STATE OF NEW YORK SUPREME COURT : COUNTY OF MONROE DAVID and EDDIE INNOCENT, -against- Plaintiffs, OAS, LLC and I.M. LEADFREY, Defendants. Index Number: 1234-2016 MEMORANDUM OF LAW SUBMITTED IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT LEADFREY'S APPLICATION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Respectfully submitted, Anne E. Joynt, Esq. LIPSITZ & PONTERIO, LLC Attorneys for Plaintiff 135 Delaware Avenue- Fifth Floor Buffalo, New York 14202 Telephone: (716) 849-0701 1
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT In this lawsuit, plaintiffs Eddie and David Innocent seek compensation for their injurious exposure to lead-based paint at Two Band Street, a rental property owned during the relevant time period by defendant I.M. Leadfrey. Defendant Leadfrey argues he is entitled to an order of Summary Judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims because plaintiffs have failed to prove that defendant Leadfrey had actual or constructive notice of chipping or peeling paint at Two Band Street during plaintiffs' tenancy and that Leadfrey was unaware of the hazards of lead-based paint to children. The evidence before this Court raises a triable question of fact on the issues of whether defendant Leadfrey possessed actual or constructive notice of a condition conducive to lead poisoning at Two Band Street and whether he had notice of the hazards of lead-based paint. Accordingly, Summary Judgment should be denied. STATEMENT OF FACTS The Court's attention is respectfully directed to the accompanying Attorney Affidavit of Anne E. Joynt, Esq., with exhibits annexed thereto, which is hereby incorporated by reference for an extensive review of the facts relevant to the instant motion. 2
ARGUMENT POINT I DEFENDANT HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE EXISTENCE OF LEADED PAINT HAZARDS AT TWO BAND STREET DURING THE TIME OF PLAINTIFFS' TENANCY A landlord may be held liable for injuries resulting from exposure to lead-based paint hazards at his rental property when the landlord failed to timely remedy the hazards, despite possessing constructive notice of their existence. See, Chapman v. Silber, 97 N.Y.2d 9 (2001). A jury may find that a defendant-landlord possessed constructive notice of the existence of lead-based paint hazards at his rental property when a combination of the landlord's knowledge and actions satisfy the following five factor test: (1) the landlord retained a right of entry and assumed a duty to make repairs at the property (the first Chapman factor); (2) the landlord was aware that the property was constructed prior to 1978 (the second Chapman factor); (3) the landlord was aware of the existence of chipping, peeling and flaking paint at the property (the third Chapman factor); (4) the landlord was aware of the health hazards of lead-based paint to young children (the fourth Chapman factor); and (5) the landlord was aware that young children resided at the property (the fifth Chapman factor). See, Chapman, supra. In his summary judgment motion, defendant Leadfrey disputes plaintiffs' ability to satisfy the second and third Chapman factors- namely, that he was aware of chipping and peeling paint at the premises and that he was aware of the health hazards oflead-based paint to children. A. DEFENDANT FAILED TO MAKE A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING ENTITLEMENT TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE ISSUE OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF A LEADED PAINT HAZARD AT TWO BAND STREET The proponent of a summary judgment motion "must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence [in admissible form] to 3
demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact." Ayotte v. Gervasio, 81 N. Y.2d 1062, 1063 (citations omitted). Failure to make such a prima facie showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposition papers. Id. See, also, Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851 (1985). Furthermore, if a party's moving papers are defective in that they fail to set forth a prima facie showing of a party's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the party may not cure the defect through the submission of reply papers. See, Korthas v. U.S. Foodservice, Inc., 61 A.D.3d 1407 (4th Dept. 2009); ~also, Walter v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 56 A.D.3d 1187 (4th Dept. 2008). In order to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment on the issue of constructive notice of lead-based paint hazards, a defendant-landlord must affirmatively demonstrate that he should not have been aware of the existence oflead-based paint hazards at his rental dwelling. See, Vidal v. Rodriquez, 301A.D.2d517, 518 (2 d Dept. 2003) ("to meet its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any triable issues of fact in a lead poisoning case, a defendant must show that he or she had no prior actual or constructive notice of a dangerous lead paint condition." (emphasis added)). The only way for a defendant to satisfy this burden is to produce proof demonstrating the absence of a material question of fact as to each disputed Chapman factor. See, McDonald v. Farina, 119 A.D.3d 1432 (4th Dept. 2014) ("Inasmuch as the evidence that defendant submitted in support of his motion failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact with respect to the five Chapman factors, we conclude that the court properly denied the motion, 'regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers'."); Watson v. Priore, 104 A.D.3d 1304 (4 1 h Dept. 2013); and Williamson v. Ringuett, 85 A.D.3d 1427 (3rd Dept. 2011). 4
In Williamson, landlords moved for summary judgment arguing that two plaintiffs could not satisfy the chipping, peeling, and flaking paint factor of the Chapman test. 85 A.D.3d at 1428. In support of their motion, the landlords submitted deposition testimony in which they denied actual knowledge of chipping or peeling paint at their rental premises. Id. The landlords also submitted an affidavit from their agent/property manager, indicating that, prior to the commencement of plaintiffs' tenancy, the property manager was unaware of any chipping or peeling paint. Id. The property manager's affidavit, however, failed to indicate whether he was aware of chipping or peeling paint at the property during the plaintiffs' tenancy. Id. On appeal, the Third Department affirmed a trial court order denying summary judgment, finding that the defendants had failed to set forth a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, the Third Department opined: [a]s the proponents of summary judgment, it was incumbent upon defendants to 'make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law... "' * * * Although defendants' affidavits are sufficient to establish that they had no actual notice of the hazard, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and affording them the benefit of every favorable inference, because [the property manager's] affidavit is vague with respect to his observations of the premises during the period of plaintiffs' occupancy, it is insufficient to establish as a matter of law that, during that time, defendants did not have constructive notice of a lead paint hazard on their premises. 85 A.D3d 1428-29 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Here, defendant's affidavit speaks only to his knowledge of the condition of the paint at the house prior to the family moving into the property and not to his knowledge of the condition of the paint after the family moved in and during their residence. Significantly, when the private 5
inspection occurred, chipping and peeling paint was found. Further, there is a direct contradiction in the affidavits of the parties regarding whether or not Leadfrey was given notice of the results of the inspection prior to the elevation in the boys' blood lead levels. In Hill v. Lorac House, Inc., the First Department held that evidence presented through plaintiffs' expert testimony that leadbased paint was found in the baseboards and closet supports, along with proof that a child under the age of seven lived at the property, was sufficient evidence that defendant was on constructive notice of a lead paint hazard. See, Hill v. Lorac House, Inc., 135 A.D.3d, 659 (I5t Dep't 2016). For these reasons, defendant cannot demonstrate that he was not aware of the existence of chipping paint or lead hazards at his rental property during the time of plaintiffs' tenancy, and he is not entitled to an order of summary judgment on the constructive notice issue. The Court's attention is also directed to the case of Kimball v. Normandeau, 132 A.D.3d 1340 (Fourth Dep't 2015). In Kimball, the plaintiffs submitted the testimony of plaintiff's mother that 1) she had informed the landlord's agent that there was chipping and peeling paint at the property and 2) that plaintiff had prior health problems arising from exposure to lead paint chips. The Court held that plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence from which a jury might infer that the defendant knew that paint was peeling on the premises and knew of the hazards of lead-based paint to young children. Id. at 1342. Grace Full has submitted her sworn affidavit that she told the landlord of the twins' prior diagnosis of lead poisoning. She also testified that she told Leadfrey of the private testing for lead and the results of lead paint being found on the front and rear exterior doors. Although Leadfrey disputes these statements, that denial creates an issue of fact to be determined by the jury. Summary judgment therefore is inappropriate, and cannot be granted. 6
B. DEFENDANT'S AWARENESS OF HAZARDS OF LEAD THROUGH THE MEDIA Defendant has admitted to subscribing to, and reading both the local papers and Reader's Digest during the 1980's and 1990's. In Jackson v. Vatter, 121A.D.3d1588 (4th Dep't 2014) the court held, "Notably, plaintiff submitted evidence establishing that defendant subscribed to local Rochester newspapers, and that those newspapers had carried a number of articles about the hazards oflead-based paint to young children. Inasmuch as defendant failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact with respect to the five Chapman factors, we conclude that the court properly denied the motion." C. DEFENDANT'S CITED CASE LAW SUPPORTS PLAINTIFFS' CONTENTIONS Defendant cites to Davis v. Brzostowski, 133 A.D. 3rd 1371 (4th Dep't 2015) and Rodrigues v. Lesser, 136 A.D.3d 1322 (4th Dep't 2016), claiming both to be distinguishable from the case at bar. It is respectfully submitted that the cases are not distinguishable in that plaintiffs have submitted sufficient evidence from which a jury might infer that the defendant knew that there was chipping and peeling paint at the house, as well as the hazards exposure to lead paint posed to the health of young children. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated herein and in the accompanying Joynt Affidavit, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court deny defendant I. M. Leadfrey' s application for an order of Summary Judgment and grant such further and different relief that may be deemed just and proper. Dated: Buffalo, New York October 18, 2016 7