Statistical Analysis of Endorsement Experiments: Measuring Support for Militant Groups in Pakistan

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Statistical Analysis of Endorsement Experiments: Measuring Support for Militant Groups in Pakistan Kosuke Imai Department of Politics Princeton University Joint work with Will Bullock and Jacob Shapiro May 13, 211 Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 1 / 24

Motivation Survey is used widely in social sciences Validity of survey depends on the accuracy of self-reports Sensitive questions = social desirability, privacy concerns e.g., racial prejudice, corruptions Lies and nonresponses How can we elicit truthful answers to sensitive questions? Survey methodology: protect privacy through indirect questioning Statistical methodology: efficiently recover underlying responses Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 2 / 24

Survey Methodologies for Sensitive Questions Randomized Response Technique Most extensively studied Use randomization to protect privacy Difficulties: logistics, lack of understanding among respondents List Experiments (item count technique) Use aggregation to protect privacy New multivariate regression analysis method New methods to detect and correct failures (joint with G. Blair) Difficulties: design effects, ceiling and floor effects Endorsement Experiments Use randomized endorsements to measure support levels Develop a measurement model based on item response theory Difficulties: interpretation, need for modeling Applications: 1 Pakistanis support for Islamic militant groups 2 Afghanis support for Taliban and ISAF (joint with J. Lyall) 3 Nigerians support for insurgents (joint with G. Blair) Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 3 / 24

Endorsement Experiments Measuring support for political actors (e.g., candidates, parties) when studying sensitive questions Ask respondents to rate their support for a set of policies endorsed by randomly assigned political actors Experimental design: 1 Select policy questions 2 Randomly divide sample into control and treatment groups 3 Across respondents (and questions), randomly assign political actors for endorsement (no endorsement for the control group) 4 Compare support level for each policy endorsed by different actors Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 4 / 24

The Pakistani Survey Experiment 6, person urban-rural sample in April 29 Four militant groups: Pakistani militants fighting in Kashmir (a.k.a. Kashmiri tanzeem) Militants fighting in Afghanistan (a.k.a. Afghan Taliban) Al-Qa ida Firqavarana Tanzeems (a.k.a. sectarian militias) Four policies: WHO plan to provide universal polio vaccination across Pakistan Curriculum reform for religious schools Reform of FCR to make Tribal areas equal to rest of the country Peace jirgas to resolve disputes over Afghan border (Durand Line) Response rate over 9% Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 5 / 24

Endorsement Experiment Questions: Example The script for the control group The World Health Organization recently announced a plan to introduce universal Polio vaccination across Pakistan. How much do you support such a plan? (1) A great deal (2) A lot (3) A moderate amount (4) A little (5) Not at all The script for a treatment group The World Health Organization recently announced a plan to introduce universal Polio vaccination across Pakistan, a policy that has received support from Al-Qa ida. How much do you support such a plan? (1) A great deal (2) A lot (3) A moderate amount (4) A little (5) Not at all Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 6 / 24

Distribution of Responses Punjab Sindh NWFP Firqavarana Tanzeems Al Qaida Afghan Taliban Pakistani militant groups in Kashmir Control Group Firqavarana Tanzeems Al Qaida Afghan Taliban Pakistani militant groups in Kashmir Control Group Firqavarana Tanzeems Al Qaida Afghan Taliban Pakistani militant groups in Kashmir Control Group Polio Vaccinations Curriculum Reform FCR Reforms Durand Line Balochistan Firqavarana Tanzeems Al Qaida Afghan Taliban Pakistani militant groups in Kashmir Control Group..2.4.6.8 1...2.4.6.8 1...2.4.6.8 1...2.4.6.8 1. Not At All A Little A Moderate Amount Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 7 / 24 A Lot A Great Deal

Methodological Challenges and Proposed Solutions 1 How to combine responses from multiple questions? = item response theory 2 How to recoup loss of statistical efficiency? = hierarchical modeling 3 How to interpret the support? = policy vs. valence 4 How to select policy questions? Policies should belong to a single dimension Respondents should not have strong views Should one use well-known policies?: Statistical and substantive tradeoffs Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 8 / 24

Endorsement Experiments Framework N respondents J policy questions K political actors Y ij {, 1}: response of respondent i to policy question j T ij {, 1,..., K }: political actor randomly assigned to endorse policy j for respondent i Y ij (t): potential response given the endorsement by actor t Covariates measured prior to the treatment Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 9 / 24

The Proposed Model Quadratic random utility model (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers): U i (ζ j1, k) = (x i + s ijk ) ζ j1 2 + η ij U i (ζ j, k) = (x i + s ijk ) ζ j 2 + ν ij x i is the ideal point and s ijk is the influence of endorsement The statistical model (item response theory): Pr(Y ij = 1 T ij = k) = Pr(Y ij (k) = 1) = Pr(U i (ζ j1, k) > U i (ζ j, k)) = Pr(α j + β j (x i + sijk ) > ɛ ij) Support level: greater support greater prob. of Y ij = 1 s ijk = { s ijk if β j otherwise s ijk Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 1 / 24

The Proposed Model (Continued) Hierarchical modeling: x i s ijk λ jk indep. indep. N (Z i δ, σ 2 x) N (Z i λ jk, ω 2 jk ) i.i.d. N (θ k, Φ k ) Noninformative hyper prior on (α j, β j, δ, θ k, ω 2 jk, Φ k) Interpretation: spacial model vs. factor analysis policy vs. valence aspects of support Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 11 / 24

Quantities of Interest and Model Fitting Average support level for each militant group k τ jk (Z i ) = Zi λ jk for each policy j κ k (Z i ) = Zi θ k averaging over all policies Standardize them by dividing the (posterior) standard deviation of ideal points Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm Multiple chains to monitor convergence Implementation via JAGS (Plummer) Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 12 / 24

Model for the Division Level Support Ordered response with an intercept α jl varying across divisions The model specification: x i s ijk δ division[i] λ k,division[i] indep. N (δ division[i], 1) indep. N (λ k,division[i], ω 2 k ) indep. N (µ province[i], σ 2 province[i] ) indep. N (θ k,province[i], Φ k,province[i] ) Averaging over policies Partial pooling across divisions within each province Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 13 / 24

Estimated Division Level Support Standardized Level of Support 1..5..5 1. Pakistani militant groups in Kashmir Militants fighting in Afghanistan Al Qaida Firqavarana Tanzeems Bahawalpur n=118 Dera Ghazi Khan n= Faisalabad n=313 Gujranwala n=43 Lahore n=579 Multan n=495 Rawalpindi n=28 Sargodha n=131 Hyderabad n=23 Karachi n=473 Larkana n=311 Mirpurkhas n= Sukkur n=293 Bannu n= Dera Ismail Khan n=84 Hazara n=287 Kohat n=5 Malakand n= Mardan n=215 Peshawar n=288 Kalat n=13 Makran n= Nasirabad n=21 Quetta n=32 Sibi n=67 Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan Zhob n=61 Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 14 / 24

Model with Individual Covariates Ordered response with an intercept α jl varying across divisions The model specification: x i s ijk δ division[i] λ k,division[i] indep. indep. N (δ division[i] + Z i δ Z, 1) N (λ k,division[i] + Z i λ Z k, ω2 k ) indep. N (µ province[i], σ 2 province[i] ) indep. N (θ k,province[i], Φ k,province[i] ) Expands upon the division level model to include individual level covariates: gender, urban/rural, education, income Individual level covariate effects after accounting for differences across divisions Poststratification on these covariates using the census Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 15 / 24

Estimated Effects of Individual Covariates Pakistani militant groups in Kashmir Militants fighting in Afghanistan Standardized Level of Support.2.1..1.2 Female Rural Income Education Standardized Level of Support.2.1..1.2 Female Rural Income Education Al Qaida Firqavarana Tanzeems Standardized Level of Support.2.1..1.2 Female Rural Income Education Standardized Level of Support.2.1..1.2 Female Rural Income Education Demographics play a small role in explaining support for groups Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 16 / 24

Regional Clustering of the Support for Al-Qaida Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 17 / 24

Some Non-Causal Observations Comparison with the knowledge on the ground Greatest support in Punjab: consistent Support in Gujranwala but not in Bahawalpur: surprising (US AID?) Least tolerant where senior leadership resides Hazara for Al-Qa ida Quetta and Zhob for Taliban Least support where many terrorist attacks before April 29 Hazara, Kohat, Nasirabad, Peshawar, and Quetta all suffered from attacks in early 29 Data on politically motivated violence from March 28 through March 29 (National Counterterrorism Center s Worldwide Incident Tracking System) Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 18 / 24

Association between Support and Violence Strong negative association Pakistani militant groups in Kashmir Militants fighting in Afghanistan Al Qaida Firqavarana Tanzeems Number of Incidents 2 15 1 5 correlation =.574 Number of Incidents 2 15 1 5 correlation =.594 Number of Incidents 2 15 1 5 correlation =.468 Number of Incidents 2 15 1 5 correlation =.414.4.3.2.1..1.2.4.3.2.1..1.2.4.3.2.1..1.2.4.3.2.1..1.2 Division Level Estimated Support Division Level Estimated Support Division Level Estimated Support Division Level Estimated Support Weaker association for the standard ordered probit model (division dummies, treatment variables, their interactions) Pakistani militant groups in Kashmir Militants fighting in Afghanistan Al Qaida Firqavarana Tanzeems Number of Incidents 2 15 1 5 correlation =.61 Number of Incidents 2 15 1 5 correlation =.365 Number of Incidents 2 15 1 5 correlation =.21 Number of Incidents 2 15 1 5 correlation =.166.4.2..2.4.6.4.2..2.4.6.4.2..2.4.6.4.2..2.4.6 Division Level Estimated Support Division Level Estimated Support Division Level Estimated Support Division Level Estimated Support Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 19 / 24

Ideology, Support, and Violence No strong relationship between: ideology and violence ideology and support Number of Incidents 2 15 1 5 correlation =.4 Division Level Average Estimated Support for Militant Groups.1.5..5.1.15.2.25 correlation =.87.5..5.5..5 Division Level Estimated Ideal Point Division Level Estimated Ideal Point Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 2 / 24

Simulation Studies 1 Based on the Pakistani Data Same 2 models plus province-level issue ownership model Top-level parameters held constant across simulations Sample sizes and distribution same as before Ideal points, endorsements and responses follow IRT models 2 Varying sample sizes Model for division-level estimates with no covariates Model for province-level estimates with no covariates but support varying across policies N = 1, 15, 2 Again, top-level parameters held constant across simulations while ideal points, endorsements and responses follow IRT models 1 simulations under each scenario (3 chains, 6 iterations) Frequentist evaluation of Bayesian estimators Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 21 / 24

Monte Carlo Evidence based on the Pakistani Data The Division Model Density 4 3 2 1 Bias Density 2 15 1 5 Coverage Rate of the 9% Confidence Intervals Proportion Statistically Significant 1..8.6.4.2. Statistical Power α level =.1.1.5..5.1.8.85.9.95 1...2.4.6.8 1. Effect Size 4 2 1. The Division Model With Individual Covariates Density 3 2 1 Density 15 1 5 Proportion Statistically Significant.8.6.4.2..1.5..5.1.8.85.9.95 1...2.4.6.8 1. Effect Size Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 22 / 24

Monte Carlo Evidence with Varying Sample Size N=1 N=15 N=2.2.1..1.2 Bias Bias N=1 N=15 N=2.75.8.85.9.95 1. 1.5 Coverage Rate of the 9% Confidence Intervals Coverage Rate..2.4.6.8 1...2.4.6.8 1. Statistical Power Effect Size Proportion Statistically Significant N=2 N=15 N=1 N=1 N=15 N=2.2.1..1.2 Bias N=1 N=15 N=2.75.8.85.9.95 1. 1.5 Coverage Rate..2.4.6.8 1...2.4.6.8 1. Effect Size Proportion Statistically Significant N=2 N=15 N=1 The Division Model The Division Model With Individual Covariates α level =.1 Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 23 / 24

Concluding Remarks Survey methodology to study sensitive questions Endorsement Experiments Most indirect form of questioning Applicability limited to measuring support Analysis based on the item response framework Multilevel modeling to efficient estimation of spatial patterns Design considerations: Policies should belong to a single dimension Respondents should not have strong opinion Separating policy and valence aspects of support Statistical vs. substantive tradeoffs Could measure policy positions and political knowledge separately JAGS code available at the dataverse Kosuke Imai (Princeton) Endorsement Experiments NEMP (NYU) 24 / 24