Report for the Electoral Reform Society Northern Ireland 2011 Assembly Election and AV Referendum

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Report for the Electoral Reform Society Northern Ireland 2011 Assembly Election and AV Referendum Report by Dr John Garry School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy, Queen s University Belfast 1

Contents 1. Executive Summary 2. Turnout 3. Results 4. Women and Representation 5. Bases of Party Support 6. Outcome of the election: Government formation 7. Referendum on the Alternative Vote Appendix A: Proportional Representation-Single Transferable Vote electoral system Appendix B: Turnout by Constituency 2

Executive Summary The election was conducted using the Proportional Representation-Single Transferable Vote electoral system (an explanation of how this system operates is provided in an appendix to this report). Turnout at the Assembly Election was 56 percent, representing a continued decline from the 70 percent turnout at the first Assembly election in 1998 (and turnout of just over 60 percent in the 2003 and 2007 Assembly elections). Turnout is related to age, social class and religion. Turnout tends to be low among young people and (more suprisingly) the middle class. Also, Protestants are less likely to vote than Catholics. The so-called hardline parties continued to perform electorally well. In the Protesant/Unionist bloc, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) outpolled the traditionally more moderate Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). In the Catholic/Nationalist bloc, Sinn Fein attracted more votes than the traditionally more conciliatory Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). This successful performance by the DUP and Sinn Fein further cemented the parties as the dominant representatives of their respective communities. This reversed the situation in the first 1998 Assembly election when the UUP and the SDLP were the dominant parties. Women remain very under-represented. Only 17 percent of candidates were women, a figure very much in line with preceding Assembly elections of 1998, 2003 and 2007. Of successful candidates, 19 percent were women which represents a steady increase over time, up from 12 percent in 1998. Religion remains a very strong predictor of vote choice with almost no Catholics giving a first preference vote to the UUP or DUP and almost no Protestants giving a first preference vote vote to the SDLP or Sinn Fein. 3

Constitutional preferences help to explain within-bloc voting. Catholics who, long term, prefer a United Ireland to a devolved Northern Ireland government are more likely to support Sinn Fein than the SDLP. Protestants who, long term, prefer direct rule from London to a devolved Northern Ireland government tend to support the UUP rather than the DUP. Voting may also be explained by voters perceptions regarding the relative ability of the parties to represent community interests. The DUP are generally regarded as better able to represent the interests of Protesants/Unionists than the UUP. Similarly, Sinn Fein are generally regarded as better able to represent the interests of Catholics/Nationalists than the SDLP The election resulted in four ministerial portfolios for the DUP, three for Sinn Fein, one each for the SDLP and the UUP and two for the Alliance party. These posts were allocated to each party using the d Hondt system (apart from the senstive post of Justice which was awarded seperately from the d Hondt procedure). The d Hondt procedure allocates portfolios to political parties roughly in proportion to the parliamentary size of each party (although the system tends to privilege the larger parties). As the largest party, the DUP received the post of First Minister. Sinn Fein received the post of deputy First Minister. When the percentage share of parliamentary seats of each party are compared to the percentage share of first preference votes received by each party, the DUP does disproporationately well (35 percent of seats from 30 percent of votes). When the percentage share of executive portfolios of each party is compared to the percentage share of parliamentary seats, the DUP, Sinn Fein and Alliance do disproportionatley well while the UUP and the SDLP do disproportionately badly. There was very little public debate in Northern Ireland relating to the referendum on changing the voting system to the Alternative Vote. Forty four percent of Northern Ireland voters supported change which was the highest positive vote of the 12 geographical regions in the UK. When broken down by religion the figure of 44 percent masks striking differences: only 26 percent of Protestants voted for change while almost three quarters of Catholics voted for change. 4

1. Introduction The 2011 Northern Ireland Assembly election was the culmination of a remarkable four year term of office of a power-sharing government consisting of all of the main political parties. The multi-party power-sharing government had, against the expectations of many, been successfully formed in the wake of the 2007 Assembly Election. Post the 2007 election, formerly fierce rivals took up the positions of coequal prime ministers. Ian Paisley, long standing leader of the hardline Protestant/Unionist party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), became First Minister. Martin McGuinness, former senior member of the IRA, and leading figure in Sinn Fein, became deputy First Minister. The moderate unionist party, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), and the moderate nationalist party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) were also in the coalition. During the course of the four year term the Alliance party, a bi-confessional party that explicitly appealed to both the Catholic and Protestant communities, was brought into the government to take up the sensitive post of Justice and Policing. This all-inclusive multi-party government is known is a consociational government and is a result of the consociational structures put in place by the 1998 Good Friday/ Belfast Agreement. The 2011 election represented the fourth Assembly election since the Agreement, elections having previously taken place in 1998, 2003 and 2007. The 2011 election witnessed the continued trend of the hardline parties (the DUP and Sinn Fein) triumphing over the moderate parties in their respective communities (the UUP and the SDLP) 5

In contrast to the Westminster election, which uses the plurality first past the post electoral system, European Parliament, local and Assembly elections in Northern Ireland use the Proportional Representation-Single Transferable Vote system. This system ensures a strong relationship between the percentage of parliamentary seats won by each party and the percentage of first preference vote share received by each party (see Appendix A for a description of the PR-STV system). The election resulted in 108 successful candidates, six chosen from each of 18 constituencies. 6

2. Turnout At the 2011 Northern Ireland Assembly election, 56 percent of citizens turned out to vote. This was a low participation rate when compared to previous Assembly elections. The first Assembly election in 1998 attracted an impressively high 70 percent turnout and the two subsequent elections were in the low 60s. The continued fall in 2011 generated concerned comment in the media about the functioning of democracy in Northern Ireland and the engagement of politicians with the wider public. Figure 1: Turnout at Assembly elections 1998-2011 (%) In order to investigate the possible sources of this decline in turnout it is necessary to break down the overall turnout rate by different groups of citizens, to identify which particular types of people are most likely to abstain from the democratic process. 7

Figure 2: Turnout by sex (%) Figure 3: Turnout by age (%) It emerges from the survey data used in this report 1 that men and women are equally likely to vote. There is, however, a relationship between age and participation: the older you are the more likely you are to vote. Barely over half of 18 to 22 year olds in Northern Ireland voted (51.3 percent) while two thirds of people aged 65 or older turned out to vote. 1 The survey data used in Figures 2-5, for the Catholic and Protestant figures in Figure 9, and for Tables 2-4 is from the 2011 Northern Ireland Election Study. This study was conducted by the author and was funded by Queen s University Belfast and the Political Studies Association of Ireland. The full details of the survey (fielded by Market Research Northern Ireland (MRNI)) and the publicly available dataset are at: http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/schoolofpoliticsinternationalstudiesandphilosophy/staff/garry/ 8

Figure 4: Turnout by social class (%) Figure 5: Turnout by religion (%) There is a somewhat unusual relationship between social class and participation. Many international studies have found that it is relatively wealthy people who tend to turn out and vote. In 2011 in Northern Ireland it is the working class (i.e. the C2 and DE social grade categories) who were particularly likely to vote. This may be explained by the relationship between religion and voting. Catholics are considerably more likely to vote than Protestants. Catholics are also more likely to be working class than Protestants, hence driving up the working class participation rate. Northern Ireland has since 2002 used individual voter registration. This is in contrast to the rest of the UK which uses household registration, although this is set to change to the individual level from 2014 onwards. Significant numbers of voters 9

(over 17,000) were added to the electoral register during the period of late registration just prior to the election. The deadline for registration was 14 April and the late surge in individuals registering may be accounted for by the early circulation in 2011 of poll cards (distributed on 28 March for the 5 May election compared to the previous norm of approximately 10 days prior to polling day). This alerted those not on the electoral register in a household, prompting many to actually register prior to the deadline. 2 2 For details see the Report on the Northern Ireland Assembly election on 5 May 2011 published by The Electoral Commission in October 2011: http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/ data/assets/pdf_file/0012/141222/nia-election-report-finalweb-no-embargo.pdf 10

3. Results Northern Ireland is often described as having two party systems. In the Protestant/Unionist bloc the main parties are the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), and the former has typically been regarded as much more hardline and uncompromising than the latter. In the Catholic/Nationalist bloc Sinn Fein emerged from links with paramilitary republicanism while the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) was the staunchly non-violent nationalist party. The characterization of the DUP and Sinn Fein as extreme, however, is increasingly difficult to sustain given the wholehearted sharing of power by the parties since the breakthrough 2007 election which initiated four years (2007-11) of inclusive power-sharing coalition government. The DUP and Sinn Fein were the main winners in the 2011 election securing between 27 and 30 percent of first preference votes. The UUP and SDLP performed poorly, achieving between 13 and 14 percent. Table 1: Seats and first preference vote share by party seats vote share (%) DUP 38 30.0 Sinn Féin 29 26.9 UUP 16 13.2 SDLP 14 14.2 Alliance 8 7.7 Other 3 8.0 11

Figure 6: Unionist party support at Assembly elections 1998-2011 (%) The dominance of the DUP over the UUP is in striking contrast to the situation in the first Assembly election in 1998 when the UUP was the larger party. In the 2003 Assembly election the DUP pushed ahead of the UUP for the first time and the DUP has now achieved twice the UUP vote at two consecutive Assembly elections. 12

Figure 7: Nationalist party support at Assembly elections 1998-2011 (%) The pattern is the same in the nationalist bloc. The SDLP was the dominant party at the first Assembly election in 1998 but was overtaken by Sinn Fein in the 2003 election. Since then Sinn Fein has widened the gap in both the 2007 and 2011 elections. 13

Figure 8: Alliance party support at Assembly elections 1998-2011 (%) The support level of the bi-confessional Alliance party has been low in the Assembly elections since 1998. However, the eight percent it secured in the 2011 election represents a continued increase on 2003 and 2007. The party has also become politically very important in that it took on the sensitive Justice portfolio during the 2007-11 term, hence becoming formally part of a five party coalition government. 14

4. Women and Representation Having a proportional representation electoral system may guarantee that the number of elected representatives of each party is in proportion to the share of the vote received by the party. However, there is no guarantee that the demographic make up of the representatives will be in proportion to the demographic traits of the wider population. This is most noticeable in relation to the (under)representation of women. Table 2 reports the percentage of election candidates in the four Assembly elections that were female. The percentage is very constant at between 16 and 18 percent. In terms of the proportion of elected representatives who are female the figures are not terribly different but it is possible to discern a trend. Table 3 reports that the proportion has steadily risen from 12 percent of MLAs who were female in 1998 to 19 percent in 2011. (The author would like to thank Neil Mathews for collating these figures). As described by Mathews (2011), the reasons for the under-representation of women may be explained by the party institutional decision making structures. In particular, party decision making in relation to candidate selection is highly decentralised (left to the local constituency) and this is a notoriously conservative way to proceed. Also, there are supply-side problems in that women do not tend to put themselves forward for selection because of the infamously macho culture of Northern Ireland party politics and also because of the domestic family and caring responsibilities that women have which limit the probability of women engaging in time consuming and family unfriendly political activities (see Mathews, 2011). 15

Table 2: Female candidates in Northern Ireland Assembly elections (% total number of electoral candidates) % 1998 15.5 2003 17.8 2007 18.3 2011 16.8 Source: https://www.ark.ac.uk Table 3: Female elected representatives in Northern Ireland Assembly elections (% total number of elected representatives) % 1998 12.0 2003 16.7 2007 16.7 2011 18.5 Source: https://www.ark.ac.uk 16

5. The bases of party support The traditionally very strong relationship between religion and voting is evident when examining first preference vote choice at the 2011 Assembly election. Almost zero Protestants give a first preference vote to either of the nationalist parties Sinn Fein or the SDLP. Similarly, very few Catholics gave a first preference vote to either the UUP or DUP. The Alliance attracted support from both communities but more from Protestants than Catholics. The other party in the contest was the small unionist party named Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) which is a staunchly anti power-sharing breakaway faction of the DUP. Table 4: Religion and Voting SF SDLP All. UUP DUP TUV other Total Protestant 0.0 0.3 11.8 27.4 51.8 3.6 5.2 100.0 Catholic 57.7 31.3 6.1 0.6 2.6 0.0 1.6 100.0 While religion strongly shapes which party bloc a voter supports, how can the within-bloc choice be explained? To address this, the constitutional preferences of the supporters of each party are compared. Catholics views regarding the long term future of Northern Ireland (should there be a United Ireland, a devolved Northern Ireland administration, or direct rule from London?) strongly shape the choice between Sinn Fein and the SDLP. Catholic supporters of a united Ireland strongly support Sinn Fein while Catholic supporters of devolution are more likely to support the SDLP. (The relatively small number of Catholics who support direct rule strongly tend to support the SDLP rather than Sinn Fein). 17

Table 5. Catholic support for SDLP and SF by long term constitutional preferences SDLP SF total Remain in the UK with a direct 64.5 35.5 100.0 and strong link to Britain Remain in the UK and have a strong 52.0 48.0 100.0 Assembly and government in Northern Ireland Unify with the Republic of Ireland 17.7 82.3 100.0 In relation to Protestant vote choice between the UUP and the DUP, it emerges that Protestants with pro-devolution views are very strongly supportive of the DUP. In contrast, Protestants who favour Direct Rule are much more evenly split between the UUP and the DUP. Table 6. Protestant support for the UUP and DUP by long term constitutional preferences UUP DUP total Remain in the UK with a direct 42.7 57.3 100.0 and strong link to Britain Remain in the UK and have a strong 29.8 70.2 100.0 Assembly and government in Northern Ireland One widely accepted interpretation as to why the hardline parties (DUP and SF) have triumphed in recent elections over the more moderate UUP and SDLP is that the former parties are perceived by voters to be more robust defenders of their respective communities. SF and the DUP may have become more moderate in terms of their ideological positions (with SF accepting the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland state and the DUP accepting power-sharing) but this movement to 18

the moderate centre has been combined with a strong reputation for defending the interests of their respective communities. Hence, voters may have moved from voting on the basis of constitutional preferences and identity and instead vote on the basis of which one of their community parties (SF or SDLP for the Catholic/Nationalist community, and DUP or UUP for the Protestant/Unionist community) has the strongest reputation for representing the interests of their community in the power-sharing government (see Garry (2009) and Mitchell, Evans and O Leary (2009)). 19

6. Outcome of the Election: Government Formation Under the terms of the 1998 Good Friday/ Belfast Agreement, a consociational government structure was established. Consociational power-sharing government would involve all (sizeable) parties in each community sharing power in a multiparty coalition government. Ministerial portfolios would be distributed to each party roughly in proportion to the size of the party. Also, in order to be carried legislation would need to attract a minimum threshold of support from the politicians representing each community (nationalists and unionists), hence providing each community with a veto on legislation. This arrangement, advocates argued, had the advantages of being proportional, all inclusive and (via the veto rights) protective of community interests. Under Northern Ireland s consociational political arrangements, the ministerial portfolios are allocated to the parties participating in the inclusive power sharing government according to the d Hondt formula. Each party takes a turn at choosing the portfolio it wishes to have. The more parliamentary seats a party has the more turns it has (and hence the more portfolios it gets) and the earlier those turns occur (so it has a better chance of securing the portfolios it really wants). Under the formula as run in 2011, the DUP having the most parliamentary seats got first pick and chose the important Finance and Personnel portfolio. Then Sinn Fein having the second highest number of seats chose Education. This surprised many commentators as Sinn Fein was widely perceived to have performed badly in terms of handling this portfolio during 2007-11 and the party was not expected to choose it again. 20

Table 7. The distribution of ministerial portfolios 1. DUP Finance and Personnel Sammy Wilson 2. Sinn Féin Education John O Dowd 3. DUP Enterprise, Trade and Investment Arlene Foster 4. UUP Regional Development Danny Kennedy 5. Sinn Féin Agriculture & Rural Development Michelle Gildernew 6. SDLP Environment Alex Attwood 7. DUP Social Development Nelson McCausland 8. Sinn Féin Culture, Arts and Leisure Carál Ní Chuilín 9. DUP Health Edwin Poots 10. Alliance Employment and Learning Stephen Farry 11. Alliance Justice* David Ford * The Justice portfolio was not allocated under d Hondt The DUP secured four portfolios, Sinn Fein secured three and the UUP and SDLP secured one each. The increased importance of Alliance was highlighted as it secured two portfolios. It gained Employment and Learning under the d Hondt procedure and also continued responsibility for the sensitive Justice portfolio. Furthermore, the largest party (DUP) attained the First Minister position and the second largest party (Sinn Fein) secured the position of deputy First Minister. (The two positions are legally equal in the sense that the First and deputy First Ministers are co-prime ministers; however, symbolically speaking, the position of First Minister is superior.) In total, of the 13 ministerial positions the DUP achieved five, Sinn Fein four, the UUP and SDLP one each and the Alliance two. Thus, the DUP received 38 percent of the ministerial positions (compared to 35 percent of parliamentary seats and 30 percent of first preference votes (see Figure 9)). Sinn Fein also received a greater percentage of ministerial posts than its percentage of either seats or votes. In contrast, the percentage share of ministerial posts gained by the UUP and the SDLP was lower than the parties respective vote or seat share. 21

The Alliance received a percentage share of ministerial positions that was double either its seat or vote share. Figure 9: Is parliamentary seat share and executive portfolio share Proportionate to vote share? 22

7. The Referendum At the same time as the Assembly election, Northern Ireland citizens were asked to vote in a referendum regarding possible change to the electoral system for Westminster elections. In the UK wide referendum Yes campaigners urged citizens to replace the first past the post system with the Alternative Vote system. No campaigners urged citizens to stick with the tried and tested status quo. While the AV referendum generated some heated debate in Britain the campaign was extremely muted in Northern Ireland. In a comprehensive media content analysis, Banduci and Stevens (2011) compared the relative attention given by the Northern Ireland media to the Assembly election and the Alternative Vote referendum. Overall, election coverage was eleven times greater than referendum coverage. In relation to newspapers and radio coverage election coverage was between nine and ten times greater than referendum coverage and television coverage of the referendum was almost non-existent. Thus, holding the Assembly election and voting system referendum concurrently led to the latter being swamped by the former in terms of media coverage. 23

Figure 10: Percentage supporting AV In Northern Ireland, forty four percent of voters supported the introduction of the Alternative Vote system. This was the highest Yes percentage in all of the 12 UK geographical regions (as listed in Figure 10). However, this overall figure of 44 percent hides the massive variation in support across the two communities in Northern Ireland. Barely a quarter of Northern Ireland Protestants supported change (26 percent which is lower than any of the 12 regions) while practically three quarters (73.5 percent) of Catholics supported the introduction of AV. What this shows is that despite the minimal media coverage of the referendum, a very clear social basis of voting emerges on this issue. Catholic propensity to change the system is consistent with long-standing Catholic desire to amend the political 24

system in Northern Ireland, especially in a manner than enhances the proportionality of political representation. 25

References Banducci, S. and D. Stevens. 2011. Media content analysis: News media coverage and information in combined elections Report prepared for Electoral Commission Available at: http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/ data/assets/pdf_file/0020/141338/exeter -media-report-web.pdf Garry, J. 2009. Consociationalism and its critics: Evidence from the historic 2007 Northern Ireland Assembly election Electoral Studies 28(3): 458-66 Mathews, N. forthcoming. The Northern Ireland Assembly Election 2011 Irish Political Studies Mathews, N. 2011. Gendered Candidate Selection in Northern Ireland Paper prepared for presentation at the Political Studies Association of Ireland conference 2011, Dublin. Mitchell, P., Evans, G. and B. O Leary. 2009. Extremist outbidding in ethnic party systems is not inevitable: Tribune parties in Northern Ireland Political Studies 57: 397-421 26

Appendix A: Northern Ireland s PRSTV system In Northern Ireland Assembly elections, the electoral system used is Proportional Representation-Single Transferable Vote (PR-STV). The 108 Assembly seats are made up of six elected representatives (Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) from each of 18 constituencies. On the ballot paper, the candidates are listed in alphabetical order. Voters are asked to indicate their favourite candidate (by writing 1 ) beside that candidate, their second favourite candidate (by writing a 2 beside that candidate), their third favourite candidate, and so on. Thus, voters rank-order the candidates. Voters may rank as many or as few candidates as they wish. Some voters may indicate a first preference and leave it at that. Other voters may comprehensively rank all of the candidates on the list. Most voters do something in between: perhaps indicating their favourite, second favourite and third favourite and ignoring the other candidates. In order to be deemed elected, a candidate must secure a certain number of votes (a quota ). In each constituency, the quota is calculated by taking into account the number of valid votes and the number of seats in the constituency: Quota=[(total number of valid votes)/(number of seats+1)] + 1 In Northern Ireland s six seater constituencies, a quota is a seventh of the valid vote plus one vote. Votes are transferred when a candidate has votes over and above the quota (i.e. votes that are surplus to requirements) or when the candidate is eliminated from the 27

contest. When voters first preference votes are counted, a candidate may receive more first preferences than the quota. These extra votes are then redistributed among the other candidates according to the second preferences indicated on the ballot papers. If no candidates manage to achieve a quota, then the candidate with the least votes is eliminated and those votes are redistributed according to the second preferences on those ballot papers. The process of counting the votes proceeds by redistributing the surplus votes of elected candidates who have exceeded the quota or by redistributing the eliminated votes of the worst performing candidates. The process continues until six candidates are deemed elected. 28

Appendix B: Turnout at the 2011 Northern Ireland Assembly Election by Constituency (%) 29