the work of the PLO s Negotiations Affairs Department (NAD) work less useful. Furthermore, multilateral steps that are not discussed and coordinated with the international community could be counterproductive to facilitating the two-state solution. Proposal: It is proposed to continue supporting NAD in a joint donor set-up - in order to strengthen the capacity of the PLO s negotiation team to enter into effective negotiations with Israel and to engage constructively with the international community. 1 Appropriations for the human rights area were obtained formulation of the Transition Programme 2 This is a consequence of the occupation, as PA cannot import certain materials for hospital, such as radio-active material for cancer treatment, due to the dual-use list imposed by Israel. 9
Municipal Development Programme Challenge: The municipal sector is still to a large extent weak. Many decisions are taken at central level and many municipalities are too small for effective service delivery. The lack of a functioning Palestinian legislative system has had a negative impact on the reform process, including the failure to ensure a sound fiscal basis for the municipalities. Opportunity: The reconciliation government has declared its willingness to move the reform process forward, including tax reform, which has already shown certain results at central level, with a view to improving municipal revenues for long-term sustainability. Civil society, an important player in giving a voice to the rights holders, appears to be interested in accountability mechanisms at local level for improved citizens voice and control of municipal affairs. Risk: Insufficient political willingness to move on the reform process will remain the major risk. This can most likely only be mitigated by more public and civil society control of the municipalities. Proposal: Continued support via the Municipal Development Program (MDP), which is supported by a multi-donor consortium, combined with more targeted support for the municipal reform process and support for local democracy in the form of accountability and citizens voice measures, not least marginalized groups such as youth, women and Bedouins, should lead to more effective engagement in the municipal sector through support to both duty bearers and rights holders. The municipal sector is important as it is responsible for delivering most of the public services for ordinary citizens. Support for this sector will be robust and sustainable, as municipal governance is a requirement irrespective of the overall political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All support will be delivered in close coordination and to the extent possible cooperation with other donors. II Support for Economic Development Challenge: One of the most significant external impediments to sustainable economic development in the West Bank and Gaza remains the movement and access restrictions imposed by Israel. Internally, there is an urgent need for the PA to move towards a more sustainable growth model that depends on the private sector and not donor funding - as the main engine of growth, which is fully recognized in the PNDP 3. Opportunity: A recent World Bank report estimates a potential increase of 35 per cent in GDP, if Palestinian businesses and farms were permitted to develop in Area C. Even if the current political framework conditions do not change, there is potential for economic development of rural areas in the West Bank, including Area C, and in the Gaza Strip. Danish support to an EU program on Land Development and Basic Infrastructure in Area C aims to preserve this potential and maintain a Palestinian presence in the area. The agricultural sector and associated businesses are highlighted by the PNDP as a major potential source of employment and revenue. Risk: The occupation with its restrictions on movements and access constitute a major risk. Domestic private sector reforms have so far been slow, despite political understanding of the necessity to create an enabling environment. Proposal: It is proposed to focus on engagements in agro-business with emphasis on supplying quality products for the domestic market as well as for exports. This would build on the PA s priorities for developing the private sector, not least the agro-business value chain with an emphasis on female empowerment, as well as Danish experience from the agricultural sector (MERAP) and support to small and medium sized enterprises in Gaza. Preparatory studies are still on-going, but an outline of interventions in support of improved agricultural practices, building on the MERAP experience and its partners, support to standardization and certification for compliance with basic health requirements and continued support to small and medium size enterprises (SME) in both the West Bank, including Area C, and Gaza, building on the Oxfam experience. Discussions are underway with several donors for joint interventions. 3 Palestinian National Development Plan 2014-2016 10
III Support for Human Rights Challenge: The human rights situation in the West Bank, incl. East Jerusalem, and Gaza remains a great concern. The Israeli government and the PA are the primary duty bearers in terms of ensuring respect for human rights for the Palestinian population. However, until the PA is fully established in Gaza, Hamas also carries a significant responsibility. Opportunity: Over the last couple of years the PA has showed a willingness to address and discuss human rights violations. The accession of Palestine to 15 human rights treaties and conventions in the spring of 2014, while also an element in Palestine s strive for statehood, has sent a strong signal about the intention to build a state based on human rights principles. Risks: The continued occupation and the risk of the reconciliation government breaking up continue to create an environment, which is not conducive in term of ensuring respect for human rights. Proposal: It is proposed to continue to support Palestinian and Israeli civil society organizations working for human rights for Palestinians through the HR/IHL Secretariat, which is jointly supported by Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Denmark. The joint approach has shown its effectiveness, not least when opposing groups have tried to intimidate donor support in this sensitive area. Also support to the Ombudsman, the Independent Commission for Human Rights, has shown good results as the official PA watch dog. Cultural support has so far been rather fragmented, but as part of the Transition Program 2014-15 a more comprehensive and strategic cultural program is under preparation. Support for contemporary culture as well as for cultural heritage is part of state building efforts and it also constitutes an inherent part of Palestinians human rights. Finally, it is proposed to strengthen support for free media and democracy; this can be done through the HR/IHL Secretariat as well as through more targeted interventions. The exact modalities are still to be worked out. IV Humanitarian Assistance Continued support to UNRWA through un-earmarked support to its General Fund as well as through the Framework Agreements with Danish NGOs remain a necessity and will complement the bilateral cooperation program. With more than 5 million registered Palestinian refugees in the five fields, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank compared to the 2.6 million non-refugees in Gaza and the West Bank 4 - it is imperative to continue support for UN-mandated UNRWA service delivery such as primarily schooling and health services as well as professional training to allow refugees to break the vicious circle. Danish NGOs primarily target vulnerable groups, irrespective of refugee status or not. These include Bedouins, women s groups and people traumatized by conflict. 4.3 Commercial Assistance The conditions for moving towards a commercially oriented trajectory are far from optimal in Palestine, although commercial interests are expressed by both Danish and Palestinian private sector actors. The political uncertainty and restrictions on movement and access constitute the main constraints. In addition, Palestine constitutes a relatively small market, and the enabling environment is not geared towards direct foreign investments. However, business opportunities do exist, especially in trade. Denmark will aim to increase the dialogue with Danish private companies regarding the commercial conditions in Palestine and possible opportunities. 4 Palestine s total population is 4.2 million of which 1.9 are registered as refugees 11
5 Results State Building: State building interventions will provide tangible results in the form of increased service delivery, such as schooling, health services, water supply, roads, etc. at both national and municipal level as well as increased public capacity and capability in policy making, oversight and operation. The PEGASE mechanism will continue to allow maintenance of the PA Administration during occupation through support to salaries, pensions and East Jerusalem hospitals, without which PA would not be able to function. NAD will continue to strengthen PLO s negotiations capacity with a view to arriving at an agreement between Israel and Palestine. The support for the municipal sector will aim at increasing service delivery through consolidation of municipalities and village councils in terms of technical capacity and fiscal sustainability. Strengthening of local democracy by empowering rights holders is one of the important prerequisites for improving accountability and service delivery at municipal level. Economic Development: Engagement more broadly in economic development would lead to an increase in production and employment, better prospects for supplying the domestic market and for increasing exports through standardisation and certification. Special attention will be given to economic empowerment of women through the proposed support to SME s. In addition, interventions in Area C, including support to the EU program on Land Development and Basic Infrastructure in Area C, will contribute to maintaining a Palestinian presence in the area and thus preserve the potential for economic development. Human Rights: The main results would be the strengthening of the watchdog role played by both civil society organisations and the Ombudsman with a view to improving the human rights situation. More emphasis on cultural rights contributes to state building efforts, but the precise results will be difficult to measure. 6 M&E framework In general, M&E frameworks will be based on existing frameworks by partners. Bilateral monitoring by the DRO will also be undertaken based on such agreed frameworks. PEGASE: Monitoring is based on joint macro framework agreed amongst all parties providing financial support to the PA budget; including the EU, the World Bank, USAID, the IMF, Norway and UK. The frameworks involve parameters for measuring fiscal performance, service delivery, progress in the macro-economic reform process, etc. NAD: A detailed log frame with indicators is agreed upon among the donors and the Negotiation Affairs Department. Among other things NAD undertakes regular surveys on the Palestinian leadership s satisfaction with NAD s products and services as well as regular polls on the population s perception of the Palestinian negotiation positions. Municipal Development Program: Detailed results frameworks at municipal level on service delivery and governance have been prepared and agreed upon by the Authorities and the donors. Economic Development: Specific results frameworks will have to be prepared measuring output level indicators, such as increase in production, job creation, women s participation and exports and these can relatively easily be measured, whereas outcome indicators such as impact on economic growth will be more difficult. Human Rights: The primary sources for monitoring will be the reports by the partner organizations; i.e. the Ombudsman, civil society organizations as well as cultural organizations on the status of human rights, including cultural and democratic rights. 12
7 Communication In line with the strategic choices, Denmark will often associate itself with statements of the EU High Representative or the European/Foreign Affairs Council, rather than issue bilateral statements. Although the latter will be used, when necessary. However, during the time period covered by this policy paper more emphasis will be given to communication to and with Palestinian actors and the Palestinian public. This will not least be related to development activities and more specifically through cultural engagements. Possibilities for communication in Denmark for instance on development results and the associated challenges should also be explored. DRO is to produce a communication strategy in which target groups, messages, etc. are to be outlined. 13
Annex - Process Action Plan Time line policy paper Documentation Min. 24 months Min. 20 months Min. 19 months Min. 18 months April May 2014 Dialogue and analysis in the priority country regarding the policy paper September 2014 Drafting synopsis for the policy paper 7 October 2014 Public consultations of the synopsis for policy paper min. three weeks prior to presentation to the Danida Programme Committee 30 October 2014 Presentation of synopsis for the policy paper to the Danida Programme Committee February/March 2014 The budget is inserted into the proposal for the Finance Act hearing will be sent out by UGS (normally in February/March) March 2014 Planning of design and formulation. Process Action Plan Draft synopsis for the policy paper Synopsis for the policy paper Synopsis incl. Annexes: Screening notes, the budget support criteria etc. Résumé of responses from public consultation and proposal of how/whether these responses will be incorporated. Min. 17 months Oct/Nov 2014 Presentation of synopsis to the Ministers February- December 2014 Analysis started identification/formulation Process Action Plan for development up to signing of commitments. Edited synopsis for policy paper; 14
Time line policy paper Documentation Min. 16 months Min. 15 months Min. 14 months Min. 13 months Min. 12 months Feb/Mar 2015 Presentation of the synopsis to the Council for Development Policy Feb/Mar 2015 Presentation of the synopsis to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Dec 2014 - Feb 2015 Drafting policy paper Feb - Mar 2015 Presentation to the MFA senior management (Koncernledelsesforum) March Apr 2015 Finalising the policy paper March Apr 2015 Presentation to stakeholders in priority country February 2015 Drafting Concept note and annexes March 2015 Public consultation of Concept note. Forward Concept note to KVA min. 3 weeks in advance of meeting in Danida Programme Committee April 2015 Meeting in Danida Programme Committee. April-May 2015 Development of Document and Development engagement Documents Edited synopsis Same as above only revised if major changes Draft policy paper Concept note with annexes Concept note and annexes. List of received responses from the consultation and summery conclusions from Danida Programme Committee. Draft policy paper Final draft policy paper Final draft policy paper Min. 11 months April 2015 [May 15] Final policy paper for approval by the Ministers Final draft 15
Time line policy paper Documentation Min 8 months April 2015 [Jun 15] The Council for Development Policy and the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee receives policy paper for orientation April 2015 [Jun 15] Lay out and publishing to be coordinated with PDK February 2015 ToR for appraisal forwarded to TAS March-April 2015 All draft documentation for forwarded to TAS Final policy paper Final policy paper ToR Draft Program Document incl. Development engagement Documents and associated partner documentation May June 2015 Appraisal mission Min. 6 months Min. 2 months Minister s Min. 2 months Minister s After Danida External Grant Committee meeting August 2015 Appraisal process finalized September 2015 Document with appropriation cover sheet forwarded to KVA October 2015 Presentation to the Danida External Grant Committee November 2015 The minister approves the Appraisal Report, recommendations summary Document, annexes and Development engagement Documents Resumé from Danida External Grant Committee 16
Time line policy paper Documentation After Minister s approval After Minister s approval After agreement(s) are signed If direct legal basis for the commitment is not in place at Finance Act: Presentation to the Parliamentary Finance Committee. NA Nov-Dec 2015 Signing of legally binding agreements (commitments) with partner(s) January 2016 Book commitment in MFA s financial systems within budgeted quarter. Document for Finance Committee (Aktstykke) Government-to-government agreement(s) and/or other legally binding agreements 17