Voluntary agreements

Similar documents
Clean Water Act Section 404 Enforcement

PS 0500: Basic Models of Conflict and Cooperation. William Spaniel williamspaniel.com/classes/worldpolitics

International Approach to Int l Monetary Issues

PSC/IR 106: Basic Models of Conflict and Cooperation. William Spaniel williamspaniel.com/ps

PSC/IR 106: Basic Models of Conflict and Cooperation. William Spaniel williamspaniel.com/pscir-106

State Regulatory Authority Over Nuclear Waste Facilities

Enforcing the Clean Water Act Authority, Trends, and Targets

Why do we need voluntary commitments?

Overview. Frans Andriessen

The Cost-Benefit Analysis of Crime*

AUTOMATED AND ELECTRIC VEHICLES BILL DELEGATED POWERS MEMORANDUM BY THE DEPARTMENT FOR TRANSPORT

Interests, Interactions, and Institutions. Interests: Actors and Preferences. Interests: Actors and Preferences. Interests: Actors and Preferences

Colorado 2016 Amendment and Proposition Ballot Guide (Adapted from the Bell Policy Center 2016 Ballot Guide) i

Globalization of the Commons and the Transnationalization of Local Governance

Independent Press Standards Organisation Arbitration Scheme Consultation Paper

Myths of Brexit. Speech at Brexit Conference in Hong Kong. The Right Honourable Lord Justice Hamblen. 2 December 2017

Experimental Economics, Environment and Energy Lecture 3: Commons and public goods: tragedies and solutions. Paolo Crosetto

by Geoffrey K. Beach, Peter J. Biersteker. and David T. Miller

Chapter 13 Topics in the Economics of Crime and Punishment

Tackling Exploitation in the Labour Market Response to the Department of Business Innovation & Skills and Home Office consultation December 2015

Expansion of the Federal Safety Valve for Mandatory Minimum Sentences

Multilateral negotiations occur in several settings: Collective action negotiation treaties requiring multiple participants Termination of

COMPETITION LAW APPLIED TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT. John Davies OECD Competition Division

Moving into Copenhagen: Global and Chinese Trends. Jennifer Morgan Director, Climate and Energy Program November 2009

Do States Free Ride in Antitrust Enforcement?

AMENDMENTS I TO XVI TO THE CONSTITUTION OF MONTENEGRO

F R E Q U E N T L Y A S K E D Q U E S T I O N S

NCSL SUMMARY P.L (HR 4472)

NEW TUNISIA NEW OPPORTUNITIES

Causes of Conflict & Political Violence: An Introduction & Review of Anarchy in IR

Trade Facilitation Agreement

Bylaws ARTICLE I ARTICLE II ARTICLE III ARTICLE IV

Date of Mailing: December 3, 2015 STATE OF NEW JERSEY MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION CASE FILE NUMBER: DXXXX XXXXX01832 OAL DOCKET NUMBER: MVH IN T

Econ 522 Review 3: Tort Law, Criminal Law, and the Legal Process

City Planning & Environmental Services. 2 September 2010

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (PUAD)

Briefing on Reform of Political Party Financing, Czech Republic 1

Political Science Introduction to American Politics

Independent review of the Financial Reporting Council s enforcement procedures sanctions

Industrial Exports: Opportunities and Challenges

EC consultation Collective Redress

Freedom of information regulatory action policy

New forms of policing and the feeling of (un)safety among the shopkeepers in Athens and Piraeus

TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN AN ERA OF UNCERTAINTY

European Union South Africa Joint Statement Brussels, 15 November, 2018

Guidance on the use of enforcement action June 2016

CPI Antitrust Chronicle February 2012 (1)

EPP Policy Paper 2 A Europe for All: Prosperous and Fair

[SE4-GB-3] The Six Party Talks as a Viable Mechanism for Denuclearization

Chapter 8: The Use of Force

Political Society By John Locke From From Second Treatise Of Government, Chapter

The internationalisation of R&D before, during and after the crisis. Bernhard Dachs, Georg Zahradnik AIT Austrian Institute of Technology, Vienna

106 MEMBERS 40 COUNTRIES NGO. in brief FOUNDING MEMBER FOUNDED. SECRETARIAT in MANILA, Philippines. DURING the 6 th ADB conference for DFIs

NATIONAL INSTRUMENT AUDITOR OVERSIGHT PART 1 DEFINITIONS AND APPLICATION

Urban Crime. Economics 312 Martin Farnham

CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA

REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA HIGH COURT OF NAMIBIA MAIN DIVISION, WINDHOEK

TREATMENT OF CONVICTS WHILE IN THE CORRECTIONAL CENTRE DUBRAVA

Unintended Impacts of AB 109, Proposition 47 & 57

Taking advantage of globalisation: the role of education and reform in Europe

Afterword: Rational Choice Approach to Legal Rules

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON POLITICAL PARTY AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING. APPENDIX No. 1. Matrix for collection of information on normative frameworks

Local Governments and the Future of Waste Management and Disposal

The WTO and Climate Change: What Are the Options? Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jisun Kim

The Regulation Dilemma: Cooperation and Conflict in Environmental Governance

Session II: Review of the experience gained in the implementation of the UN Set, including voluntary peer reviews

As Passed by the House. Regular Session Sub. H. B. No

COMPREHENSION/EXPRESSION REVIEW EXERCIZES

Our vision for law and justice 2018

POLICE AND THE LAW USE OF FORCE

Status, challenges and new approaches to multinational science and technology cooperation

Housing and Planning Act Civil Penalties

LESSON 4: PREVENTING AND POLICING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME

As Introduced. Regular Session H. B. No

CONSIDERATION OF REPORTS SUBMITTED BY STATES PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE COVENANT. Sudan

Interpreting the Constitution: What Does That Mean? STEP BY STEP

Prepared Testimony. Thomas M. Conway International Vice President

HAULAGE PERMITS AND TRAILER REGISTRATION BILL DELEGATED POWERS IN THE BILL MEMORANDUM BY THE DEPARTMENT FOR TRANSPORT

1 Guidance Notes to the Ofcom Approved Code of Practice for Complaints Handling

SEALING YOUR JUVENILE RECORDS

Engaging Reluctant Countries in Climate Change Mitigation Efforts

VIETNAM FOCUS. The Next Growth Story In Asia?

Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Effect on Interstate Relationships

ICCWC Indicator Framework for Combating Wildlife and Forest Crime

How much benevolence is benevolent enough?

Compliance approach in the Product Emissions Standards Bill 2017

Enforcement guidelines. October 2015

Speaker Profiles. Graeme Dennis Partner, Sydney T F

Establishing trust in the multilateral trade system through transparency and international standards implementation monitoring

employer can seek about a person's criminal record history. While an employer is permitted to seek, and take account of, a lot of

ORGANIZATIONAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES THE HONORABLE RUBEN J. CASTILLO VICE-CHAIR, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION

The Liberal Paradigm. Session 6

SENATE, No. 380 STATE OF NEW JERSEY. 215th LEGISLATURE PRE-FILED FOR INTRODUCTION IN THE 2012 SESSION

Economics 320F An Economic Analysis of Law Midterm Exam Suggested Answers

Public consultation on the EU s labour migration policies and the EU Blue Card

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (P.L )

Vulnerable Children Bill

Strategic Developments in East Asia: the East Asian Summit. Jusuf Wanandi Vice Chair, Board of Trustees, CSIS Foundation

What Cancun can deliver for the climate

Game Theory and Climate Change. David Mond Mathematics Institute University of Warwick

Transcription:

Voluntary agreements Miriam Fischlein ESPM/MGMT 3604-5604 Agenda Basics of voluntary agreements Group work on articles drawbacks + advantages of voluntary agreements Voluntary agreements as cooperation dilemmas 1

William Ruckelshaus, former EPA Administrator Voluntary agreements are not panaceas for every environmental problem They are extremely difficult to bring about, frustrating to participate in, often lengthy, and expensive for their members, and they can easily fail. cited in Marcus et al. 2002 The basics of voluntary agreements Involve commitments from both parties (government and firms) Include specific targets and time schedules Both sides have something to gain Often not legally binding 2

When are voluntary agreements used? Areas with no existing statutory requirements (e.g., Energy Star). Areas with heterogeneous offenders, where traditional C&C regulation is costly. Areas where VA has little cost for at least some firms. Source: Lyon & Maxwell 2004 Increasing popularity of voluntary agreements OECD, 1999: 300 negotiated agreements in the EU countries 30,000 local negotiated agreements in Japan 40+ private voluntary agreements in the US Drivers for firms: Flexibility, innovation Governments: Attractive new instrument May alleviate burden of litigation and pressure from environmental groups Feasible even under budget cutbacks and political climate disfavoring new regulations 3

Jigsaw exercise In groups of 4, report to each other on the article you read Fiorino 2001: Performance Track Places Trust in the Carrot over the Stick. Delmas & Keller 2005. Free riding in voluntary environmental programs: The case of the U.S. EPA WasteWise program Based on the articles, discuss: Why do firms participate in voluntary agreements? What are the drawbacks? Why do governments offer voluntary agreements? What are the drawbacks? Report your results on the blackboard Why do firms participate in voluntary agreements? More flexible Can boost reputation (even if you re not actually complying) Less reporting Access to information source / tech support Cooperation with EPA (builds trust) Immunity from some penalties Preempt legislation 4

What are the drawbacks for firms? 3rd party audits aren t always protected and information can be used against them. Regulatory uncertainty Government might not keep its word Environmental group pressure may increase Why do governments offer voluntary agreements? Save time and money Creates good faith (trust) Easy to implement Not a law Cheaper Companies go beyond compliance => environmental performance gains 5

What are the drawbacks for governments? Companies can t always be trusted to comply. Difficulty in determining how to punish companies for self-reported violations (kick out repeat offenders?) Could also give government bad reputation for saying companies are participating who are actually not doing anything Risk of free riders Noticeable impact on environmental quality? Thought experiment: Prisoner s dilemma If neither Al nor Bob confess, both will serve 1 year for carrying a concealed weapon. If both confess, both go to prison for 10 years for burglary. If Al confesses and implicates Bob, and Bob does not confess, Al goes free and Bob goes to prison for 20 years (and vice versa). What would you do? 6

Prisoner s dilemma - continued Al confess don't Bob confess don't 10,10 20,0 0,20 1,1 => Actions that are rational for the individual result in all actors being worse off overall Voluntary agreements as cooperation dilemmas Government Deter Govern cooperatively Firm Defect Self-Police Firm: 2 (a) Government: 2 (b) Firm: 0 (c) Government: 5 (d) Firm: 5 (e) Government: 0 (f) Firm: 4 (g) Government: 4 (h) Adapted from: Potoski & Prakash, 2004 7

Making voluntary agreements work Instruments for ensuring agreements is kept: Reporting + external auditing (can include Environmental Management System) Participating facilities not completely exempt from oversight Instruments for ensuring private gain: Regulatory relief Public recognition Knowledge transfer and public information provision Grant funding Examples of voluntary agreements Water Alliances for voluntary efficiency 8