What is Fairness? Allan Drazen Sandridge Lecture Virginia Association of Economists March 16, 2017

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What is Fairness? Allan Drazen Sandridge Lecture Virginia Association of Economists March 16, 2017

Everyone Wants Things To Be Fair I want to live in a society that's fair. Barack Obama All I want him to do is to give me a fair shake. Donald Trump BUT, what is fair? 2

A Story (based on Sen, Rational Fools ) Barry and Donald find two apples, one large, one small. Who gets the larger one? Barry tells Donald, You choose. Donald picks the larger apple. Barry is upset, and says, That s not fair! Why? asks Donald. Which one would you have chosen, if you were choosing? The smaller one, of course, Barry says. Donald replies, "Then what are you complaining about? That's the one you got! 3

What is Fairness? Who s right in that story? Barry or Donald? What determines when something is fair or unfair? Outcome? Process? Behavior? How can economics methodology help us answer these questions? 4

Fairness of Outcomes Perceived appropriateness of the distribution of goods, benefits, and other outcomes in a society, group, or organization In short, equal in some dimension. But which one? Income or wealth? Utility? Marginal utility (or need)? 5

Fair Outcomes in Getting Apples What is the fair versus unfair outcome in the story of Barry and Donald? Since apples can t be split, there can t be equal apples Neither division seems to violate a fairness-of-outcome criterion among possible outcomes (we assume they value apples equally) Barry wasn t complaining about outcomes, but about process or behavior and Donald was disingenuous at best in saying it was fair because Barry got the outcome he wanted 6

Fairness of Process Perceived appropriateness of rules or procedures used to allocate goods, benefits, and other outcomes Impartiality making judgments that are free from discrimination or bias Equality of opportunity Equal treatment of equals, unequal treatment of unequals. Entitlement a fair process gives people what they re entitled to Desert a fair process gives people what they deserve 7

Fairness of Process Entitlement and Desert Entitlement (Nozick) A person who acquires a holding fairly (in accordance with rules of fair acquisition or transfer) is entitled to that holding A rules-of-the-game concept If this merchandise is defective, the buyer is entitled to a full refund if returned within 60 days." Desert A normative or moral concept All good children deserve to go to heaven. Someone can be entitled to something according to the rules but not deserve it A billionaire legally paying very low or zero taxes Someone can deserve something, but there is no law, institution, etc. that ensures that he or she gets it "All good children deserve to go to heaven." 8

Fair Process in Dividing Apples None of the fairness-of-process concepts suggests that the process of dividing apples was unfair (given the indivisibility of the apples) Barry felt there was something unfair about Donald s behavior, given Barry s view of how one should act in a situation like that Are these reasonable expectations? Maybe or maybe not. But given these expectations (and an other-regarding person could understandably have them), was Barry right to be upset about Donald s behavior? As economists, can our tools help untangle this situation? 9

Fairness in Process versus Fairness in Outcomes Let s talk about fairness in process vs. outcomes before returning to behavior There are strong proponents on both sides, where a key issue is whether outcomes represent mainly effort (suggesting entitlement theories) or also a lot of (good or bad) luck (where luck includes natural endowments) Rawls (Justice as Fairness A Restatement): Even though the initial state may have been just, and subsequent social conditions may have been just for some time, the accumulated results of many separate and seemingly fair agreements [is that] very considerable wealth and property may accumulate in a few hands and these concentrations are likely to undermine fair equality of opportunity. 10

Example: Funding of Schools Should schools spend the same on every student? More on the brightest and most talented, who have the greatest potential and hence are perhaps the most deserving? More on students with the greatest needs? Try to ensure minimum outcomes (minimum education level)? How does society choose which fairness concept? 11

Principles Chosen in the Original Position Rawls publicly recognized rules and procedures which those cooperating accept as appropriate to regulate their conduct including the idea of fair terms of cooperation: these are terms which each participant my reasonably accept providing that everyone else likewise accepts them Principles that would be chosen before one knows one s circumstances 12

Fairness in Behavior or Conduct a) Playing according to the rules b) Obligations we have towards others (Scanlon, What Do We Owe One Another? ) Responsibility given one s position or resources Lack of selfishness; reciprocal or altruistic behavior This is how we should behave. How (and why) do people actually behave the way they do? 13

Reciprocity Rabin (1993): People do not seek uniformly to help other people; rather, they do so according to how generous these other people are being. People not only reward cooperative or kind behavior but punish uncooperative or unkind behavior and norm violations Strong Reciprocators willing to bear the cost of rewarding or punishing even if they gain no direct benefit from their acts How can we think of this in terms of utility maximization? Psychological game material benefits plus utility based on reciprocated (un)kindness uu ii = π ii ( ) + (j s kindness) [1+(i s kindness)] Kindness depends on payoff to another relative to a reference payoff 14

Battle of the Sexes Ida prefers to go to Opera, Jim prefers to go to Boxing, but they prefer to go out together to the same event Payoff Matrix Jim Opera Boxing Ida Opera 2X, X 0, 0 Boxing 0, 0 X, 2X Nash equilibrium Each player s choice of action maximizes his utility given the other player s action: (Opera, Opera) and (Boxing, Boxing) 15

Jim s Payoffs from Ida s Actions Suppose Ida believes Jim is choosing b j = Boxing. What are Jim s best and worst material payoffs from Ida s choice a j π jj hiiiii = 2XX Ida does what s best for Jim and agrees to see Boxing π jj mmmmmm = 0 Ida says, If he wants boxing, I ll insist on Opera, though it hurts us both. π jj llllll = 2XX Ida says, Why cut off my nose to spite my face? If he chooses Boxing, choosing Opera makes both of us worse off! I ll choose Boxing as the Pareto-efficient outcome. 16

Kindness Relative to a Reference Point π eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee jj = π hiiiii llllll jj +πjj 2 = 2XX is the reference point (Here, there is only one Pareto efficient choice for Ida if Jim chooses Boxing) ff ii = π jj aa ii,bb jj π jj ee +π jj hiiiii πjj mmmmmm = normalized measure of Ida s fairness ff ii (B, B) = 0 (as Boxing is Ida s only Pareto choice) ff ii (O, B)= -1 (she believes Jim chose Boxing, but she chose Opera nonetheless) Why would she do this?? 17

Hostile Equilibria Jim believes that Ida is hostile She chooses Opera when he believes that she knows he is choosing Boxing (and he is hostile since he believes she is choosing Opera ) Is this an equilibrium? Ida s utility uu ii = π ii + ff jj [1+ff ii ] where ff jj = -1 π ii (Opera, Boxing) = 0 and π ii (Boxing, Boxing) = X Her kindness payoff is 0 if she chooses Opera (with ff ii (O, B)=-1) and -1 if she chooses Boxing (ff ii (B, B)=0) Hence, if X < 1, she chooses Opera, motivated by her belief that Jim is hostile Given the (self-fulfilling) beliefs about the other s hostility, each player is unwilling to cooperate if it means conceding to the other player 18

Cooperative Equilibria A belief that the other is willing to cooperate is also self-reinforcing (Boxing, Boxing) is a cooperative fair behavior equilibrium (Opera, Opera) is a cooperative fair behavior equilibrium Helping the other is helping myself, given the structure of the game, so it s not intuitively surprising that fairness leads to good behavior 19

Back to Barry and Donald Suppose the large apple is worth 2X and the small one X to both boys. Donald would give payoffs of (X,2X) if he chose and Barry would give payoffs of (X,2X) if he chose Moreover, Barry believes that fairness is giving the larger share to the other, i.e., the equitable payoff ππ jj ee = 2X Hence, Barry views his behavior as the norm, neither kind nor unkind: π jj (aa ii ) π ee = 2X-2X = 0 (and ff BBBBBBBBBB = 0) 20

And, the Donald? If we presume he knows Barry s beliefs about fairness (ππ jj ee = 2X ), Donald is unkind A material payoff of X to Barry implies that Donald s fairness ff DDDDDDDDDDDD (You Choose, Larger Apple) is negative, which is why Barry is upset Hence Barry s kindness utility ff DDDDDDDDDDDD [1+ff BBBBBBBBBB ] < 0 and if X (his material payoff from the smaller apple) is small enough, it doesn t compensate him and his overall utility is lower Donald s reply, "Then what are you complaining about? That's the one you got! misses the point (and is disingenuous at best, given what we presume that Donald knows) 21

The Dictator Game Apple story is a special example of a one-shot dictator game one player chooses how much of a pot of resources to keep for himself and how much to give to the other In the lab, 30-40% of proposers share some of pot In apple story, there is an earlier stage of choosing who is the dictator Drazen and Ozbay (2016) studied this general issue How does being chosen to decide affect generosity? Group of 3: 2 candidates and one voter Election treatment voter chooses one candidate who then decides how to allocate resources Appointment treatment one candidate is chosen at random to decide how to 22 allocate resources

Choosing Who Chooses Drazen and Ozbay (2016) The generosity of the chooser in the laboratory depends on how he was chosen Elected choosers are more likely to share give more when they share favor the voter while appointed leaders treat voter and losing candidate more equally Reciprocity towards those who put the leader in office Should reciprocity be expected by voters? 23

Why Do We Care? Unfairness bothers us Society is one of interdependence and depends on implicit cooperation If people have the notion that things are unfair, benefits of society break down Certain types and especially degrees of inequality eat away at the structure of society 24

Our Contribution as Economists The main goal of this lecture was not meant to convince to be nice or fair to others If it did, that s terrific! The goal was to argue how economic analysis can help us understand phenomena in this case, fair behavior Our contribution is in showing how our tools can help address policy problems Not only, for example, what kind of health care policy we want... but also perceptions of the fairness of those policies and why voters may be legitimately (or perhaps not) unhappy with those policies (even if those policies are supposed good for them ) 25

Thank you for your attention!