Lecture notes Northern Ireland 4: Key players, the peace process and agreements

6. Northern Ireland 4: Key players, the peace process and agreements 1. The Peace Process and Agreements In 1973 an attempt was made to create a power-sharing executive and devolved government, which took its form in the Sunningdale Agreement. This agreement is significant in that many of the ideas and principles formulated here can be found in later treaties between the two governments, especially including the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, as well as providing a framework for further peace discussions. A new Northern Ireland Assembly was elected in 1982 with a plan for rolling devolution, however some members refused to take their seats and this plan failed. When the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed on 15 November 1985 by the governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, unionists were filled with dismay, since they were neither consulted nor was their acquiescence or participation needed to render the agreement effective. 1 The treaty granted the Republic substantial rights of codetermination over Northern Irish affairs, as it provided for the formation of an Inter-Governmental Conference dealing with political matters, security and related matters, legal questions, and the promotion of cross-border co-operation. 2 In addition, in Article 1 both governments acknowledged the status of Northern Ireland as part of the UK and affirmed that a prospective united Ireland could only become reality by majority consent of the Northern Irish people. 3 Both, nationalists North and South, perceived the agreement as a victory, whereas unionists saw themselves betrayed by Britain and were willing to oppose the treaty by any means. As a corollary, unionists joined serious loyalist riots led by the UDA and UVF. These attacks were even directed at British security forces with an aim to pressurising Westminster not to withdraw British troops from Northern Ireland. On the other side, the PIRA intensified its campaign to finally get the British out of Ireland. However, despite the ongoing violence between the communities throughout the period between 1985 and 1993, the Anglo-Irish Agreement remained on the political agenda as the prevailing framework for the settlement of the Northern Ireland conflict. In the early 1990s, Britain and the Republic increased their efforts to break the stalemate which the talks between the Northern Irish parties had turned into. 4 On 25 November 1993 they issued the Downing Street Declaration, 5 which sought to get the antagonists back round the negotiating table. In this officially denoted Joint Declaration, the British government pursued the objective of removing the main republican justification for violence, namely British imperialism in Ireland 6 and recognised Irish unity by majority consent. Moreover, Britain denied having any selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland. 7 The Irish government on the other hand fully accepted that a united Ireland could only come into existence by the free wish of the majority of the Northern Irish people. In addition, the Republic warranted the unionist community to examine any elements in the Republic that could possibly threaten them. Both sides agreed that only those parties should be entitled to 1 Barton 179. 2 Hennessey 273. 3 For a full text of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, see Republic of Ireland, Government Publications, Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985 (Dublin: The Stationery Office, 1985). 4 During this period secret political talks occurred within the nationalist camp between the SDLP and Sinn Féin as well as between the British government and Sinn Féin. John Hume, the leader of the SDLP, and his counterpart of SF, Gerry Adams finally reached consent over nationalist aspirations for Northern Ireland. SF held also secret contact with the British government; however, these talks produced no considerable results but demonstrated the British exertions to include SF in the peace process. Unionists felt alienated and politically isolated, and eventually decided to bring them back into play. For further details, see Boyce 132 147 and Dixon 235-238. 5 For a full text of the so-called Downing Street Declaration, see Republic of Ireland, Department of Foreign Affairs, Joint Declaration. Department of Foreign Affairs Online (http://www.irlgov.ie/iveagh/angloirish/jointdeclaration/default.htm). 6 Hennessey 286. 7 Department of Foreign Affairs (http://www.irlgov.ie/iveagh/angloirish/jointdeclaration/default.htm). Mag. Bert Preiss page 1 (10) 18/11/2006

participate in decision-making who completely committed themselves to the exclusive use of democratic and peaceful means. Nevertheless, the two governments disputed over the relevant unit to decide over Northern Ireland s state membership; while for Britain the entity of pertinence was Northern Ireland, the Republic regarded the whole island of Ireland as the area in question. 8 The Declaration marked the onset of the current peace process that endeavoured to include all parties involved in the conflict. Its first significant upshot was the IRA s announcement of an end to its violent campaign and, as a reaction, the ceasefire declared by loyalist paramilitaries in 1994. 9 The paramilitary absence from violence and the establishment of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD), headed by the former US Senator George Mitchell, accelerated this pathway to peace. 10 The Mitchell Report dealing with the contentious issue of handing over of weapons (decommissioning), appeared in January 1996, shortly before the end of the IRA ceasefire, which was followed in that year by more violence. 2. Key Players and Antagonistic Views The Protestant and Catholic Church had a substantial influence on the shape of the political landscape of Northern Ireland. Religious segregation has led to an almost complete cleavage in voting behaviour of Catholics and Protestants, which is also profoundly reflected in the campaigns of the political parties, being usually intended to exclusively address one of the two Northern Irish communities. The parties involved in the Northern Irish peace process can be classified into internal and external key players. 2.1 Internal Key Players The internal key players - the local parties and organisations of Northern Ireland - are divided alongside their supporting communities. There are three camps in Northern Ireland, namely the Catholic nationalist and republican camp, the Protestant unionist and loyalist group, and the neutral and non-sectarian party. 2.1.1 Catholic Nationalists and Republicans Almost all Northern Irish Catholics can be politically attributed to the nationalist and republican camp. At this point my task is to provide an overview of how they are publicly organised and to summarise their views and objectives. The political parties that represent the Catholic minority are the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Féin (SF), the latter being now the larger political party. 11 On the paramilitary underground level, the republican campaign is predominantly led by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The Social Democratic and Labour Party The SDLP was formed soon after the outbreak of the Troubles in 1970 as a moderate constitutional nationalist alternative to Sinn Féin. According to the SDLP s constitution, the party advocates a socialist policy and aims to promote the cause of Irish unity based on the consent of a majority of people in Northern Ireland. 12 However, nationalist ideas are given priority since the party s leader Gerry Fitt was replaced by John Hume in the early 1970s. Thus, referring to McGarry and O Leary, members of the SDLP, in particular Hume, can be called neo-nationalists, since they believe in an inclusive nationalism in which all the people of Ireland can be cherished 8 Hennessey 287 288. 9 The IRA declared its ceasefire on 31 August 1994, whereas the UDA and the UVF followed on 13 October 1996. Nevertheless, the IRA revived its paramilitary campaign in early 1996, but finally restored its complete cessation of violence on 20 May 1997. For further details, refer to Hennessey 288 294 and Dixon 267. 10 Dixon 259 260. 11 Nicholas Whyte, (http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/grecent.htm). In the 2003 Assembly election SF increased its share by 6% to 24% compared to 18% in 1998. In the same period the SDLP lost 5% and received 17% of the peoples votes. In the 2003. 12 Social Democratic and Labour Party, Constitution. (Belfast: Linenhall Library, 1995 unpublished), 2. Mag. Bert Preiss page 2 (10) 18/11/2006

equally and seek the unity of the Irish nation through the consent of the relevant people. 13 In order to achieve its objectives, the SDLP is committed to the exclusive use of political means and strongly opposes any form of violence. Mark Durkan, the present leader of the party, justifies this commitment: The only consequence of violence is a more deeply divided people. The SDLP believes that the political process is the only instrument that can bring about peace and justice for both communities of Northern Ireland. 14 The party has an inclusive communitarian view in recognising that the identity and rights of the unionists, who perceive themselves as British Protestants, have to be guaranteed in any forthcoming united Ireland. 15 Moreover, the SDLP alludes to the double-minority problem, 16 which means that each of the two communities in Northern Ireland constitutes at once a majority and a minority within the island of Ireland. 17 For the SDLP, the key to conflict resolution lies in an extraterrestrial approach that includes Britain and the Republic of Ireland. Thus, a state structure should be created, where both identities, the Irish nationalist and the British unionist, are reflected adequately. 18 In 1979, Hume demanded such a concerted Anglo-Irish approach, when he appealed to Britain and the Republic to take a positive and decisive initiative. 19 In the early 1980s, Hume played a leading role in the formation of the New Ireland Forum, a joint nationalist movement composed of nationalist politicians North and South. The SDLP apprehends unionists hegemony as a key source of antagonism and disapproves of the unionist principle of majority rule; instead, the party prefers a conception, that is predicated on equal representation of both communities. 20 Northern Ireland is also perceived to be a European region, the underdeveloped economy of which can benefit substantially from its membership of the European Union. 21 Furthermore, the SDLP advances the opinion, that the European process helps to alleviate the tension between the two communities. As Mark Durkan argues, The European context plays a considerable role in bringing the British and Irish identities closer together, as the Republic of Ireland and Britain are co-housed under a new European umbrella. 22 In the aftermath of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, Hume took the initiative to dissuade the exponents of SF from pursuing their republican struggle and to get them engaged in the political peace process. In his talks with the party leader of SF, Gerry Adams, he convinced Adams that any future settlement of the conflict should be based on the principle of national selfdetermination for the Irish people as a whole. 23 Following the definition of McGarry and O Leary, the doctrine of national self-determination demands that members of the nation [freely] consent to the form of government under which they live and express themselves. 24 Subsequently, Hume persuaded Adams to implicitly acknowledge, that the acquiescence of the majority of Northern Irish unionists is a sine qua non of a prospective united Irish republic. 13 John McGarry and Brendan O Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), 20. 14 Mark Durkan, Social Democratic and Labour Party, Chairperson, personal interview, Belfast, 3 June 1998. 15 Social Democratic and Labour Party, The SDLP Analysis of the Nature of the Problem, May 1991 (Belfast: SDLP Headquarters, 1991), 2. 16 For a detailed analysis of the double-minority problem, see Harold Jackson, The Two Irelands: the Problem of the Double Minority A Dual Study of Inter-group Tensions (London: The Minority Rights Group, 1995). 17 Social Democratic and Labour Party, SDLP Analysis, 3. 18 John Hume, A New Ireland: Politics, Peace, and Reconciliation (Boulder: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1996), 58 61. 19 John Hume, The Irish Question: a British Problem. Foreign Affairs 58.2 (1979): 309. 20 Social Democratic and Labour Party, Manifesto: Westminster Parliamentary Election 1 May 1997 (Belfast: SDLP Headquarters, 1997), 1. 21 SDLP, Manifesto 16. 22 Durkan, personal interview. 23 Gerard Murray, John Hume and the SDLP: Impact and Survival in Northern Ireland (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1998), 161 186. 24 McGarry and O Leary, Broken Images 14. Mag. Bert Preiss page 3 (10) 18/11/2006

Sinn Féin Republicans of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) founded Sinn Féin in 1905. 25 The party s name derives from Gaelic, the Irish idiom, and means We Ourselves. SF professes itself to be an Irish republican party, the principal aim of which is to achieve unity of Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. 26 In a leadership address, the President of SF, Gerry Adams, and his deputy, Martin McGuinness, declared: We will never lose sight of our objective of a United Ireland. And we will continue to make advances. 27 To make these advances, SF repeatedly pursued a radical strategy including the support of militant Irish republicanism. SF is closely linked with the IRA and is deemed to be its political arm. 28 Adams and McGuinness have their political roots in the republican movement of the late 1960s, when PIRA launched its paramilitary campaign. 29 SF seeks to attain national self-determination for the Irish people as a whole. According to Adams, this right of the Irish nation to exert its free democratic will is denied to republicans by the partition of this country [Ireland] and by the British connection. 30 Since unionists are supposed to have material interests in the maintenance of the link with Britain, 31 they will not abandon the union with Britain unless they are forced to do so. Therefore, republicans of SF regard their combined armed and political campaign as justified. McGarry and O Leary classify them as ethnic militants, since it is legitimate for them to defend the right to pursue national self-determination and the liberation of Northern Ireland from British rule through armed revolutionary violence. 32 Britain should be coerced to adopt a policy of Irish re-unification and cease to succour Northern Irish Protestants. SF holds the British and the unionists directly liable for having established a system of profound social and economic inequalities. The republican party advocate an irredentism that asserts a territorial claim to the entire island of Ireland and decline the right of unionists to veto Irish unity. In the view of SF, the Protestants of the Six Counties, as the republicans denote Northern Ireland, who do not have a different identity; they are an Irish minority, whose acquiescence is desired, but is not required to accomplish a Irish unification. 33 In his vision of an independent 32-county Irish republic, Adams stresses the guarantee of equal rights and liberties to the significant national minority of unionists. 34 The Republic of Ireland, in republican terminology named the Twenty-six Counties, is also held responsible for its failure to end partition. Adams describes the Republic as politically and economically highly contingent upon Britain and as a British neo-colony. 35 When SF realised by the late 1980s that its revolutionary struggle did not effectively lead to Irish unity, the party decided to reshape its strategy; from then on, the party intended to form a political coalition with the SDLP to achieve Irish unification. Despite SF s refusal to a unionist right of veto, Adams subscribed to Hume s conviction that an all-party consent including the governments of Britain and the Republic would be necessary to establish a united Irish republic. He speaks of an agreement that must earn the allegiance, and agreement, of all traditions. 36 In Adams s view, the right of national self-determination for the Irish nation in its entirety would form the basis of such a peaceful conflict settlement. 37 25 Connolly 513. 26 Sinn Féin, Objectives. Sinn Féin Online (http://www.sinnfein.ie). 27 Gerry Adams and Martin McGuiness, Leadership Address: Sinn Féin Ard Fheis, 18 April 1998 (Dublin: Sinn Féin Headquarters, 1998), 4. 28 Brendan O Brien, The Long War, the IRA and Sinn Féin: from Armed Struggle to Peace Talks (Dublin: The O Brien Press, 1995), 11. 29 O Brien 21. 30 Gerry Adams, A Pathway to Peace (Dublin: The Mercier Press, 1989), 10. 31 Adams, Pathway 57. 32 McGarry and O Leary, Broken Images 19. 33 Adams, Pathway 11. 34 Adams, Pathway 42. 35 Adams, Pathway 32. 36 Adams, Free Ireland 235. 37 Gerry Adams, Free Ireland: Towards a Lasting Peace, 2nd ed. (Dingle: Brandon Books, 1995), 236. Mag. Bert Preiss page 4 (10) 18/11/2006

The Irish Republican Army The IRA is the most prominent republican paramilitary organisation. It emerged from the IRB and the Irish Volunteers in 1916 during the struggle for Irish independence. Among the early members of the republican movement were many Fenians, who fought for the right of being Irish and who were largely supported by the younger Catholic clergy. 38 As a response to the sectarian violence against the civil rights upheavals in 1969, a split in the republican movement occurred. The Provisional IRA arose as a new wing, yet remained affiliated to the IRA Army Council. The Official and the Provisional IRA ultimately aim to force the British out of Northern Ireland and to establish a united socialist Irish republic. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the armed struggle was central for both competing wings of the IRA to destabilise the public system of Northern Ireland and to smash the unionist connection with Britain. 39 However, their strategy was different; while the PIRA s campaign included the bombing of commercial targets in Northern Ireland, the Official IRA strongly opposed these attacks, since the Catholic working class suffered most from it. At that time, the main targets of the Officials were the British army and the RUC. For McGarry and O Leary, members of the IRA are civic militants, as they insist that the Irish right to national self-determination can be sought through force of arms, not least because Irish national territory is presently occupied by an imperial power. For them, the choice between armed and unarmed struggle is a matter of strategy rather than of principle. 40 In its training manual, the so-called Green Book, the IRA Army Council lays its exclusive claim to being the lawful government of the Irish Republic. The organisation deprives all other parliaments and assemblies of the right to act on behalf of the Irish people. In the IRA s apprehension, these bodies are illegal assemblies, puppet governments of a foreign power, and willing tools of a [sic] occupying force. 41 Accordingly, the IRA has repudiated the Republic of Ireland from its advent, because it failed to gain authority over all 32 Irish counties. 42 The Downing Street Declaration in 1993, including the British recognition of Irish selfdetermination, appeared very promising for the republican movement. However, it demanded from the IRA to permanently cease its guerrilla warfare in order to admit SF to the peace talks. On a review of the republican strategy, the leadership of the IRA and SF jointly agreed that engaging in the political dialogue could bring them closer to Irish unity. Moreover, an end of the paramilitary campaign would put the pressure for action on the unionists and the British government. 43 With the declaration of its complete cessation of military operations on 31 August 1994, the IRA Army Council acknowledged the potential of the peace process in creating a just and lasting settlement. 44 On the whole, except for a short renewal of its campaign in 1996, the IRA has stopped its violent insurrection until now. 45 38 Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA, 11th ed. (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 29 31. The leaders of the Fenian Brotherhood, which was founded in 1858, also called their association IRB. 39 O Brien 200 204. 40 McGarry and O Leary, Broken Images 18. 41 O Brien 350. 42 Coogan, IRA 44 53. 43 O Brien 320 321. 44 O Brien 323 324. 45 However, this does not apply to a dissident splinter group of the IRA, the Real IRA, which pursues a highly radical and bloody campaign to achieve its ultimate goal, a united Irish Republic dominated by republicans. Mag. Bert Preiss page 5 (10) 18/11/2006

2.1.2 Protestant Unionists and Loyalists In essence, nearly all Northern Irish Protestants are politically represented by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the former being now the larger of the two. 46 Many of these unionist politicians are members of the political society of the Orange Order. 47 The Order s traditional annual parades, which are usually well attended by unionists and loyalists, have frequently occasioned sectarian clashes with local Catholic residents. 48 The loyalist paramilitary field is predominantly occupied by the organisations of the Ulster Voluntary Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). The Ulster Unionist Party The formation of the UUP dates back to 1905. The party was founded in response to the threat of the Union posed by the Home Rule crisis on Ireland. 49 Originally, the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC), which was the then official name of the UUP and which later became its governing body, was composed of representatives of local unionist institutions, the Orange Order, evangelic Protestantism, and loyalist members of the British parliament. The UUP s ultimate aim is to preserve and consolidate Northern Ireland s position within the United Kingdom. In the words of its present party leader, David Trimble, the UUP aims to carry forward [its] overriding objective which is to strengthen the Union [of Great Britain and Northern Ireland]. 50 The UUP frequently justifies this objective by referring to the economic and social benefits for all people of Northern Ireland that arise from the region s membership of the UK. In Trimble s opinion, the economic superiority of Great Britain to the Republic of Ireland has resulted in higher living standards in the province than in the Irish state. Moreover, he perceives Britain as a modern, liberal, multicultural, multi-national state, that allows all its citizens to develop their personalities to the full, regardless of their ethnic or cultural identity. McGarry and O Leary, who define unionism as a type of British nationalism, classify this conception of a union of all the equal citizens of the United Kingdom, irrespective of their racial, religious or cultural origins as civic unionism. 51 From 1921 to 1972 the UUP was the sole governing party of Northern Ireland. Unionists concede that during this period of autocratic rule Northern Ireland adopted a sectarian structure, where Catholics were considerably underrepresented. 52 Nevertheless, they essentially impute this inequality to the Catholic nationalist hostility, north and south. 53 For Ulster unionists, the principal cause for the Troubles is Irish nationalism; in peculiar, they regard the republican struggle of SF and the IRA as a terrorist war. 54 This republican assault on Ulster has been encouraged by the Republic of Ireland through its constitutional claim, which contains an aggressive aim [that] drives and motivates the IRA, as Trimble enunciates. 55 46 Nicholas Whyte, (http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/grecent.htm). In the 2003 Assembly election the DUP received 26% of the electorate, which meant an increase of 8% of its 18% share in 1998. The UUP simultaneously also won 2% and received 23% of the electorate s votes. 47 For an elaborate study of the history of the Orange Order and its influence on the unionist society, see Kevin Haddick-Flynn, Orangeism: The Making of a Tradition (Dublin: Wolfhound Press, 1999). 48 An epitome for this sectarian turmoil, the annual Drumcree Church Parade, has been scrutinised by Dominic Bryan, Orange Parades: The Politics of Ritual, Tradition and Control (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 1 10. 49 Ulster Unionist Party, Northern Ireland s Largest Political Party: Building the Union Together. UUP Online. (http://www.uup.org). 50 David Trimble, Ulster s Need for Constitutional Certainty. Strengthening the Union. No. 13 (London: Friends of the Union, 1993), 6. 51 McGarry and O Leary, Broken Images 92. 52 Paul Bew, Peter Gibbon and Henry Patterson, Northern Ireland 1921 1994: Political Forces and Social Classes (London: Serif, 1995), 48 50. 53 Bew, Gibbon and Patterson, Political Forces 43. 54 Ulster Unionist Party, Manifesto: Assembly Elections 25 June 1998 (Belfast: UUP, 1998), 3. 55 Trimble 9. As the result of the Southern referendum on the Good Friday Agreement, the Republic abolished its territorial claim to Northern Ireland. Mag. Bert Preiss page 6 (10) 18/11/2006

In their effort to invigorate the union with Britain, Ulster unionists emphasise their traditionally close ties to British Conservatism. Yet the relationship between the UUP and Britain has been frequently characterised by unsteadiness and ambiguity. From the early 1970s onwards, Unionist- British relations deteriorated reaching their lowest point in the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which engendered a fear of British betrayal among Ulster unionists. The UUP deeply resented the treaty, as it granted a role and responsibility to the Republic in the affairs of Northern Ireland and, what is more, provided for a united Ireland by the majority wish of the Northern Irish population. 56 However, the Downing Street Declaration, that indicated Britain s unambiguous commitment to the peace process, and its subsequent nationalist encouragement, impeded the UUP from prolonging its politics of abstention. 57 The Democratic Unionist Party The DUP emerged from its predecessor, the Protestant Unionist Party, in 1971. 58 Its foremost objective is to secure, uphold and maintain the Constitution of Northern Ireland as an integral part of the United Kingdom. 59 The party is massively dominated by its leader, Reverend Ian Paisley, who is also the founder of the Free Presbyterian Church. Paisley advocates an evangelical Protestantism, that is tailor-made for the traditionalists of the Protestant working class of Northern Ireland. They feel their ethnic identity defended as it secures their status as comparatively higher privileged than their Catholic counterparts. 60 As Wallis et al. point out, Paisley constantly refers in his sermons to the sacred history of Protestantism, thus reminding his adherents of the atrocities committed by the Catholic Church, and emphasises that only by an absolute and uncompromising stand can a similar fate be avoided. 61 Paisley s extreme Protestant view is entrenched in the DUP. Moreover, he adopted a campaign technique for the DUP, that exploited the tradition of the march to strengthen the identity of Northern Irish Protestants. However, in the early 1980s, the DUP realised the limits of its ecclesiastical embodiment in attracting new voters; from then on, the party has become more secularised, which has led to an influx of young urban unionists. 62 For McGarry and O Leary, Paisley and many of the DUP s exponents are ethnic unionists, who perceive the Union [as] the expression of British Protestant achievement and Ulster [as] the home of the descendants of Scots and English settlers who brought civilization to Ireland. 63 The DUP believes that Northern Ireland should be governed by majority rule and promotes an internal conflict settlement, where, as the DUP Party Secretary, Nigel Dodds, points out, the SDLP s assignment should be the protection for Nationalists interests. 64 The party deprives SF of any political participation rights, as it regards the republican movement as the chief culprits of the Troubles. The DUP s profound hostility towards an external approach is also reflected in its vigorous anti-european position. The Anglo-Irish Agreement encountered the DUP s fundamental opposition. In the party s apprehension, the British had deceived the unionist community, as the treaty revealed their intention to withdraw from the province. Paisley expressed the fears of many unionists of being coerced by Britain into a united Ireland when he stated that the British government is trying to sell us out. Absolutely. 65 Irish unification would mean the absorption of Northern Ireland into a 56 Bew, Gibbon and Patterson, Political Forces 214 216. 57 Paul Bew, Peter Gibbon and Henry Patterson, Northern Ireland: Between War and Peace The Political Future of Northern Ireland (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1997), 214 215. 58 Democratic Unionist Party, Party History. DUP Online (http://www.dup.org.uk/history.html). 59 Democratic Unionist Party, Objectives. DUP Online (http://www.dup.org.uk/objectivepage.asp). 60 Roy Wallis, Steve Bruce and David Taylor, No Surrender! : Paisleyism and the Politics of Ethnic Identity in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Department of Social Studies Queen s University Belfast, 1985), 12 16. 61 Wallis, Bruce and Taylor 19. 62 Feargal Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism since the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Cork: Cork University Press, 1997), 46 47. 63 McGarry and O Leary, Broken Images 92 93. 64 Cathal McCall, Identity in Northern Ireland: Communities, Politics and Change (London: MacMillan, 1999), 141. 65 Hennessey 276. Mag. Bert Preiss page 7 (10) 18/11/2006

Roman Catholic Irish Republic and the destruction of Northern Irish Protestantism. Consequently, the DUP assumed the position of the protector of the Protestant identity in the upcoming peace talks. 66 The Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Defence Association The UVF was originally founded by unionist leaders in 1912 as a resistance force against Irish Home Rule but ceased shortly afterwards. It was resuscitated in 1966 by militant Belfast loyalists. Most of its early recruits came from the Protestant working-class and were determined to forcefully resist any unionist concessions to Northern Irish Catholics. 67 Soon after the eruption of the Troubles, the UVF was challenged on the loyalist paramilitary level by the UDA, which was formed in 1971 as an umbrella organisation for loyalist defence groups. The UDA soon became the largest loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland. Notwithstanding their considerable amount of supporters, both organisations have been proscribed: the UVF in 1975 and the UDA in 1992. 68 The loyalist paramilitary campaign is dominated by retaliation and defence; the lion s share of their sectarian assaults on Northern Irish Catholics are reprisals for republican paramilitary attacks on the unionist community. McGarry and O Leary interpret loyalism as an older form of British nationalism because it is not based upon cultural identification with the present peoples of Great Britain, but is reflected by its loyalty to the Crown rather than Parliament, provided the Crown defends Protestant liberties in Ulster, and its emphasis on the Protestant community of Northern Ireland. 69 Accordingly, the principal loyalist objective is to uphold the political status quo of Northern Ireland, which is characterised by the ascendancy of Northern Irish Protestants and the union with Britain. 2.1.3. Neutrals and Non-Sectarians The group of Northern Irish dissenters are opposed to any sectarianism and adopt a mediator role between the two rivalling camps. This neutral cross-communal centre ground, which accounts only for a small fraction of the electorate, is predominantly politically occupied by the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI). 70 The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland The APNI was set up by Northern Irish liberals in 1970 to give political expression to those who felt that nationalist and unionist political parties did not reflect their political views. Being the only Northern Irish party that draws cross-denominational support from Catholics and Protestants, its foremost aim is meeting the needs of all the people of Northern Ireland. 71 From its onset, exponents of the APNI espoused the maintenance of the union with Great Britain, albeit exclusively for economic reasons. 72 This is why McGarry and O Leary assign them to the unionist camp. 73 However, in my opinion, this classification into what one may describe as economic unionism is misleading, since it disregards the considerable amount of Catholic nationalist partisans of the APNI and, in addition, ignores the party s own pretension of being neither unionist 66 Dennis Cooke. Persecuting Zeal: A Portrait of Ian Paisley. (Dingle: Brandon Books, 1996), 221. 67 Steve Bruce, The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992), 11 18 and 26 27. 68 British Broadcasting News, Who are the Loyalist Paramilitaries? BBC News Online. 23 Aug. 2000 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern ireland/893094.stm). The UDA could avoid earlier proscription by exploiting its cover name, the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). 69 McGarry and O Leary, Broken Images 112. 70 Nicholas Whyte, (http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/grecent.htm). In the 2003 Assembly election the APNI s share decreased from 6% in 1998 to 4%. 71 Alliance Party, FAQ Frequently Asked Questions. APNI Online (http://www.allianceparty.org/html/faq.html). The other neutral political party, the Northern Ireland Women s Coalition (NIWC) shall only be mentioned at this point, since it represents only a small fraction of Northern Ireland s electorate. For more information on the NIWC, see Northern Ireland Women s Coalition, About Us. NIWC Online (http://www.niwc.org/aboutus.asp). 72 Hennessey 183. 73 McGarry and O Leary, Broken Images 94. Mag. Bert Preiss page 8 (10) 18/11/2006

nor nationalist. The party advocates a structure of devolved government for Northern Ireland that rests on the Northern Irish identity, irrespective of the Catholic or Protestant ancestry of its citizens. 74 In order to develop this common identification, the APNI stresses the importance of reconciling the two hostile camps. Hence, the party promotes the incorporation of a Ministry of Community Relations. 75 The APNI adopts a pro-european attitude and is affiliated to the European network of liberal parties. The party emphasises the encouraging effects that the consideration of an Irish-British-European axis would have for the regional economy, thus enhancing the development of the economic resource of a Northern Irish identity. In its post-modern view, the APNI espouses for the embedment of Northern Ireland in an evolving federal Europe, as this could create an embracing umbrella for the Irish and British dimension of the Northern Irish society. The former Alliance Party leader, John Alderdice, expresses the party s vision of a United Europe [that is] not a Europe built on nationalism but on communities of regions. 76 2.2 External Key Players 2.2.1 Great Britain Since Northern Ireland s inception, the political landscape of Britain has been dominated by the bipartisanship of the Conservative Party, which is the traditional ally of unionism, and the more reformist Labour Party. 77 Correspondingly, the alignment of the British Northern Ireland policy has always hinged upon the party politics of these two movements, depending upon which of them was in power at the time. For the initial forty years of the unionist hegemony, the British attitude towards them was characterised by a policy of benign neglect, that was primarily motivated for reasons of security and stability. Therefore, the mostly Conservative governments of that period usually confined themselves to determining the social and economic structural conditions of the province and did not interfere in its day-to-day politics. A shift in British policy transpired at the threshold of the Troubles, when the then Labour government feebly began to urge unionists to introduce pro-catholic reforms. 78 Yet, as already being mentioned, these efforts to avert the violent outbreak of the conflict were not successful. After the fall of the Sunningdale Executive, both Labour and Conservatives became increasingly detached from Northern unionists and strived for more inclusion of the Irish Republic in settling the conflict. In the early 1980s the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher entered into intergovernmental talks with the Irish Taoiseach Charles Haughey. This Anglo-Irish process reached its first apex in the Anglo-Irish Agreement, as the Conservative government, led by Margaret Thatcher, for the first time recognised the unity by consent principle for Northern Ireland. From then on, the consideration of the Irish dimension has formed an essential ingredient of the peace process. It has also entailed concessions of Britain to the nationalist community, one of the most significant being issued by the former Northern Ireland Secretary, Peter Brooke, declaring that Britain had no strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland. 79 Besides, Conservatives and Labour jointly aspired to resolve the conflict in an all-party approach. Tony Blair, the current British Prime Minister and Labour Party leader promised that on the issue of peace in Northern Ireland his party would work with the Conservative Party together, united, to put peace above party politics. 80 74 Hennessey 184. 75 Alliance Party, A Guide to Alliance Social and Economic Policies (Belfast: APNI, 1996), 5. 76 McCall 190. See also 186 192. 77 For a concise historical account of the Conservative Party and the Labour Party, see Cannon 237 238 and 553 554 respectively. 78 Michael J. Cunningham, British Government Policy in Northern Ireland 1969 89: Its Nature and Execution (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 8 20. 79 Boyce 138. See also 121 128. 80 Tony Blair, New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country (London: Fourth Estate, 1996), 277. Mag. Bert Preiss page 9 (10) 18/11/2006

2.2.2 Republic of Ireland The political structure of the Irish Republic bears some resemblance to the British political system. Like in Britain, the political dominion of the Republic is divided up among two parties: the usually larger party, Fianna Fáil, which describes itself as a republican party, and the more conservative party of Fine Gael. 81 The moderate gap in the nationalist conceptions of the two parties is epitomised in McGarry and O Leary s classification; they attribute the majority of Fianna Fáil s and many of Fine Gael s deputies to the camp of constitutional republicans, who are committed to the unification of the nation in an all-ireland republic [through] active diplomacy by the Irish state, yet also assign a significant proportion of Fine Gael s exponents to the group of revisionists, who are patriots of the present Irish state [and] wish to revise the definition of the Irish nation by accepting partition. 82 However, notwithstanding these ideological differences, both parties when being in power did not tangibly differ in their approach to the North. The Northern Ireland policy of the Republic was primordially dominated by a hybrid of noninterference and disregard. Although the erstwhile mostly Fianna Fáil governments were inclined to endorse Northern nationalists, they limited themselves to enshrining the public awareness for the territorial claim of the Irish constitution. 83 This policy of irredentist nationalism gradually attenuated with the emergence of the conflict and the endemic high level of violence in Northern Ireland. A period of political rapprochement to Britain followed, where the Irish governments eventually succeeded in incorporating an Irish dimension in the bilateral arrangements with their British counterparts. In the subsequent peace process the Irish government sought to promote the dialogue between the SDLP and SF, thus inducing republicans to renounce their armed struggle, so that SF could eventually participate in the forthcoming multi-party talks. 84 81 Fianna Fáil is the Irish expression for soldiers of Ireland, whereas Fine Gael denotes Irish race. For a brief historical account of the two parties, see Connolly 191 192 and 194 195 respectively. 82 McGarry and O Leary, Broken Images 18 and 20. 83 Basil Chubb, The Government and Politics of Ireland, 3rd ed. (New York: Longman, 1992), 8 9. 84 John Coakley and Michael Gallagher, ed., Politics in the Republic of Ireland, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1999), 48 49 and 324 327. Mag. Bert Preiss page 10 (10) 18/11/2006