IPS233: Comparative and International Political Economy Kenneth Mori McElwain Class Times: T, TH 1:15-3:05 kmcelwain@stanford.edu Location: Rm. 60-62C Office: Encina East 103 Office Hours: TH 3:15-5:00 or by appointment Objectives This course examines the interaction of politics and economics in developed / developing democracies and introduces students to the field of comparative and international political economy. Topics include: the origins and purposes of state intervention in the market; the relationship between economic growth and democratization; varieties of capitalism; class conflict and compromise; the evolution of the welfare state; the policy link between voters and partisan governments; and challenges posed by globalization. In covering a broad range of material, you will engage some fundamental questions about the political economy: Why does the government tax you? Is redistributing wealth from the rich to the poor better or worse for each party? What is the difference between capitalism and socialism (and what, exactly, is democratic socialism )? Would more Americans be better off with stronger unions? Has globalization led to a convergence in policies across countries? Course Design Each class will combine lectures with seminar-style discussions. I will spend the first 30-40 minutes of each session detailing the issues surrounding that week s topic and introducing some case studies of various countries. The remaining time will be devoted to a discussion of the topic at large, where we will role-play / simulate the behavior of actors facing different strategic environments. This sounds a lot geekier than it will be, but I promise it will be both fun and insightful. The purpose of these simulations is to blend ideas and evidence from the readings to give you a feel for the underlying efficiency concerns and distributive conflicts that drive the political economy writ large. Requirements It goes without saying that I expect you to have read the assigned material by the first session of that week, and your participation in class discussions will account for 25% of the grade. In addition, there will be take-home midterm that comprises 25% of the final grade. The rest of your evaluation will be based on an independent research paper, where you will apply the theories discussed in this course to analyze the political economy of a country or region of your choice. One option is to examine the specific topics discussed in the readings, such as the politics of the poor vs. the rich or the electoral incentives of politicians. Another is to expand McElwain CPE 1
the analysis to new topics, such as the effects of globalization on the environment or the impact of trade on poverty in developing countries. You should submit a research prospectus topic and country/region in Week 7, and I will recommend further reading for your paper. The final paper (15-20 pages) will be due during reading period. Required Books There are three assigned textbooks for this class, and these can be purchased at the Stanford Bookstore (or online, if you prefer). Most of the readings are journal articles, which can be downloaded from the Stanford Courseworks website once you sign up for the class: http://coursework.stanford.edu/. You can also find them online through the library s E-Journals link: http://library.stanford.edu/catdb/e_resources/index.html. Katzenstein P. (1997). Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe. Cornell, Cornell University Press. ISBN: 0801493269 Hall, P. and D. Soskice, eds. (2001). Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford, Oxford University Press. ISBN: 0199247757 Mares, I. (2003). The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 0521534771 McElwain CPE 2
Section I: Economic Structures and Regime Type 1) State Intervention in the Economy Olson, M. (1993). "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." American Political Science Review 87(3): 567-576. Przeworski, A. and F. Limongi (1997). "Modernization: Theories and Facts." World Politics 49: 155-83. Cheibub, J. A. (1998). "Political Regimes and the Extractive Capacity of Governments: Taxation in Democracies and Dictatorships." World Politics 50: 349-76. 2) The Organization of Capitalism (2 weeks) Akamatsu, Kaname. 1962. A Historical Pattern of Economic Growth in Developing Countries. Developing Economies 1:3-25. Krugman, Paul. 1994. The Myth of Asia's Miracle. Foreign Affairs 73 (6):62-78. Hall, P. and D. Soskice, eds. (2001). Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford, Oxford University Press, Chapters TBA Michael Zachary Taylor. Empirical Evidence against Varieties of Capitalism s Theory of Technological Innovation. International Organization (Summer 2004). McElwain CPE 3
Section II: Policy Linkages between the Government and Society 3) Class Conflict? The Political Representation of the Rich vs. the Poor Korpi, W., and M. Shalev. 1979. Strikes, Industrial-Relations and Class Conflict in Capitalist Societies. British Journal of Sociology 30 (2):164-187. Przeworski, Adam, and Michael Wallerstein. 1982. The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Capitalist Societies. American Political Science Review 76 (2):215-238. Calmfors, L. and J. Driffill (1988). "Centralization of Wage Bargaining: Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance." Economic Policy 6: 13-61. Swenson, P. (1991). "Bringing Capital Back in, or Social-Democracy Reconsidered - Employer Power, Cross-Class Alliances, and Centralization of Industrial-Relations in Denmark and Sweden." World Politics 43(4): 513-544. 4) Welfare State Evolution: Redistribution and De-commodification Gladwell, Malcolm. 2006. The Risk Pool. The New Yorker, August 28, 30-35. Mares, I. (2003). The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Chapter TBA Alesina, A. and R. Perotti (1997). "The Welfare State and Competitiveness." The American Economic Review 87(5): 921-939. 5) The Electoral Connection I: What Voters Want Erickson, R. S., M. B. MacKuen and J. A. Stimson (2000). "Bankers or Peasants Revisited: Economic Expectations and Presidential Approval." Electoral Studies 19: 295-312. Lewis-Beck, M. and M. Paldam (2000). "Economic Voting: an Introduction." Electoral Studies 19: 113-121. Stokes, Susan C. 1996. Economic Reform and Public Opinion in Peru, 1990-1995. Comparative Political Studies 29 (5). Pacek, A. and B. Radcliff (1995). "The Political Economy of Competitive Elections in the Developing World." American Journal of Political Science 39(3): 745-59. McElwain CPE 4
6) The Electoral Connection II: What Politicians Give Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. 2006. Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others. American Political Science Review 100 (2):165-181. Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions. International Organization 41 (2):203-223. Przeworski, A. and J. A. Cheibub (1999). "Democracy, Elections and Accountability for Economic Outcomes." Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. A. Przeworski, S. C. Stokes and B. Manin. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.14-27. Persson, T., G. Roland and G. Tabellini (2000). "Comparative Politics and Public Finance." Journal of Political Economy 108(61): 1121-1161. McElwain CPE 5
Section III: Changes in the Global Environment 7) State Power and Globalization Krasner, Steven. 1976. State Power and the Structure of International Trade. World Politics 28 (3):317-347. Katzenstein P. (1997). Small States in World Markets : Industrial Policy in Europe. Cornell, Cornell University Press. Chapters TBA 8) Coping with Globalization Freeman, Richard. 1995. Are your wages set in Beijing? Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (3):15-32. Wood, Adrian. 1995. How trade hurt unskilled workers. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (3):57-80. Garrett, G. (1995). "Capital Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy." International Organization 49(4): 657-87. Iversen, T. and A. Wren (1998). "Equality, Employment, and Budgetary Restraint - The Trilemma of the Service Economy." World Politics 50(4): 507-9) The Decline of the Welfare State? Pierson, P. (1996). The New Politics of the Welfare State. World Politics (January). Pontusson J., and R. Clayton. (1998). Welfare-State Retrenchment Revisited: Entitlement Cuts, Public Sector Restructuring, and Inegalitarian Trends in Advanced Capitalist Societies. World Politics (October). Boix, C. (1997). "Political Parties and the Supply Side of the Economy: The Provision of Physical and Human Capital in Advanced Economies, 1960-90." American Journal of Political Science 41(3): 814-845. Mosley, L. (2000). "Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States." International Organization 54(4): 737-773. McElwain CPE 6