Case: 2:13-cv-00953-MHW-TPK Doc #: 311 Filed: 07/17/15 Page: 1 of 14 PAGEID #: 7977 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION LIBERTARIAN PARTY OF OHIO, et al. : : Plaintiffs, : : v. : CASE NO. 2:13-cv-00953 : JON HUSTED, Ohio Secretary of State : JUDGE WATSON : Defendant, : MAGISTRATE JUDGE KEMP : - and - : : STATE OF OHIO, et al. : : Intervening Defendants. : NON-PARTY MATT BORGES MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION (Doc. No. 302) Now comes non-party Matt Borges ( Borges ), by and through counsel, and hereby submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Compel Production Under Rule 45 From a Non-Party, Mr. Matt Borges filed by Plaintiff Libertarian Party of Ohio and Intervening Plaintiff Robert Hart ( Plaintiffs ). Borges respectfully urges this Court to deny Plaintiffs Motion ( Motion ) for three reasons. First, the documents sought are not relevant as a matter of law. Second, Plaintiffs fail to meet their threshold burden to support the Motion. Third, Borges does not currently maintain or possess any materials that are responsive to the subpoena and the cost and effort required to determine if any responsive materials are retrievable is overly burdensome. For these reasons and as set forth more fully below, the Motion should be denied. 9154776v5
Case: 2:13-cv-00953-MHW-TPK Doc #: 311 Filed: 07/17/15 Page: 2 of 14 PAGEID #: 7978 I. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. The Subpoenaed Information Is Not Relevant As A Matter of Law The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limit discovery to non-privileged matters that are relevant to a party s claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. While the scope of relevance is broad in discovery matters, it is not without its limits. To be certain, if a party asserts a claim or defense that patently lacks merit and then attempts to use such a claim or defense as a basis to conduct unnecessary or expensive discovery, the party who is the target of such conduct is not without a remedy. Williams v. Wellston City Sch. Dist., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122796, 1920 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 2, 2010). [R]elevance is determined in the context of the elements of the cause of action or defense thereto and in assessing the proper scope of discovery, the Court should balance a party s right to discovery with the need to prevent fishing expeditions. Conti v. Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc., 326 F. App'x 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1998)). Plaintiffs frame their argument regarding relevance of the documents sought as applicable to Count Seven of the Third Amended Complaint which asserts that Felsoci acted together with Terry Casey, the Kasich Campaign, and the Ohio Republican Party to protest Plaintiff Earl and remove him from the ballot. Assuming the Republican Party was involved, this proof would help establish state action. Pl. Mot. Compel 6, June 26, 2015. Plaintiffs claim that documents establishing who is paying Felsoci s attorneys and when the decision to pay Felsoc s [sic] attorneys was made are relevant to establishing state action. Id. However, Plaintiffs underlying claim that any action by the Ohio Republican Party ( ORP ) in this case could constitute state action is faulty and is precisely the type of claim that this Court cautioned against in Williams v. Wellston City Sch. Dist., supra: it patently lacks 9154776v5 2
Case: 2:13-cv-00953-MHW-TPK Doc #: 311 Filed: 07/17/15 Page: 3 of 14 PAGEID #: 7979 merit. Case law is exceedingly clear that a political party is not a state actor when it engages in protesting a candidate to the ballot. As such, documents seeking information to bolster such a meritless contention are not relevant and should not be the subject of discovery. This is especially so where, as here, one political party is seeking to engage in a wide-ranging and burdensome fishing expedition through the personal and business records of another political party s employee. To bring a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for a deprivation of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must allege that the defendants: (1) deprived the plaintiff of some constitutional right and then (2) acted under the color of state law. Banchy v. Republican Party of Hamilton County, 898 F.2d 1192, 1194 (6th Cir. 1990). Case law is clear that private parties cannot violate the First and Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, thus a plaintiff who relies upon the actions of a private party to maintain a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim must demonstrate that a private party was performing a state action. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 555 U.S. 246 (2009), Black v. Barberton Citizens Hosp., 134 F.3d. 1265 (6th Cir. 1998), Federspiel v. Ohio Republican Party State Cent. Comm., 867 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. Ohio 1994). Federal courts have routinely and uniformly held that a state action is not simply one traditionally employed by governments, but rather one traditionally exclusively reserved to the State. Nader v. McAuliffe, 593 F. Supp. 2d 95, 102 (D.D.C. Cir. 2009). (Internal questions and citations omitted.) Nader, supra, is particularly relevant to the instant matter because the facts in that case are virtually identical to the allegations raised by Plaintiffs in the instant matter. In fact, Nader is dispositive. Like Plaintiff Earl in the instant case, Mr. Nader claimed that his constitutional rights had been violated because individuals acting on behalf of the Democratic Party filed ballot protests in several states to remove Mr. Nader from the ballot. Id. at 98. Like 9154776v5 3
Case: 2:13-cv-00953-MHW-TPK Doc #: 311 Filed: 07/17/15 Page: 4 of 14 PAGEID #: 7980 Plaintiff Earl, Mr. Nader alleged that the Democratic Party, the Kerry-Edwards political campaign and others acted in concert with state officials to remove Mr. Nader from the ballot. Id. at 103. Yet the Court in Nader concluded that Mr. Nader and his campaign offer no facts that plausibly suggest that filing ballot access challenges is a function traditionally exclusively reserved to the States. Id. at 102, quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Nader Court further held because private citizens could file ballot challenges, such ballot challenges were not a function exclusively reserved to the states, and thus the court held that the Kerry-Edwards supporters and the Democratic Party were not state actors. Id. at 104. The facts and legal issues presented in Nader are strikingly similar to those presented in the instant case. As is evident from the facts before this Court, private citizens can file protests in Ohio: Felsoci filed a protest in the instant action and neither Plaintiffs nor any other entity raised any dispute as to his ability to do so. The act of filing a protest is not exclusively reserved to the state under Ohio law. On the contrary, state law requires that a protest be filed by any qualified elector who is a member of the same political party as the candidate. Ohio Revised Code 3513.05. Thus, Ohio law specifically allows (in fact requires) that private citizens file protests and does not reserve such action exclusively to the state. Plaintiffs site a single case in support of their argument related to the relevance of the documents they seek, but their singular reliance on Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 660 (1944), is wholly misplaced. In Smith v. Allwright, the U.S. Supreme Court found that a political party could be a state actor where state law accorded complete control over the election process to a political party, which then used its statutory control to exclude African Americans from voting. However, Smith v. Allwright and other cases finding state action by political parties are so clearly distinct from the facts presented in the instant matter that they are wholly inapplicable. 9154776v5 4
Case: 2:13-cv-00953-MHW-TPK Doc #: 311 Filed: 07/17/15 Page: 5 of 14 PAGEID #: 7981 In fact, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found Smith v. Allwright to be easily distinguishable and explained that political parties could be state actors only insofar as they had been assigned an integral part in the election process such that the party is performing a governmental function. Banchy v. Republican Party of Hamilton County, 898 F.2d. 1992 (6th Cir. 1990). The Banchy Court found a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim to be groundless because there is no evidence in the record and no explanation by the plaintiff of how the [political party played] an integral part in the electoral process. Banchy, 898 F.2d 1192, 1196 (1990). See also Federspiel v. Ohio Republican Party State Cent. Comm., 867 F. Supp. 617, 622 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (distinguishing Smith v. Allwright to conclude that the Ohio Republican Party was not a state actor because the Party did not play an integral part in the election process challenged in that case). Similarly, in this case, Ohio law does not assign an integral role in the protest process to political parties and does not, as a matter of law, reserve the process exclusively to the state. This Court has already ruled that the act of filing a protest is not a public function exclusively reserved to the state as it was designed to be used by private citizens: As a result, under Banchy and Nader, Felsoci s filing of the protest, even if it was on behalf of the Ohio Republican Party, did not constitute a state action under 1983. Order Den. Pl. Mot. Prelim. Inj. 22, Oct. 17, 2014 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs vociferously protest that the Opinion in Order is only preliminary, thus they should be allowed to engage in discovery into the ORP s state action. Preliminary or not, the ruling is correct and is well supported by recent case law which unlike the single case cited by Plaintiffs in their support of relevancy in the Motion, is directly on point and is easily distinguished. Banchy v. Republican Party of Hamilton County, supra and Federspiel v. Ohio Republican Party State Cent. Comm., supra. 9154776v5 5
Case: 2:13-cv-00953-MHW-TPK Doc #: 311 Filed: 07/17/15 Page: 6 of 14 PAGEID #: 7982 Despite this earlier ruling by this Court and the ample case law precedent supporting it, Plaintiffs still adamantly maintain that information regarding Borges and the ORP s involvement (or lack thereof) with the protest of Plaintiff Earl is somehow relevant to their 1983 claim. Borges should not be subjected to a broad fishing expedition through his materials simply so that Plaintiffs can gather irrelevant color commentary about an inference that operatives or supporters of the Ohio Republican Party orchestrated the protest that Felsoci signed. Libertarian Party v. Husted, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49841, *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 2014). The record in this case is uncontroverted that neither Borges nor the ORP were involved in locating a protestor bringing the protest which ultimately resulted in Plaintiff Earl being disqualified from the ballot. 1 Witness Terry Casey s repeated testimony in this case and the ample discovery already obtained by Plaintiffs support that statement. 2 Plaintiffs make no proffer, other than their assumption, to suggest any set of facts to the contrary. However, even if that were not the state of the record in this matter, and even if the protest was filed on behalf of the Ohio Republican Party, there would be no state action as a matter of law and evidence related to such activity would not be relevant. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has often held that a district court does not abuse its discretion in denying discovery when the discovery requested would be irrelevant to the underlying issue to be decided. Sigmon v. Appalachian Coal Properties, Inc., 400 F. App x 43, 50 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting and citing Green v. Nevers, 196 F.3d 627, 632 (6th Cir. 1999) and 1 Borges testified in these proceedings on March 17, 2014 and repeatedly stated that neither he nor the ORP went looking for a Libertarian for the protest. Borges further testified that the ORP had not paid and had no idea who would pay the legal fees associated with the protest of Plaintiff Earl. Pls. Mot. Compel Hr g Tr. At PAGEID #7830, Mar. 17, 2014. 2 The repeated testimony of Witness Terry Casey is consistent with Borges testimony that Casey orchestrated the protest, had not coordinated with the ORP to bring the protest, and had not sought payment from anyone for his actions. Casey Dep. 145:4-145:17; 147:3-147:12, Sept. 28, 2014; Prelim. Inj. Hr g 65:2-65:12, Oct. 1, 2014; Prelim. Inj. Hr g 101:2-101:22; Prelim. Inj. Hr g 107:10-108:10. 9154776v5 6
Case: 2:13-cv-00953-MHW-TPK Doc #: 311 Filed: 07/17/15 Page: 7 of 14 PAGEID #: 7983 Elvis Presley Enters. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889, 894 (6th Cir.1991)). The discovery requested by Plaintiffs from Borges is irrelevant to the underlying issue as they have framed it and Borges urges this Court to deny Plaintiffs Motion to Compel. In the alternative, this Court has broad discretion to stay discovery under these circumstances in order to allow the legal sufficiency of the claim or defense to be tested through motions practice. See, e.g., Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1999). Williams v. Wellston City Sch. Dist., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122796, 19-20 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 2, 2010). Borges respectfully requests that the underlying legal issue (whether the ORP s involvement constitutes state action) be resolved before the ORP is required to search any further and incur further time and costs involved in responding to this subpoena. B. Plaintiffs Fail to Meet Their Burden to Establish Relevance Even if the documents sought were relevant to these proceedings, Plaintiffs failure to provide adequate support for the claimed relevancy of the documents they seek is fatal to their Motion. Courts in this Circuit have long held that, once an objection to the relevance of the information sought is raised, the party seeking discovery bears the burden of demonstrating that the requests are relevant to the claims or defenses in the pending action. The proponent of a motion to compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving that the information sought is relevant. Martin v. Select Portfolio Serving Holding Corp., No. 1:05-cv-273, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68779, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2006) (citing Alexander v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 186 F.R.D. 154, 159 (D.D.C. 1999)). See also Allen v. Howmedica Leibinger, 190 F.R.D. 518, 522 (W.D. Tenn. 1999); Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, P.C. v. United States, No. 1:07-cv-88, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91285, 2008 WL 4865566, *4 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 10, 2008) (unpublished). 9154776v5 7
Case: 2:13-cv-00953-MHW-TPK Doc #: 311 Filed: 07/17/15 Page: 8 of 14 PAGEID #: 7984 Plaintiffs argue that: Assuming the Ohio Republican Party were involved, this proof would help establish state action. Pl. Mot. Compel 6, June 26, 2015 (emphasis added). Assumptions cannot carry a legal burden, especially when those assumptions do not comport with the evidence already on the record in this case. Notably, Plaintiffs make no legal argument in support of their contention that the documents sought are somehow relevant to these proceedings. Instead, Plaintiffs cite only to their own Third Amended Complaint and its reliance on Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) to bolster their legal claims. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and the previous discussions between counsel provide no insight into the legal basis for Plaintiffs relevancy claim. Instead, Plaintiffs can only repeatedly state that the earlier rulings by this Court were either dispositive of the issue 3 or inexplicably in the alternative, only preliminary in nature. Borges does not dispute the procedural status of this case, which is of no genuine import to the issue at hand. Rather, Borges submits that the focus should be on the legal issues related to the relevancy of the documents sought, rather than the procedural posture of this case. Plaintiffs failure to provide any legal support for the claimed relevance of the documents sought is fatal to the Motion. As set forth above, even if the protest were filed on behalf of ORP, such action would not constitute state action as a matter of law and would not further Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim. In other words, activity by the ORP at the time the protest was filed would not constitute state action. Plaintiffs implicit contention is that activity by the ORP more than a year after the 3 Pls. Mot. to Compel Produc. 6, June 26, 2015 ( [T]his Court has already twice ruled that who was paying Intervenor-Defendant-Felsoci s attorneys is relevant to this case. ). But cf. Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104973 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (holding that the motion to compel Mr. Felosci is deferred pending further proceedings in accordance with the order); Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted, 302 F.R.D. 472, 477 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (holding that Plaintiffs deposition of Mr. Felsoci may go forward because Mr. Felsoci had not met his heavy burden of showing that his deposition would be unreasonably cumulative or duplicative ). 9154776v5 8
Case: 2:13-cv-00953-MHW-TPK Doc #: 311 Filed: 07/17/15 Page: 9 of 14 PAGEID #: 7985 protest is somehow relevant defies logic. But more importantly, Plaintiffs provide nothing more than their implicit contention. Plaintiffs must do more than set out a veiled conspiracy theory to meet their threshold burden to establish the relevancy of their subpoenaed documents. Because Plaintiffs provide no legal support for the relevancy of the documents sought, the Motion should be denied. See Guinn v. Mount Carmel Health Sys., No. 2:09-cv-0226, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85152, at *13-14 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (denying motion to compel because requester made no attempt to inform the Court of how each specific discovery request is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or how precisely specific requests have been narrowly tailored. ) See also Coupled Prods., LLC v. Component Bar Prods., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120184 ( E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2010) (motion to compel denied because no legal support was provided for the relevancy of the documents sought, thus the hurdle of showing relevance was not met. ) Plaintiffs have not, and cannot, meet the hurdle of showing relevancy. Borges should not be required to submit to a burdensome, expensive and potentially futile document production in order to allow Plaintiffs to engage in a fishing expedition that is based solely on Plaintiffs illfounded assumptions. C. Currently, Borges Maintains No Materials Sought by the Subpoena and Retrieving Other Material (if any Exists) is Overly Burdensome. 4 It is clear that even if the information sought by Plaintiffs was relevant, district courts have discretion to limit the scope of discovery where the information sought is overly broad or would prove unduly burdensome to produce. Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 4 Plaintiffs claim that issues of undue burden were resolved is not accurate. Pls. Mot. to Compel Produc. 6, June 26, 2015. Discussions between counsel regarding the scope of the subpoena were successful in better defining the records sought and narrowing the subpoena to issues that have some connectivity to the instant case. However, Borges objections as to the burdensome nature of the subpoena were not resolved. Continued due diligence by Borges related to the subpoena have only further solidified that production would be unduly burdensome and potentially futile. 9154776v5 9
Case: 2:13-cv-00953-MHW-TPK Doc #: 311 Filed: 07/17/15 Page: 10 of 14 PAGEID #: 7986 474 F.3d 288, 305 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)). In determining the proper scope of discovery, a district court balances a party s right to discovery with the need to prevent fishing expeditions. Conti v. Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc., 326 F. App x 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1998)); TCYK, LLC v. Doe, No. 2:13-cv-539, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128160, at *8-9 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2013). The Court must weigh the likely relevance of the requested material... against the burden... of producing [it]. EEOC v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 26 F.3d 44, 47 (6th Cir. 1994). This is especially so when a non-party is the subject of the subpoena. [T]he status of a person as a non-party is a factor that weighs against disclosure[,] and is relevant to the determination of whether a subpoena imposes undue burden. Spears v. First Am. Eappraiseit, No. 13-mc-52, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33842, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2014) (quoting EEOC v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 26 F.3d 44, 47 (6th Cir. 1994)). See also, Lowe, No. 09-10269, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127586, 2012 WL 2887177, at *4 (citing N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 231 F.R.D. 49, 51 (D.D.C. 2005); United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 10-CV- 14155, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141355, at *15 ( E.D. Mich. Oct. 1, 2012) (finding that non-party status is also a relevant factor). Based upon a review of the subject matter listed in the subpoena, Borges is unlikely to find any communications with any the twenty-two (22) individuals listed individuals within the specified timeframe pertaining to Plaintiffs nine enumerated subjects of discovery. Borges believes that, to the extent he ever had any communications at all with the twenty-two identified individuals listed in the subpoena, communications regarding the nine enumerated subjects would have occurred in 2014, thus having been long ago discarded pursuant to the ORP document retention practices discussed below. 9154776v5 10
Case: 2:13-cv-00953-MHW-TPK Doc #: 311 Filed: 07/17/15 Page: 11 of 14 PAGEID #: 7987 Borges does not expect to find any responsive documents in either his personal or work email accounts or his cell phone. He also does not expect to find any paper or electronic documents within the scope of the subpoena in any storage location to which he has access. Although not the subject of the present subpoena, the ORP also cooperated, at Borges request, in instituting a litigation hold immediately after the subpoena was received. This included suspending the ORP s email retention practices in which emails older than 90 days are automatically deleted. The ORP also confirmed that its disaster recovery backup media is recycled daily, meaning that the backup media would also not contain any emails older than the date in which the retention policy was suspended. As to materials that might be recoverable through forensic efforts, the potential relevance of the requested material (if any) is far outweighed by the burden of production. Plaintiffs provide no basis for their broad demand that Borges produce inaccessible forms of electronically stored information (ESI) that are particularly expensive to preserve, collect, search, and produce. The subpoena demands production of ESI broadly defined to include such items as erased, fragmented or damaged data... and any other information stored on computer or other electronic platforms or located in but not limited to cache memory.... Plaintiffs fail to show why it is even likely that any relevant electronically stored information might be found in such sources. As such, at least with respect to the demand for these burdensome inaccessible forms of ESI, Plaintiffs have failed to take reasonable steps not to impose undue burden or expense as required by Rule 45(c)(1). To be sure, the burden would be high. Compliance with the subpoena as worded would require the assistance of an information technology professional competent to conduct computer forensics investigations of the ORP s server and personal computer hard drives used by Borges, 9154776v5 11
Case: 2:13-cv-00953-MHW-TPK Doc #: 311 Filed: 07/17/15 Page: 12 of 14 PAGEID #: 7988 extracting bits and pieces of electronic information from these electronic images, attempting to re-constitute the data into some form of intelligible text, and preparing the resulting text for legal review. Such a demand is far outside the norm for discovery from a party, let alone discovery from a non-party. Indeed the cost and burdensomeness of such discovery in inaccessible data is widely acknowledged. Civil litigation should not be approached as if information systems were crime scenes that justify forensic investigation at every opportunity to identify and preserve every detail.... [M]aking forensic image backups of computers is only the first step of an expensive, complex, and difficult process of data analysis that can divert litigation into side issues and satellite disputes involving the interpretation of potentially ambiguous forensic evidence. John B. v. Goetz, 531 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 2008)(quoting The Sedona Principles: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, Second Edition 11, at 34, 47 (The Sedona Conference Working Group Series, 2007). Borges does not have personnel on staff who are trained to conduct the computer forensic investigation necessary to search for the forms of inaccessible ESI requested by the subpoena nor should he be required to bear the cost and expense of hiring a forensic consultant. As such, pursuant to Rule 45(e)(1)(D), Borges need not provide discovery with respect to the inaccessible electronically stored information, (if any exists) which it has identified as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. Finally, the subpoena is unduly burdensome as it seeks information which is not only irrelevant to the Plaintiffs stated objective (proving state action), and is costly and difficult to try to recover (if recovery is even possible), but Plaintiffs already have information about the matters identified in their subpoena. It is evident from Plaintiffs own pleadings that they already have obtained, through discovery from the parties, materials from the relevant time frame about their nine enumerated topics. Significant testimony and documents have already 9154776v5 12
Case: 2:13-cv-00953-MHW-TPK Doc #: 311 Filed: 07/17/15 Page: 13 of 14 PAGEID #: 7989 been produced by others in these proceedings to establish that the ORP was not involved in finding a protestor, orchestrating a protest of Plaintiff Earl s candidacy, or directing the litigation that resulted from that action. If the Court does not deny Plaintiffs Motion in its entirety, which it should in view of their failure to demonstrate relevancy, then Borges respectfully urges this Court to limit the scope of any order for production pursuant to Rule 45(d)(1)(D). Borges, who is not a party, should be protected from the intrusion resulting from Plaintiffs demand and costs of any ordered document search should be shifted to the Plaintiffs. II. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Matt Borges, a non-party, by and through counsel, respectfully requests that the Court DENY Plaintiffs Motion, and order production of the discovery identified above. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Maria J. Armstrong Maria J. Armstrong (0038973) Gregory J. Krabacher (0079259) Bricker & Eckler LLP 100 S. Third St. Columbus, OH 43215 Phone: (614) 227-8821 Fax: (614) 227-2390 Counsel for Non-Party, Matt Borges 9154776v5 13
Case: 2:13-cv-00953-MHW-TPK Doc #: 311 Filed: 07/17/15 Page: 14 of 14 PAGEID #: 7990 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that on July 17, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was electronically filed with the Clerk for the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the attorneys of record at the addresses they have provided to the Court. /s/ Maria J. Armstrong Maria J. Armstrong (0038973) 9154776v5 14
Libertarian Party of Ohio et al v. Husted, Docket No. 2:13-cv-00953 (S.D. Ohio Sept 25, 2013), Court Docket General Information Court Federal Nature of Suit Docket Number United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio; United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio Constitutionality of State Statutes[950] 2:13-cv-00953 2015 The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Service // PAGE 15