Social Reproduction and Value Conflict S. Farrokh Mostafavi Institute for Training and Research on Management and Planning P.O. Box 19395/4647, Tehran Iran farrokh_mostafavi@hotmail.com Paper presented at the IUSSP Seminar on the Demography of Conflict and Violence, held in Oslo, Norway, 8-11 November 2003. Funding and support provided by IUSSP
Social Reproduction and Value Conflict This paper is concerned with the conflict that may arise in a society due to the different values and lifestyles that new generations may adopt. Both value change and demographic conditions may contribute to the intensity of the conflict that may ensue. Value changes may lead to changes in attitude and behavior that could come into conflict with the established norms and practices. Weber (1949) has discussed the importance of values in the generation of conflict, which occurs between general views on life and universe. In recent years, Huntington (1993) has also developed a theory of conflict among civilizations based on conflict on cultural values. On the other hand, demographic factors may result in a population structure with a high proportion of young people capable of exerting considerable influence in society. Such a conflict may be reinforced by other factors, such as youth unemployment. Population replacement can lead to changes in cultural values. The theory of intergenerational value change (Inglehart 1997, 2000) explains the changes in cultural values in industrial societies as a result of economic development and intergenerational population replacement processes. The theory uses the research finding that basic values of individuals are largely fixed by the time they reach adulthood (Inglehart 1977, 1997; Rokeach 1968, 1973). It is argued that the formative experiences of the younger generations in industrial societies during the twentieth century have differed from those of the older ones (Inglehart 2000). Before the Second World War, the crucial concern for most people was threat of economic deprivation. On the other hand, the postwar generation has experienced economic security as a result of rapid economic development and the expansion of the welfare state. The rising levels of existential security have led to intergenerational value change from materialist values to postmaterialist and postmodern values. Thus, throughout advanced industrial societies, we observe a cultural shift from focusing on economic and physical security toward focusing on self-expression and the quality of life. The new values emphasize environmental protection, the women s movement, and participation in decision-making in economic and political life. In this paper I consider the changes in values in certain developing countries and the conflict that may result thereof. The paper is composed of three sections. In the first section, a theoretical framework is developed. In the second section, the theory is applied to explain the situation in Iran. The third section draws some predictions that could be used to test the theory.
I. A Theory of Generation Change and Value Conflict The main hypothesis of this paper is that social reproduction results in new generations that may adopt new values due to changing social conditions. The change of values will lead to social conflict or social problems if the dominant authority relations do not permit the realization of the new values. All societies are involved in social reproduction. Every population, in order to survive, should reproduce itself. At any point in time individuals are born into a population and others die. There is a process of renewal of the population through the new generations that are added, as there is also a process of aging and dying out. Thus, every society is confronted with bearing and rearing of children, and the problems that may arise thereof, including the inculcation of values in the youth. Values are conceptions of desirable (van Deth and Scarbrough 1995) that serve as standards of selection, including the selection of individual lifestyles. Individuals are not indifferent to their environment. They prefer certain choices and may be opposed to others. Individuals start to acquire values after birth, and mainly during their early years of upbringing (Inglehart 1977, 1997). They learn these values through experience, education, and communication of ideas. Parents play a major role in the education of values to new generations. But, they are not the only source of values. Peer groups and social organizations, such as the educational system, also play an important role in the transmission of values to the new generations. The importance of modern education needs to be emphasized. Modern education is itself a source of new ideas and values. In addition, educated people can have better access to new ideas and values. Two social processes can lead to changes in values. First, changes in socioeconomic conditions could lead to changes in the values of the new generations that experience new (and different) conditions (Inglehart 2000). Second, the generation and communication of new ideas and values in a society could be another source. The communicated values may reach people of all age groups. However, they will have differential effect on different age groups. Young people are more open to these values because they are in the ages of value formation. People in older ages, on the other hand, have passed these ages and are less likely to be influenced. The process is related to the differential capacity of the different age groups to adopt new values. It is a fact that in the contemporary world almost all societies experience socioeconomic change. It is also a fact that new ideas and values are always produced and communicated. These two premises entail that young people in contemporary societies are always exposed to new ideas and new socio-economic conditions, which may result in the adoption of new values by them.
Modern western values constitute one possible value system that can be diffused to other societies. Important western values that may be communicated include freedom, liberal democratic values, human rights, women s rights, individualism, and individual achievement. The diffusion of values requires the existence of appropriate communication channels. Modern information and communication technology, such as radio, television, Internet, and mass media play an important role in this respect. International migration could also contribute to such transfer of ideas and values. Value differences among individuals may lead to conflict among them because their lifestyles may be incompatible with each other. The new generations may adopt certain values that are incompatible with the values of the dominant authorities. These authority relations may pertain to small organizations, such as a family, or the political relations within the social system. The dominant authorities may try to impose their own values and may not accept the realization of other values. Thus, discordance may emerge between values of the authorities and that of the new generations. Depending on the concrete situation, the rift of values may lead to different consequences. One possible consequence is social conflict, between the authorities and the generations with new values. The social conditions, however, may not permit the occurrence of social conflict, or the dominant authorities may suppress it. In these cases, the change of values may result in other social problems, such as decrease in trust to authorities, decrease in professional responsibility, increase in emigration, and legitimation crisis. A number of factors can influence the intensity of the conflict. These include (1) the type of values involved, (2) high proportion of the youth in the population, and (3) the existence of high unemployment among the youth. High fertility in the past results in a population structure where the youth make up a considerable proportion of the population. An increase in the relative proportion of the young people will increase their influence in society. It may also lead to unemployment when large numbers of the youth enter labour markets. The resulting social conflict could manifest itself in a variety of ways, including the following. a. Political conflict and protest. The diffusion of new political values among the youth could result in the development of new aspirations and political demands, leading to political conflict with the established system. The aim of such political activities is to change the dominant political structure in accordance with the new values. In the modern world, the most important of these values are liberal democratic values, which result in democratic social and political movements. An example is the student protests during the 1990 s in the People s Republic of China, culminating in its suppression in the Tienamen Square. The
student s demands were clearly influenced by western (in particular American) values of democracy and freedom, and well portrayed in the symbol that they displayed: the United States Statue of Liberty. b. Election results. The conflict of values and interests may manifest itself in various elections, such as presidential, parliamentary, or city council elections, leading to the election of new and reformist candidates to office. The existence of free elections makes it possible to resolve the conflict peacefully. c. Norm breaking behavior. When other forms of expression are suppressed, the youth may engage in norm breaking behavior in order to express their dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs. d. Crime and Violence. Crime movies provide important role models for the youth to engage in crime and violent behavior, especially when the traditional values are eroded or rejected. Motivated by crime movies and a desire to acquire quick riches, young people may form gangs and engage in violent and criminal behavior. II. Case Study: Iran In this section I use the proposed theory in order to explain the observed events in Iran. 1. History of value conflict in Iran The history of conflict between tradition and modernity in Iran goes back to the rise of modernity in the west and Iran s interaction with it. The defeat of Iranian forces from Russian army in several battles during the 19 th century convinced certain Iranian elites (such as Abass Mirza, Ghaem Magham, and Amir Kabir) of the necessity of acquiring western techniques (Behnam 1996). These developments led to more communication and interaction with the west. Students were sent to Europe and technical schools were established in the country. Contact with the West resulted in changes in ideas, attitudes, values and beliefs of some Iranian intellectuals. Those who were in the government started to introduce bureaucratic and social reforms (such as Amir Kabir). Intellectuals outside the government started to criticize the political system. These criticisms and oppositions led to the Constitutional Revolution of 1905. Here we can see the value conflict between the constitutionalists (Mashrooteh Khahan) who valued freedom and the adoption of modern systems of government, and the traditionalists (Mashroohe Khahan) who held to the belief that Islamic values and edicts should be established in society. The conflict has continued to this day. The
differences cover almost all aspects of life, from individual lifestyles to forms of government. After the 1979 Islamic revolution, the ruling clergy tried to impose traditional Islamic values in society. At schools, students were taught religious subjects. People were encouraged to participate in mass praying. In streets, it was expected that people would observe certain religious edits. In particular, women were expected to observe the dress code. Since the 1979 revolution, the clergy has taken control of the judicial system and has tried to enforce religious rules. Radio and television programmes have also been regulated, with attempts to make them Islamic. 2. The development of communication technology The development of information technology has increased the communication of ideas among the population. Each week the national television broadcasts several foreign movies. Satellite TV programmes are popular in Iran. Although they are legally banned, people set up illegal dishes and use receivers to view such programmes. The widespread use of such dishes, as can be seen over the roofs, attests to the popularity of these programmes. Foreign movie videotapes or CDs are abundant at specialized shops and can be obtained easily, or they can be viewed in cinemas. In recent years the number of Internet users has increased in Iran. This technology is also an important source of ideas and values for the users. 3. Demographic situation Demographic transition in Iran started before 1956, when the first census of population was undertaken. Declining levels of mortality, coupled with high rates of fertility has resulted in high rates of population growth and a young population age structure. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for the country increased from 6 children per woman in 1976 to 7 children in 1980, thereafter declining to 6.3 children in 1986, 2.8 children in 1996, and 2.17 children in 2000 (Abassi-Shavzi 2002). Total population of the country increased from 18.9 million in 1956, to 33.7 million in 1976 (two years before the Islamic revolution), and to over 60 million in 1996 (Statistical Center of Iran 1998). Thus, during the 20-year period 1976-1996, the population of the country almost doubled. The average annual rate of population growth during the period 1976-1986 was 3.9 percent, which was one of the highest population growth rates recorded in that time. Refugee entry into the country from Iraq and Afghanistan also contributed to this high rate of population growth. The proportion of young people in the age group 15-24 years to total population has increased from 15.4 per cent in 1956 to 19 per cent in 1976 and to 20.5 per cent in 1996 (Statistical Center of Iran 2002). In 1996, the number of people in the
age group 15-24 was 12.3 million (Statistical Center of Iran 1998). The age group 10-14 years constituted the largest five years age group (over 9 million, 15 per cent of the total population), followed by the 5-9 years age group (8.5 million, 14 per cent). These data indicate that in 1996 young people constituted a considerable proportion of the country s population. Projections of population age structure indicate that the youth will make up a considerable proportion of the Iranian population in the years to come. The past two decades have also witnessed important changes in the country s population characteristics. The proportion of literate population has increased from about 38 per cent in 1976 to over 69 per cent in 1996. The proportion of population living in urban areas has increased from about 47 per cent to over 61 per cent during the same period (Statistical Center of Iran 1998). These changes in population characteristics can have significant influence concerning the changes of values during the period. One important consequence of this population age structure is the pressure that it produces in the labour market. Young people reaching ages of employment face shortage of jobs available. In order to provide the needed jobs to this population, the economy should grow at rates higher than the prevailing ones. Unable to do so, it has resulted in increasing unemployment over the years, exacerbating some of the problems discussed below. 4. Main areas of conflict Important areas of value conflict in contemporary Iran are related to the form of government, freedom of expression, and individual rights. Democratic values and beliefs have been popular in Iran since the early 20 th century. Current political structure in Iran, which is referred to as religious democracy by political elites, is a form of theocracy with some semi-democratic elements. At the top of the state is the religious leader, who controls the armed forces and appoints the head of judiciary. In case of a conflict between different institutions of the state, the leader has the final say. The clergy also controls the parliament through the Council of Guardians. In order to become a law, this Council should approve the decisions of the parliament. The reform movement in Iran advocates the extension of citizen democratic rights. President Khatami s main election slogans were freedom, democracy, individual rights, and political and economic reforms. In contrast, the conservatives want all political and judicial measures to conform to Islamic codes as interpreted by the ruling clergy. The success of reformists in various elections indicates the popularity of democratic values and ideals among the population, especially the youth.
Freedom of expression has been an important demand of the Iranian intelligentsia during the past century. Apart from specific periods, the state in Iran has generally restricted the activities of the free press. The traditional clergy in the state also favour control of the mass media. After the election of the reformist president Khatami to office, there was considerable increase in the publication of newspapers and journals. After a short period, however, the judicial authorities have banned many of these publications. Current religious rules restrict women s activities and their relationship with men. Women should observe certain dress codes and avoid certain activities (such as singing or dancing in front of men). There are also restrictions on women s social activities. For example, women cannot be elected to leadership positions or become judges. The association and sexual relationship between men and women is also regulated by Islamic rules, as interpreted by the clergy holding power. Women desire more freedom of participation in social activities. It is believed that women s vote played an important role in the election of Mr. Khatami to office. Survey results indicate that a large number of the youth prefer a fundamental change in the current social situation in Iran. According to the findings of the survey Iranian Values and Beliefs, in 2001 about 34.3 per cent of the population in the age group 15-29 years in Tehran thought that the current situation in the country cannot be reformed and preferred a fundamental change in the country. The corresponding figures for the age groups 30-49 and 50 years and over were 24.5 and 18.7 per cents, respectively. The proportion of young people in the age group 15-29 years who preferred reform of the current situation was 60.8 per cent, compared to the 69.6 and 74.1 per cents for the age groups 30-49 and 50 years and over, respectively (Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance 2002, p.200, table 8). These data indicate that there is a considerable rift between the youth and the authorities. After the 1997 presidential election, a number of surveys were conducted in Iran in order to study the reasons for the election of Mr. Khatami. These surveys reveal some of the values and preferences of the voters, which were in conflict with officially declared values. The survey Causes in the Seventh Election, which was carried out by the Research Centre of the parliament, asked for the reasons for the election of Mr. Khatami from a sample of 3971 people collected from various parts of the country. Among the main reasons offered were preferring freedom and modernism (rank 3, 38.53 per cent) and paying attention to women s problems (rank 14, 13.3 per cent) (Rabyee 2001, p. 167, table 18). In another survey conducted by the University Crusade (Jahade Daneshghahi) with a sample of 2350 respondents from Tehran, establishment of individual and social freedom had rank 11 (3 per cent) among the reasons for the election of Mr. Khatami (Rabyee 2001, p. 176, table 20). Another survey conducted by the Institute for Strategic Studies with a sample of about 3000 people from Tehran, the second
most important reason (11.2 per cent) offered for the election of Mr. Khatami was the need for more individual and social freedom (Rabyee 2001, p177, table 21). These surveys reveal the importance of the values of freedom and individual rights among certain groups of the population. 5. Forms of conflict In recent years, value conflict in Iran has been manifested in a variety of ways, including the following. a. Students protests. On several occasions students have demonstrated in streets against restriction of freedom of speech or the confiscation of reformist newspapers. In some cases violent clashes has occurred between the students and security forces and other individuals. Some students have been arrested and sentenced to jail. b. Election results. The main slogans of the contemporary reform movement in Iran that had sweeping victories in the presidential, parliamentary, and city council elections were freedom, democracy, tolerance, and individual rights. The vote of the youth and women played an important role in the election of the reformist president Khatami twice to the office. Similarly, their vote was decisive in the landslide victories of the reformist candidates for parliament during the parliamentary elections of 2000 and the city councils elections of 1999. Dissatisfied with the performance of these reformist candidates, many of the same people refrained to vote in the city council elections of 2003, leading to the election of many conservative candidates, especially in large urban areas. c. Norm breaking activities. The Youth has demonstrated a tendency to break official norms during specific public gatherings, such as the street celebrations after a major football victory or during the national Chaharshanbeh Souri celebrations. Examples of such activities include girls singing and dancing in the streets and shouting with boys. Due to the generality and spontaneity of these gatherings and their large scale, their control is difficult for the authorities. Other such practices include wearing inappropriate clothes and broadcasting load Western music in their cars. d. Family problems. Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, women s awareness of their rights has increased due to increase in their level of education and the diffusion of ideas of women s rights. Women are now less likely to accept men s authority or tolerate unsuccessful marriages. Consequently, such marriages are likely to break down. High divorce rates in the country have been considered a social problem in need of attention. Besides cultural
factors, however, economic hardship has also contributed to this process. Although it is difficult to obtain reliable data, newspaper reports also indicate the existence of parent child conflict. The phenomena of young girls running away from home has attained the status of a social problem to the extent that newspapers have devoted special attention to it and the national TV has produced a serial on the problem. e. Youth violence and crime. Youth violence and crime occupy the pages of daily newspapers in Iranian society. Television programmes also display interviews with young criminals and gangs captured by police. The form of these crimes, as well as the interviews, suggests that many of these young criminals are influenced by crime movies. In addition to the communication of criminal role models, increasing unemployment due to the large number of young people entering the labor market has also contributed to the increases in criminal activities. 6. The ruling elites view concerning the problem Among the ruling elite and the conservative clergy, the problem of diffusion of values and ideals is considered as a Cultural Attack (Tahajome Farhangui). In response, the authorities have demanded solutions and counterattacks. Measures suggested have been different. The conservative faction has blamed the newspapers, illegal satellite programmes, and foreign radios and televisions as channels of this attack. Consequently, they demand closing of such newspapers, more control of the cultural industry (including newspaper and book publications), and banning of the use of satellite televisions. Some (unknown) organizations have started to send interfering signals, making it difficult to receive Iranian programmes from satellite televisions. In contrast, the reformers have advocated more open society, development of a critical attitude, more tolerance, freedom, and more education in order to counter the problem. The debate between the two factions concerning the more appropriate way to solve the problem continues to this date. III. Prediction and testing Our theory predicts that conflict may emerge in those societies where new generations have acquired new values and the authorities do not permit the realization of these values. China is particularly relevant here, given that she is well integrated into the world market and is modernizing. The country experienced massive student protests during the 1990s, with students demanding democracy and freedom. These protests have been suppressed. But, unless the ruling elite in
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