Introduction March 15 th Notes Principles of War Seminar Series What Do We Know About Future Warfare? The speaker began by warning the audience against putting too much stock into major theories such as Fourth Generation Warfare, Effects-Based Operations, Network Centric Operations, etc. He stated that history shows that warfare situations are much richer and more complicated than any single theory can cover. However, academics sometimes make their names by restating and re-branding what is inherently obvious. There is an overwhelming problem with the concept of the Principles of War they are misnamed. They should be considered Principles of Warfare which covers all manner of belligerent relationships. War, on the other hand, is more directly related to acts of combat. The Principles address more than just acts of combat. Noting that in 37 years of analysis, he had never explicitly used the Principles of War nor had he been directed to do so, the speaker referred to other writers who had held the Principles of War in low regard. In particular, he mentioned Bernard Brodie s Strategy in the Missile Age. In that mid-century Cold War book, the author damned the Principles of War with faint praise, and they never really recovered. The Principles of War need to be seen as strategic not tactical in nature. Using them in the strategic realm reveals America s overall strategic blindness. The speaker noted that his argument was conservative with some central points to consider: There is no such thing as modern war war is war as it always has been The past is an uncertain guide to the future but it is all we have We must rely on history to inform us, not modern theories no new device or methodology from physicists will be built to predict the future The future does not have to be radically different from the past however, if you believe that history is evolving and progressing toward some better level, you may be disappointed by what is in this talk Before going into detail speaker summarized his major points: 1. War and warfare will always be with us: it is a permanent feature of the human condition. 2. War and warfare has an unchanging nature, but a highly variable character. It follows that history is our best, albeit incomplete, guide to the future. This is why what Clauswitz has to say covers everything. 1
3. Irregular warfare may well be the dominant form of belligerency for some years to come, but interstate war, including great power conflict, will enjoy a healthy future. Just such a conflict already is taking shape. This is a more contentious concept than those previously described Irregular warfare includes terrorism and it may be the dominant type of warfare for the near future. Indications of the development of the next great power conflict may be arguable and incomplete but they do exist No matter how bad terrorist acts may become, what they can do pales in comparison to what a Great Powers war could do 4. The political context is the principal, though not the sole, driver of war s incidence and character. Above all else, warfare is political behavior. 5. Warfare is social and cultural, as well as political and strategic, behavior. As such it must reflect the characteristics of the communities that wage it. New technological advances developed differently in different societies Tanks in World War II reflected the community values of their builders sometimes despite contradictory strategic concerns o Germans built tanks around guns o Americans built tank forces around the concepts of mobility and numbers 6. War and warfare do not always change in an evolutionary linear fashion. Surprise is not merely possible, or even probable, it is certain. Look how predictions were wrong throughout the 20 th Century No pundits of one decade got it right about what would happen in the following 10 years We have no reason to believe that we will make better predictions even though more people seem to be involved now than ever before 7. Efforts to control, limit, and regulate war and therefore warfare, by international political, legal, and normative-ethical measures and attitudes are well worth pursuing. However, the benefits from such endeavors will always be fragile, vulnerable to overturn by the commands of perceived belligerent necessity. Discussion 1. War and warfare will always be with us: it is a permanent feature of the human condition. War is social behavior for political reasons o Human nature is based on that point o Individuals don t wage war o Kindly people can be trained to kill in wars 2
o Literature gives us no new alternative answers Thucydides noted that fear, honor, and interest were the causes for war and that is still true Group violence is never good for a country but domestic violence does not lead inevitably to war Humans may not be driven to create wars but some individual leader will always arise and lead people into war People in groups do not behave using the same psychology as they do individually A state does not behave like a moral person o Statecraft is not practiced according to ethics or morality o As the new Prime Minister, Tony Blair stated his government would have an ethical foreign policy It lasted about nine months Never spoken of now France has a very cynical view about things that can be done in the name of the state War is not a problem that can be solved, but situations might be alleviated o Any particular war may be stopped or avoided o Each war has its own particular set of circumstances that can be studied and compensated for War is really about the power to influence others o Often it is waged more for honor than the other two reasons o Sometimes it is said that a war is waged for commercial or material interests o More likely relates to a country s sense of self 2. War and warfare has an unchanging nature, but a highly variable character. It follows that history is our best, albeit incomplete, guide to the future. The nature of war is not mysterious This fits with Clauswitz s concept of the objective and subjective aspects of war o His concepts are pitched at such a high level that there is no need to adjust them to fit the times o Clauswitz is eternally valid; proof against technological change o His concepts apply to all forms and styles of future war including wars in space and in cyberspace Warfare has always been both regular and irregular The US Defense Community tends to pick up new terminology quickly but it is often meaningless o Effects-based operations How could you plan operations without looking at the likely effects? o Competitive strategy What would be an uncompetitive strategy? These may be changes in the grammar of warfare but they are only evolutionary shifts not real changes to the nature of warfare 3
Our past must be our future at the strategic level and we only have history to look at it o If we do not look at history, we would not be adequately skeptical about current situations o Respect for history will show the similarities of past, present and future warfare 3. Irregular warfare may well be the dominant form of belligerency for some years to come, but interstate war, including great power conflict, will enjoy a healthy future. Just such a conflict already is taking shape. The strategic future does not belong to the terrorists but they will be around There also could be 2 or 3 Great Power struggles in the next century o Still too early to say exactly what will happen to create a new Cold War but indicators already present o Sino-Russian Axis They have been gathering other countries who also wish to oppose US hegemony Includes Iran, Syria, Venezuela all largely related to oil Has been going on since 2003 Russia decided not to cooperate on the Iraq War Now ignoring the problems the West has with Iran s nuclear power ambitions The idea is to oppose the US globally, but this is unrelated to the Principles of War discussion Need to look at the bigger picture Do not be over impressed with the current situation o There can be no surprise-free future Any new paradigm was really always there someplace o Terrorist acts could pale to insignificance next to a Great Power war 4. The political context is the principal, though not the sole, driver of war s incidence and character. Above all else, warfare is political behavior. War is about power To the media war is entertainment a great global spectator sport for those not personally involved in it o However, war only shares some things with sports o That some people admit to liking to fight in wars, does not mean that war is about satisfying the human need for violence o War is about politics even if soldiers are trained to take pride in carrying out the functions of war John Keegan s claim that war is cultural does not mean that it is solely cultural o Wars may be fought for cultural reasons but it is really politics and power that motivate war 4
Wars today may be about new security topics (environmental or ethnic issues) without direct military agendas but o History shows that war can be precipitated by many things o Don t be confused by new agenda sources o War is about politics regardless of the character of the situation that caused it 5. Warfare is social and cultural, as well as political and strategic, behavior. As such it must reflect the characteristics of the communities that wage it. The professional military establishment may look at war differently than the whole society does But there is still a national/cultural element to any war There is the discipline in the inconvenience of the enemy o We may have a preferred way of waging war but the enemy may have other ideas that could complicate our plans o We may not get to choose how we wage the war our way of war may not work well in a given situation o Some say that globalization is eroding the distinctions between cultures but that is not necessarily true in all cases All defense analysts today at least pay lip service to the concepts of cultural issues in war o However, they rarely go far enough to do anything about it o Despite awareness soldiers still see themselves as strangers in a strange land in Iraq o If you listen to Sun Tzu, then we need greater insight into ourselves 6. War and warfare do not always change in an evolutionary linear fashion. Surprise is not merely possible, or even probable, it is certain. The new American Way of War involves C4ISR, an acronym that keeps growing as more areas of concern are grafted on to it Now we want to leverage information for war Whenever a new technological innovation comes along, involved pundits claim they can see the future using it alone o But they are wrong to think any new technological advance can go only one way o Look at the different ways tanks developed in World War II which grew out of a common technological base o Now we can expect global uses of information technology to be significantly different from how we image using them There is also no reason to believe that the US will maintain its overall overwhelming advantage in military capabilities o RMA leadership does not guarantee strategic success, because there is more to war than warfare o Why should there be a single best way / best buy for any set of forces? Look at the variations in how countries bought aircraft in the 1930s 5
Each country used the new technology to fit its own set of circumstances o Democratization and access to global media helps to both spread the technology and its uses But each society will decide how to use it So each society will wage war differently While the US does magnificently in using technology in war, it does not do well with understanding its enemies o Enemies will present challenges unrelated to the capabilities and ways of waging war so we need to understand them better o Being ideologically confident does not insure that you will win the war or even let you worry about some war issues How could we lose against the insignificant Vietnamese military? Believing your quarterback is so much better than the other team could lead to ignoring what they are doing The US Defense establishment is discussing developing a more flexible fighting force o They seem to be sincere and doing the training but it is not clear that they can develop what they say they want o Americans do not fight in land warfare patiently o American political/strategic/institutional elements may not allow the necessary changes to be made We are what we are. War and warfare do not change in an evolutionary way o History is not necessarily progressing toward something better o Books describing the Path to the War of are all written as history They do have merit as stimulus to the imagination Trying to do virtual history / playing a god role in predicting the future is likely to be misleading American s conduct of future war will involve all the new things that technology is expected to bring o However, what the enemy does will also have some effect on that future war o History shows that enemies do not allow a military leadership to continue on indefinitely without any resistance American military transformers should realize that there is no last move in warfare development The enemy always finds a way to make another move Future wars will have many variants o We can not depend on continuing to fight third class militaries lead by stupid people Great surprises will come even though we cannot predict them o All four great wars of the last 200 years came as surprises Wars against France from 1792-1815 World Wars I and II The Cold War o Humanity s record of predictions is not very good 6
It is always assumed that surprises only happened in the past due to some anomaly There is nothing about the current or future that should make us expect it will be different from the past So great surprises are to be expected even if we don t know what they are likely to be 7. Efforts to control, limit, and regulate war and therefore warfare, by international political, legal, and normative-ethical measures and attitudes are well worth pursuing. However, the benefits from such endeavors will always be fragile, vulnerable to overturn by the commands of perceived belligerent necessity. Attempt to avoid all wars will always fail eventually Diplomacy cannot be used to avoid political decisions o Arms control agreements happen when the political context is permissible o Arms control is not apolitical and cannot actually solve the political issues The problem is that the world has an anarchic situation o The Thucydides reasons for war fear, honor, interests might now be adjusted to read fear, culture, interests Politics will win out over laws, diplomacy, and even ethics o Even Al Qaeda has some terrestrial desires Warfare rarely reaches absolute levels o There have been few genocides or regime changes in history o However, no atrocity is beyond what a human could do o Any means can be justified by someone to meet their identified ends What we do in a desperate situation will not be done in a world without cultural influences Control of war is feasible but policy and strategy are the most reliable predictors of the future Question & Answer Session Question: In state to state wars have armies become so expensive that they are actually too fragile a resource to put into battle and so there would be a need to go to the use of nuclear weapons very quickly? We must assume that we will have competent enemies in the future o If so, they are unlikely to go against US Forces directly, since they would be overwhelmed o Therefore they will need to find a different way to impede the efficacy of US power Could use US dependence on GPS as a path Could make use of US weakness in mine warfare in littoral areas The idea is to find some clever, low cost way to disrupt the US high tech advantage 7
Even in 1911 it was clear that war did not pay but people went to war anyway bankrupting the UK in 1917 and again in 1940 o A group of smart colonels could come up with something dramatically disruptive using very little money There is a need to think of the Grand Strategy and involve early diplomatic options including venues such as the United Nations There is more to war than warfare and more to conflict than battle There will always be ways found to go against the great powers o We need to take a holistic view of the situation Question: Is it realistic to believe that the Great Powers will find some way to deter irregular forces? We may not be able to deter terrorist completely, but we can punish or persuade those involved and those in support of the fighters o They will all have an address somewhere and we can take the fight there to show them the errors of their ways Do not write off deterrence immediately even against irregular or religious warriors o Muslims do not need to die in a jihad to go to heaven o There are other ways than being the tip of the spear o Activist need to be persuaded of these less violent ways If an insurgency is going nowhere for a long time, it can become an uncomfortable way of life o People get bored and the movement runs out of foot soldiers o It is possible to deter some people, particularly those who are in support modes There is a brand of terrorists that does need to be shot they cannot be deterred or controlled o We may say that we will not negotiate with terrorists but it happens o Irregular war can become a way a life and addictive o Those who have lead irregular warfare often do not make good leaders in the post revolutionary government Russia and the Bolsheviks make a good example o If all else fails, those in the lead of the irregular forces will eventually age and even die off In Afghanistan the training grounds are closed now so there may be fewer well-trained terrorists entering the fray Al Qaeda s tradition of winning is now not as firm as it was They beat the Soviets so they expected to beat what they expected to be the even weaker Americans They were surprised and that won t help recruiting future footsoldiers o If the fighter s theory is the Will of Allah covers all actions, there may be little deterrence can do No way to deal with them so need to be ruthless at the Grand Strategy level 8
This is not a new phenomenon Looking back at nuclear strategy and what each side could have done to the other only 15 years ago, is tremendously more horrific than anything a terrorist can do even in the future Question: How does US hegemony today stand in history? There is no parallel to the relative US military power gap over other countries until you go back as far as the Roman Empire in the 1 st or 2 nd Centuries. The US does have some economic weaknesses compared to China now, but certainly not militarily Whenever there is a single power, there will be attempts to take it down o US currently has no one to discipline its moves such as the Soviets during the Cold War o After the Cold War the US seemed to lose interest in the rest of the world and was considered casualty-adverse But rational nations generally are casualty-adverse Part of US doctrine now states that it plans to stay far ahead of other military forces so that it cannot be opposed o Rivals are already unhappy with US view on many issues o We cannot expect that the 21 st Century will be ordered to US desires o Rivals feel aggrieved and insulted China and Russia are upset by how the US has been treating them For example: Russia s concerns about NATO enlargement were ignored In the 21 st Century the only real rivals to the US would have to come from the Eurasian land mass not South America o Really only China working with Russia is a likely rival Russia has too far to go to be a potential rival on its own Regular warfare would not be the issue for sometime There are many economic / political / diplomatic / UN moves that China or Russian could make to thwart US desires Some of these issues are already appearing An emerging block of states want to stand up to the US and what it wants to do What this is really all about is honor going back to Thucydides trio of reasons for war o George Bush lectures Russia on the joys of democracy and the evils of its current ways in full public view of the Russian people o This is barely 15 years since Russia was a super power This could lead to another whole round of conflict o It could probably only be lead by China o However, China could implode but doing well so far in a difficult task 9
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