13 August 2012 Attack on New Zealand Soldiers Harbinger of Strategic Threat to Future of Afghanistan Jason Thomas FDI Associate Key Points The two principal strategic threats to enabling the gains made in Afghanistan to stick once US-Coalition forces have withdrawn are the Haqqani Network and the quality of the Afghan National Security Forces. The Haqqani Network has turned asymmetric warfare into a business enterprise with safe havens in Pakistan and support from the Pakistani Inter- Services Intelligence Agency (ISI). It has strong links with al-qaida and other regional terrorist networks, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Recent handovers of US Combat Outposts to Afghan National Army units have demonstrated their lack of logistical and supply capabilities, allowing the insurgents to move back into previously cleared areas. The US and Coalition countries may want to reconsider which troops they withdraw and leave the Operations Mentoring and Liaison Teams, who train the Afghan National Security Forces, to remain much longer than the 2014 deadline. The Afghan population in the villages and valleys away from the main centres will be faced with the stark choice of siding with a potentially weak Afghan Government or Taliban and Haqqani commanders who live among the people.
Summary The recent attack by well-equipped and tactically effective insurgents on Afghan and New Zealand soldiers in the relatively benign province of Bamiyan had all the hallmarks of the Haqqani Network. It is an ominous sign of things to come as United States and Coalition forces withdraw, leaving security to the Afghans. The Haqqani Network could be one of the biggest threats to the long-term viability of the US-NATO counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. The second strategic threat is the quality of the 352,000 Afghan National Security Forces scheduled to be trained by the end of 2102 and the ability of the Afghanistan Government to support them in the field. These are important concerns if the Afghan Government is to be able to withstand what could be a second surge by the Taliban once foreign forces depart. Analysis On 4 August 2012, two New Zealand soldiers were killed and six wounded in a co-ordinated assault by a group of insurgents who were described as being better equipped and significantly more proficient that any previous group encountered by the New Zealanders. The modus operandi and tenacity of Haqqani Network fighters tends to reflect this profile. The Haqqani Network was described in two recent reports by the Institute of War and the Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point, as the biggest risk to Afghanistan and regional security. The Institute of War highlighted the Haqqani Network as the most capable and potent insurgent group in Afghanistan, and continues to maintain close operational and strategic ties with al-qaida and their affiliates based in Pakistan. They also have strong links with and other regional terrorist networks, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which was connected with the Mumbai attacks in 2008. Founded by Jalaluddin and now run by his sons, the Haqqani Network has been described as the Sopranos of Afghanistan, with a sophisticated network of drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, transport and logistics enterprises and the taxing of local contractors who win international funding for development projects. The Haqqani Network has been responsible for some of the most brazen attacks on symbolic US and Coalition assets, such as the 2011 attack on the US Embassy, the suicide raid on Kabul s InterContinental Hotel and the eight-hour siege in Kabul s parliamentary district in April of this year. While once a vehicle for the CIA during the United States covert support of the Mujahedeen against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, they are now a proxy for Pakistan and benefit Islamabad by maintaining instability in Afghanistan and preventing an Afghan-Indian alliance. It is important to recognise the Haqqani Network in order to properly understand the anatomy of the violence and insurgency in Afghanistan. Many continue to see the violence as the result of the Taliban as a homogenous group, when it is actually an extraordinarily loose arrangement. The Haqqani Network is one of the few anti-government elements in Afghanistan with a strong command and control structure. While the Taliban have established a system of shadow government throughout Afghanistan, the Haqqani Network has a deeper and more sophisticated reach across the country and is controlled from North Waziristan in the Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Its ability to operate with impunity is largely the result of the support it receives from Pakistan s Inter-Services Page 2 of 5
Intelligence Directorate. Afghanistan s National Intelligence Directorate (NDS) recently disclosed that, on 28 June 2011, it had intercepted communications between the fighters who were assaulting the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul and their Haqqani Network handlers, based in Pakistan. In an intercepted phone call, Badruddin Haqqani, a top network leader, is heard directing one of the fighters and laughing during the attack that killed 11 civilians and two Afghan policemen, as well as nine members of the attack team. While US Special Forces began targeting members of the Haqqani Network in late 2010 and US drone strikes into the border areas with Pakistan have made an impact, this is unlikely to continue now that Afghan forces lead night raids. As the Taliban demonstrated time and again to the British in 2009 in Helmand s Sangin Valley, they are capable of re-forming and reasserting their authority on the human terrain, if the pressure is released. With their safe havens in Pakistan, the Haqqani Network is able to regenerate just as quickly as their Taliban counterparts. As with nearly all negotiations in Afghanistan, President Karzai may be left with having to carve out a deal with yet another group of bad guys if he wants to cement the gains made so far. Just like Abdul Razziq of Spin Boldak, unfortunately, even if you cannot control them, they make better partners than enemies. The other worrying sign from the gun battle in Bamiyan is that the Afghan Forces could not contain the insurgents themselves and had to call on the New Zealanders, who have been overseeing the Provincial Reconstruction Taskforce with about 170 soldiers. In a little over 12 months, there will be no New Zealand soldiers to call upon or, indeed, Coalition troops in many other districts across Afghanistan. Bamiyan is recognised as one of the more peaceful areas, unlike much of the south-eastern part of the country. It was for that reason that the transition from foreign forces to Afghan-led security began there. While no one doubts the courage and bravery of the Afghan soldiers themselves, they are simply not up to the task on their own. That is mostly because of a lack of resources and the inability of the Afghan Government to properly fund the maintenance of the military vehicles and equipment required to provide security for the population: a fundamental requirement of counterinsurgency. Unfortunately, this trend is not limited to Bamiyan Province. The brittle nature of the security transition from US forces to the Afghan National Army (ANA) was captured by Kevin Sief of the Washington Post. In April 2011, the ANA proudly took control from US Forces at Combat Outpost Tangi in Jalrez Valley, located in Wardak Province, about 50 kilometres from Kabul. It took only a few months before the Afghan soldiers abandoned the base to the Taliban because it was too dangerous without US ground and air support. In February this year, ANA forces took control of Combat Outpost Conlon, only to discover that they had one shot-up vehicle, no night vision goggles, little food and electricity for only three hours per day. NATO has now been looking to increase the original target for the number of trained ANA personnel from 170,500 to 195,000 by November 2012. How will such a large force, even if only concentrated in certain areas, be properly sustained by the Afghanistan Government? Retired US Marine Corp Colonel Jeff Haynes raised this concern in a 2009 report for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. In his paper, Reforming The Afghan Army: Getting The Most Out Of The ANA So We Can Do Less, Col. Haynes warned that growing the ANA too Page 3 of 5
fast will result in poorly trained, less effective units on the battlefield. Lacking adequate leadership, ANA soldiers are much more likely to engage in criminal activity. Corruption and AWOLs will increase, and the reputation of the ANA will decline, as more allegations of abuse against the Afghan people surface. Col. Haynes cites a poignant article in the New York Times, which makes the point that, Past counterinsurgents who tried to expand under similar conditions, like the British in Malaya (1948-60) and the Salvadorans (1980-92), discovered that too many inexperienced officers took command and the experienced officers were spread too thinly. In addition to fighting poorly, badly led troops usually alienate the population by misbehaving and they often desert or defect. At the risk of appearing disingenuous to the US and Coalition forces who have been responsible for training the ANSF, the issue is not with the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs). This paper merely seeks to highlight a real risk to all that hard work and to the ability of the Afghan Government to project its legitimacy and protect the population going forward. With the imminent withdrawal of foreign forces, it is understandable that the US-NATO Command is looking to speed up the capacity for the ANSF to take on the task of securing its own nation. As the examples above demonstrate, more time might be required to improve the quality of the ANSF and its capacity to be properly equipped, rather than only the quality. If there were to be any policy re-think by the likes of Australia and the United States as the pace of withdrawal increases, it should be to leave more OMLT trainers on the ground and continue the exit of combat units and Provincial Reconstruction Teams. While New Zealand soldiers have been in Afghanistan since 2003, the US-led International Security Assistance Forces have only really been fully committed and adequately resourced for a counterinsurgency campaign since 2009. Between the end of 2001 and 2008, Afghanistan was neglected in favour of the war in Iraq. During that period, the Taliban mastered their own surge, entrenching themselves back into strategic areas like Kandahar and Helmand while building training grounds and support networks in Pakistan. Today, in many villages and valleys across Afghanistan, the sight of international or Afghan security forces off the main roads is rare and the Provincial Governors almost never show their faces. Under these conditions, the populace do not feel protected, nor do they trust many of the corrupt Afghan Government officials. Given the ability of the Haqqani Network to endure throughout one of the most intense periods of targeting by the US, and the continued support it has from Pakistan, it is unlikely that the ANSF is going prove effective against an organisation that has made asymmetric warfare its business for the last twenty years. The families of those New Zealand soldiers killed in the attacks will wonder if it was worth paying the ultimate sacrifice, especially when the future of any gains made by the New Zealanders even in a place like Bamiyan, are fragile and reversible. No matter how many schools are built and roads paved, the local population know that ultimately they will be left to deal with the insurgents on their own. Their choice of supporting either the corrupt and inept Karzai Government or the local Taliban commander, who knows where they live, is not far away. Page 4 of 5
***** About the Author: Jason Thomas worked alongside US forces in Afghanistan in 2009-2010 and in 2011. He has also worked in South Sudan, the civil war area in Sri Lanka and the Philippines. He is undertaking his PhD on counter terrorism and, in his spare time, he takes disadvantaged young people trekking on the Kokoda Track in Papua New Guinea. ***** Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual author, unless stated to be those of Future Directions International. Published by Future Directions International Pty Ltd. Desborough House, Suite 2, 1161 Hay Street, West Perth WA 6005 Australia. Tel: +61 8 9486 1046 Fax: +61 8 9486 4000 E-mail: lluke@futuredirections.org.au Web: www.futuredirections.org.au Page 5 of 5