Part V Dangerous Crossroads

Part V Dangerous Crossroads

Introduction: Controlling the Crossroads When abroad on the international highway, states sometimes get involved in situations which are of a different order to those in which the principal repercussion is their own embarrassment or that of their friends. Instead, they may find themselves in, or even seek, a major confrontation with a long-standing adversary, or behave in a manner which could have that outcome. It is as if one or both parties were driving recklessly at a crossroads, with all the dangerous consequences which such behaviour can very easily entail. These consequences, moreover, could well involve a much wider company than the initial antagonists. For each of them might have close associates, of whom some, from more motives than one, might involve themselves in this way or that with the fortunes of their friend. Not very long ago such happenings would have generally been seen as the business only of those states who were directly affected by the affray. If one state wanted or stumbled into war with another, and had not accepted any fetters on its legal freedom so to behave, the affair was regarded as entirely its own concern. If the conflict escalated, that too was just the bad - or possibly good - luck of those who were involved. War for states was a hazard roughly equivalent to the affliction of the individual by taxes - a seemingly inevitable concomitant of life. The twentieth century, however, has seen a remarkable turnabout in the international aspect of this equation. In the theory of the matter, states are no longer free to threaten or use force against their fellows, so that resort to arms is now always presented in a defensive, or at most a pre-emptive, light. The international society at large is regarded as having a right to interest itself in outbreaks of inter-state violence, and to work for their limitation or conclusion. And since 1945 the development of bipolarity on the one hand and nuclear weapons on the other has resulted in great and understandable anxiety about the escalatory dangers of many conflicts. Post-Second World War developments have given a further twist to the incidence of escalation and the extent of worries about it. The new norms about proper behaviour and the increasing practical difficulties of the matter have together produced a very marked diminution in 274

Introduction 275 the despatch of armies across frontiers with a view to territorial aggrandizement. Deprived of this possible means of adding to their political realms, the superpowers have become even more concerned about the international orientation of third states, and this concern has been heightened by the ideological division ofthe times. In consequence, when lesser governments have appeared shaky there has sometimes been competitive activity to support or unseat them, or an apprehension about the possibility of such activity. Escalation has therefore sometimes seemed likely to occur not just as a consequence of an initially limited international dispute but also of internal political events which have attracted outside interest. In the endeavour to control conflicts, and especially to prevent their escalation, use has quite often been made of the device of peacekeeping. And it is no coincidence that nine out of the eleven cases in which such means have found employment have been located in the Middle East. For that area's long historical experience as an important international crossroads has been given an even higher profile by four mid-century developments of a regionally-specific kind: firstly, the withdrawal from the Middle East of France and Britain; secondly, the volatility of many of the successor regimes and the fact that hardly any of them lined up clearly with either East or West; thirdly, the discovery that the region's oil resources were even larger than had been thought, and the financial interest in and economic dependence on them of many Western countries; and fourthly, the bitter Arab-Israeli conflict. When this heady scene is placed in the context of a keen competition between two ideologically-divided and nuclear-armed superpowers, both of whom have throughout shown a lively strategic interest in the affairs of the Middle East, it is not at all surprising that it has been the venue of a number of anti-escalatory operations of a peacekeeping kind. The first was at a location which, in a very different local context, was to be the scene of much peacekeeping later on: Lebanon (Section B). In 1958, however, the problem arose out of the anxiety of its rightward-moving Government that externally-based left-wing forces were working for its overthrow; the initial sharing of that perception by the United States; and the scepticism of many other states about that analysis. The compromise outcome was the despatch of an observer group to see what was going on. Five years later, and in relation to (now North) Yemen, the first part of this scenario was reversed, and Egypt immediately sent large numers of troops to support the 'progressive' regime against its internal opponents, who were receiving help from Saudi Arabia (Section E). This activity rang many Western

276 Dangerous Crossroads alarm bells; a disengagement agreement was negotiated; and a UN group sent to supervise its execution. In the event, however, and for reasons unconnected with the UN's peacekeeping work, it was not executed. The next three peacekeeping bodies all attempted to defuse dangerous behaviour at the Arab-Israeli crossroads. After the Six Day War of 1967, in which Israel occupied much Arab land, UN Military Observers were posted on three of the four military fronts: on the Israeli-Syrian cease-fire line immediately after the War; on that between Egypt and Israel - which ran along the Suez Canal - shortly afterwards; and on Lebanon's side of her line with Israel in 1972 (Section F). They were all present when the war broke out in October 1973, and in varying ways still operate in these areas. In the highly dangerous circumstances which developed on the Egyptian - Israeli front at the end of the 1973 War - when a superpower confrontation seemed imminent - first UN observers and then a UN Force were rushed to the scene (Section G). They stayed for six years, witnessing, and assisting in, a remarkable process of reconciliation. On the Israeli-Syrian front, too, UN observation was reinstituted at the end of the War, and in 1974 a stabilizing agreement provided for the despatch of a UN Force, which is still in place (Section H). In 1975 civil war broke out in Lebanon, which immediately attracted the sharp concern of her two neighbours - Israel and Syria. As these two states composed the bitterest pair of Arab-Israeli enemies, and each had close links with a (different) superpower, the situation had considerable explosive potential. Over the next seven years it attracted no fewer than four operations which, at least at their start, had a peacekeeping character. In 1976 Syria intervened in strength to check the civil war, but had other fish to fry in Lebanon and is still trying to fry them (Section I). The UN sent an 'Interim' Force to south Lebanon in 1978, which is also still there (Section J). In 1982 a non-un Force supervised the withdrawal of Palestinian fighters from Beirut, where they had been under siege by Israel (Section K). And immediately afterwards another Force of the same type tried to help the Lebanese Government restore its authority in its capital - but a good part of the Force ended up by participating, painfully, on the Governmental side in the resumed civil war (Section L). Away from the Middle East, the UN deployed its largest-yet peacekeeping force in Congo (now Zaire) in 1960 (Section C). Much of the impetus behind the decision to establish this Force arose out of (arguably ill-founded) fears that the anarchy which existed in Congo

Introduction 277 might result in the state becoming a cockpit of the Cold War. The Force stayed for four years, arousing great controversy on two quite different counts: its relations with the host Government and its hostile behaviour towards the secessionist province of Katanga. As well as helping to control incipient dangers at a crossroads, peackeeping bodies can be used to assist in the winding down of conflicts which have occurred at such locations. Thus at the end of the Korean War of 1950-1953 (in which the UN was for the first, and thus far last, time a traditional combatant - an activity quite different from that which has come to be known as peacekeeping), the Organization was turned to for peacekeeping tasks (Section A). In a very tenuous form it conducts them still. In a rather similar way, the superpower parties to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 looked to the UN to help them conclude the matter (Section D). But to their surprise and annoyance their plans were frustrated by the potential host state's outright refusal to accept the role which had been assigned to it. It was a reminder that while peacekeeping can be very useful, it is often far from popular with those who are, in a sense, on its receiving end.