BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY

BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY

Also by John Baylis ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY (editor) ANGLO-AMERICAN DEFENCE RELATIONS, 1939-84 BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY IN A CHANGING WORLD (editor) BRITAIN, NATO AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS: Alternative Defence versus Alliance Reform (with Ken Booth) CONTEMPORARY STRATEGY: Theories and Concepts, Vol. I (with Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams) CONTEMPORARY STRATEGY: The Nuclear Powers, Vol. II (with Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams) NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR PEACE (with Gerald Segal, Edwina Moreton and Lawrence Freedman) SOVIET STRATEGY: (editor with Gerald Segal)

British Defence Policy Striking the Right Balance John Baylis Senior Lecturer in International Politics University College of Wales, Aberystwyth Palgrave Macmillan

ISBN 978-0-333-49133-1 ISBN 978-1-349-19823-8 (ebook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-19823-8 John Baylis, 1989 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1989 All rights reserved. For information, write: Scholarly and Reference Division, St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 First published in the United States of America in 1989 ISBN 978-0-312-02788-9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Baylis, John. British defence policy: striking the right balance/john Baylis. p. em. Bibliography: p. Includes index. ISBN 978-0-312-02788-9: $45.00 (est.) I. Great Britain-Military policy. 2. Great Britain--Defenses. I. Title. UA647.B29 1989 355'.0335'41-dcl9 88-39225 CI

To Marion, for her 'generosity of spirit'

Contents Acknowledgements Preface Introduction: The Incrementalist Approach to British Defence Policy I The Continental Commitment Versus a Maritime Strategy 19 2 European Versus Global Defence 30 3 Europe Versus the 'Special Relationship' 37 4 Nuclear Weapons Versus Conventional Forces 50 5 Alliance Commitments Versus National Independence 59 6 The Economic Challenge 72 7 The Technological Challenge 81 8 The Political Challenge 92 9 Incrementalism Versus a Radical Review 104 10 Striking the Right Balance for the Future 118 Appendices: Statistics on Defence Spending Since 1945 139 Notes and References Index IX XI 1 145 162 Vll

Acknowledgements British officialdom is notoriously secretive, especially on matters of security. Unlike academics across the Atlantic, there is little opportunity in Britain for 'outsiders' to involve themselves in the policymaking process. One of the few ways of trying to get the necessary 'feel' for the subject is through personal contacts. Over the past three years while I have been working on this book, I have had the privilege of interviewing, and corresponding with, a wide range of individuals who are currently involved in, or have in the past been involved in, the formulation or execution of British defence policy. These contacts have proved to be invaluable. Numerous individuals have been kind enough to share their experiences with me and provided me with insights which I could not have acquired from any other source. Almost without exception, however, the officials and officers concerned would only talk to me on the condition that they remained anonymous. To all these individuals I am very grateful indeed. I wish also to express my thanks to the following people: to my colleagues Professor John Garnett, Professor Ken Booth, Dr Colin Mcinnes and Dr Moorhead Wright for all their help with various aspects of the book; to Lord Carver who has patiently replied to all my enquiries; to the Rt Hon. Leon Brittan for permission to quote from his study, Defence and Arms Control in a Changing Era; to Mr John Day of the Policy Studies Secretariat for setting up a series of interviews in the Ministry of Defence; to the library staffs of the Hugh Owen Library, Chatham House and the International Institute for Strategic Studies; to the staff at the Public Records Office at Kew; to Simon Winder, my editor, for his faith in the author and his professional approach during the publication of the book; to Keith Povey for his editorial skills in the production of the book; to Mrs Shelagh Byers for her thorough and painstaking compilation of the statistics for the appendices; to Alan Macmillan for cheerfully undertaking the task of producing the index; and to Mrs Susan Davies who typed a large proportion ofthe book and who helped to introduce me to the complexities of the word processor! Finally, and most importantly, I am grateful to my family for their unfailing encouragement and support. In particular, this book is lovingly dedicated to Marion, who continues to perform the myriad tasks of wife, mother and teacher with great fortitude, patience and good humour. JoHN BAYLIS IX

Preface Most of the literature on British defence policy since 1945 is highly critical. Titles such as The Long Retreat, The Long Recessional, The Collapse of British Power and A Nation in Retreat? reveal a widely held view that the United Kingdom's post-war security policy has been characterised by a continuous process of contraction and decline. 1 Readers are left with the strong impression that British defence policy has been largely unsuccessful. The critics are divided about who is responsible for this failure. For some the British economy is the main 'villain of the peace'. 2 For others the blame lies squarely with the governments of both parties. They are accused of such things as 'failing to clarify priorities', 'avoiding choice', 'ducking the problem', failing to engage in 'serious rethinking', as well as suffering from 'an absence of political vision', and 'a lack of clarity and consistency of purpose'. 3 Above all the problem, we are told, lies with the governments' incrementalist and ad hoc approach to defence policy-making. The long retreat from power has been conducted 'in the British tradition of pragmatism and empiricism with little regard to long term planning'. 4 This negative interpretation of British defence policy-making is summed up well in Martin Edmonds critique, in which he says: The essential problem that Britain has faced throughout the postwar period is that there has been insufficient resources to meet the country's defence commitments as defined by successive governments. In trying to meet these commitments through expedient compromises, time slippages and piecemeal economies, successive governments have contributed to the over-riding problem that the balance of policy and material, men and organisation has never been properly achieved. 5 The implication of these criticisms seems to be that if only more attention had been given to long-term planning and a systematic process of establishing priorities, British defence policy would have been better, more 'appropriate', than it has been. But would it? Is 'incrementalism' or 'muddling through' such a bad thing? Has British defence policy in fact been unsuccessful? Does the establishment of clear and unambiguous priorities always produce a better defence xi

XII Preface policy? In the present debate about future defence policy, the need for a radical review of defence policy and clear emphasis on priorities is taken for granted by many academic defence analysts and opposition politicians. The Conservative government, however, holds that such a major review is unnecessary. Pragmatism will see us through. The Ministry of Defence, we are told, will get by with 'adjustments to the programme' and 'better value for money'. 6 Who is right? Which approach is most likely to bring about the best defence policy for Britain in the future? Are these approaches necessarily mutually exclusive? These are the questions which this book attempts to explore. The initial task is to try to explain the reasons why incrementalism has tended to characterise Britain's approach to defence. This involves an analysis of the particular problems associated with defence, the nature of British strategic culture, and the British approach to policy-making in general and defence in particular. The main section of the book considers how incrementalism has affected British defence policy over the post-war period. Attention is focused on how British policymakers have attempted to resolve a number of recurring questions and dilemmas by striking what they regard as the right balance. Chapters I to 5 deal with these recurring questions and dilemmas. I. Should Britain's main contribution to European security be on land (the continental commitment) or at sea (the maritime strategy)? 2. Should the nation concentrate on threats to European security or be prepared to intervene in conflicts elsewhere in the world? 3. Should the 'special relationship' with the United States take precedence over defence cooperation with Britain's European allies? 4. Should priority be given to strategic nuclear forces, if necessary at the expense of conventional forces? 5. Should the nation supplement its power by playing a part in an integrated military alliance or retain its national independence? Chapters 6, 7 and 8 then attempt to make an assessment of the contemporary and future challenges to British defence policy. In the light of these economic, technological and political challenges, the final two chapters consider the strengths and weaknesses of Britain's 'traditional' approach to defence decision-making and suggest how some improvements might be made.