Institutions I. MPA 612: Public Management Economics March 5, Fill out your reading report on Learning Suite!

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Institutions I MPA 612: Public Management Economics March 5, 2018 Fill out your reading report on Learning Suite!

Current events

Plan for today Institutions Rules, power, allocations, and fairness

The rules of the game Institutions run the world

Institutions Laws Rules Regulations Customs Norms Moral injunctions

Economists used to hate institutions Pragmatic reasons Institutions change slowly; no reason to worry about them Ideological reasons Human progress is the emancipation from constraints on behavior. Liberty & freedom = no constraints Adam Smith: if A wants to sell something to B, there shouldn t be any constraints

BUUUUUUUUT The whole Smithean premise falls apart in the absence of constraints No property rights? No right to transfer property? No liability for contract breaches?

So what are institutions? Rational behavior Constraints Temporary equilibria

Institutions as rational choices People cooperate because of their rational utility functions

Institutions as constraints Socially imposed constraints on human activity Rules and norms Humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions

Institutional formality Formal institutions Codified expectations backed by enforcement mechanisms; laws Informal institutions Expectations that aren t codified or backed with formal enforcement; etiquette, customs, conventions

Are formal or informal institutions more powerful? There s no clear divide between formality and informality

Informal LDS institutions White shirts First M. Last President EQ vs. Sister RS Sacrament handedness 1st counselor position on stand Easter vs. Christmas

Why do people follow some rules, ignore other rules? Institutions = temporary equilibria Rules meet game theory

Institutions are outcomes of games Decisions based on payoffs, repetition, etc. Self-enforcing Self-reinforcing Self-undermining

Self-enforcing Stable, Nash equilibrium Bala Left Right Anil Left Live, Live Die, Die Right Die, Die Live, Live

Self-enforcing Not always life or death What s the norm for when two people crash at a door? Older person first? Woman first? Repeat a lot = cultural norm emerges

Self-reinforcing Equilibrium increasingly stable Institution entrenches itself Codified road signs More right-sided cars Too hard and costly to change

Self-undermining Equilibrium deteriorates Tourists from other-sided countries hate coming Tourism industry suffers People agitate for change (while still driving on original side)

Self-enforcing Self-reinforcing Self-undermining

Summary of institutions Rational choice ignores external factors Institutions-as-rules doesn t explain changes or uneven enforcement Institutions-as-equilibria saves the day

Rules, power, allocations, and fairness Institutions again run the world

Power The ability to do what we want in opposition to the intentions of others

Who gets to decide what? Bala Left Right Anil Left Live, Live Die, Die Right Die, Die Live, Live

How do we evaluate allocations?

Pareto efficiency No alternative allocation where one person would be better off and nobody would be worse off Better off more money Outcome is preferred because of norms, culture, money, other institutions

5 4 I,T Outcomes better for both than I,T Outcomes better for both than T,I Bala s payoff 3 2 1 T,T I,I T,I Outcomes better for both than I,I Outcomes better for both than T,T I,I = Both use Integrated Pest Control (IPC) I,T = Anil uses IPC, Bala uses Terminator 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 T,I = Anil uses Terminator, Bala uses IPC T,T = Both use Terminator Anil s payoff

BUUUUUT More than one Pareto-efficient allocation Pareto efficient better No rankings No fairness

Let s create economic policy!

Annual income Tax rate $0 $10,000 0% $10,001 $50,000 10% $50,001 $100,000 20% $100,001 $300,000 30% $300,000 $ 50% 1: Progressive tax rate Increasing marginal rates 2: Flat tax 15% regardless of income $80,000 15% = $12,000 Jody earns $80,000 a year. She pays 0% on first $10,000 $10,000 0% = $0 She pays 10% on the next $40,000 $40,000 10% = $4,000 She pays 20% on the last $30,000 $30,000 20% = $6,000 Total tax: $0 + $4,000 + $6,000 = $10,000

Next time More institutions Trade, tariffs, and fairness