The United Nations Crisis Committee

The United Nations Crisis Committee GSMSTMUNC III The Gwinnett School of Mathematics, Science, and Technology

GSMSTMUNC III 2 Hello Delegates, Welcome to the Iranian Coup Committee! My name is Frank Hu, and I will be your crisis director for your committee, along with Abinav Routhu. We are both currently Juniors at GSMST and have been with the MUN club at our school for a little over two years now, so we have each had our fair share of conferences and have experienced the research, debate, and teamwork that goes into every single one. Crisis committee is neither a standard, structured affair nor is it an experience tailored towards MUN novices. Crisis is at times confusing, at times frustrating, but always chaotic. Yet, we are confident in your ability to thrive in such environments. This is the rawest and most genuine form of world affairs. We have high expectations. Our Crisis Committee structure is fairly routine. While Abinav and I will be both planning and chairing your committee, it would have been difficult for just the two of us to organize such an endeavor. For that reason, we also have the help of an expert behind the scenes crisis team helping us plan out the storyline for the committee and essentially how everything will play out. For our crisis team, we have chosen people who are not only members of the MUN club, but also those who have demonstrated a passion for international affairs and a willingness to make this committee the best it can be. So don t worry, you are definitely in good hands when it comes to the planning part. Of course, awards will not only be a decision by the two chairs, but we will also be sure to consult with the team as a whole to get as unbiased a decision as possible, so those who truly go the extra mile get the recognition they deserve. The Crisis topic this year is one that we are very excited about and one that takes a more historical perspective: The Iranian Coup of 1953 was not only a serious change in government power stemming from the desire to control Iran s natural resources, but was an event made all the more controversial through the involvement of government agencies like the CIA and MI6. Come September, we will all work through this historical scenario together while managing an endless stream of crisis updates that will keep things interesting and challenging. This will be no small task, and will require a great amount of collaboration, constructive debate, and problem solving. Furthermore, you will have maintain a constant balance between your individual agenda and interests and those of the collective. Although this all sounds difficult and quite exhausting, it will also be a truly fun experience and help demonstrate how critical decisions can have massive impacts on government, policy, and politics. The committee will consist of key figures involved with planning and executing the coup of 1953, and your ultimate goal is to plan and execute the overthrow of the Prime Minister. Each delegate will have a great deal of authority and power in terms of deciding how the coup will unfold. For the purposes of this committee, and in order to stimulate debate, we will try to level the playing field as much as we can, but it is understandable that some figures naturally have more authority than others. That being said, we still encourage everyone to participate as much as possible during sessions of structured and unstructured debate, and that everyone contribute to creating effective and meaningful directives. We understand that this is essentially a competition, but in the committee room, we advise you to play your roles and stick to your agenda rather than constantly trying to outperform others.

GSMSTMUNC III 3 To truly succeed in this challenging environment, delegates should expect to have extensive knowledge of the historical context of the Iranian Coup of 1953, a firm grasp on the roles and powers which make up your committee, the ability to adapt to new information quickly and readily, the skills needed to both cooperate with your peers and act independently when called for, but most importantly, the ambition to change history, We also do advise that you write a position paper for this committee with detailed information about who you are representing and what role they played and what their specific views on the matter are. This will give you a better understanding of what your personal goals are and what you should work towards throughout the course of the committee. Finally, please conduct in depth research as you are preparing for this committee. This background contains some information, but certainly not enough. We would strongly encourage you to look into credible sources in addition to Wikipedia and to truly immerse yourself in your respective role. We look forward to meeting and working with you! Best, Frank Hu & Abinav Routhu If you have any outstanding questions or concerns, feel free to contact either one of us at frank.li@gsmst.org or abinav.routhu@gsmst.org.

GSMSTMUNC III 4 Each position shown here represents an important faction which played a role in the deposition of Mohammad Mossadegh; however, each one had its own priorities and goals, be they political, economic, or religious in nature. While some of these men may be national premiers and others footmen, all were men with certain power and clout, if not in the most traditional fashion. We highly suggest researching not only your position, but all positions listed. These are the peers you will be negotiating and cooperating with forging directives in the pursuit of your personal goals. Expect an email from us soon after selection with your crisis portfolio. General Fazlollah Zahedi Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Allen Welsh Dulles John Foster Dulles Ayatollah Mohammad Behbahani Ayatollah Abol Qassem Kashani Donald Wilber Kermit Roosevelt Jr. John Alexander Sinclair Anthony Eden William Fraser, 1st Baron Strathalmond Shaban Jafari Dwight D. Eisenhower Winston Churchill Assadollah Rashidian

GSMSTMUNC III 5 The information shown here is simply to provide you with the necessary information regarding the political environment surrounding the coup as well as how the event occurred historically. How the coup ultimately progresses will be left up to a decision by the committee and does not have to adhere strictly to the historical outcome. The Origins of the Iranian Coup of 1953 Iran s Natural Oil Reserves While superficially the coup may have appeared to be a change in government power, in truth, the entire scenario centered around control of Iran s natural resources. Iran holds some of the largest deposits of proved crude oil and natural gas reserves, enough to make the country the fourth largest and second largest reserve holder of oil and natural gas, respectively 1. With such an abundance amid a time where oil was beginning to garner a reputation as black gold in the beginning of a new era in technology known as the Petroleum Age, it is unsurprising that other countries, particularly Western superpowers, would attempt to seize control of such resources, much to the displeasement of the Iranian government, which was suspicious of large scale foreign involvement. In this case, the primary target of the Iranian government was the Anglo Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which had had a substantial presence in Iran since the early 20th century. Problems with the AIOC The Anglo Iranian Oil Company, or AIOC, was founded in 1908 following the discovery of a large oil field in Mosjed Soleiman, Iran, and was the first company to utilize the oil reserves of the Middle East 2. Originally, it was known as the Anglo Persian Oil Company until it was renamed to the AIOC in 1935 2. The company was mainly in pursuit of the natural petroleum reserves that were native to Iran and were utilizing them to gain profits. In many ways, the company appeared as a representation of imperialist policies in Iran, with the AIOC streaming massive profits to Europe; in fact, the British government owned a majority share, and revenue that Iran did receive was mostly used to pay off debts to European creditors that earlier Shahs had incurred. In addition to financial mistreatment, there were also physical manifestations of the company s neglect in the fact that they did not fulfill the promise of training Iranian technicians and specialists, paid Iranian employees significantly less than foreigners, and housed Iranian employees in substandard housing 2. With all of these clear abuses by the AIOC, it is not surprising that there would be popular discontent with the way that the company was conducting its business and effectively funneling money and petroleum out of Iran. While the British gains increased dramatically, such major profits were not accumulated without an equally significant and detrimental cost to Iran and its economy. Under such circumstances, action by the government was not only a possibility, but an inevitability. Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh and the Coup While the coup had a plurality of aims, one of the central targets was the Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh. Mohammed Mossadegh became the democratically elected Prime Minister following the assassination of the previous Prime Minister, Ali Razmara 3. While

GSMSTMUNC III 6 Mossadegh was popular with the people and strove for Iran to be independent and truly democratic, he unfortunately clashed with foreign interests when he attempted to wrest unchecked power away from the AIOC in terms of the country s petroleum reserves, and to end the exploitative system installed by the British 4. To accomplish this, Mossadegh attempted to audit the AIOC s documents, but was met with fierce resistance and intransigence from the company itself, who refused to cooperate. To counter this, Mossadegh, and the Iranian parliament (Majlis) voted to nationalize Iran s oil industry and to expel all foreign corporate representatives from the country 5. Obviously, the company was unhappy with this sudden change in policy, and this discontent from the AIOC would serve as a primary motivator for the coup to occur. CIA and MI6 Involvement: Operation Ajax To further complicate matters, the CIA and MI6, two of the most well known spy agencies from America and Britain respectively, had a role in the coup, which was codenamed Operation Ajax 5. The official beginning of the coup occurred when Mossadegh dissolved Parliament, claiming that he and his cabinet would rule with absolute power and that the Shah would no longer have any control over the government; in other words, Mossadegh effectively gained total and dictatorial power over Iran, which was not an appealing concept to the Shah. Under these trying political circumstances, the Shah finally agreed to the CIA s offer of staging a coup d'é tat to overthrow Mossadegh, install a new Prime Minister that would be easier to manage, and to strengthen the Shah s power over the government, effectively reinstating control 5. The man that was chosen as Mossadegh s replacement was General Fazlollah Zahedi. Beginning his career in the military, Zahedi was a known loyalist who was distinguished due to his service to the Reza Shah in terms of quelling the Kurdish rebellion and the Iran autonomy movement 6. Because of his loyalties to the Shah, it was believed that he would be the best fit as the new Prime Minister to replace Mossadegh. Once the Shah had agreed to the plan of a coup, and it was decided that Fazlollah Zahedi would assume the role of the new Prime Minister, the CIA was the main body that staged the coup. The first attempt involved having the coup plotters write a series of Farmans (royal decrees) that dismissed Mossadegh as Prime Minister and appointed Zahedi as the replacement. This decree was then signed officially by the Shah himself, and was then delivered to Zahedi. Once Zahedi had agreed and was notified of the plot, he departed for Northern Iran for a week so that the coup could be staged in his absence 5. On Saturday, August 15th, the commander of the Imperial Guard, Nematollah Nassiri, delivered the Farman dismissing Mossadegh to the Prime Minister himself. Unlucky for the coup planners, Mossadegh was aware of the plot, warned by the Tudeh Party, a manifestation of the communist movement in Iran 7. Mossadegh rejected the Farman and the authority of the Shah to dismiss the Prime Minister without a majority vote by Parliament and had Nematollah arrested. After this coup attempt failed, Zahedi continued asserting that he was the rightful Prime Minister and as a result, he had to be transported constantly between multiple safe houses to avoid arrest by Mossadegh. Furthermore, Mossadegh also ordered the arrest of the coup plotters and dozens were imprisoned. Believing that he had definitively snuffed out the plot, Mossadegh let his guard

GSMSTMUNC III 7 down and told his supporters that they should carry on with their lives. At this point, the CIA had been forced to evacuate Iran and the Eisenhower administration was seriously entertaining the possibility of supporting Mossadegh, seeing as he had no intentions of any allegiance with Russia and believing that he could help keep the spread of Communism in check 5. However, determined to assert himself as the Prime Minister, Zahedi did not give up on overthrowing Mossadegh. Still hiding and running away from Mossadegh, Zahedi met with the pro Shah Ayatollah Mohammad Behbahani and other loyalist supporters in secret. There, the group came up with a brand new plan to overthrow Mossadegh, funded by money from the CIA. In addition to the funding, conditions were favorable for Zahedi given that the country was hysterical following the disappearance of the Shah, Mossadegh arresting any opponents, and the spread of Communism. On August 19th, a first group of paid infiltrators posing as Tudeh Party members started a communist revolution, and convinced actual Tudeh Party members to join. A mob of Tudeh members soon formed and took to the streets, attacking any symbol of capitalism and causing general destruction and chaos. At the same time, a second group of paid infiltrators began to rally ordinary Iranians into a second mob on the premise that they must oppose this communist revolution, which was sickening and had to be stopped. In the midst of this generated chaos and massive demonstrations, Zahedi commanded the army to drive off the Tudeh Party members and then stormed all the government buildings with the help of the demonstrators. By the end of the day, Zahedi and his army had full control over the government, and Mossadegh was firmly in army custody and eventually sentenced to house arrest. Because of the fact that the overthrow of Mossadegh mainly occurred under Zahedi, the CIA was not initially directly linked to the events that had occured 5. News Coverage with the Coup Given that the ultimate goal of the coup was to overthrow Mossadegh, news coverage leaned more towards propaganda than anything else. Articles published in the New York Times and other well known papers carried inflammatory articles towards Mossadegh, all with the intention of casting the Prime Minister in a negative light. In addition to newspapers, documentaries and other forms of media were used ultimately for the same purpose in both Britain and the US 5. Effects of the Coup Damage to the US Reputation After the coup, the U.S. suffered serious damage to their international reputation. Although the new government was originally well received by the people, it was ultimately dependent on the US for support and funding, especially in terms of consolidating their power 5. However, what was truly devastating to the US reputation in the Middle East was when the Shah was finally overthrown in 1979; this event cemented the anti-american sentiment that is felt not only in Iran, but across the entire Middle East to this very day, especially after the CIA came forward and confessed that the agency was involved in staging the coup of Mossadegh. Many consider this event the first of many Western policy decisions which led directly to the rise of extremist, anti American terrorist organizations 8.

GSMSTMUNC III 8 Further US Covert Operations The 1953 coup essentially showed the US that they had the power to foster similar uprisings in other countries and that it was within their purview to install governments that were friendlier to US policies and would be more open to western collaboration. This basically began a new frontier, involving more and more covert operations to further advance US policies. Such actions, unfortunately, were detrimental to the countries given that it sometimes involved toppling democratic governments to achieve US goals. In addition to this, the new governments that were installed were usually weak and ineffective without US funding and support 9. US Oil Gains As an agreement for staging the coup and for restoring the AIOC, the US required not only that the AIOC withdraw its monopoly over the petroleum reserves of Iran, but that five american oil companies also gain the rights to drill for petroleum. The Royal Dutch Shell company and Compagnie Française des Pétroles also gained rights to draw from Iran s reserves. This measure would be effective immediately upon the success of Operation Ajax. Such an arrangement was deemed beneficial by the Shah given that the large influx of money due to this system helped resolve the economic collapse that Iran had been experiencing for the past three years 5. Lack of Iranian Democracy Mossadegh was a strong advocate for a truly independent and democratic Iran, and aspire towards this goal during his term as Prime Minister. The AIOC and the foreign monopoly that existed over Iran s petroleum reserves was an obstacle to that goal. After the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Mossadegh, Iran was unable to regain that similar governmental structure under the powerful rule of the Shah, who would not fall until the revolution of 1979. The emergent power structure, that of the Ayatollah and his religious theocracy, built a national identity founded on Western distrust and suppressive principle, a culture present to this very day. As a result, the coup of 53 effectively set back democracy in Iran and prevented the country from achieving true political independence with a democratically elected government 4.

GSMSTMUNC III 9 We look forward to seeing you soon. Good Luck!

GSMSTMUNC III 10 References 1. https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=irn 2. http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/anglo Iranian_Oil_Company 3. https://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran coup timeline.html 4. http://www.mohammadmossadegh.com/biography/ 5. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1953_iranian_coup_d%27%c3%a9tat 6. https://www.britannica.com/biography/fazlollah Zahedi 7. http://www.iranchamber.com/history/tudeh/tudeh_party01.php 8. http://www.ibtimes.com/iran long lasting legacy 1953 uscia coup 214329 9. http://www.rferl.org/content/iran coup mossadegh cia 60th anniversary/25076552.html