MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA

PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA RESEARCH SERVICES MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA A revised version of Information Paper No.15, incorporating data from the 1997 State election. JENNI NEWTON INFORMATION PAPER 16

1998, Parliamentary Library of South Australia Not to be reproduced in part or whole without the written permission of, or acknowledgement to, the Parliamentary Library of South Australia. This information paper has been prepared by the Research Service of the South Australian Parliamentary Library. While all care has been taken to ensure that the material is both accurate and clearly presented, the responsibility for any errors remains with the author. February 1998 ISSN 0816-4282

CONTENTS INTRODUCTION... 1 THE FAIRNESS CRITERIA........ 2 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FAIRNESS REQUIREMENT THE 1991 REPORT... 3 THE 1994 REPORT... 4 THE ACCURACY OF THE CHECKING EXERCISE THE PROBLEM BEFORE 1993: ESTIMATING THE TWO PARTY PREFERRED VOTE AT EACH BOOTH... 6 THE PROBLEM NOW: DECLARATION VOTES... 10 A. THE NUMBER OF DECLARATION VOTES... 10 B. THE EFFECT OF DECLARATION VOTES 1. Did declaration votes make a difference to the formality of the count?... 11 2. Did declaration votes make much difference to the outcome of the election?... 11 3. Was this effect because declaration voters were much more radical or conservative than voters who lodged their votes at booths?... 13 4. Was the effect of declaration votes greater in those seats which recorded more declaration votes (i.e. was the effect due to the number of declaration votes)?.................. 14 C. DO WE NEED TO INCLUDE DECLARATION VOTES IN A CHECKING EXERCISE... 15 D. HOW SHOULD WE ALLOCATE DECLARATION VOTES TO BOOTHS?... 15 1. Allocate declaration voters pro-rata to booths at the average two party preferred rate for all declaration voters in the seat... 15 2. Allocate declaration voters pro-rata to booths at the average two party preferred rate for all ordinary voters in the seat... 16 3. Allocate ALP and LIB declaration voters pro-rata to booths... 17 SUMMARY... 17 APPLYING THE FAIRNESS CRITERIA LOOKING TOWARDS THE NEXT ELECTION.............. 18 PATTERNS IN ACTUAL RESULTS: SWINGS IN RECENT SA STATE ELECTIONS... 19 1. Uniform swings?... 19 2. Proportionate swing?... 22 3. Characteristics of the individual seats?... 23 THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO SWINGS 1. Fischer and Charnock.... 26 2. The Cube Rule...... 29 THE CUBE RULE AND THE DEMOCRATS..... 32 A SITTING MEMBER ADVANTAGE....... 34 THE NUMBER OF MARGINAL........ 36 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION... 37 REFERENCES....... 41

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA "It's not the voting that's democracy, it's the counting." Tom Stoppard, Jumpers (1972) Act 1 After each State election in South Australia, an Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission is required to examine State electorates with a view to redistribution. In deciding whether boundaries need to be amended, the Commission is required to take into account many factors, including "as far as practicable" making sure that the boundaries are fair to all parties. This paper is about the process by which the boundaries are judged to be fair. INTRODUCTION Since 1975, South Australian State electoral boundaries have been redistributed on a regular basis by an Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission (EDBC), made up of a Supreme Court Judge, the State Electoral Commissioner and the State Surveyor General. Redistributions took place in 1976 (with effect at the 1977, 1979 and 1982 State elections), in 1983 (effective at the 1985 and 1989 elections), in 1991 (effective at the 1993 State election) and most recently in 1994 (effective at the 1997 State election). Redistributions do not require Parliamentary approval but become operative on the order of the EDBC; while a 1994 amendment now allows the EDBC to issue a draft report before making a final order and report, the final order of an EDBC can only be appealed on points of law. Under the Constitution Act (SA), the EDBC must take several factors into account when deciding where to draw electorate boundaries. Each resulting electorate must have the same number of electors, give or take 10 per cent (s.77). The electorate boundary must be an unbroken line, unless islands are involved. That is, no electorate can be made up of two (or more) separate pieces of land, unless the pieces are islands (s.82(5)). As far as it is practicable for the Commission to make it so, the redistribution must be "... fair to prospective candidates and groups of candidates so that, if candidates of a particular group attract more than 50 per cent of the popular vote (determined by aggregating votes cast throughout the State and allocating preferences to the necessary extent), they will be elected in sufficient numbers to enable a government to be formed." (s.83(1» Within these limits, the Commission must also, as far as practicable, have regard to, "(a) the desirability of making the electoral redistribution so as to reflect communities of interest of an economic, social, regional or other kind; (b) the population of each proposed electoral district; (c) the topography of areas within which new electoral boundaries will be drawn; (d) the feasibility of communication between electors affected by the redistribution and their parliamentary representative in the House of Assembly; (e) the nature of substantial demographic changes that the Commission considers likely to take place in proposed electoral districts between the conclusion of its present proceedings and the date of the expiry of the present term of the House of Assembly and may have regard to any other matters it thinks relevant." Page 1 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Constitution Act (SA) 1934, s.83(2). The underlining is mine.) While the other requirements have been in the Act since 1975, the fairness requirement of section 83(1), was inserted into the Act in 1991. THE FAIRNESS CRITERIA The insertion into the Constitution Act of the fairness requirement has quite a history. In a Constitution Amendment (Electoral Redistribution) Amendment Bill which he introduced in 1989, the Hon. KT Griffin (then Liberal Shadow Attorney General) proposed several changes to the Constitution Act. He argued that under the boundaries as they then stood, and as they would apply at the election expected within months, the Liberal Party required 52% of the total State-wide two party preferred vote for House of Assembly seats in order to win government. He also noted that because the most recent redistribution of seats had taken place six years previously, population movements had caused the number of electors in seats to vary by mid- 1989 from almost 26 000 in Fisher to fewer than 17 000 in Elizabeth. The Bill proposed a redistribution after each second State election and also the incorporation into section 83 of the Act of a requirement that the EDBC, when making a redistribution, should take into account a new criterion, namely "the desirability that a political Party or group gaining 50 per cent plus one of the two party preferred vote at a general election of members of the House of Assembly at which the proposed redistribution would apply should have a reasonable prospect of forming a government." (Han. KT Griffin, SAPO, 9 August 1989: p114) The Bill lapsed when an election was called. On November 25th 1989, the ALP (with the support of two Independent Labor candidates) won 24 of the 47 House of Assembly seats with 47.9% of the two party preferred vote. The Liberal Party (and one National Party candidate) won 23 seats with 52.1 % of the two party preferred vote. Much as Mr Griffin had predicted, the ALP took government with less than half of the two party preferred vote. In 1990 the Labor Deputy Premier (Hon. Dr Hopgood) introduced a Bill to amend the Constitution to require a redistribution to take place after every two elections. In his second reading speech, he equated fairness with equality of elector numbers, saying that the real problem with the redistribution process was that when the Parliament had changed from 3-year to 4-year terms, no account had been taken of the resultant increase in the length of time between redistributions required under the Constitution Act. The Hopgood Bill proposed to solve that problem by requiring more frequent redistributions so that the number of electors in each electorate was more frequently pulled into line. In reply, the Liberal Party strongly advocated a fairness requirement, emphasising that electorates with equal numbers of electors still could not prevent the 1989 situation in which a redistribution could "lock up the potential Liberal vote in as few seats as possible and to spread the Labor vote as widely as possible" (0 Baker, SAPO 10 April 1990: p.1377). "At the last election, there were 13 non-labor seats which polled higher than 65% of the two party preferred vote for the winning candidate... However, only five seats were won by Labor with the successful member getting more than 65 per cent. This is the perfect psephological example of the 'locked in' interest.... At the last election, the non-labor vote in these seats totalled 146 469. Labor needed about 20 600 fewer votes to win its 13 safest seats than the Liberal Party." (0 Baker, SAPD 10 April 1990: p.1377.) Page 2 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA The Liberal argument was that if single-member electorates were to be retained, then more frequent redistributions, with account taken of the political value of each vote, needed to occur. At the same time, a willingness was also expressed to consider the West German top-up system or multi-member electorates with proportional representation. The Bill was sent to a Select Committee on April 10 th 1990. In November of 1990, the Select Committee reported to the Parliament, and recommended: an immediate redistribution, and further redistributions after each State election; retention of single-member electorates for the next State election, but after that (and in the light of the results of that election) a review of both the West German top-up system and single-member electorates (as far as I know this has not been formally done, although the parties may well have made their own judgements based on the 1993 State election); and adoption of the fairness requirement originally proposed in the Griffin Bill. In order to implement the Select Committee's recommendations, sections of the Constitution Act needed to be amended, and so a referendum was required. The referendum was held on 9 February 1991, and the question asked was "Do you approve the Constitution (Electoral Redistribution) Amendment Bill 1990?" The vote in favour was 76.7% across the State, with a clear majority in each electorate. As a result, the Constitution Act (SA) was amended to require that the Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission should be required to formulate a redistribution after each State election (not every third election). This is more frequent than any other State, Territory or Federal requirement except that for the ACT. The amendments also require the EDBC to draw the boundaries in such a way that, as far as is reasonably practicable, the party which won the majority of votes should be assured of holding the majority of seats. This fairness requirement is unique to South Australia, although the Court Liberal government in Western Australia did express an interest in electoral reform for their Legislative Assembly, including equal-sized electorates and a fairness criterion ("Electoral reform mooted", West Australian, 17 December 1996:p9) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FAIRNESS REQUIREMENT THE 1991 REPORT The Commissioners have addressed the fairness requirement in a number of ways. Firstly, both the 1991 and the 1994 Commissions have applied the proposed boundaries to the results from the previous State election, in a checking exercise. This exercise is also done by each of the major parties, Professor Dean Jaensch (Politics and International Studies Department, Flinders University of South Australia), Antony Green (ABC TV Election Unit, Sydney) and myself. In a sense, what we ask is: "If the last election had been held on these boundaries, would the party with the majority of votes have won the majority of seats?" As with economic models, all other factors are generally held constant. This retrospective application of election results is a kind of bottom-line exercise. If a proposed set of boundaries showed that, at the last election, the party with the majority of votes would clearly not have won the majority of seats, then we might question how the Commission proposed that those same boundaries would better reflect voters' intentions at the next election. Page 3 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA The 1991 Commission drew the metropolitan boundaries, and then checked them for the political consequences of the proposed boundaries. "The check of the metropolitan area was mainly made against the 1989 voting patterns. It was found that the requirements of section 83 (1) would not have been met on an overall review of these seats. A new kind of imbalance had developed simply out of a faithful application of the criteria in Part V of the Act other than section 83 (1). The past voting patterns were closely checked in every metropolitan booth, and the necessary final adjustments were then made in order that the total metropolitan distribution would comply, as far as practicable, with the requirements of section 83 (1 )." (EDBC 1991 Report: para 54.2.) I understand this passage to mean that the Commission checked the 1989 voting patterns in the proposed metropolitan seats, found that the new boundaries would not have given enough metropolitan seats to the party with the majority of two party preferred votes, and adjusted the boundaries until the required relationship between seats and votes occurred. From comments made at paragraph 58.3, it seems that in some areas both 1985 and 1989 State election results were scrutinised. In their submissions to the 1991 EDBC, both the Labor and the Liberal parties based their proposed sets of boundaries on 1989 election results. The Commission saw this as evidence of agreement that past voting patterns could be appropriately used to indicate future voting patterns. The Commission noted the possibility that the parties may have based parts of their submission on "other more recent information" (EDBC 1991 Report: para 64.2.1) - presumably party polling - but saw such information as "likely to be of minimal value" (op.cit.). "The Commission agrees with the thrust of the Liberal Party's submission, that voting patterns in the 1989 election are the most relevant because they are the most recent. They also reflect the wishes of electors at a time when the distribution of seats was as even as possible (24 : 23) and when the overall popular vote was quite even (48 : 52)." (EDBC 1991 Report: para 59.1) The Commission's Report acknowledged that the checking exercise would still not guarantee that a fair result would be achieved at the next election, for many reasons, including that: some voters will move into, and out of, an electorate; some voters can be expected to change their allegiance; and the checking exercise contains inherent errors. Nonetheless, the Commission "... has taken on board these conflicting views and bears in mind all the imperfections and uncertainties associated with using past voting patterns as an instrument for checking the political consequences of its redistribution. In the end, it has decided to use past voting patterns as they were the only guide available to it." (EDBC 1991 Report: para 58.4, my emphasis) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FAIRNESS REQUIREMENT THE 1994 REPORT In 1994 the Commission staff checked the boundaries formulated by the Commission, against the results from the 1993 State election. While the 1993 data were the most recent voting figures then available to the Commission, they were never seen as indicative of the way that voters might align themselves at the next State election, for the simple reason that in 1993 there was a massive swing against the ALP government, largely as a result of what had come to be known as "the State Bank disaster". No-one imagined that all of those voters who changed their allegiance in 1993 would continue to vote Liberal (either as a first or subsequent Page 4 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA preference), but by the same token those voters were not all expected to return to Labor at the next election either. The 1994 Commission did not call attention to the extraordinary nature of the 1993 voting figures, and the extra limitations which these data imposed upon the task of making the distribution fair for parties contesting the next election: "The test of electoral fairness in s.83(1) is easily stated but, as will be obvious, quite difficult to apply. The data is incomplete and much must depend on judgement and conjecture and even guesswork. There is no rule of thumb by which electors' future voting intentions may be reckoned. There is more than one way in which the political effect of changing an electoral district may be assessed. " (EDBC 1994 Report: para 10.1) In discussing their checking exercise in relation to Unley and Kaurna (at paras 10.3 to 10.4, and 10.7 to 10.10), the 1994 Report shows that the Commissioners were sensitive to factors which might bring in new voters to an electorate or might move current voters out of an electorate. Projecting the future population of electorates occupied a great deal of the Commission's efforts. However, when it came to the problem of estimating how a swing back from the 1993 results would be likely to occur (and the effect of that swing on the fairness of the boundaries as they would stand at that next election), the Commission found major difficulties. Both the 1991 and 1994 Commissions have accepted, with some reservations, the concepts of a two party preferred vote (2PP), of ranking electorates by their swing-to-lose factor, and of showing these ran kings in the form of an electoral pendulum. The pendulum is based on an idea that if a party gains a swing of - say - 11 %, then it will win all of the opposing party's seats requiring a swing-to-iose of 11 % or less. The 1994 Commission rejected the probability of a uniform swing at the next election, remarking that "... experience shows that election swings are rarely, if ever, uniform." (EDBC 1994 Report: para 6.2). It noted that in fact at the 1993 State election the swings were decidedly non-uniform. With an average swing to the Liberal Party of 8.9%, the 14 rural seats swung towards the Liberal Party by 4.6% on average, whereas the 23 metropolitan seats swung towards the Liberal Party by, on average, 10.5% (EDBC 1994 Report: para 8.5 and Appendix 12). The Commission noted that the ALP had won only 39.1 % of the two party preferred vote at the 1993 election, and that in order to win government it therefore would require an average swing of 11 % across the State at the next election. It published, for the first time in South Australia, its own estimates of the swing-to-iose in each seat according to the new boundaries; the Pendulum at Figure 1 shows the Commission's swing-to-iose estimates for these new seats. It should be noted here that the Commission's estimates are based on the results from the 1993 general election; it is not common practice to take the results of by-election contests into account when preparing estimates of the effect of a redistribution of boundaries. This is partly because by-elections are sometimes not contested by a major party (for example there was no Liberal Party candidate for the Elizabeth by-election of 9.4.94) so there may be no two party preferred result, but the main reason is that a redistribution affects every seat and so we need results from every seat on a comparable basis. The Pendulum at Figure 1, based on the Commission's estimates of the new seats after the 1994 redistribution, shows that 14 seats currently held by Liberal Members would each fall to labor with a swing to Labor in their areas of under 11 %. A fifteenth, Florey, would fall with a swing of 11 %. With a uniform swing of 11 % in each of the new seats, the ALP would win a majority of the two party preferred vote and would win 25 seats (one more than a simple majority). Page 5 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA While Frome would only require a swing of 8.2%, and Stuart 9.0%, the Commission argued that the smaller swings to Liberal in rural seats at the 1993 election showed that these two seats would be unlikely to fall to Labor even on a Statewide average two party preferred swing of 11 %; instead one or more metropolitan seats individually requiring a swing of more than 11 % would be likely to fall. "Our aim must be to ensure that the Labor Party would win 14 more seats under the 1994 redistribution with a swing in its favour of 11 %. As we have said, it is unlikely to win Stuart or Frome on an 11% State-wide swing. However, if on that hypothesis the Labor Party is getting less than 11 % of the two party preferred vote in Stuart and Frome, it must be getting more than 11 % in one or more other seats. The difficulty comes in reckoning where the above-average swings in its favour are likely to occur." (EDBC 1994 Report: para 8.11, my emphasis) The Commission noted that at the 1993 State election, marginal metropolitan seats recorded larger swings than safer metropolitan seats (at para 8.16), and concluded that the new boundaries would be likely to be fair to both parties. My own feeling is that the Commission did not make out a case that the ALP would win 14 more seats - and only 14 - with a non-uniform swing of 11 %. The problem is that the Commission specifically rejected the likelihood of a uniform swing occurring at the next election (EDBC 1994 Report: para 6.2) and also specifically dismissed the probability of a swing back to the ALP being non-uniform but proportionate to the swing towards the Liberal Party in 1993. "..it would obviously be quite wrong to suppose that a general swing to the Labor Party at the next election would simply reverse, and to a proportional degree, the swings against it in the individual electoral districts in 1993. There are any number of variables that would combine to make that a most unlikely eventuality." (EDBC 1994 Report: para 8.16) Having disposed of the two most obvious ways of guessing what pattern a future swing would take, the Commission does not seem to have a strong basis for its judgement that the new boundaries would be fair. My feeling is that the pattern of swings is an unexplored area in the Commissions' work. However, it is not the only area which seems to call for further work; the other is the accuracy of the checking exercise. Given that the checking exercise is logically prior to application of a predicted swing, the checking exercise should be examined first. THE ACCURACY OF THE CHECKING EXERCISE THE PROBLEM BEFORE 1993: ESTIMATING THE TWO PARTY PREFERRED VOTE AT EACH BOOTH The detailed outcome of the 1991 Commission's estimates was not published, but the Commission did report that the result was that if the new boundaries been in place at the 1989 State election, the Liberal Party would have won 24 of the 47 House of Assembly seats, and hence government. My own estimate at the time, and the estimates made by the ALP and the Liberal Party, was that although several of the seats would be very marginal, if the new boundaries had been in place in 1989 the Labor government would have been returned with 24 seats. Dean Jaensch gave both parties 23 seats and found Newland too hard to call (Newton 1992: summary table). Page 6 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

6 MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA The Commission had superior access to data and a great deal of well-respected expertise, and its estimate was, rightly, accepted. My point in raising these different estimates of the outcome of the redistribution, is not to criticise any particular estimates, but to show that it is possible for several justifiable estimates to be made. One of the difficulties which existed in 1991 and which has since been removed, was that the State Electoral Office produced figures showing the distribution of preferences for an electorate as a whole, but not for each booth. This meant that when a portion of an electorate needed to be moved, an assumption needed to be made about how the preferences would have been allocated in the relevant booths, to reach a two party preferred figure for the area being moved. In the absence of any better guide, it was common practice to assume that the pattern of distribution of preferences in a group of booths would be the same as that for the electorate as a whole. Since the 1993 State election the State Electoral Office has been able to provide two party preferred counts for each booth. Not only does this remove a possible error in the earlier process, but it gives us an idea of the size of the previous error. It is quite possible now to compare the pattern of distribution of preferences in the seat as a whole, with the pattern of distribution of preferences at each booth. In general, in 1993, the pattern of distribution of preferences in metropolitan booths was not very different from the average when the seat was counted as a whole, but there were some fairly major differences in country booths. Table 1 illustrates this point. It looks at two party preferred figures for Lee, the seat which became the most marginal following the 1993 State election. Preferences were distributed from five candidates: Behn (Call To Australia), Brown (Independent for Natural Law), Cotton (Independent), Wasylenko (Independent Labor) and Clements (Australian Democrats). On the left of the table are the actual first preference votes received at each booth, and for the seat as a whole, and the actual two party preferred count at each booth. In the left-centre panel is the actual distribution of preferences which occurred in 1993 at each of the Lee booths, and in the final count for the seat as a whole. This can be inferred from the two columns to the left. It is simply the proportion of first preference votes for candidates other than ALP or Liberal, which must have been allocated to the ALP or Liberal candidates (when preferences were distributed) in order to arrive at the two party preferred figures published for each booth. In the right-centre panel are the estimated two party preferred figures for each booth, which I have calculated by applying the pattern of distribution of preferences in the seat as a whole, to each booth (on a pro-rata basis). In this case, in each booth I have allocated 64.3% of all preferences to the Liberal candidate, and 35.7% of all preferences to the ALP candidate. This is how I used to make booth estimates, before the State Electoral Office was able to provide the booth figures on a two party preferred basis. On the right of the table are measures of the difference between the two methods of showing the two party preferred vote for each booth - the actual and the estimated method. Table 1 shows that in most cases the estimates of how preferences would have been distributed (using the average figures for the seat as a whole) would have been reasonably close to the actual result. The largest differences would have been at Woodville West, where the actual distribution of preferences gave the ALP 68.8% of preferences, compared to the ALP's share of only 64.3% of preferences in the seat as a whole, and in West Lakes Shore, where the actual distribution of preferences gave 40.7% of preferences to the Liberal Party, compared to only 35.7% of preferences in the seat as a whole. Page 7 of 41: Dated February 20,1998

6 MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA However, when we apply these differences to the number of first preference votes lodged at these booths, and look (at the right side of Table 1) at the difference between these two methods in terms of their overall effect on the two party preferred count, we find that the estimates were generally within 10 votes of the actual result and even in the case of the very big West Lakes Shore booth the estimate was only 22 votes out. As a proportion of all formal votes in Lee, this is 0.1 percentage points. In effect what we see in Lee is that the old method would have introduced an error which sometimes favoured the ALP and sometimes the LIB candidate, and which was of the order of up to 0.1 percentage points per booth. In a redistribution checking exercise, the error in a whole seat rather than one booth would depend on how a redistribution split the seat. If a hypothetical redistribution kept the borders of Lee intact, then there would be no difference between the two methods of estimating the two party preferred vote in the seat. If, however, the seat were split so that - for example - the northern booths of Semaphore Park, Semaphore Park South and West Lakes Shore were moved off into another seat, then having the actual two party preferred counts for each booth makes the process of estimating the two party preferred vote for the new seat more accurate. Table 2 shows that using the old method of estimating two party preferred booth figures in Lee we would have estimated the two party preferred vote for the northern group of booths to be ALP:LlB 42.8:57.2 but we now know (because we have actual counts) that it was actually 42.5:57.5. That is, the old method would have generated an error of 0.3 percentage points in this case. Is Lee representative of all seats? Looking at the estimates made of the effect of the 1991 redistribution, what margin of error should be added to the estimate for each seat? Did the 1991 estimates show a fair result or was the margin of error so high that no such conclusion should have been drawn? I have calculated the figures for each booth in each seat on the same basis as Table 1 showed for Lee. These calculations take up 15 pages, which I can supply on request; Table 3 shows the first of those 15 pages. The far right hand column of Table 3 shows, for each booth, the difference between the actual two party preferred vote in the booth and the estimate of the two party preferred vote which needed to be made before 1993. This difference - or error - is expressed in Table 3 in terms of 1. the percentage of preferences which the ALP (or LIB) candidate actually received at each booth compared to the average percentage of preferences that same candidate received for the seat as a whole; 2. the number of votes (on a two party preferred basis) this difference represents; and 3. the percentage of all formal votes in an average seat which this difference represents - i.e. the size of the error attached to each booth's two party preferred estimate. The reason why I have expressed the error value as a percentage of the average number of formal votes in a seat (rather than the actual number of formal votes in the relevant seat) is that in a checking exercise it is necessary to look at the error which would arise from combining several booths from several seats, so a common denominator is needed. In 1993 the average number of formal votes in a seat was 19406. I should state here that the full calculations for Table 3 show a problem with the distribution of declaration vote preferences in Custance. I believe that this problem lies in the data supplied, and because it generates an incongruous result for Custance I will exclude that one seat wherever that seems necessary. As is shown in Table 3, the error induced by having to assume that the distribution of preferences in each booth would follow the pattern of distribution of preferences in the seat as a whole was, in general, fairly small; when we look at each booth of each seat, we find that each booth carried an error in the order of +/- 0.1 percent of all formal votes in the seat. Page 8 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

6 MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA Some booths, by virtue of a large number of preferences which had to be distributed, a very distinct pattern of preference distribution or a large number of voters who used the booth, generated a larger error. Table 4 shows that there were 14 seats which had at least one booth with an error of 0.2 percentage points. That is, the old method (which was then unavoidable but is now no longer necessary) would have produced an estimate for a redistributed seat which was inaccurate to the extent of at least 0.2 percentage points. While safe seats would not be greatly affected, in marginal seats this error would be sufficiently large to be a problem in a redistribution checking exercise. The single booths generating the highest error using the old method with voting figures from the 1993 State election, would have been Port Lincoln (0.4% of all formal votes lodged in Flinders) and Port Lincoln South (0.5% of all formal votes lodged in Flinders). In a redistribution a segment of a seat represented by several booths which carry a larger error might be separated from the seat and added to another seat. In this case the error attached to each booth would be cumulative. However, looking at the booths listed in Table 4 and the relevant maps it seems to me that the booths with larger errors are rarely neighbours, and when they are the seats are not marginal ones. Without extending this exercise to every likely possible combination of booths, I would guess that the old method of estimating a two party preferred result may have introduced an error of - at the most - 0.5 percentage points. That is, I believe that the two party preferred estimates made with State data prior to 1993 (or indeed Federal data prior to 1993) need to be treated as if they could have a margin of error of up to 0.5 percentage points. After the 1991 redistribution, my own estimate and that of the ALP and the Liberal Party, was that although several of the seats would be very marginal, if the new boundaries had been in place at the time of the State election in 1989 the Labor government would have been returned with 24 seats. Dean Jaensch gave both parties 23 seats and found Newland too hard to call. The three most marginal seats looked to be Newland, Unley and Colton. The various estimates of the two party preferred status of the "new" seats (as ordered by the 1991 EDBC) to which I have access are shown in Table 5. If we recognise a margin of error of up to 0.5 percentage points due to the old methodology, then both Newland and Unley could well have been either Labor or Liberal seats on the basis of the 1989 State results. What does that say about the fairness of the 1991 redistribution? pointless to argue with either the Commission's statement that Simply that it would be "It is likely that, on the present redistribution, the Liberal Party would have governed with 52 per cent of the popular vote in 1989... " (EDBC 1991 Report: para 55.1) or with the other estimates which seemed to indicate that the ALP would still have won 24 seats (and hence government). The figures were just too close. There is no need now to dwell on a methodological problem that has been overcome. For the 1993 State election, two party preferred results are available for each booth, so the problem of how to distribute preferences in individual booths does not arise and the methodological error is avoided. But now another error, albeit of smaller proportions, has emerged because the figures from individual booths do not include declaration votes. Page 9 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA THE ACCURACY OF THE CHECKING EXERCISE THE PROBLEM NOW: DECLARATION VOTES A declaration vote is one "given to an elector who is unable to vote at a polling booth in his/her District on polling day" (State Electoral Department, 1993, Everyday Electoral Terms). Declaration votes include absent and postal votes. By their nature these votes cannot be allocated to particular polling booths, so they are presented separately in the statistics. Before 1993 when booth figures became available on a two party preferred basis, it was common practice to allocate a number of declaration votes to each booth on a pro-rata basis, before allocating preferences (pro-rata) to finally estimate the two party preferred vote for each booth. Now that we no longer need to go through the exercise of allocating preferences to estimate a two party preferred figure for each booth (because we have actual counts now), I suspect that declaration votes will be left out of the process altogether. The reasoning would probably be that there are so few declaration votes, and that we really don't know how to allocate them to individual booths, so that it may be better to concentrate on the ordinary votes lodged at booths. Is it important to include declaration votes in the checking exercise, or could they be ignored? A. THE NUMBER OF DECLARATION VOTES At the 1993 State election the number of declaration vote certificates issued in State electorates ranged from 1389 in Chaffey to 3036 in Adelaide; in 1997 the number of declaration vote certificates issued ranged from 2371 in Finniss to 3525 in Waite. Table 6 shows the proportion of all votes which were declaration votes, for each seat contested at the State elections of 1993 and 1997. (There were boundary changes between the elections but the table stands because there is no need to compare a given electorate's results in 1993 and 1997). Table 6 shows that in 1993 declaration votes made up 11.5% of all votes State-wide, ranging from 6.8% of all votes in Chaffey, to 15.5% of all votes in Norwood and 15.6% of all votes in Adelaide. In 1997, declaration votes were more common in every electorate, probably because the election was held during the last weekend of school holidays. Of all ballot papers issued in 1997, 14.4% were issued to declaration voters. In Waite 18% of all votes were declaration votes, and the lowest proportion was recorded in Finniss with 12%. While 18% represents an appreciable proportion of all votes lodged, declaration votes still might be unimportant if they follow the same pattern of formality and the same two party preferred pattern as ordinary votes lodged in the same seat. The following tables therefore look at the difference between declaration votes and ordinary votes lodged at booths within each electorate. In the following tables the results from several seats are marked "rethrow". There is always a possibility in a seat that the final two candidates preferred by the electors of that seat will be from parties other than the ALP and the Liberal Party, so the final two party preferred result in the actual count for the seat may be NAT: LI B, IND LAB:ALP, IND:L1B etc. In these circumstances, the State Electoral Office has, since the 1985 State election, asked for the first preferences of the non-alp non-lib candidate to be reallocated ("rethrown") for Page 10 of 41 : Dated February 20,1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA statistical purposes only, and has provided us with data showing the ALP:LlB two party preferred vote in those seats. For example, the actual result in Chaffey in 1993 was NAT:LlB 43.7% : 56.3% but a rethrow produced an ALP:LlB two party preferred result of ALP:LlB 21.0%: 79.0%. Rethrows were conducted in 1993 for Chaffey and Flinders (both NAT: LIB) and for Davenport and Waite (both DEM: LI B), and in 1997 for Napier (ALP:DEM), for Heysen, Waite, Davenport, Schubert, Kavel, Finniss (all DEM:LlB), for Chaffey and Flinders (both NAT:LlB) for MacKiliop (IND LIB :LlB), and for Gordon (IND:LlB). B. THE EFFECT OF DECLARATION VOTES 1. Did declaration votes make a difference to the formality of the count? Tables 7A and 7B show the proportion of all ordinary votes, all declaration votes and all votes (ordinary + declaration) which were formal or were deemed to be formal as a result of the operation of the ticket vote provisions. (Table 7 A is for 1993, 7B for 1997.) I have arranged the seats in order of their swing-to-iose, in case we can see a contrast between ALP and LIB seats, safe and marginal seats etc. The far right hand column of both versions of Table 7 shows the difference between the proportion of formal votes in the ordinary vote count and in the count of all votes for each seat: it therefore shows the effect on the proportion of formal votes of including declaration votes in the count for each seat. What is fairly clear is that including declaration votes did not change the proportion of formal votes in the Statewide count by very much at all. In 1993 including declaration votes in the count raised the proportion of formal votes by 0.2 percentage points in Spence and Adelaide (because a higher proportion of declaration votes were formal) and lowered it by 0.3 percentage points in Peake (because a lower proportion of declaration votes were formal). Apart from those three seats the effect was so small that it could easily be ignored. In 1997 including declaration votes raised the proportion of formal votes by 0.3 percentage points in MacKillop, by 0.2 percentage points in 18 seats and lowered it in only one seat - Fisher, by 0.1 percentage points. For the State as a whole, the effect of including declaration votes in the count was to increase the proportion of votes which were formal by 0.1 percentage points. The size of the effect, and the direction, did not follow an obvious pattern in either 1993 or 1997, and my feeling is that the difference between declaration votes and ordinary votes lodged at booths in terms of their formality is so small that we can ignore it and concentrate on formal declaration votes and formal ordinary votes. The following sections therefore relate to formal votes. 2. Did declaration votes make much difference to the outcome of the election? Tables 8A and 8B show the two party preferred vote for all ordinary votes in each seat, and the two party preferred vote when al/ votes are taken into account (i.e. when declaration votes are added into the count). The EFFECT OF DEC VOTES column at the right of Tables 8A and 8B is calculated as the difference between these two columns and shows the effect on the two party preferred vote in each seat, of including declaration votes in the count. The two versions of Table 8 show that, for the State as a whole, declaration votes did not have a great effect in 1993 nor in 1997, but did have a big enough effect on some seats that we should look at them in more detail. In 1993 declaration votes raised the ALP two party preferred vote by 0.1 percentage points and lowered the Liberal two party preferred vote by 0.1 percentage points, Page 110141: Dated February 20,1998

MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA and in 1997 they raised the Liberal two party preferred vote by 0.3 percentage points and lowered the ALP two party preferred vote by 0.3 percentage points. In seats won by the ALP candidate, declaration votes reduced the two party preferred ALP vote by only a tiny amount - 0.1 percentage points (on average) - in 1993 but in 1997 declaration votes reduced the two party preferred ALP vote in seats won by the ALP by an appreciable amount - 0.5 percentage points (on average). In 1997 a pattern emerged in ALP seats, where in all cases except Elder the effect of including declaration votes was to reduce the ALP's two party preferred percentage for the seat. In seats won by the Liberal Party candidate, declaration votes reduced the two party preferred LIB vote by 0.2 percentage points (on average) in 1993 and increased it by 0.2 percentage points in 1997 (again, on average). Unlike the ALP seats in 1997, there was no pattern to the direction of declaration votes in LIB seats in 1997 (nor in ALP or LIB seats in 1993). In some cases declaration votes reduced the LIB winning margin (the greatest effect was 0.5 percentage points in Schubert) and in some cases they increased it (1.2 percentage points in Davenport, 1.0 in Stuart and Frome). It is clear from Table 8A that in 1993 declaration votes were able to lift a winning candidate's two party preferred vote by up to 1.1 percentage points (in Eyre) or to reduce a winning candidate's two party preferred vote by up to 1.0 percentage points (in Peake). Were there any seats in 1993 where the ordinary vote count put the seat within 1.0 percentage points of being won or lost? One, Hanson. In 1993, the two party preferred vote in Hanson was ALP: LI B 49.1 % : 50.9% when votes cast at all of the booths were counted. It was possible, based on the figures shown in Table 8A, that the inclusion of declaration votes could have changed the two party preferred vote by 1.0 percentage point either way. Hanson's result could therefore have been anywhere between ALP:LlB 48.1% : 51.9% and 50.1% : 49.9% (in fact it emerged at 48.8% : 51.2%). It seems quite possible that Hanson may have been won by the ALP rather than the Liberal Party candidate if the declaration votes had not been so supportive of the Liberal candidate. Table 8B shows that in 1997 declaration votes were able to lift a winning candidate's two party preferred vote by up to 1.2 percentage points (in Davenport) or to reduce a winning candidate's two party preferred vote by up to 1.6 percentage points (in Giles). Were there any seats in 1997 where the ordinary vote count put the seat within 1.6 percentage points of being won or lost? Four, and indeed one seat - Hartley - was won by the ALP on the ordinary vote count but then swung to the Liberal Party once declaration votes were included into the count. The ALP won Norwood (51.6% 2PP), Mitchell (51.1 %) and Hartley (50.2%) on the basis of the ordinary votes lodged at booths. In addition the ALP was within 1.6 percentage points of Stuart (49.4%) on the ordinary vote count. If the declaration votes in Mitchell and Norwood had favoured the Liberal Party more (or perhaps if there had been more declaration votes) and if the declaration votes in Hartley and Stuart had favoured the ALP more (or if there had perhaps been more of them) any of these four seats could have had a different outcome. In Giles the ALP two party preferred vote was reduced by 1.6 percentage points when declaration votes were added in to the count. If this had happened in Stuart - a neighbouring seat and in many ways quite similar to Giles - then the seats would have changed from 50.6% LIB (two party preferred ordinary vote) to 51.0% ALP (two party preferred full count). The actual results when declaration votes were included into the count were as follows: the ALP margin in Norwood was reduced by 0.9 percentage points but the ALP candidate still won the seat, in Mitchell the ALP margin was reduced by 0.2 percentage points and the ALP candidate still won the seat, in Hartley the ALP margin was reduced by 0.7 and the seat passed to the LIB candidate, and in Stuart the LIB margin was increased by 1.0 percentage point and the LIB candidate won the seat. Page 12 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA 3. Was this effect because declaration voters were much more radical or conservative than voters who lodged their votes at booths? I have often heard it said that absent and postal votes (declaration votes) are more likely to favour the Liberal Party than are votes lodged at the booths of the same seat. I have also heard it said that declaration votes will favour the party which held the seat before the election. Tables 9A and 9B show, for each seat, the two party preferred percentages for ordinary votes lodged at booths, and for declaration votes. Declaration votes differed from ordinary votes by up to 11 percentage points (in Giles in 1997 the two party preferred vote for ordinary votes was 63.0% ALP but for declaration votes it was only 52.1 % ALP). Should this be judged a big difference or a small difference? In electorates where the two party preferred results can be quite radically different from one booth to another, perhaps the most surprising thing is the relative conformity of declaration votes with ordinary votes for each electorate. Table 9A does not show any evidence of a general tendency of declaration votes to favour the Liberal Party in 1993 nor in 1997 (Table 9B). In general, declaration votes favoured the ALP in seats where ordinary votes favoured the ALP, and declaration votes favoured the Liberal Party in seats where ordinary votes lodged at booths favoured the Liberal Party. (The exceptions were Giles, Napier and Peake in 1993, and the four most marginal seats in 1997 - Florey, Mitchell, Norwood and Hartley.) Tables 9A and 9B also show quite clearly that declaration votes can favour the same party as the ordinary votes but can favour that party more or less strongly. That is, in a LIB seat the declaration votes can be either more strongly LIB than ordinary votes, or less so. It is tempting to say that in general declaration votes favoured the party which won the ordinary votes count, but a little less strongly. While this does seem to be true it is not terribly helpful because the Difference columns of Tables 9A and 9B show that the exceptions to this generalisation are often the seats which are most delicately balanced: in 1993 the generalisation did not apply in six of the 10 remaining ALP seats, five of the 14 seats the ALP lost to LIB, and in seven of the 23 seats the Liberal Party retained. in 1997 the generalisation does apply in all of the seats the ALP retained, and in all except one of the seats which the ALP won from the Liberal Party (the ALP seat of Elder did not comply). The four most marginal ALP seats on the ordinary vote count (Florey, Mitchell, Norwood and Hartley) probably did comply with the generalisation if we accept that declaration votes favoured the party which won the ordinary vote count (ALP) but less strongly, to the extent that support for the ALP in the declaration vote count fell below 50%. The four most marginal LIB seats after Hartley (Stuart, Frome, Colton and Unley) did not complyand of the remaining LIB seats half did and half did not comply. If declaration voters were consistently more likely to vote for the sitting Member, then we should be able to see it most clearly in the seats which changed hands. In 1993 the ALP lost 14 seats to the Liberal Party, and it is true that in nine of these 14 seats declaration voters were a little more likely to have voted for the ALP than ordinary voters did. On average in these 14 seats the ALP won 43.4% of the ordinary vote count but more - 44.2% - of the declaration vote count. In 1997, 11 of those same 14 swinging seats swung back to the ALP, and in 10 of the 11 the sitting Members and their party (this time the Liberal Party) again won a bigger share of the declaration vote count than they won of the ordinary vote count. On average in Page 13 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA these 11 seats the Liberal Party won only 45.3% of ordinary votes but slightly more - 47.6% - of declaration votes. In 1993 the ALP sitting Members who kept their seats attracted a bigger proportion of declaration than ordinary votes in only six out of the ten cases, and LIB sitting Members won a greater share of declaration votes than ordinary votes in only 7 of the 22 cases. In 1997 none of the 10 sitting ALP Members won a greater share of declaration votes than ordinary votes, but 15 of the 26 "Liberal" (including NAT, IND, IND LIB) cases did. In summary, it does not seem that declaration voters have been consistently much more radical or more conservative than ordinary voters in the same electorate, although there is some evidence that in a seat which swings the sitting Member may lose a slightly smaller share of the declaration voters than of ordinary voters. In both 1993 and 1997, both the direction and the size of the effect varied markedly from seat to seat. The figures in the column marked EFFECT OF DECLARATION VOTES show that there were enough declaration votes in each seat for the different voting preferences of declaration voters to have an effect on the overall result in almost every seat. Comparing these figures with the results in the DIFFERENCE column it is clear that in both 1993 and 1997 the seats where declaration votes were appreciably different from ordinary votes (in terms of their two party preferred percentages) were the ones where declaration votes had the greatest overall effect on the count for the seat, suggesting that it was this difference, rather than the varying number of declaration votes in each seat, which was responsible for declaration votes changing the two party preferred result in most seats. In summary, in general the effect of declaration votes on the final count has been small, although in a few seats it has been so big as to demand attention; in terms of individual seats the effect of declaration votes on the overall count has not been predictable in either size or direction although the maximum effect of declaration votes in the two elections for which we have data has been +/- 1.6 percentage points. 4. Was the effect of declaration votes greater in those seats which recorded more declaration votes (i.e. was the effect due to the number of declaration votes)? To look at the effect of the number of declaration votes, I have standardised the number of declaration votes in each seat, by recalculating the final two party preferred vote for each seat using the average number of declaration votes (2237 in 1993 and 2749 in 1997), but retaining the actual two party preferred percentages for declaration votes lodged in that seat. For this exercise the number of ordinary votes has been kept the same as in the actual election count, but the number of total votes has been allowed to rise or fall. (Custance is not included in Table 10A or 11A.) The calculations are shown in Tables 10A and 10B and the results are summarised in Tables 11 A and 11 B. Tables 11 A and 11 B show the actual effect of declaration votes in each seat, and then the hypothetical effect of declaration votes in the same seat had that seat recorded the average number of declaration votes for that election. The difference between the two columns is very small - only 0.1 percentage points in every case (or about 20 votes) except Chaffey in 1993 (0.3 percentage points) and Spence and Stuart in 1997 (0.2 percentage points). My interpretation of the figures in Tables 10 and 11 is that they show that the number of declaration votes lodged in each electorate has not made an important difference to the final two party preferred vote in each seat. Page 14 of 41 : Dated February 20,1998

MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA C. DO WE NEED TO INCLUDE DECLARATION VOTES IN A CHECKING EXERCISE? It is worth pointing out that no clear pattern has emerged by ordering the seats according to their marginality and party, although ordering seats according to which party held the seat before the election may be useful. If declaration votes can make a difference of up to 1.6 percentage points, as they did in the 1997 final count, then I believe it would be wrong, especially in the marginal seats, to exclude declaration votes from a redistribution estimation exercise. It is quite possible that the very large swing against the government in 1993, and the election date in 1997, generated larger-than-normal discrepancies between declaration and ordinary votes. It is possible that data from the next few State elections will show that, in general, declaration votes fall into line with booth votes, in which case it may be possible in future to ignore declaration votes when calculating the effect of a boundary change on an electorate. In the meantime, I believe that declaration votes should be included in any checking exercise. D. HOW SHOULD DECLARATION VOTES BE ALLOCATED TO BOOTHS? The problem with including declaration votes in an estimation exercise is that there is no way of knowing where declaration voters live, but they need to be allocated to booths so that when a seat is split in a redistribution declaration votes can be transferred with booth votes. Several options are available. 1. Allocate declaration voters pro-rata to booths, at the average value for all declaration votes in the seat. It has been customary to assume that declaration voters are spread across the electorate in the same way as ordinary voters. Declaration votes are usually allocated to individual booths on a pro-rata basis or to segments of the electorate. In the end both of these methods will give the same results, as long as declaration votes are allocated at the two party preferred value for all declaration votes in the electorate. Table 12A shows how this method has been applied, using Peake's 1993 results as an example. The aim of the exercise in Table 12A is to break Peake up into three segments which can then be attached to other electorates in a hypothetical redistribution exercise. The Brooklyn Park booth received 10.4% of all formal ordinary votes lodged within Peake, so 10.4% of all formal declaration votes lodged within the electorate need to be allocated to that booth: Brooklyn Park booth therefore receives 211 declaration votes. Brooklyn Park South received 6.7% of ordinaries so it receives 6.7% of declaration votes (136 declaration votes), and so on. The average value for all declaration votes in Peake was ALP:LlB 52.9:47.1 %, so those two party preferred percentages are used to split the declaration votes in each booth into Labor and Liberal votes. Adding these to the actual Labor and Liberal ordinary votes lodged at each booth gives an estimated final figure for each booth, in which each booth is accorded not only the ordinary votes lodged there but also a proportion of the declaration votes lodged in the electorate as a whole. The advantage of this method is that at the end of the exercise the two party preferred percentages for individual booths may have changed - and that seems reasonable because on average declaration votes are different from ordinary votes - but the two party preferred vote for the seat as a whole has not changed. The problem with this method - and it has not been acknowledged because in the end it Page 15 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA has seemed to be too difficult to remedy - is that all declaration votes in an electorate are allocated at the same value. This means that in Peake, for example, declaration votes will be allocated at the same rate of ALP: LIB 52.9%: 47.1% to Thebarton, which is a strongly Labor booth, and to Lockleys which is a strongly Liberal booth. Are declaration voters from Thebarton and from Lockleys really more like each other, than like ordinary voters from Thebarton and ordinary voters from Lockleys? 2. Allocate declaration voters pro-rata to booths at the average value for all ordinary votes in the seat. The Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission seems to have allocated declaration votes in a quite different way. The Commission has allocated declaration votes at the two party preferred value expressed by the ordinary votes in a given booth or segment of the electorate. The 1994 Report records the Commission's method in some detail, as follows. "Take the case of a simple movement of 1000 electors from District A to District B. The Electoral Office's records, which have been made available to us, show the two party preferred result for each polling booth within District A and the two party preferred declaration vote figures for that district as a whole. The Electoral Office's records also show the percentage of electors in each district who voted as formal ordinary voters and formal declaration voters. If, for example, 77.0% of electors in District A voted as formal ordinary voters and 10.0% of them voted as formal declaration voters, 870 (770 plus 100) votes are transferred from District A to District B. In assessing the political effect of the transfer, one has to identify - and this will not always be clear - the polling booth (or booths) where the 770 formal ordinary voters are likely to have voted last December. Usually the two party preferred result from that booth can then be applied to the 770 transferred votes, with the result being deducted from the two party preferred result in District A and added to the two party preferred result in District B. However, the catchment area of the polling booth in question may not be politically homogeneous. If that appears to be the case a judgement will have to be made as to whether the polling booth result, as applied to the transferred votes, should be weighted in the direction of one party or the other to allow for the estimated political disposition of the voters who are being transferred to District B. As for the 100 formal declaration voters, we can only assume that they voted the same way as the ordinary formal voters in the transferred area. Again, the votes, appropriately distributed between the parties, are added to the District B result and deducted from the District A result." (1994 EDBC Report: para 10.5, my italics.) Table 12B applies this method to the electorate of Peake, using the same hypothetical segments as were used in Table 12A. As the various segments of the seat are parcelled up ready to be sent to other electorates, a pro-rata parcel of declaration votes is attached (the quote above shows that the Commission assumes that the distribution of formal declaration votes across the seat will be the same as the distribution of formal ordinary votes.) As Segment 1 contains 18.7% of all formal ordinary votes lodged in Peake, it receives 18.7% of all formal declaration votes lodged in Peake. The Commission applies to these declaration votes, the two party preferred rate which is the average for the ordinary votes lodged at those booths included in the segment. At the end of the exercise there are three segments whose two party preferred percentages have not changed, but (because this method does not recognise that there is a difference between the declaration vote two party preferred percentage and the ordinary vote two party preferred percentage in each seat) the two party preferred vote for the seat as a whole is not correct. The advantage of the Commission's methodology is that it assumes that declaration voters have more in common with other ordinary voters who live in their local area, than with other declaration voters who happen to live in their electorate. Page 16 of 41 : Dated February 20,1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA The problem with the Commission's methodology is that it does not produce the right answer at the end of the process. 3. Allocate ALP and LIB declaration voters pro-rata to booths. Table 12C shows that it is possible to assume that declaration voters are spread across the electorate in roughly the same way as ordinary voters, and also to assume that declaration voters have more in common with the ordinary voters at their local booth than they do with voters elsewhere in their electorate. This is possible if ALP declaration votes are allocated according to the distribution across the electorate of all ALP voters who lodged their votes at booths, and LIB declaration votes are allocated across the electorate according to the distribution of LIB voters who lodged their votes at booths. In Table 12C, looking at the two party preferred results for each of the booths in Peake, Thebarton had 7.2% of all formal ALP ordinary votes (and only 3.3% of all formal LIB ordinary votes) so it receives 7.2% of ALP declaration votes (and 3.3% of LIB declaration votes). Similarly, Lockleys received 14.6% of formal LIB ordinary votes but only 6.9% of ALP ordinary votes, so we allocate to it 14.6% of the LIB declaration votes and only 6.9% of the ALP declaration votes. This breaks the relationship between the ALP and the LIB votes in the declaration vote count. There is no need to allocate the declaration votes at the same two party preferred rate to each booth: it is enough to know how many ALP declaration votes and how many LIB declaration votes to allocate to each booth. When these are added to the actual counts of the ordinary votes lodged at each booth, the outcome is a two party preferred result for each booth which includes the ordinary votes and the declaration votes for the area. The method gives correct two party preferred percentages for the seat as a whole, and it also allows declaration votes to affect the ordinary vote count for each booth. Table 120 summarises the results from the previous three tables. It shows that this last method will produce better estimates than the others. It produces the correct number of ALP and LIB formal votes for the seat as a whole, It reflects the fact that the party preferences shown in a seat's declaration votes can be different from the same seat's ordinary votes, by showing a change to the two party preferred percentages in a segment once declaration votes are included, and It reflects the fact that some booths in a seat are much stronger for the ALP, and takes this into account by allocating more ALP declaration votes (and similarly for the Liberal Party). THE ACCURACY OF THE CHECKING EXERCISE: SUMMARY Both the 1991 and the 1994 Electoral Districts Boundaries Commissions have checked their proposed seats against the results at the previous election, in order to check that the party which won the majority of votes at that previous election would have won the majority of the proposed seats (and therefore would have won government). Because it was not possible to properly allocate preferences before 1993, the checking exercise carried out on the 1991 redistribution contained a margin of then-unavoidable error, which I estimate was up to 0.5 percentage points in any electorate. While the 1991 Commission estimated that the redistributed seats would have given government to the Liberal Party in 1989, both Newland and Unley could have been estimated as being either Labor or Liberal. Page 17 of 41 : Dated February 20,1998

6 MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA While the Commission supplemented the checking exercise with well-informed judgement, the checking exercise alone should probably not have been accorded the status it has had in recent years. The 1993 and 1997 data, and future data, will make it possible to estimate the effect of a redistribution with more accuracy simply because the State Electoral Office now produces data showing the two party preferred percentages for the ordinary vote at each booth. Declaration votes still need to be allocated in a purely statistical exercise, and the result will still relate to the previous election rather than the next one, but the checking exercise itself will be more accurate now. To summarise the previous section on declaration votes: the declaration vote count includes a similar proportion of informal votes to the ordinary vote count, so it does seem to be quite legitimate to ignore informal votes in any checking exercise; State-wide, declaration votes reduced the LIB two party preferred vote by 0.1 percentage points in 1993 and increased it by 0.3 percentage points in 1997, but in some seats the effect of including declaration votes was much larger, changing the final two party preferred percentages by up to 1.6 percentage points. The change does not seem to be consistently in the same direction (and therefore does not seem to be predictable); the effect generated by including declaration votes into the count seems to be due to the difference between the two party preferred vote for declaration votes and for ordinary votes, not due to the number of declaration votes; because of the unpredictability of declaration votes compared to the ordinary vote count, and the size of the effect, we do need to recognise declaration votes in any checking exercise; the most accurate way to include declaration votes is to allocate the ALP declaration votes to booths on the basis of those booths' share of the electorate's ordinary ALP votes, and to allocate LIB declaration votes to booths on the basis of those booths' share of the electorate's LIB ordinary votes. The question of how we relate the checking exercise to a future election remains unanswered. APPLYING THE FAIRNESS CRITERIA LOOKING TOWARDS THE NEXT ELECTION As stated earlier, the 1994 Commission rejected the probability of a uniform swing, and even of a non-uniform but proportionate swing - a situation where seats which swung the most from 1989 to 1993 would swing back the most at the next election. If there is no way to predict how far individual seats will swing with a given State-wide swing, then how is it possible to judge that a redistribution will result in the party winning the majority of the vote winning enough seats to govern? In recent years this question has been addressed in several ways: studying the patterns of actual swings at South Australian State elections; applying probability theory to swings; and studying the characteristics of individual seats. Page 18 of 41 : Dated February 20,1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA PATTERNS IN ACTUAL RESULTS: SWINGS IN RECENT SOUTH AUSTRALIAN STATE ELECTIONS. At the 1977 State election, the ALP won 53.4% of the two party preferred vote throughout the State (see Table 13), and the Liberal Party won the remaining 46.6%. At the 1979 State election, the ALP won 44.9% of the two party preferred vote throughout the State, and the Liberal Party won 55.1%. The average Statewide swing from 1977 to 1979 was therefore 8.5% to LIB, on a two party preferred basis (see Table 14). At the 1982 election the swing was 6 percentage points back towards the ALP. More recently the Statewide swings were 2.3% to the ALP in 1985, 5.3% back to LIB in 1989 and then another 8.9% to LIB in 1993. In order to show these swings for individual seats, the redistributions need to be taken into account. Tables 13 and 14 use: actual results for the State elections of 1977, 1979 and 1982 as these elections were all fought on the 1976 EDBC boundaries; Jaensch's estimates of the 1982 election results using the seats ordered by the EDBC in 1983 and then the actual results from the 1985 and 1989 State elections on those 1983 boundaries; my estimates of the 1989 election results using the seats ordered by the 1991 EDBC and then the actual results from the 1993 State election on those 1991 boundaries; and finally my estimates of the 1989 election results using the seats ordered by the 1994 EDBC, EDBC estimates of the 1993 election results using the seats ordered by the 1994 EDBC, and then the actual results from the 1997 State election on those 1994 boundaries. Where the final result for a particular seat did not come down to an ALP:LlB two party preferred contest, Tables 13 and 14 use rethrow data published by the State Electoral Office from the 1985 State election onwards. Prior to 1985, there are no rethrow data, so for 1977 to 1982, I have used Jaensch's estimated two party preferred estimates. There is one problematic result, namely Flinders in 1977, when the final two candidates preferred in Flinders were ALP and NAT. Because the NAT candidate was acting in coalition with the LIB government, Jaensch did not calculate an estimated ALP:LlB set of figures, using instead the ALP:NAT figures as if they were equivalent to ALP:LlB data. 1. Uniform swings? Table 14 shows quite clearly that the swings in individual seats were often fairly different from the Statewide swing; that is, there was not, strictly speaking, a uniform swing at any of the elections from 1977 to 1997. While at most elections the general direction of swings was uniform, the size of the swings in individual seats was very variable. At the 1979 election for example, the overall swing was 8.5% towards the Liberal Party but the swing in each seat ranged from 2.5% in Goyder to 21.3% in Mitcham. Swings were not even consistent in their direction in 1985, ranging from 9.8 % towards the ALP in the safe Liberal seat of Alexandra, to 8.0% towards the Liberal Party in the safe ALP seat of Whyalla. Still, if the swing in even just the more marginal seats was uniform, the concept of a uniform swing might remain useful. The pendula at Figure 2 show the state of the seats after the 1977, 1979 and 1982 State elections. This set shows the movements in seats which were drawn up as a result of the 1976 EDBC. The pendula incorporate the definitions of marginal, safe etc used by the Australian Electoral Commission and the State Electoral Office, as follows: marginal seats are those which require a swing of under 6% to change hands; fairly safe seats are those which require a swing of at least 6% but under 10% to change hands; and safe seats are those which require a swing of 10% or more to change hands. Page 19 of41 : Dated February 20,1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA The first pendulum in Figure 2 shows the state of the seats after the 1977 State election (i.e. going in to the 1979 election) and the second pendulum of Figure 2 shows the outcome of the 1979 election. There was an average swing Statewide of 8.5 percentage points away from Labor at the 1979 election (see Table 14), so if there had been a uniform swing, the Liberal Party would have won 4 extra seats at the 1979 election (Morphett which would change hands with a swing of 0.5% to LIB, Mawson and Todd which would both change hands with a swing of 6.6% to LIB, and Brighton which would change hands with a swing of 8.2% to LIB). In fact the Liberal Party won 7 extra seats. Morphett, Mawson, Todd and Brighton did all change to the Liberal Party. The swings to LIB were: Morphett 5.7 percentage points, Mawson 9.5, Todd 11.1, Brighton 12.8. These seats did not each record the State average swing (8.5% to LIB) so there was no uniform swing even within this group, but the right seats did change hands. However, the Liberal Party also won another three seats which would not have been predicted to have changed hands under a uniform swing of 8.5% to LIB. These seats were Henley Beach (ALP 59.3% at the 1977 election, but swung 10.3 percentage points to LIB in 1979), Newland (59.8% ALP in 1977 but swung 15.9 percentage points to LIB in 1979) and Norwood (60.2% ALP in 1977 but swung 10.3 percentage points in 1979). Interestingly, Unley did not change hands although it sat between Newland and Norwood on the 1977 pendulum, so it cannot be said that the extra seats were the next three seats on the pendulum. The outcome of the 1979 election, shown in the second pendulum of Figure 2, is also the state of the seats going into the next State election, in 1982. The outcome of the 1982 State election is shown in the third pendulum of Figure 2. There was an average swing across the State of 6.0% back towards the ALP at the 1982 election, so a uniform swing would have delivered 7 seats to the ALP: Norwood, Henley Beach, Mawson, Todd, Brighton, Morphett and Mt Gambier. In fact, the ALP won only 4 of these, plus one unexpected seat. As expected, Norwood, Henley Beach, Mawson and Brighton changed hands and became ALP seats, but Mt Gambier, Morphett and Todd swung by only very small amounts (Mt Gambier 3.4 percentage points; Morphett 3.8; Todd 3.2) and stayed Liberal. Then the ALP also picked up Newland even though that seat would not have been predicted to have changed hands under a uniform swing of 6.0% to the ALP. The second set of pendula, at Figure 3, show the state of the seats after the 1982, 1985 and 1989 State elections. This set show the movements in seats which were drawn up as a result of the 1983 EDBC, and the figures shown in this 1982 pendulum are Jaensch's estimates of the way that voters in these (newly redistributed) seats voted at the (previous) 1982 State election. Table 14 shows that the average swing across the State at the 1985 State election was 2.3% towards the ALP. If a uniform swing had occurred we would expect that Hayward, Newland, Bright and possibly Fisher would have changed hands and become ALP seats at the 1985 election. Indeed, as we see from the second pendulum, those seats did move to the ALP in 1985, but in addition, the ALP won Adelaide. At the next State election, in 1989, there was a Statewide average swing of 5.3% back to the Liberal Party. A uniform 5.3% swing to LIB would have sent 6 ALP seats to the Liberal Party (namely Adelaide, Fisher, Newland, Bright, Hayward and Unley). The 1989 election was interesting in that the largest swings against the ALP government occurred in their own heartland - and also in safe Liberal seats such as Mt Gambier (swing Page 20 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA of 12.6% to LIB), not in the marginal seats. So while 5 of the 6 seats did change hands they all recorded swings to LIB well below the State average of 5.3% (3.9% in Adelaide, 4.2% in Fisher, 1.6% in Newland, 2.6% in Bright and 3.7% in Hayward). Unley's swing of only 2.7% was not enough to make it change hands. The third set of pendula, at Figure 4, show the state of the seats after the 1989 and 1993 State elections. This set show the movements in seats which were drawn up as a result of the 1991 EDBC, and the figures shown in this 1989 pendulum are my estimates of the way that voters in these (newly redistributed) seats voted at the 1989 State election. The figures for 1993 are actual results. At the 1993 State election, the Statewide average swing was 8.9% to LIB. The pendula in Figure 4 show that if every seat had swung by 8.9% then Unley, Newland, Norwood, Florey, Mawson, Peake, Mitchell, Kaurna, Torrens, Elder, Hanson, Wright, Giles, Lee and perhaps also Reynell would all have become Liberal seats. Reynell did change hands, as did all of the other seats, with the exception of Giles, which swung by only 3.4% and remained with Labor. Finally, the pendula at Figure 5 show the state of the seats after the 1989, 1993 and 1997 State elections, based on the boundaries ordered by the 1994 EDBC. The figures for 1989 are my estimates, those for 1993 are the EDBC's estimates and those for 1997 are actual results. The first pendulum in Figure 5 shows the state of the seats after the 1989 State election - i.e. going into the 1993 election. Table 14 shows that the Statewide swing at the election of 1993 was 8.9% towards the Liberal Party, and from the first pendulum it is clear that with a uniform swing 16 ALP seats would have become LIB seats (Mawson, Hartley and Unley, Newland, Florey, Mitchell, Kaurna and Norwood, Peake, Torrens, Hanson, Elder, Wright, Reynell, Giles and Lee). Such a sweep would have left the ALP with only nine seats. The second pendulum in Figure 5 shows that the ALP was indeed left with few seats. Of the 16 seats expected to change hands with a uniform swing of 8.9%, 15 seats actually did move and only Giles stayed relatively firm, experiencing only a 3.5% swing to LIB while around it Reynell swung by 10.1 %, Lee by 9.1 %, and even the traditionally solid Labor seat of Playford swung by 9.1 % (although it remained a Labor seat). At the 1997 State election no-one was surprised when the direction of the average Statewide swing was back towards the ALP, but at 9.4% the size of the swing was a surprise to many. The second pendulum in Figure 5 shows that a uniform swing of this size would have at least 12 seats and possibly thirteen moving back to Labor (Lee, Hanson, Kaurna, Reynell, Wright, Elder, Peake, Torrens, Norwood, Frome, Stuart, Mawson and perhaps Mitchell). The first nine did swing (Lee, Hanson, Kaurna, Reynell, Wright, Elder Peake, Torrens and Norwood all became ALP seats). The next three seats - Frome, Stuart and Mawson - did not change hands and then Mitchell did change hands, Colton did not, Florey did change, Unley did not and Hartley was terribly close but finally did not. If a uniform swing is one in which each seat swings by the same number of percentage points, then it is quite clear from these pendula that there has not been a uniform swing in South Australian State elections in at least the past twenty years. If uniform Statewide swings had occurred: in 1979 the Liberal Party would have won an extra 4 seats, but they won 7; in 1982 the ALP would have won 7 extra seats but they won only 5; in 1985 the ALP would have won 4 extra seats but in fact they won 5; in 1989 the Liberal Party would have won 6 extra seats, but they only won 5; in 1993 the Liberal Party would have won 15 seats and in fact they won 14; and in 1997 the ALP would have won 12 seats and in fact they won 11. Page 21 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA It is also true that the seats which changed hands were not always the ones which would have been predicted to change on the basis of a uniform swing: in 1979 Unley should have changed hands and Norwood should not have changed; in 1982 Mt Gambier, Morphett and Todd should have changed hands and Newland should not have changed; in 1985 Mt Gambier should have changed hands and Adelaide should not have changed; in 1993 Giles should have changed hands; and in 1997 Frome, Stuart and Mawson should have changed hands and Mitchell and Florey should not. Clearly, the uniform swing is not a particularly accurate model for predicting how many seats will change hands with a given average Statewide swing, nor is it a particularly accurate model for predicting which seats will change hands with a given average Statewide swing. 2. Proportionate swings? It is difficult to compare the performance of individual seats across Table 14 because of the boundary changes which occurred - Stuart in 1977 for example was not much like Stuart in 1997. Still, some seats did seem to swing more than others - Newland moved to the ALP in 1979 and then back to the Liberal Party in 1982 with an above-average swing on each occasion. More recently Bragg, Bright, Coles, Elizabeth, Fisher, Florey, Hart, Hartley, Heysen, Mitchell, Napier, Ross Smith, Torrens and Waite all swung to the ALP (in 1993) and then back (in 1997) by above-average amounts. From Table 14 it does appear that the seats which swung most were often the most likely seats to have swung back again at the next election. It is possible to calculate the hypothetical two party preferred results which would have occurred if there had been a proportionate swing back: that is, if the seats which had swung most from 1977 to 1979 had then swung back most in 1982, and so on. The results from three consecutive elections held on the same boundaries are required to construct this "swing and swing back" series, so it is possible to compare actual and hypothetical swings for 1977-1979-1982 (on 1976 EDBC boundaries), 1982-1985-1989 (on 1983 EDBC boundaries) and 1989-1993-1997 (on 1994 EDBC boundaries). Table 15A shows the hypothetical results for an average Statewide swing to the ALP of 6.0% in 1982, if it had been true that the swing from 1979 to 1982 in each seat had been proportionate to the swing which had occurred in that seat from 1977 to 1979. With such a hypothetical proportionate swing, in 1982 the ALP would have won 26 seats and the Liberal Party 21, and these would have been the same seats as the ALP and Liberal Party actually did win in 1982, with the exception of Todd (which was actually retained by the Liberal Party, but under a hypothetical proportionate swing would have fallen to the ALP). While a proportionate swing hypothesis for 1982 does not predict the two party preferred result in each seat very accurately at all, it does give a reasonable idea of the seats that would be won; that is. it does seem to be a reasonable approximation of the actual swing pattern for 1979 to 1982. By comparison, the uniform swing hypothesis was not at all useful for predicting which seats would change hands in 1982 (it predicted 7 seats would change hands, but in fact only 3 of those 7 changed hands and another one swung unexpectedly). Page 22 of 41 : Dated February 20,1998

() MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA If a proportionate swing model works quite well for 1977-1979-1982, does it work for 1982-1985-1989? Table 15B shows the same exercise for that period. If the 5.3% Statewide swing away from the ALP in 1989 had been experienced in each seat in proportion to the size of the swing in that same seat from 1982 to 1985, the results would have been as shown in the 'Hypothetical 1989' column. The ALP would have won 22 seats (it actually won 24) and the Liberal Party would have won 25 seats (it actually won 23). The hypothetical proportionate swing generates the wrong results in 1989 for Henley Beach, Todd and Unley, which would hypothetically have changed hands to Liberal (in fact they stayed Labor), and also for Mt Gambier, which would hypothetically have changed hands to Labor (in fact it stayed Liberal). The hypothesis that the swing in a given seat at one election is likely to be proportional to the swing in that same seat at the previous election was reasonable for explaining the results in 1982 but not very helpful at all in relation to the results in 1989. Was 1997 any better? Table 15C shows the actual and hypothetical results for 1997. If the 9.4% Statewide swing towards the ALP in 1997 had been experienced in each seat in proportion to the size of the swing in that same seat from 1989 to 1993, the results would have been as shown in the 'Hypothetical 1997' column. The ALP would have won 27 seats (it actually won 21) and the Liberal Party would have won 20 seats (it actually won 26). The hypothesis that a seat which swings in one election will swing back at the next election in proportion to that first swing, was a reasonable description of what actually happened in 1982 but was really not useful at all in 1989 nor in 1997. 3. Characteristics of the individual seats? When the 1994 EDBC checked its redistributed seats against the voting figures for 1993, it needed to check that the redistribution would be fair. A fair redistribution would give 24 seats to the party or group which won 50.1 % of the two party preferred vote, so the EDBC aimed to "ensure that the Labor Party would win 14 more seats under the 1994 redistribution with a swing in its favour of 11 %" (EDBC 1994 Report; para 8.11). The pendulum at Figure 1 shows the Commission's own estimates of the new seats. With a uniform swing of 11 % the ALP would expect to win another 14 or perhaps 15 seats (Florey is on 11% swing-to-iose), giving the ALP 24 or 25 seats. But the Commission argued that because they were rural seats Stuart and Frome would be unlikely to change hands even with an average Statewide swing much higher than the swing required in those particular seats (Stuart would need a swing to the ALP of 9% and Frome 8.2%). The ALP submission to the 1994 Commission had included a table showing that over the period from 1977 to 1991, rural seats had swung less readily than metropolitan seats (EDBC 1994 Transcript of Public Hearings, vol. 1; p38). The Commission took up this point (EDBC 1994 Report section 8). I do not have access to the ALP's table but I imagine that it would look something like Table 16. Table 16 confirms that, on average, country seats have not swung as far as the average seat across the State. The swing across the State at the 1979 election was 8.4 percent to LIB, but in country seats this was dampened, and was only felt as a swing of 4.9% to LIB. In 1982, the swing of 6.0% to the ALP Statewide was again dampened in country areas where it was expressed as a swing of only 2.1 % to the ALP. In 1985 the Statewide swing was 2.1 % towards the ALP but in country areas it was expressed as a swing of only 1.8% to the ALP. Page 23 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA Then in 1989, country areas expressed a swing of 5% to LIB compared to a swing of 5.1 % to LI B across the State. In 1993 the Statewide swing was 8.9% to LIB but in country areas this movement was dampened and a swing of only 4.9% to LIB was recorded in country seats. Most recently, in 1997 the Statewide swing was 9.4% towards the ALP but seats in country areas recorded a swing of only 7.5% to the ALP. Table 16 confirms that at all of the last six elections, the average swing recorded in country seats has been lower than the average swing recorded in seats in metropolitan areas or over the State as a whole. Most of the country seats over this period have been safe seats for the Liberal Party (or the National Party). It is possible that the result observed in Table 16 is not because country seats somehow swing less than metropolitan seats, but has another explanation - perhaps safe seats do not swing as much as marginal seats. Perhaps the group of "All metropolitan seats" includes a higher proportion of seats that swing because they are marginal seats. Table 17 shows the swing recorded in marginal, fairly safe and safe seats at each election from 1979 to 1997. Although I have normally followed the convention of referring to the swing at an election as a swing to or away from the ALP, in Table 17 it is clearer to express the swing as being either towards the ALP or towards LIB. I have also included both estimates for the swing from 1989 to 1993; i.e. the estimate for the swing from 1989 to 1993 when the seats are delimited using the boundaries which applied in 1989 and also the estimate for the swing from 1989 to 1993 when the seats are delimited using the boundaries which applied in 1993. Table 17 does not confirm any hypothesis that safe seats swing less. ALP safe seats swung more than the Statewide average swing in 1979, 1982, 1989 and again in 1997, and LIB safe seats swung more than the Statewide average swing in 1985. Can we expect that any individual country seat will swing less than the average swing for metropolitan seats or for the Statewide swing? Table 18 shows that most country seats do swing less than the State average, but this is not true all the time. In 1982 the average swing across the State was 6.0% towards the ALP, but in Kavel the swing was 7.6% to the ALP. In 1985 the average swing across the State was 2.3% towards the ALP but in country seats the results were very varied. Alexandra recorded a swing of 9.8% towards the ALP, Custance 3.7%, Flinders 3.4%, Goyder 5.6% and Light 5.7%. (And Whyalla - an ALP seat - recorded a swing of 8% away from the ALP.) In 1989 the average swing across the State was 5.3% towards the Liberal Party. Most country seats swung less than that, but Flinders was right on the State average, Mt Gambier swung by 12.6% to LIB, Stuart by 8.4% to LIB and Whyalla by 6.1% to LIB. In 1993 only Finniss recorded a swing above the State average of 8.9% to LIB. Expressed in terms of the 1991 boundaries the swing in Finniss was 9.0% to LIB, or on the 1994 boundaries it was 9.8% to LIB. In 1997 the average swing across the State of 9.4% to the ALP, was equalled in Hammond and exceeded in Finniss (10.2% towards the ALP). Table 18 shows 105 swings for country seats between 1979 and 1997; of these cases 92 swung less than the Statewide swing and 13 swung by the same amount or more. Is a probability of 88% good enough to prove a rule? Page 24 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

6 MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA My conclusions from Tables 16, 17 and 18 are that it is fair to expect that at any given election the swing in country areas will be lower than in metropolitan areas, but it should be borne in mind that not all seats will behave as if they are aware of the rule. The common idea is that safe seats swing least and marginal seats swing the most; this was not confirmed by Table 17. Table 17 is also a fairly clear proof that uniform swings have not occurred in South Australian elections over the past 20 years. It is difficult to see any clear pattern in the results from Table 17, but it may be possible to infer that the swings gained in the marginals are actually unlikely to be the greatest swings of a given electoral campaign, not because these seats are inherently less likely to swing, but because they usually contain the median seat and are therefore the sites of the most attention from both of the major parties (and often from minor parties and independents as well). The boxed outlines of Table 17 (mostly in the centre of the table) show the swing for that sector of the pendulum in which the median seat was located before the election: for example in 1977 the ALP fairly safe seat of Brighton became the median seat. By definition, the median seat will always belong to the party which won the election most recently. In 1977 the ALP won 27 of the 47 seats - including the median, Brighton - and therefore won government. GOing into the 1979 election then, the task for the ALP was to retain all of its seats, of which those from Brighton down to the most marginal seat required the most protection (see Figure 2 again). Brighton would fall with a swing in that seat of 8.2% to LIB. The task for the Liberal Party was to win all of the ALP seats at least as far up the pendulum as Brighton, but in order to make sure of the result the next most marginal seats after the median (Henley Beach, Newland, Unley, NorwOOd) would also have been targeted. The LIB campaign achieved a Statewide average swing of 8.5% to LIB, felt most strongly not in the most marginal seats (the swing to LIB in the single ALP marginal - Morphett - was only 5.7%), but in the group of fairly safe ALP seats (which included Brighton) and also in the safest ALP seats. The result was that the Liberal Party won government in 1979. All of the seats which went into the 1979 election as LIB seats stayed LIB, and the swing in these seats was lower than the average swing for that election. This pattern of swings is consistent with the idea of a strong LIB campaign especially in the ALP marginals and the fairly safe ALP seats, and a strong ALP defence of its most marginal seats. Going into the 1982 State election the Liberal Party had been in government and the ALP would have been aiming for the median seat which was then Todd (LIB marginal requiring a swing of 4.7% to change hands). The ALP achieved a 6% Statewide swing back to the ALP which was expressed most forcefully in the LIB marginal seats and also in those seats the ALP already held. The ALP took government. In 1985 the Liberal Party had been in Opposition and needed to win either Unley or Todd (both about 52% ALP after the redistribution). The 2.3% Statewide swing to the ALP had its biggest impact in the ALP marginals and in the safe LIB seats. The ALP retained power. To win the 1989 State election the Liberal Party required the median seat of Unley (marginal ALP, requiring a swing of 5.1 % to LIB to change hands). The Statewide average swing of 5.3% to LIB which they achieved was experienced least forcefully in the marginal ALP seats and most forcefully in safe ALP seats and in marginal or safe LIB seats. In effect. the required swing to LIB was achieved but in the wrong seats, and not enough seats changed hands. In 1993 the Liberal Party required just one more seat. Unley (the median) was a marginal ALP seat requiring a swing of under 1 % to change hands. The eventual 8.9% Statewide swing to LIB was expressed most forcefully in the marginal ALP seats and in the Liberal seats other than the very safest group. The Liberal Party took government. Page 25 of 41. Dated February 20, 1998

MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA In 1997 there were so many marginal and fairly safe LIB seats that the median seat was a safe Liberal seat. The eventual swing of 9.4% to the ALP was expressed most strongly in ALP seats. The Liberal government retained power. Table 17 also does show quite clearly that when there has been a Statewide swing to the ALP, then the ALP marginals have swung more than the LIB marginals, and when there has been a Statewide swing to LIB then LIB marginals have swung more than the ALP marginals; there seem to be a tendency for marginal seats to become less so. Is this evidence of the ability of hard-working Members in marginal seats to make their seats safer? The implications for predicting the outcome of an election are unsettling: marginals can be expected to swing more if they are moving up the pendulum than if they are moving down the pendulum. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO SWINGS 1. Fischer and Charnock Fischer's 1994 paper for the Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission proposes a method for checking whether a redistribution is fair, based on the probability that a given seat will swing. His method requires us to assume that "the swing in the two party preferred vote between elections is normally distributed with a standard deviation of 2.5 percentagepoints" (Fischer 1994:p6). Fischer's paper does not provide evidence that this assumption can be made in relation to South Australian State elections. Firstly, have swings in South Australian State elections really been normally distributed? Figures for swings at each State election since 1977 have been provided earlier (Tables 13A and 13B). These data use Jaensch's and my own estimates to take into account the redistributions between the 1982 and 1985 elections and the 1989 and 1993 elections. Table 19 looks at several of the statistical characteristics of the data shown in Table 13A and 13B. These characteristics have been chosen because they indicate whether we should accept the assumption that swings at State elections in South Australia are generally normally distributed, with a variation of 2.5 percentage points. Sprent (1977) states that: "Generally normality implies that, in all but very small samples, small deviations of observations from the sample mean are more common than large ones.... we may get a good picture of what normality implies by comparing the magnitude of all deviations from the sample mean with the mean absolute deviation. This is obtained by dividing the sum of all the magnitudes of deviations from the mean by the number of observations... As a rough rule of thumb the normality assumption is reasonable if about half, or perhaps a few more, of the deviations have a magnitude less than (the mean absolute deviation) and none are more than three or four times (that amount).... Another indication of normality is that the numbers of positive and negative deviations from the sample mean are about the same." (Sprent, 1977: p87). Therefore, Fischer's assumption that seat-by-seat swings at State elections in South Australia are normally distributed with an average variability of 2.5 percentage points, would be acceptable if: Page 26 of 41. Dated February 20, 1998

6 MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA the mean absolute deviation was about 2.5 percentage points - in fact Table 19 shows that over the six periods it ranged from 2.0 to 3.2; about 23 or 24 of the 47 deviations from the mean in each swings column fall below the mean - Table 19 shows that they have done so (ranging from 22 below the mean in the 1979 to 1982 swing, to 31 below the mean in the swing from 1982 to 1985); there are very few values (ideally none at all) falling above 3 or 4 times the mean absolute deviation. Table 19 shows that there were five falling above 3 times the mean absolute deviation, and only one fell above 4 times the mean in all of the 47 seats over the six elections; and finally roughly half of the deviations in each series were positive and roughly half negative - and indeed they were. On the basis of these results, it is at least arguable that Fischer's assumption of normality with a 2.5% variation in relation to Federal swings can be applied to South Australian State elections over the past twenty years. In particular, the assumption would seem to apply even to the 1989-1993 swings which were extraordinarily large. To look at whether individual seats would be likely to change hands with a given Statewide swing, Fischer's 1991 paper outlined the process, although in this paper on Federal elections he assumed that "swings within an election will be normally distributed with a standard deviation of 3.5 percentage points" (Fischer 1991, p302, my emphasis). "To measure whether a seat will change hands, consider the seat, named K, held by the government with a two party preferred margin of 4.8 per cent. Suppose that there is no overall swing against the government. When there is a 3.5 percentage point standard deviation of the swing from seat to seat, we see that K is 4.8/3.5=1.37 standard deviations from changing hands to the opposition. There is thus an 8.5% chance of K swinging to the opposition (since the probability of being 1.37 standard deviations or more above the mean of a standard normal distribution is 0.085). If there is a 2 per cent overall swing against the government around Australia, with a 3.5 percentage-point standard deviation as before, K requires a 2.8 percentage point swing over and above the national swing to change hands. The probability of the swing being the additional 2.8 percentage points or greater, is 21.2 per cent (the probability of being 2.8/3.5=0.8 standard deviations from the mean, assuming normality as before). To find out what would happen on average if there were a 2 per cent overall swing against the government, we perform this calculation for all seats. " (Fischer, 1991: p302). To see how well this method would predict which seats are likely to change hands, it seemed reasonable to apply Fischer's method to the South Australian State seats as they existed just before the last two State elections. Table 20 shows the results of this exercise. I have calculated the probability of each seat changing hands, given an election with a swing of 8.9% to LIB (for 1993) and an election with a swing of 9.4% to the ALP (for 1997). The swing-to-iose figures for the 1993 table are my estimates of the 1989 voting results applied to the 1991 boundaries, and the swing-to-iose figures for the 1997 table are my estimates of the 1993 voting results applied to the 1994 boundaries. Table 20 shows that, according to Fischer's method, with an 8.9% swing to LIB in 1993, 14 ALP seats had a probability of 50% or more of swinging to the Liberal Party. These seats were Lee, Giles, Wright, Hanson, Elder, Torrens, Kaurna, Mitchell, Peake, Mawson, Florey, Norwood, Newland and Unley. (Perhaps not surprisingly, these were the same seats which would be predicted to swing if a simple uniform swing of 8.9% to LIB is applied to the 1989 pendulum.) The list is roughly, but not entirely, correct. In 1993 all of the above seats changed hands except Giles, which remained with the ALP. In addition, Reynell became a Liberal seat, although Fischer's method gives it a probability of changing hands of only 48.4%. Page 27 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA A similar result appears for the 1997 part of Table 20. Assuming a swing of 9.4% to the ALP and applying Fischer's method, 12 LIB seats had a probability of 50% or more of changing hands: Lee, Hanson, Kaurna, Reynell, Wright, Elder, Peake, Torrens, Norwood, Frome, Stuart and Mawson. Once again, these are the same seats we would expect to change hands if a uniform swing of 9.4% to the ALP had been applied to the 1993 pendulum. And once again the list is not quite right: Lee, Hanson, Kaurna, Reynell, Wright, Elder, Peake, Torrens and Norwood all swung to the ALP but Frome, Stuart and Mawson did not. In addition, there were a few changes which Fischer's method would not predict. Mitchell was a fairly safe LIB seat going into the 1997 election; it required a swing of 9.5% and Fischer's method gives it a probability of changing hands with a Statewide swing of 9.4% to the ALP, of 48.4% - a little unlikely. Mitchell recorded a swing of 10.3% and did change hands. Florey was a safe LIB seat with a swing-to-iose going into the 1997 election of 11.0%. The probability of Florey changing hands with a Statewide swing of 9.4% to the ALP, was 26.11 % - highly unlikely. Florey recorded a swing of 12.3% and did change hands. Sitting between Florey and Mitchell on the pendulum going into the 1997 election, Colton was a safe LIB seat, requiring a swing-to-iose of 10.7%. Fischer's method gives it a probability of changing hands with a Statewide swing of 9.4% to the ALP, of 30.15% - unlikely but not impossible. It recorded a swing of 6.6%, and remained in LIB hands. Here we encounter a problem with the application of Fischer's method to the results of actual electoral contests. This problem relates to the assumption in such statistical abstractions, that each seat will be equally likely to swing by a given amount, and that the swing in one seat is independent of the swing in another seat. That is, we are unable to take account of our "real world experience" that, although there are always exceptions, country seats do generally swing less than city seats; that a marginal ALP seat will swing more if the Statewide swing is in favour of the ALP than if the swing is in favour of the Liberal Party (and a marginal LIB seat will swing more if the Statewide swing is in favour of the Liberal Party than if the swing is in favour of the ALP); that a party will concentrate its resources on winning the most marginal of its opponents' seats, and also that a party may be able to concentrate its resources to produce a sizeable swing in one seat but may not be able to stretch to the neighbouring seat as well. My feeling is that Fischer's method is probably no more useful than a uniform swing theoretical framework. A recent paper by Charnock proposes a similar probability model linking voting swings and seat changes. Charnock's model differs from Fischer's in that he proposes separate statistical functions for coalition seats and ALP seats, but he still assumes both that the distribution of swings in each group follows a normal distribution and that "swings in electorates are statistically independent random variables" (Charnock 1993: p341). Charnock applied his model to Federal swings from 1990 to 1993. His model predicted roughly the correct number of seats changing hands (11 to the coalition and 4 to the ALP compared to the actual result of 10 to the coalition and 4 to the ALP) but in the process he pointed to a major problem - the extreme variability of possible outcomes. ".. it is also extremely important to note the amount of random variation which could be reasonably expected. Overall, as stated in the previous paragraph, the model suggests an expected gain by the coalition of 7 seats, but with a standard deviation (for the net gain) of 3.2 seats. This implies that, for example, there was approximately a 90% chance of the coalition having a net gain of from 2 to 12 seats (inclusive). I would suspect that this is a larger degree of variability than most people would have anticipated. Variability such as this must, however, be recognised as a direct consequence of acknowledging a role for random fluctuations of swings (and hence in net seat changes)." Page 28 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Charnock 1993: p344) While the variability would be lower with a standard deviation of 2.5 rather than the 3.2 and 3.7 Charnock was obliged to use for Federal statistics, it would still be difficult to validate the fairness of any redistribution on the basis of a result which could range between 2 and 12 seats. The work by Fischer and by Charnock applying probability theory to electoral results has not yielded a theoretical framework which provides any more certainty than MacKerras's pendulum and the uniform swing. 2. The Cube Rule Political analysts and commentators often refer to the Cube Rule, which specifies the number of seats which should be won by a party gaining a given percentage of the vote, assuming fair boundaries and single-member electorates. It takes into account the observed fact that a party may win 50% of seats with 50% of the two party preferred vote, but will win more than 60% of seats with 60% of the two party preferred vote and may win almost all of the seats with much less than all of the vote. "The cube law is an attempt to provide a formula which reproduces the exaggeration of the winning party's majority... It states that the ratio between the percentages of seats won by the two parties is roughly the same as the ratio between the cubes of the percentage of votes cast for the two parties. If V and v are the percentages of votes cast and Sand s are the percentages of seats won by the two parties then the cube rule may be written as an equation: = V 3 S v 3 (Soper and Rydon, 1958: Note 6). The ALP submission to the House of Assembly Select Committee on the Constitution (Electoral Redistribution) Amendment Bill, described the rule in more detail. "... the Cube Law is a special case of a wider principle linking seats (S), electorates (E) and votes (V) in electoral systems whether based on single-member electorates (S = E) or multimember electorates (E = ns where n > 1). The general rule is SA = rva T SB LVB J It can be demonstrated that in the Anglo-Saxon single-member electorate (S = E) system, n = log V log E If n = 3, we have a reformulation of the Cube Law. It can be shown that the Cube Law approximates mathematical accuracy when the number of seats in the National Assembly is a cube root of the nation's population: S = 3.yp or the cube root of 2 times the voting population: S = 3.y[2P v l. On this basis, South Australia with a voting population of 941368, should have a Parliament of 123 members, that is for a given voting population the "ideal" or "Cube Law" Assembly size can be calculated as above (=123). Since the actual Assembly size in South Australia is much less than this (=47) it follows that!qgjl will be greater than 3. log E In fact it is equal to log 941,368 = 5.9738 = 3.573 = n, so the "Cube Law" for the log 47 1.6721 House of Assembly in South Australia becomes: Page 29 of 41 : Dated February 20,1998

MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA SA= rvaf 5 SB LVBJ The point is that one can expect some mild over-amplification in South Australia's electoral results provided that malapportionment or other factors do not distort the position." (ALP 1990 : footnote 5.) Now that there are 1010753 electors on the South Australian roll (as at October 1997) n is even bigger, at 3.59. But in practice, the simpler cube (3.0) is used rather than the more precise 3.5 or 3.59. Does the Cube Rule work in South Australian elections, or do we have so few seats that the errors are too high? Table 21 shows the number of votes actually won by the ALP and Liberal Party, at the State elections from 1977 to 1997, and the number of seats which each party won as a result. It also shows how many seats each party would have won at those elections if the Cube Rule had applied - that is if the boundaries had been statistically "fair". Table 21 shows since the Boundaries Commission has been required to take voting into account, the number of seats won by each party at elections have been exactly right. Over the longer term, the number of seats which the parties won in 1977, 1982, 1985, 1993 and 1997 all followed the Cube Rule very closely, but in 1979 and 1989 the Cube Rule would not have predicted the number of seats won by each party very well at all. That lack of alignment in 1979 and 1989 could be because the Cube Rule doesn't apply very well in South Australia, or it could be because the distribution of boundaries at the time of those two elections was not ideal. We know that the boundaries in 1989 were not ideally placed. These boundaries were seen before the 1989 election to present a problem, when Mr Griffin argued that under the boundaries as they then stood, and as they would apply at the election expected within months, the Liberal Party required 52% of the total State-wide two party preferred vote for House of Assembly seats in order to win government. The 1991 report of the EDBC accepted that the Liberal Party had been disadvantaged by those boundaries, and estimated that the disadvantage was of the order of one seat. The Cube Rule would imply a disadvantage of 3 seats (Table 21 shows that the Liberal Party should have won 26 seats rather than 23 with its 52% of the two party preferred vote), but it is possible that the Commission judged that the Liberal Party lost two seats because of the different population size of many of the electorates, and one because of the differential concentration of Liberal supporters in several seats. The Cube Rule does seem to be useful even in the context of the relatively small number of State seats here in South Australia. It gives us a fairly accurate idea of how many seats a party would win with a given percentage of the vote (and, by implication, a given swing) but has the disadvantage of not showing us which seats a party would win with a given percentage of the vote, or which seats would change hands with a given swing. Accepting that, we can calculate the number of Assembly seats which should be won by each party with a given percentage of the two party preferred vote, and this is shown in Table 22. I wanted to look at the smallest percentage of the vote which either of the two major parties would need to win in order to win a first - and then each subsequent - seat.. Of course winning a seat needs to be seen as a contest, and winning a first seat requires that a party wins one more than the number of votes required to win half a seat - i.e. enough votes to prevent the other party from winning all of the seats. Table 22 shows, for example, that to win its first seat a party would need to win 18.08% of the two party preferred vote plus one vote. Rounding 18.08 up to 18.1 % would take that Page 30 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

() MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA required extra vote into account, so 18.1 % of the two party preferred vote across the State would give a party one seat, 24.3% would ~ive it two seats, 27.7% would give a party three seats, and so on. In order to win the 241 seat, a party requires one more vote than the number of votes required to win 23.5 seats; Table 22 shows that this is 50% of the two party preferred vote across the State plus one vote. Finally, Table 22 shows that a party would need to win almost 82% of the vote to win every seat. In 1997 the Liberal Party and the 3 non-labor Members won 51.5% of the two party preferred vote; they should have won 26 seats, which indeed they did. With a swing of, say, 5% away from the Liberal Party at the next election the Cube Rule would predict that the Liberal Party and the 3 non-labor Members (on 46.5% of the two party preferred vote) would win 19 seats. The 1994 Commission seems to have accepted that the Cube Rule is a useful guide to the optimal distribution of seats around the pendulum, under the circumstances of a fair electoral distribution. In late 1995, when the Commonwealth Parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters was enquiring into the process of Federal redistributions, one of the Commissioners (Mr Andy Becker, then South Australia's State Electoral Commissioner) appeared before the Committee as a private citizen. He was asked about the fairness test. "Naturally, of course, these things are new to us, and I think probably new universally. Most of the systems that we have seen in the past are top-up-systems to try to ensure that groups with 50 per cent plus or more of the vote, do get more than 50 per cent of the seats. It was an interesting exercise and one of the things for which we were not particularly well geared in South Australia, largely because of the lack of information. In the 1991 redistribution we did not have two party preferred figures on each polling place: we only had them by district. We had to make a lot of assumptions regarding declaration voting and how we should apply those across the state. The outcome of that redistribution, according to pundits, was about 0.4 per cent still in favour of the Labour Party, and I do not know that I could argue against that. I think when you are getting that close it is probably pretty hard to say exactly what the situation is. But given the situation at that stage, it probably was a pretty fair redistribution, and I think that the fairness test, as best we could apply it, operated. In 1993 we had an unbelievable landslide against the Labor Party, with the State Bank fallout and all that sort of thing. But the interesting thing about that was the cube law approach. The cube law stood fairly well firm... That is the only test you can apply. If it had not come out that way, I dare say we probably would have been saying it was such a flood that we could not predict that and therefore we cannot say whether or not the fairness test was right or wrong. I say at this stage - and I think Colin Hughes would agree - that we got it right the first time, and I think Malcolm MacKerras says we got it right the first time. And the cube law has shown that it does operate in the case of the South Australian elections, that the fairness test that was applied in 1991 was effective. The next question of course is: on the figures that we got at the last election, which was the landslide, will the 1993-94 redistribution stand up? So that remains to be seen, and we will not be seeing that until 1997. Depending on the swings and whatever, we might have to apply the cube law or it might become so simple that we would have the 23-24 situation we had in 1989 and it would be very easily tested against the total vote outcome. If somebody has got 50 per cent of the vote plus one, and they have got 24 seats, then the fairness test has been shown to have worked." (Committee on Electoral Matters, 1995: EM 135.) At the State election of 1997, the ALP won 48.5% of the two party preferred vote across the State and fell just short of winning 22 seats. In the end, the ALP won 21 seats, the Liberal Party 23 and non-labor Members won 3 seats. The Cube Rule does seem to have applied in 1997. Page 31 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA THE CUBE RULE AND THE DEMOCRATS An interesting question arises in considering the Cube Rule table. Could the Cube Rule provide a measure of the fairness of a redistribution to the Australian Democrats, whose candidates won 9.1 % of first preferences at the State election of 1993 and 16.4% in 1997? The Cube Rule table (Table 22) is a theoretical table, based on two parties, not necessarily the ALP and the Liberal Party. It suggests that a party which won 18% or more of the two party preferred vote should win at least one seat if an electoral distribution is unbiased, so the question is whether the Australian Democrats - with 16.4% of the first preference vote in 1997 - would have won 18% or more of the DEM : OTHER two party preferred vote (and hence one or more seats) in 1997. For Table 21 the results for seats in which the final two candidates were DEM and LIB or NAT and LIB were converted to results on an ALP: LIB two party preferred basis. In the same way then it should be possible to convert the results in all of those seats contested by the Democrats, to DEM : LIB or DEM : ALP two party preferred results. What is required is an indication of how ALP votes would be distributed between DEM and LIB candidates if the ALP candidate is to be excluded during the count; and an indication of how LIB votes would be distributed between DEM and ALP candidates if the LIB candidate is to be excluded during the count. In fact, at the 1997 State election, there were three safe LIB seats in which there were only three candidates and the final two candidates represented the Liberal Party and the Democrats, so we do have an indication of how ALP votes would be distributed if the ALP candidate was to be excluded. In Finniss, the ALP candidate's 2583 votes were allocated 9.3% to LIB and 90.7% to DEM. In Heysen, the ALP candidate's 3938 votes were allocated 8.3% to LIB and 91.7% to the Democrat candidate. In Waite, the ALP candidate's 3270 votes were allocated 14.8% to LIB and 85.2% to DEM. In 1993, there had been two seats where the ALP candidate's first preferences were allocated: Davenport where the ALP first preferences went 11.0% to the LIB candidate and 89.0% to the DEM candidate, and Waite where the ALP candidate's first preferences were allocated 42.6% to the DEM candidate and 57.4% to the Liberal sitting Member. With such a difference between these two seats in terms of the percentages of their ALP votes which were allocated to the Democrats, it was only possible to make tentative remarks about the LlB:DEM two party preferred results around the State. The 1997 results make Waite in 1993 look atypical. In 1997, there was also one safe ALP seat - Napier - where there were only three candidates and the final two candidates were ALP and DEM - i.e. the LIB candidate's first preference votes were distributed. In Napier the LIB first preferences were allocated 16.1% to DEM and 83.9% to LIB. It would not be unreasonable to calculate adem: ALP two party preferred vote in safe ALP seats on the assumptions that LIB votes were distributed in each of those safe ALP seats, and that they were distributed in the proportion which we found in Napier. Similarly, in safe LIB seats it would not be unreasonable to calculate adem: LIB two party preferred vote on the assumptions that ALP votes were distributed in each of those safe LIB seats, and that they were distributed in the proportions which we found in Finniss, or Heysen, or in Waite. As for estimating adem: OTHER vote in seats which are not safe ALP or safe LIB seats, there are no indicators in the 1997 State election results; my feeling is that the pattern of allocating ALP preferences in Finniss, Heysen and Waite, and the pattern of allocating LIB preferences in Napier could al/ be used to give outer limits of a reasonable estimate. Page 32 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA Table 23 shows the actual 1997 voting figures for each seat at that stage of the count just before the Democrat candidate was excluded. (I have allocated the OTHER votes on a 50:50 basis to the DEM and LIB columns.) The right hand columns of Table 23 show estimates of the ALP: DEM two party preferred vote in safe ALP seats if the LIB candidates had been excluded and the LIB first preferences distributed in the same way as occurred in Napier; the ALP: DEM or LIB : DEM two party preferred vote in those seats which were not safe ALP seats or safe LIB seats, if the LIB or ALP first preferences were distributed as occurred in Napier, or in Finniss, or in Heysen, or in Waite; and finally the LlB:DEM two party preferred vote in safe LIB seats if the ALP candidates had been excluded and the ALP first preference votes had been distributed in the same way as occurred in Finniss or in Heysen or in Waite. Using Table 23 it is possible to estimate a range within which adem : OTHER two party preferred result for the whole of the State after the 1997 State election might be found. The only indicator we have for estimating DEM : LIB two party preferred figures for safe ALP seats is Napier, but for seats which are not safe ALP or safe LIB seats there are four possibilities, and for safe LIB seats there are three. There are therefore 12 possible DEM OTHER estimates for 1997. Table 24 shows all of these estimates. Table 24 shows that an estimate of adem: OTHER two party preferred result for the 1997 State election would fall somewhere between DEM 45.6% : OTHER 54.4% and DEM 47.6% : OTHER 52.4%. With somewhere between 45.6% and 47.6% of the two party preferred vote Statewide, the Cube Rule (see Table 22) suggests that the Australian Democrats could have expected to win between 17 and 20 seats. Given that the Democrats did not win even one seat in 1997, these results are startling: how should they be regarded? Firstly, because the Democrat vote relies so heavily on the distribution of ALP and LIB preferences I think that we can only see the Democrat vote as part of a coalition. Secondly, any ALP ticket is likely to put the Democrats ahead of the Liberal Party (as any Liberal ticket is likely to put the Democrat candidate ahead of an ALP candidate). But my feeling is that this practice would change if the Australian Democrats looked likely to win many seats. Finally, the problem for the Democrats has been, in the past, that their support has been spread over several electorates. In 1993 there were only three seats in which the Democrats gained more than even 15% of the first preferences: Davenport (26.5%), Ross Smith (16.5%) and Waite (18.2%). In 1997, there were 31 seats in which the Democrats gained 15% or more of first preference votes, and indeed in 11 of these seats the DEM candidate recorded over 20% of first preferences. With 16% of all first preferences across the State in 1997 it could be argued that the Democrats must have support - in their own right - at least equal to the 18.1 % of the State's two party preferred vote which the Cube Rule requires before a seat can be fairly won. In their submission to the 1994 EDBC, the Australian Democrats did argue that the Commission should create a seat around Davenport and Waite which would be winnable for a candidate from their party (P. Black, 1994 EDBC Transcript of Public Hearings, p246-251). The Commission rejected this idea on the grounds that the relationship between votes and seats in the House of Assembly is not based on proportional representation, but on the ability of a party to concentrate its vote in an area to the extent necessary to win a seat. Page 33 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

() MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA "It would not be right, in our opinion, to create an electoral district in order to give a party representation in the House of Assembly that it could not ordinarily expect to get under the normal operation of our single-member electorate system. That would be to contrive a result on something like proportional representation grounds that the Parliament has plainly rejected." (EDBC 1994 Report: para 9.2). An alternative view could be that the Commission leaves itself open to accusations that it has deliberately split the Democrat vote between electorates. THE SITTING MEMBER ADVANTAGE In their submissions to the 1991 and 1994 Commissions (and in the public hearings), the ALP representatives argued that: a sitting Member has an advantage over a non-sitting candidate, increasing the two party preferred vote for the sitting Member's party at the next election by 1 % to 2%; the 1993 election had resulted in a Parliament with many more Liberal than ALP sitting Members; and therefore at the next election the Liberal Party would receive an advantage from having so many sitting Members. (J.Hill for the ALP, 1994 EDBC Transcript of Public Hearings, pp46, 48, 55.) In their submissions to both the 1991 and 1994 Commissions, the ALP compared the ALP:L1B two party preferred vote for the House of Assembly with the ALP:L1B two party preferred vote for the Legislative Council lodged at the same booths. The difference, according to the ALP, should be seen as a measure of the personal vote for the local Member representing that area in the House of Assembly. The ALP argued that "It's Labor's contention,... that this, this is the personal vote and in particular the Sitting Member advantage, is a relevant matter to be considered by the commission under section 83(2) when drawing boundaries." (J.Hili for the ALP, 1994 EDBC Transcript of Public Hearings, p55.) At the Commission's request, I commented on the methodology of calculating the personal vote tables. The ALP's methodology is to reduce the Assembly and the Council contests in a certain geographic area - a House of Assembly electorate - to a two party contest, ALP versus LIB. My conclusion from this methodology was that, because of the way that the personal vote advantage had been calculated: "... (t)he sum of the personal votes of the Liberal candidate and the ALP candidate must always equal zero. That means that a candidate who is very popular and gains a good personal vote will necessarily have to win that vote away from the other candidate. In one seat where there are two excellent candidates and in another seat where there are two hopeless candidates, the personal vote table will show one excellent candidate and one hopeless candidate with the same personal vote." (J. Newton, 1994 EDBC Transcript of Public Hearings, p.98-99.) That is, the personal vote calculations can only show the popularity of a Member compared to his or her opponent, not compared to any other Member. It is important to make the distinction between a Member's personal vote, and the advantage which sitting Members may have over non-sitting candidates who may not be blessed with party resources or the high media profile which may accrue to a sitting Member. To look only at a sitting Member's advantage over a non-sitting Member, it is necessary to compare the average level of personal vote gained by the group of Sitting Members who win their seats Page 34 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA again, with the average level of personal vote gained by non-sitting candidates who win their seats. At Table 25 is a summary of the "personal vote" calculations for sitting Members and new Members at the State elections of 1985, 1989, 1993 and 1997. I have excluded those seats where the final two candidates were not ALP and LIB candidates, because it is difficult to know just how to interpret the personal vote calculations in these contests. (For example, in Chaffey the final 2PP contest was actually NAT: LIB in 1997 but we have rethrow figures of ALP: LIB 29.0%: 71.0%. My estimate of the way that the voters of Chaffey voted for the ALP and Liberal Parties for the Legislative Council was ALP: LIB 33.9%: 66.1 %, giving LIB a higher vote in the House of Assembly of 4.9%. But it would be true to say that this 4.9% advantage relates as much to the ALP: NAT contest as it does to the ALP: LI B contest.) I have excluded those contests where the ALP and LIB candidates were both sitting Members (because neither sitting Member would have an advantage). Finally, it is important to that both contests are against candidates of a similar strength, so I have excluded the personal votes of new MPs who win their seats away from sitting Members. Table 25 shows that successful sitting MPs have, on average, had a personal vote at a State election of somewhere between 1 and 5 percent; new Members who did not have to compete against a sitting MP had much more varied personal vote scores ranging from 3 percent to minus 2 percent. When the average sitting MP's personal vote is compared to the average personal vote for a new MP who did not face a sitting Member, the advantage to the sitting Member has varied from almost nothing to 4.4 percent. It is very difficult to draw conclusions about the different levels of sitting Member advantage which accrue to Members of the ALP or the Liberal Party, and this is particularly so for new LIB MPs because most new LIB MPs have arrived in the Parliament after having beaten a sitting ALP Member (and were therefore excluded from the analysis). For the ALP, the difference between the personal vote of an ALP sitting Member and a new ALP Member who did not face a sitting MP candidate, has varied from almost nothing in 1985 to about 1 percent in 1989 and 1993 and then 4.4 percent in 1997. The 1997 data do not change the conclusions I drew from the 1985 to 1993 figures: "... 1 do not believe that the data support any hypothesis that the higher personal vote of ALP Members (sitting and new) is a result of their party being in government. It may be explained just as readily by different campaign techniques... Similarly I do not believe that the data would support any average figure to quantify the sitting Member advantage. The figures have been too variable and there have been too few new Members over the period for which I have data, to give any sort of credibility to such a figure. In addition, the figures for Ministers show that it is quite possible to be disadvantaged by being a sitting Member (for too long, for example)." (J. Newton, written submission to the 1994 EDBC, listed as Exhibit 107.) The 1994 EDBC decided against taking into account a sitting member advantage or a personal vote, for many reasons, including that: it is not possible to know which of the members who won seats at a given election would stand for those seats at the next election; the opposing parties can be expected to campaign more strongly in an electorate with a sitting member; the idea that the difference between the 2PP vote for the Council and for the Assembly is only due to the local Member is unproven; and Page 35 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA the size of a Member's personal vote depends on the calibre of the opposing candidate. (EDBC 1994 Report: para 7.6). My own feeling about a personal vote which a Member may build up over time in his or her own constituency is that it should perhaps be seen as akin to a campaign skill, albeit built up over an extended period rather than just the period of a campaign. A personal vote or a sitting Member advantage belongs to the Member, not the electorate, and I do not believe that it is the sort of thing that the Commission should take into account. THE NUMBER OF MARGINAL The Commission's job must be to set the seats around the pendulum in such a way that a party cannot win the median seat without also winning the majority of the vote, but it must not be so difficult to win the median seat that the party would need more than a small majority of the Statewide vote. Given that some seats will not swing as easily as others, and that we cannot necessarily predict which seats these will be, it seems prudent to me to have a grouping of seats around the median seat. But the 1994 Report states that the Commissioners "agree with the Labor Party that it is undesirable to have too much bunching of seats on the pendulum, especially in the few percentage points above and below the median seat. We have adjusted the political balance in a number of instances to make the percentage steps between the closely marginal seats more even." (1994 EDBC Report: para 8.13). Perhaps the difference between the Commission's attitude and mine is a matter of judgement about how much grouping is too much bunching. In the end the Commission cannot prevent a result like that of 1989, in which the Liberal Party received the majority of the two party preferred vote across the State but not in the right seats. No amount of reasoned diligent work by the Commission will be able to take the relative strength of the Parties' campaigns into account - and nor should it. It is the Commission's job to create a level playing field for the candidates and the parties, and both the 1991 and the 1994 Commissions have worked extraordinarily hard to do this. In 1993 the result was so much in favour of the Liberal Party that it was difficult to say how many seats they would have won with only a 50.1 % share of the two party preferred vote, but in 1997 the result was much closer. Looking back, both the 1993 and the 1997 results can be judged now to have been fair results; each party's vote translated into the number of seats which the Cube Rule would have predicted. The Act does not require the Commission to "ensure, as far as practicable" that the party which wins 65% of the vote will win 65% of the seats, and the party which wins 35% of the vote should win 35% of the seats. This could only be achieved by proportional representation or by a top-up system such as the West German and now the New Zealand system. Page 36 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

6 MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS "Exercise of judgement based upon wide familiarity with the situation, and great caution in the statement of conclusions from the data, are the beginning of wisdom in statistical work." E.E. Day, 1930, Statistical Analysis, MacMillan, New York, p382. After each State election in South Australia, an Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission is required to examine State electorates with a view to redistribution. In deciding whether boundaries need to be amended, the Commission is required to take into account many factors, including "as far as practicable" making sure that the boundaries are fair to all parties "so that, if candidates of a particular group attract more than 50 per cent of the popular vote..., they will be elected in sufficient numbers to enable a government to be formed." (Constitution Act (SA) s.83(1 ).) This fairness requirement is unique to South Australia. It imposes an obligation on the Commission to attempt to draw boundaries which will be fair at a future election, but whether a given redistribution will actually meet the requirements of section 83(1) will only ever become apparent once that future election has been held. In the past, the Commission has checked a proposed set of boundaries against past election figures. This checking exercise has its own problems. The 1991 Commission checked its proposed boundaries against the 1989 election results and found that they would have given government to the Liberal Party which had won 50% or more of the vote; my own estimate at the time, and those of the ALP and the Liberal Party, was that although several of the seats would be very marginal, if the new boundaries had been in place in 1989 the Labor government would have been returned with 24 seats. (Jaensch gave both parties 23 seats and found Newland too hard to call.) The different estimates arose, I believe, from different methods for distributing preferences, as well as from different decisions when booth results needed to be split between new electorates. The difficulty with the distribution of preferences which existed in 1991 (and which has since been removed), was that figures showing the distribution of preferences were available for an electorate as a whole, but not for each booth. In the absence of any better guide, it was common practice to assume that the pattern of distribution of preferences in a group of booths would be the same as that for the electorate as a whole. Now that the State Electoral Office produces actual two party preferred counts for each booth it is possible to calculate the error, which this assumption contained. In general, I suspect that two party preferred estimates for a given electorate made with data prior to 1993 need to be treated as if they had a margin of error of up to 0.5 percentage points (page 9). This means that, while I would not argue with the Commission's conclusion that its 1991 boundaries would have given 24 of the 47 House of Assembly seats to the Liberal Party, I also believe that the other publicly available estimates made at the time - which gave 24 seats to the ALP - are quite defensible. While checking a proposed set of boundaries against past election figures is no guarantee of the fairness of those boundaries at a future election, it is at least a good guide, and so the checking exercise itself should contain as little room as possible for dispute or error. That is Page 37 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA why the State Electoral Office's action at the 1993 State election, making available a two party preferred count for each booth, is a vital step. Not only has it made more accurate calculations possible but it has also reduced the scope for disagreement (between parties or political analysts) about the proposed seats. There is one other source of possible distortion, albeit of smaller proportions, namely declaration votes. While they have generally been included in checking exercises in the past, the availability of two-party preferred figures for each booth now makes it tempting to concentrate on booth figures and ignore the (less-numerous) declaration votes. Including or excluding declaration votes generally changed the winning party's 2PP vote by 0.1 percentage points in 1993 (Table 8A) and 0.3 percentage points in 1997 (Table 8B). However, there were quite striking variations between seats, of up to +/-1.0 percentage points in 1993 and up to +/-1.6 percentage points in 1997. Excluding declaration votes from a redistribution checking exercise would therefore mean that the estimated 2PP for any new seat would need to be treated as if it had a margin of error of up to 1.6 percentage points. For most purposes it would seem better to avoid that margin of error simply by including declaration votes in the exercise. The difficulty is in knowing how best to allocate declaration votes to booths. After reviewing several methods (Tables 12A to 120) I believe that the most accurate method is to allocate ALP declaration votes according to the distribution across the electorate of all ALP voters who lodged their votes at booths, and allocate LIB declaration votes across the electorate according to the distribution of LIB voters who lodged their votes at booths (page 16). This method reflects the observed difference between declaration voters and ordinary voters but sees ALP declaration voters as more like other ALP voters than like LIB declaration voters (and LIB declaration voters as more like other LIB voters than like ALP declaration voters). It also produces correct two party preferred percentages for the seat as a whole. It is clear that the State Electoral Office's provision of two party preferred figures for each booth, and a more accurate method of including declaration votes in a checking exercise, can now be used to deliver the best possible estimates of how the voters in proposed electorates voted at previous elections. How voters in the new electorates will vote at the next election is more difficult to see. Looking at the results of the past six State elections, spanning the past 20 years, it is quite clear that there has not been a uniform swing at any South Australian State election over this period, and the seats which changed hands were not always the ones we would predict on the basis of a uniform swing (Table 14 and Figures 2 to 5). Applying the swing-to-iose information for each new seat (which is produced by the checking exercise) to a pendulum, can give us a fairly good guide to how many seats would change hands with a given swing, but probably not which seats would change hands. As an alternative, a hypothesis that the swing in a given seat at one election is likely to be proportional to the swing in that same seat at the previous (or next) election was not very helpful (Tables 15A to 15C). Finally, attention to the characteristics of individual seats or groups of seats was not infallible. A hypothesis was made that rural seats swing less readily than metropolitan seats. This was found to be true in general terms: it is true that at any given election rural seats have, on average, swung less than metropolitan seats (Table 16). But individual rural seats have not all learnt to abide by the rule, so it is quite possible that a given rural seat will swing more than expected (Table 18). Page 38 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

6 MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA The common belief that marginal seats swing wildly and safe seats swing very little, was also shown to be misleading (Table 17). Indeed, the bracket of marginal seats usually contains the median seat which is the target of both parties, and so it is likely that the contest within this bracket of seats will usually produce quite a low net swing for seats within the bracket (page 23). It is also clear that the average size of the swing in the bracket of marginal seats varies according to the direction of the swing (Table 17). A Statewide swing to the ALP has consistently produced larger swings in marginals that the ALP already holds than in LIB marginals, and vice versa. This would be consistent with the idea that the contest in the bracket of seats which contains the median seat can be expected to be intense, and the swings in that bracket lower. My conclusion was that marginals can be expected to swing more if they are moving up the pendulum than if they are moving down the pendulum (page 25). While it is interesting to look at how the seats swing, it would be nane to assume that the size and direction of swing is somehow contained in the nature of each seat. That would mean ignoring the role of the Parties' campaigns, or attributing swings in individual seats to luck. Clearly, which seats swing - and by how much - is a function not only of the characteristics of the seat itself but also of the pressure applied by the parties' campaigns. Fischer has proposed a method for checking whether a redistribution is fair, based on the probability that a particular seat will swing. The method relies on an assumption that each seat will be equally likely to swing by a given amount, and that the swing in one seat is independent of the swing in another seat. However, when this method is used to apply an 8.9% swing to the South Australian seats as they stood just before the 1993 election it was wrong in three cases, and when used to apply a 9.4% swing to the seats as they appeared just prior to the 1997 State election, it was wrong in five cases (Table 20). Fischer's method is not particularly helpful. Charnock has proposed a more refined probability model linking voting swings and seat changes, but it relies on the same assumptions as Fischer's model. Charnock has also pointed out the extreme variability of possible outcomes under a probability model (page 27). An alternative method which has often been held up as showing the fairness of a redistribution, is the Cube Rule, which specifies the number of seats which should be won by a party gaining a given percentage of the vote, assuming fair boundaries and single-member electorates. Indeed, it does seem to apply in the South Australian case: the number of seats which the parties won in 1977, 1982, 1985, 1993 and 1997 followed the Cube Rule very closely, but in 1979 and 1989 the Cube Rule would not have predicted the number of seats won by each party very well at all (Table 21). It is probably not a coincidence that these two elections have been recognised as having the largest numbers of electorates going into the election well above or below quota. The Cube Rule does seem to be useful even in the context of the relatively small number of State seats here in South Australia. It gives us a fairly accurate idea of how many seats a party would win with a given percentage of the vote (and, by implication, a given swing) but has the disadvantage of not showing us which seats a party would win with a given percentage of the vote, or which seats would change hands with a given swing. While the Cube Rule is generally considered in terms of an ALP:LlB two party contest, it could be applied to a DEM:LlB or ALP:DEM contest. At the State election of 1997 the Australian Democrats won 16.4% of first preferences across the State. With this level of support it could be argued that the Democrats must have support - in their own right - at least equal to the 18.1 % of the State's two party preferred vote which the Cube Rule requires before a seat can be fairly won. Page 39 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA As a member of a coalition, I estimate that at the State election of 1997 the Australian Democrats could have received somewhere between 45 and 48% of the DEM:OTHER two party preferred vote (Table 24). While DEM candidates still were not able to win a single House of Assembly seat in 1997, they ran second in six seats when first preferences were counted, and then when second and subsequent preferences were counted out DEM candidates were runners-up in seven seats. These seats were Davenport, Finniss, Heysen, Kavel, Napier, Schubert and Waite. Some of these seats share boundaries. The Commission has considered the argument that it should create a seat which the Democrats have a chance of winning, and has rejected that view on the grounds that the Act does not require the Commission to "contrive a result on something like proportional representation grounds that the Parliament has plainly rejected" (page 32). An alternative view could be that the Commission leaves itself open to accusations that it has deliberately split the Democrat vote between electorates. In both 1991 and 1994 the Commission deliberated over the question of whether to take into account an electoral advantage which may accrue to a party with many sitting members. Personal vote calculations made by comparing the Assembly and Council contests within a given area, can only show the popularity of a Member compared to his or her opponent, not compared to any other Member involved in a different contest. Examination of personal vote data for the 1985, 1989 and 1993 State elections showed that the average personal vote of a sitting MP has generally been higher than the average personal vote of a successful non-sitting candidate (Table 25). Figures for Liberal Party sitting MPs are not as clear, but in the case of ALP sitting Members, the advantage to a Sitting MP ranged from about 1 % to 3%. I do not believe that the data support an argument that a sitting Member advantage of a given size exists and must be taken into account by the Commission. The Commission's job must be to set the seats around the pendulum in such a way that a party cannot win the median seat without also winning the majority of the vote, but it must not be so difficult to win the median seat that the party would need more than a small majority of the Statewide vote. Given that some seats will not swing as easily as others, and that we cannot necessarily predict which seats these will be, it seems prudent to me to have a grouping of seats around the median seat. But in the end the Commission cannot prevent a result like that of 1989, in which the Liberal Party received the majority of the two party preferred vote across the State but not in the right seats. It is the Commission's job to create, as far as possible, a level playing field for the candidates and the parties. Methods by which the Commission can check its proposed boundaries will always be vital to the Commission's own credibility, and I hope that this exercise will be recognised as a contribution towards improving the methodology. At the same time the Commission needs, I feel, to make it clear to concerned individuals and parties that not only is there really no way of predicting how voters will swing in particular seats, but also that the fairness requirement does not require the Commission to take into account those factors in an election which are under the parties' (or candidates') control, such as the relative strength of the parties' campaigns, their concentration in marginal or winnable seats, or which candidates the parties choose. Page 40 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

o MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA REFERENCES Constitution Act (SA) Australia. Parliament. Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, 1995, Official Hansard Report, 4 October 1995. Australian Labor Party (SA Branch), 1990, Submission to the House of Assembly Select Committee on the Constitution (Electoral Redistribution) Amendment Bill, ALP (SA Branch), Adelaide. Charnock, D., 1993, "Voting swings and seat changes: a stochastic model", Australian Journal of Political Science (1993) vol 28: pp340-346. Day, E.E. 1930, Statistical Analysis, MacMillan, New York. Fischer, A., 1991, "Swings and Gerrymanders", Electoral Studies, Vol 10 (4), December 1991, pp 299-312. Fischer, A., 1994, The Redistribution of Electoral Boundaries, copy courtesy of the 1994 EDBC. Hughes, 0., 1984, "Uniform swing revisited: Further comments on MacKerras", Politics, vol. 19 (2), November 1984. Jaensch, D., 1977, The 1977 Elections in South Australia: a statistical analysis, Flinders University Politics Department Occasional Monograph No.6, Adelaide. Jaensch, D., 1979, The 1979 Elections in South Australia a statistical analysis, Flinders University Politics Department Occasional Monograph No.7, Adelaide. Jaensch, 0, 1983, The 1982 Elections in South Australia a statistical analysis, Flinders University Politics Department Occasional Monograph No.8, Adelaide. Karmel, P.H. and Polasek, M., 1970, Applied Statistics for Economists, Sir Isaac Pitman (Aust) Ply Ltd, Melbourne. MacKerras, M., 1973, "The swing: variability and uniformity", in Mayer, H., Robertson for the Australasian Political Studies Association, Sydney. Labor to Power: Australia's 1972 Election, Angus & Newton, J, 1992, The 1991 Electoral Redistribution in South Australia: 1989 voting statistics transferred to the new House of Assembly boundaries, Parliamentary Library of South Australia Research Service Information Paper No.11, Parliamentary Library, Adelaide. Rydon, J., 1973, "Swings and Predictions: the analysis of Australian electoral statistics", in Mayer, H, Labor to Power: Australia's 1972 Election, Angus & Robertson for the Australasian Political Studies Association, Sydney. Soper, C.S. and Rydon, J., 1958, "Under-Representation and Electoral Prediction", Australian Journal of Political History, Vol. 4(2). South Australia. Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission (EDBC), 1991, 1991 Report, Government Printer, Adelaide. South Australia. Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission (EDBC), 1994, 1994 Report, Government Printer, Adelaide. South Australia. Parliament. House of Assembly Select Committee on the Constitution (Electoral Redistribution) Amendment Bill, 1990, Report, SA Parliamentary Paper 157 of 1990-91 South Australia. Parliament. South Australian Parliamentary Debates (SAPO), The Parliament, Adelaide. South Australia. State Electoral Department, 1978, General Elections 1977: Statistical Returns, SA Parliamentary Paper 144 of 1978-79. South Australia. State Electoral Department, 1980, Periodical and General Elections 1979: Statistical Returns, SA Parliamentary Paper 132 of 1980-81 South Australia. State Electoral Department, 1982, Periodical and General Elections 1982: Statistical Returns, SA Parliamentary Paper 145 of 1982-83. South Australia. State Electoral Department, 1986, General Elections 1985: Statistical Returns, SA Parliamentary Paper 145 of 1986-87. South Australia. State Electoral Department, 1991 (a), Periodical and General Elections 1989: Statistical Returns, SA Parliamentary Paper 161 of 1991-92. South Australia. State Electoral Department, 1991 (b), Referendum on the (Electoral Redistribution) Act 1990, South Australian Parliamentary Paper 167 of 1990-91. South Australia. State Electoral Office, 1996, Statistical Returns for General Elections 1993 and By-elections 1994, State Electoral Office, Adelaide. South Australia. State Electoral Department, 1993, Everyday Electoral Terms, The Department, Adelaide. Sprent, P., 1977, Statistics in Action, Penguin, Melbourne. Page 41 of 41 : Dated February 20, 1998

PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA RESEARCH SERVICES MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA A revised version of Information Paper No.15, incorporating data from the 1997 State election. [TABLES] JENNI NEWTON INFORMATION PAPER 16

1998, Parliamentary Library of South Australia Not to be reproduced in part or whole without the written permission of, or acknowledgement to, the Parliamentary Library of South Australia. This information paper has been prepared by the Research Service of the South Australian Parliamentary Library. While all care has been taken to ensure that the material is both accurate and clearly presented, the responsibility for any errors remains with the author. February 1998 ISSN 0816-4282

----.~-------- 14 ---~----------- INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA FIGURE 1: PENDULUM AFTER THE STATE ELECTION OF 11.12.93 IF THE NEW HAD BEEN IN EXISTENCE (BOUNDARIES COMMISSION ESTIMATES) ALP SWING LIB 2PP TO LOSE 2PP 30 30 80.3 Flinders 79.4 MacKillop 79.3 Bragg 29 29 79.0 Chaffey 28 28 27 27 ------ 26 261-----::-" 75.3 Finniss ---- 25 25 75.0 Hammond ---_.-,,------ 74.5 Heysen 74.3 Waite 24 24 74.0 Kavel,,---- f--------- 23 23 --- 72.5 Goyder 72.4 Morphetl & Schubert 22 22 72.2 Davenport 71.5 Gordon 21 21 70.7 Fisher 20 20 19 19 ----.. ----_.- -- 18 18 f---,,?8.2 Bright.. - 17 17 f---.-- 66.8 Coles 16 16 66.6 Newland ---_.-.- SAFE -- 15 15 65.2 Lig~,,_ SAFE 14 ~.. 1!-delaide. 13 13 ---- -------- FAIRLY SAFE 1----.--------- 7 71--_ 57.4 Norwood --- 56.5 Torrens Napier 56.4 6 6 MARGINAL 12 12 62.2 Hartley._- Price 61.0 11 11 61.5 Unley 60.9 Florey ----- Ramsay 60.3 10 10 60.6 Colton MEDIAN Taylor 59.4 59.4 Mitchell I-- 9 91---_ 59.2 Mawson - Hart 58.7 58.9 Stuart FAIRLY 1---- 8 8 58.1 Frome SAFE._--,,- Spence 57.7 5 5 ---- 54.9 Peake Giles 54.3 4 4 MARGINAL ---,,- f--- 53.5 Elder 3 3 53.2 Wright 1--- f-. 52.5 Reynell..._---- Elizabeth 52.7 Ross Smith & Playford 52.1 2 2 52.4 Kauma -- --- 51.8 Hanson 1 1 51.0 Lee V...QJ.. 'Note that the actual swing to lose in any given seat would be the difference between 50.0% and the 2PP vote for that seat, plus either 1 vote or 0.1 %. SOURCE: EDBC 1994 Report, Appendix 17

INFORMATION PAPER 15: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF PREFERENCES AT EACH BOOTH, LEE ELECTORATE, STATE ELECTION 1993 ACTUAL RESULTS 2PP IF PREFERENCES STATE ELECTION 1993 ACTUAL ALL DISTRIBUTED DIFFERENCE DISTRIBUTION IN LINE WITH THE BETWEEN FIRST TWO PARTY OF PREFERENCES DISTRIBUTION FOR THE THE METHODS PREFERENCES PREFERRED SEAT AS A WHOLE BOOTH NAME ALP LIB Others ALP LIB total to ALP to LIB All ALP LIB total ALP LIB ALP LIB (No) (No) (No) (No) (No) formals (%) (%) (%) (No) (No) formals (%) (%) (No) (No) % total formals LEE Albert Park 627 647 142 715 701 1416 62.0 38.0 100.0 718 698 1416-2.4 2.4 3 Grange (s2) 70 176 32 91 187 278 65.6 34.4 100.0 91 187 278 1.3-1.3 0 Royal Park 967 886 184 1089 948 2037 66.3 33.7 100.0 1085 952 2037 2.0-2.0-4 Royal Park South 926 814 214 1071 883 1954 67.8 32.2 100.0 1064 890 1954 3.4-3.4-7 Seaton 947 899 230 1096 980 2076 64.8 35.2 100.0 1095 981 2076 0.4-0.4-1 Semaphore Park 667 549 155 771 600 1371 67.1 32.9 100.0 767 604 1371 2.8-2.8-4 Semaphore Park South 671 438 137 756 490 1246 62.0 38.0 100.0 759 487 1246-2.3 2.3 3 West Lakes Shore 1341 2956 437 1600 3134 4734 59.3 40.7 100.0 1622 3112 4734-5.1 5.1 22 Woodville Central (s2) 173 161 28 191 171 362 64.3 35.7 100.0 191 171 362-0.1 0.1 0 Woodville West 840 618 189 970 677 1647 68.8 31.2 100.0 962 685 1647 4.4-4.4-8 Total booth votes 7229 8144 1748 8350 8771 17121 64.1 35.9 100.0 8354 8767 17121-0.2 0.2 4 Declaration votes 900 994 288 1089 1093 2182 65.6 34.4 100.0 1085 1097 2182 1.3-1.3-4 LEE ELECTORATE 8129 9138 2036 9439 9864 19303 64.3 35.7 100.0 9439 9864 19303 0.0 0.0 0-3 -0.02 0 0.00 4 0.02 7 0.04 1 0.01 4 0.02-3 -0.02-22 -0.11 0 0.00 8 0.04-4 -0.02 4 0.02 0 0.0 NOTES: (s2) means that the Woodville Central booth operated for Lee and also for another electorate. The figures in the table above relate to votes lodged at the Woodville Central booth by electors who lived in Lee. SOURCE: Actual data are from figures published in: South Australia. State Electoral Office, 1996, Statistical Returns for General Elections 11 December 1993 and By-elections 1994, State Electoral Office, Adelaide. Estimated data are my calculations based on applying the distribution of preferences in the seat as a whole to the first preference votes in each booth.

INFORMATION PAPER 15: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 2: ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL TWO PARTY PREFERRED RESULTS FOR GROUPS OF BOOTHS, STATE ELECTION 1993. TWO PARTY PREFERRED RESULTS LEE Actual Estimated 1993 (actual count) (preferences allocated on proportional basis) STATE ALP LIB TOTAL ALP LIB ALP LIB TOTAL ALP LIB ELECTION (no.) (no.) (%) (%) (%) (no.) (no.) (no.) (%) (%) Semaphore Park 771 600 1371 56.2 43.8 767 604 Semaphore Park South 756 490 1246 60.7 39.3 759 487 West Lakes Shore 1600 3134 4734 33.8 66.2 1622 3112 Northern booths 3127 4224 7351 42.5 57.5 3148 4203 Albert Park 715 701 1416 50.5 49.5 718 698 Grange (52) 91 187 278 32.7 67.3 91 187 Royal Park 1089 948 2037 53.5 46.5 1085 952 Royal Park South 1071 883 1954 54.8 45.2 1064 890 Seaton 1096 980 2076 52.8 47.2 1095 981 Woodville Central (52) 191 171 362 52.8 47.2 191 171 Woodville West 970 677 1647 58.9 41.1 962 685 Southern booths 2257 1828 4085 55.3 44.7 2246 1839 1371 1246 4734 7351 1416 278 2037 1954 2076 362 1647 4085 55.9 44.1 60.9 39.1 34.3 65.7 42.8 57.2 50.7 49.3 32.7 67.3 53.3 46.7 54.5 45.5 52.7 47.3 52.8 47.2 58.4 41.6 55.0 45.0 NOTES: (52) means that the Woodville Central booth operated for Lee and also for another electorate. The figures in the table above relate to votes lodged at the Woodville Central booth by electors who lived in Lee. SOURCE: Actual data are from figures published in: South Australia. State Electoral Office, 1996, Statistical Returns for General Elections 11 December 1993 and By-elections 1994, State Electoral Office, Adelaide. Estimated data are my calculations based on applying the distribution of preferences in the seat as a whole to the first preference votes in each booth.

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 3' DISTRIBUTION OF PREFERENCES AT EACH BOOTH, STATE ELECTION 1993 ACTUAL RESULTS ACTUAL ESTIMATED 2PP STATE ELECTION 1993 DISTRIBUTION IF PREFERENCES DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FIRST TWO PARTY OF ALL FOLLOWED THE METHODS PREFERENCES PREFERRED PREFERENCES AVERAGE FOR SEAT (Actual minus Estimated) BOOTH NAME ALP LIB Others ALP LIB total to ALP to LIB ALP LIB total ALP LIB ALP LIB % ave. (No) (No) (No) (No) (No) formals (%) (%) (No) (No) formals (%) (%) (No) (No) formals ADELAIDE Adelaide 155 292 92 219 320 539 69.6 30.4 212 327 539 7.2 Adelaide Hospital 45 52 16 56 57 113 68.8 31.3 55 58 113 6.4 Adelaide South 350 665 186 480 721 1201 69.9 30.1 466 735 1201 7.5 Adelaide West 274 289 133 362 334 696 66.2 33.8 357 339 696 3.8 Broadview (sl) 333 725 160 432 786 1218 61.9 38.1 433 785 1218-0.5 Collinswood 194 585 106 251 634 885 53.8 46.2 260 625 885-8.6 Lower North Adel 203 602 150 297 658 955 62.7 37.3 297 658 955 0.3 Nailsworth 425 629 211 561 704 1265 64.5 35.5 557 708 1265 2.1 North Adel East 480 1500 281 653 1608 2261 61.6 38.4 655 1606 2261-0.8 Prospect 1106 1483 490 1408 1671 3079 61.6 38.4 1412 1667 3079-0.7 Prospect South 350 785 188 472 851 1323 64.9 35.1 467 856 1323 2.5 Walkerville 355 1775 245 494 1881 2375 56.7 43.3 508 1867 2375-5.6 Total booth votes 4270 9382 2258 5685 10225 15910 62.7 37.3 5678 10232 15910 0.3 Declaration votes 773 1663 547 1107 1876 2983 61.1 38.9 1114 1869 2983-1.3 ADELAIDE 5043 11045 2805 6792 12101 18893 62.4 37.6 6792 12101 18893 0.0 BRAGG Beaumont 206 1866 170 279 1963 2242 42.9 57.1 288 1954 2242-5.6 Beulah Park (sl) 312 527 180 419 600 1019 59.4 40.6 399 620 1019 10.9 Burnside 329 2060 265 464 2190 2654 50.9 49.1 458 2196 2654 2.4 Glen Osmond 111 760 103 154 820 974 41.7 58.3 161 813 974-6.8 Glenunga 457 1722 274 587 1866 2453 47.4 52.6 590 1863 2453-1.1 Kensington Park 191 740 151 282 800 1082 60.3 39.7 264 818 1082 11.8 Linden Park 203 1169 132 267 1237 1504 48.5 51.5 267 1237 1504 0.0 Marryatville 218 601 143 296 666 962 54.5 45.5 287 675 962 6.0 Rose Park (s2) 291 1139 250 418 1262 1680 50.8 49.2 412 1268 1680 2.3 Stonyfell (sl) 56 616 61 79 654 733 37.7 62.3 86 647 733-10.8 Tusmore 255 1469 200 339 1585 1924 42.0 58.0 352 1572 1924-6.5 Total booth votes 2629 12669 1929 3584 13643 17227 49.5 50.5 3565 13662 17227 1.0 Declaration votes 498 1915 413 679 2147 2826 43.8 56.2 698 2128 2826-4.7 BRAGG 3127 14584 2342 4263 15790 20053 48.5 51.5 4263 15790 20053 0.0 BRIGHT Brighton 639 2068 365 844 2228 3072 56.2 43.8 853 2219 3072-2.5 Brighton South 325 875 141 411 930 1341 61.0 39.0 408 933 1341 2.3 Hallett Cove 772 1914 342 975 2053 3028 59.4 40.6 973 2055 3028 0.7 Hallett Cove South 672 1563 299 857 1677 2534 61.9 38.1 847 1687 2534 3.2 Marino 375 1118 204 484 1213 1697 53.4 46.6 495 1202 1697-5.3 Nth Brighton (sl) 237 638 85 290 670 960 62.4 37.6 287 673 960 3.7 Seacliff 584 1638 284 755 1751 2506 60.2 39.8 751 1755 2506 1.5 Sheidow Park (sl) 361 740 198 467 832 1299 53.5 46.5 477 822 1299-5.2 West Brighton(sl) 167 570 91 219 609 828 57.1 42.9 220 608 828-1.6 Total booth votes 4132 11124 2009 5302 11963 17265 58.2 41.8 5311 11954 17265-0.5 Declaration votes 579 1449 349 793 1584 2377 61.3 38.7 784 1593 2377 2.6 BRIGHT 4711 12573 2358 6095 13547 19642 58.7 41.3 6095 13547 19642 0.0 CHAFFEY Barmera 172 830 1179 458 1723 2181 24.3 75.7 465 1716 2181-0.6 Berri 258 1040 1373 611 2060 2671 25.7 74.3 599 2072 2671 0.9 Cobdogla 15 155 246 66 350 416 20.7 79.3 76 340 416-4.1 Glossop 35 165 379 138 441 579 27.2 72.8 129 450 579 2.4 Loxton 188 1290 1524 524 2478 3002 22.0 78.0 566 2436 3002-2.8 Loxton North 29 154 280 92 371 463 22.5 77.5 98 365 463-2.3 CHAFFEY CONTINUES -7.2 7-7 0.0-6.4 1-1 0.0-7.5 14-14 0.1-3.8 5-5 0.0 0.5-1 1 0.0 8.6-9 9 0.0-0.3 0 0 0.0-2.1 4-4 0.0 0.8-2 2 0.0 0.7-4 4 0.0-2.5 5-5 0.0 5.6-14 14-0.1-0.3 7-7 0.0 1.3-7 7 0.0 0.0 0 0 0.0 5.6-9 9 0.0-10.9 20-20 0.1-2.4 6-6 0.0 6.8-7 7 0.0 1.1-3 3 0.0-11.8 18-18 0.1 0.0 0 0 0.0-6.0 9-9 0.0-2.3 6-6 0.0 10.8-7 7 0.0 6.5-13 13-0.1-1.0 19-19 0.1 4.7-19 19-0.1 0.0 0 0 0.0 2.5-9 9 0.0-2.3 3-3 0.0-0.7 2-2 0.0-3.2 10-10 0.0 5.3-11 11-0.1-3.7 3-3 0.0-1.5 4-4 0.0 5.2-10 10-0.1 1.6-1 1 0.0 0.5-9 9 0.0-2.6 9-9 0.0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0.6-7 7 0.0-0.9 12-12 0.1 4.1-10 10-0.1-2.4 9-9 0.0 2.8-42 42-0.2 2.3-6 6 0.0 SOURCE: calculated from data published in: South Australia. State Electoral Office, 1996, Statistical Returns for General Elections 11 December 1993 and By-elections 1994, State Electoral Office, Adelaide.

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 4' BOOTHS AT WHICH THE ERROR WOULD HAVE BEEN 0.15 PER CENT OR MORE IN 1993 ACTUAL RESULTS ACTUAL ESTIMATED 2PP STATE ELECTION 1993 DISTRIBUTION IF PREFERENCES DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FIRST TWO PARTY OF ALL FOLLOWED THE METHODS PREFERENCES PREFERRED PREFERENCES AVERAGE FOR SEAT (Actual minus Estimated) Booth Name ALP LIB Others ALP LIB total to ALP to LIB ALP LIB total ALP LIB ALP LIB % ave. (No) (No) (No) (No) (No) formals (%) (%) (No) (No) formals (%) (%) (No) (No) formals CHAFFEY Loxton 188 1290 1524 524 2478 3002 22.0 78.0 566 2436 3002-2.8 2.8-42 42-0.2 COLES Athelstone 878 1957 710 1163 2382 3545 40.1 59.9 1205 2340 3545-5.9 5.9 42-42 -0.2 Athelstone West 786 1472 579 1003 1834 2837 37.5 62.5 1053 1784 2837-8.6 8.6 50-50 -0.3 COLTON West Beach 521 1399 788 856 1852 2708 42.5 57.5 894 1814 2708-4.8 4.8 38-38 -0.2 FLINDERS Kirton Point 229 601 491 398 923 1321 34.4 65.6 348 973 1321 10.3-10.3-50 50 0.3 Port Lincoln 474 1632 1088 821 2373 3194 31.9 68.1 737 2457 3194 7.7-7.7-84 84 0.4 Port Lincoln South 297 437 555 522 767 1289 40.5 59.5 431 858 1289 16.4-16.4-91 91 0.5 Wudinna 19 408 236 44 619 663 10.6 89.4 76 587 663-13.6 13.6 32-32 -0.2 GILES Why Norrie NW 598 308 368 814 460 1274 58.7 41.3 780 494 1274 9.2-9.2-34 34 0.2 Why Stuart South 1231 506 635 1601 771 2372 58.3 41.7 1545 827 2372 8.8-8.8-56 56 0.3 HART Taperoo 1223 742 731 1644 1052 2696 57.6 42.4 1683 1013 2696-5.4 5.4 39-39 -0.2 HARTLEY Magill North 796 1101 293 989 1201 2190 65.9 34.1 955 1235 2190 11.5-11.5-34 34 0.2 HEYSEN Aldgate 322 1236 429 580 1407 1987 60.1 39.9 550 1437 1987 7.0-7.0-30 30 0.2 MACKILLOP Bordertown 194 1230 371 277 1518 1795 22.4 77.6 312 1483 1795-9.4 9.4 35-35 -0.2 NAPIER Smithfield 480 364 440 800 484 1284 72.7 27.3 763 521 1284 8.5-8.5-37 37 0.2 PEAKE Flinders Park 841 1218 800 1291 1568 2859 56.3 43.8 1339 1520 2859-6.0 6.0 48-48 -0.3 Lockleys 358 1241 319 511 1407 1918 48.0 52.0 557 1361 1918-14.3 14.3 46-46 -0.2 Lockleys North 329 669 238 448 788 1236 50.0 50.0 477 759 1236-12.2 12.2 29-29 -0.2 Torrensville (s 1) 895 732 487 1230 884 2114 68.8 31.2 1198 916 2114 6.6-6.6-32 32 0.2 PLAYFORD Ingle Farm 1703 1248 547 1965 1533 3498 47.9 52.1 2030 1468 3498-11.9 11.9 65-65 -0.3 PRICE Queenstown 872 681 282 997 838 1835 44.3 55.7 1035 800 1835-13.5 13.5 38-38 -0.2 WAITE Myrtle Bank 336 1712 480 536 1992 2528 41.7 58.3 568 1960 2528-6.8 6.8 32-32 -0.2 SOURCE: calculations made for Table 3: full set available on request.

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 5: ESTIMATED 2PP VOTE FOR THE THREE MOST MARGINAL, 1989 STATE ELECTION RESULTS APPLIED TO THE 1991 BOUNDARIES ALP estimates Liberal Party estimates Jaensch estimates Parliamentary Library (Newton) estimates NEWLAND ALP 50 to 53 ALP 50.4 50.0: 50.0 ALP 50.6 UNLEY ALP 50 to 53 ALP 51.2 ALP 50.5 ALP 50.4 COLTON ALP 50 to 53 LIB 50.9 LIB 52.0 LIB 50.9 SOURCE: Newton, J., 1992, The 1991 Electoral Redistribution in South Australia: 1989 voting statistics transferred to the new House of Assembly boundaries, Research Service Information Paper No.11, Parliamentary Library of South Australia, Adelaide.

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 6: DECLARATION VOTES AS A PROPORTION OF ALL VOTES IN EACH SEAT, STATE ELECTION 1993 STATE ELECTION 1993 1997 ADELAIDE 15.6 17.4 BRAGG 14.1 16.7 BRIGHT 12.1 14.2 CHAFFEY 6.8 12.2 COLES 11.0 13.2 COLTON 11.6 14.4 CUSTANCE 8.7 seat did not continue DAVENPORT 12.4 14.7 ELDER 12.6 14.9 ELIZABETH 10.5 15.0 EYRE 13.0 seat did not continue FINNISS 8.0 12.0 FISHER 11.4 14.8 FLINDERS 9.7 13.6 FLOREY 11.4 14.9 FROME 9.0 14.9 GILES 10.2 14.3 GORDON 8.2 13.0 GOYDER 10.0 13.0 HAMMOND new seat 16.2 HANSON 14.2 15.1 HART 10.1 13.3 HARTLEY 13.9 16.0 HEYSEN 10.9 14.5 KAURNA 10.7 14.1 KAVEL 11.1 14.5 LEE 11.2 14.5 LIGHT 9.5 12.5 MACKILLOP 9.3 12.8 MAWSON 11.1 15.4 MITCHELL 11.3 14.8 MORPHETT 12.6 15.5 NAPIER 12.1 12.7 NEWLAND 11.4 13.7 NORWOOD 15.5 16.9 PEAKE 10.9 12.9 PLAYFORD 11.0 12.9 PRICE 11.6 13.2 RAMSAY 11.1 13.2 REYNELL 12.1 13.8 RIDLEY 11.9 seat did not continue ROSS SMITH 13.2 14.1 SCHUBERT new seat 12.8 SPENCE 10.7 13.1 STUART new seat 17.2 TAYLOR 13.8 14.5 TORRENS 12.1 14.7 UNLEY 14.4 16.3 WAITE 14.4 18.0 WRIGHT 12.5 15.6 AVERAGE, ALL 11.5 14.4.. SOURCES: South Australia. State Electoral Office, 1996, Statistical Returns for General Elections 11 December 1993 and By-elections 1994, State Electoral Office, Adelaide. Official but as-yet-unpublished 1997 State election data from the State Electoral Office

.. INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 7 A: EFFECT OF DECLARATION VOTES ON THE TOTAL FORMAL VOTE IN EACH SEAT, 1993 SWING TO LOSE PERCENT AGE OF VOTES EFFECT OF WHICH WERE FORMAL INCLUDING ALP LIB DECLARATION ORDINARY ALL DECLARATION (%) (%) VOTES VOTES VOTES VOTES PRICE 11.1 96.8 95.7 95.8 0.1 RAMSAY 10.0 97.3 96.5 96.6 0.1 1--'---- HART 8.6 95.0 94.7 94.7 0.0 TAYLOR 8.1 96.1 96.5 96.5-0.1 SPENCE 7.8 97.5 95.9 96.1 0.2 ELIZABETH 7.7 96.6 96.4 96.4 0.0 --- --,----"-~ PLAYFORD 2.8 97.5 96.4 96.5 0.1 GILES 2.5 97.4 97.8 97.7 0.0 ROSS SMITH 2.2 95.7 96.3 96.2-0.1 NAPIER 1.2 95.3 95.0 95.0 0.0 AVERAGE, ALP 96.5 96.1 96.2 0.0 LEE 1.2 95.5 94.9 95.0 0.1 HANSON 1.3 96.7 95.9 96.0 0.1 REYNELL 1.3 97.0 97.1 97.1 0.0 KAURNA 2.9 95.6 96.0 95.9 0.0 ELDER 3.5 95.8 95.3 95.3 0.1 WRIGHT 4.1 97.0 97.5 97.4-0.1 PEAKE 5.7 92.9 95.7 95.4-0.3 FROME 5.8 98.5 97.9 97.9 0.1 -,,- -----f-----,-- EYRE 6.6 98.1 97.8 97.8 0.0 TORRENS 6.6 95.2 96.0 95.9-0.1 NORWOOD 7.5 97.7 96.9 97.0 0.1 MITCHELL 9.5 97.4 96.4 96.5 0.1 MAWSON 9.7 96.7 96.7 96.7 0.0 -------r----'- '-,------, -,----~--- ----------..._- FLOREY 10.5 96.7 97.1 97.1-0.1 COLTON 10.6 96.4 95.8 95.9 0.1 UNLEY 11.6 97.4 97.3 97.3 0.0 HARTLEY 13.3 96.7 96.6 96.6 0.0 ADELAIDE 14.2 98.3 97.1 97.3 0.2 COLES 16.0 97.3 96.3 96.4 0.1 LIGHT 16.5 97.5 97.2 97.3 0.0 NEWLAND 17.5 97.5 97.4 97.4 0.0 BRIGHT 19.1 98.2 97.8 97.9 0.0 FISHER 20.8 97.4 97.7 97.7 0.0 MORPHETT 22.0 97.0 97.3 97.3 0.0 GORDON 22.3 99.4 97.9 98.0 0.1 DAVENPORT (rethrow) 22.3 97.8 98.0 98.0 0.0 GOYDER 23.4 98.2 97.9 98.0 0.0 WAITE (rethrow) 24.0 96.8 97.2 97.1-0.1 KAVEL 24.4 97.7 97.3 97.4 0.0 FINNISS 24.5 98.4 97.6 97.7 0.1 HEYSEN 24.6 98.1 98.2 98.2 0.0 CUSTANCE 24.6 97.9 97.4 97.4 0.0 RIDLEY 25.2 98.3 97.4 97.5 0.1 MACKILLOP 27.8 98.7 98.2 98.2 0.0 BRAGG 28.8 97.9 98.1 98.1 0.0 CHAFFEY (rethrow) 29.1 97.1 96.7 96.7 0.0 FLINDERS (rethrow) 30.7 98.3 98.1 98.1 0.0 AVERAGE, LIB 97.2 97.1 97.1 0.0 AVERAGE, ALL 97.1 96.9 96.9 0.0.. SOURCE: calculated from data published In: South Australia. State Electoral Office, 1996, Statistical Returns for General Elections 11 December 1993 and By-elections 1994. State Electoral Office, Adelaide.

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 7B: EFFECT OF DECLARATION VOTES ON THE TOTAL FORMAL VOTE IN EACH SEAT, 1997 SWING TO LOSE PERCENTAGE OF VOTES EFFECT OF WHICH WERE FORMAL INCLUDING ALP LIB DECLARATION ORDINARY ALL DECLARATION (%) (%) VOTES VOTES VOTES VOTES PRICE 24.5 95.2 96.2 95.3 0.1 SPENCE 23.4 95.8 96.7 96.0 0.1 HART 22.8 95.9 96.3 96.0 0.1 TAYLOR 22.3 94.9 96.0 95.1 0.2 NAPIER 21.2 (rethrow) 95.2 96.9 95.4 0.2 RAMSAY 18.3 94.2 95.4 94.3 0.2 ROSS SMITH 14.9 95.1 96.3 95.2 0.2 ELIZABETH 14.4 95.6 96.6 95.8 0.1 PLAYFORD 13.1 95.1 96.2 95.2 0.1 GILES 11.5 96.5 98.1 96.7 0.2 TORRENS 10.2 95.9 96.4 96.0 0.1 LEE 7.2 93.9 95.1 "--- 94.1-0.2 PEAKE 7.1 95.8 96.6 95.9 0.1 KAURNA 5.9 95.6 95.9 95.7 0.0 HANSON 5.6 94.1 95.3 94.3 0.2 REYNELL 3.8 94.9 96.4 95.1 0.2 WRIGHT 3.2 95.4 95.8 95.4 0.1 ELDER 2.7 93.9 95.4 94.2 0.2 FLOREY 1.5 95.0 95.8 95.1 0.1 MITCHELL 1.0 96.5 96.4 96.4 0.0 NORWOOD 0.8 95.9 96.1 95.9 0.0 AVERAGE, ALP 95.3 96.2 95.4 0.1 HARTLEY 0.6 95.8 96.8 96.0 0.2 STUART 1.7 96.8 97.5 96.9 0.1 FROME 3.0 96.6 98.1 96.8 0.2 COLTON 4.1 96.7 97.4 96.8 0.1 UNLEY 4.6 96.5 97.4 96.6 0.1 MAWSON 4.8 96.0 96.1 96.0 0.0 ADELAIDE 5.5 96.4 97.4 96.5 0.2 --------~.-. ---------"- ""------ "- BRIGHT 6.2 96.2 96.7 ---------------0.1 96.3 LIGHT 6.4 95.4 96.8 95.6 0.2 COLES 7.9 95.3 96.8 95.5 0.2 NEWLAND 8.1 95.7 96.7 95.8 0.1 "- FISHER 9.9 96.7 95.9 96.6-0.1 "------ - "-- HEYSEN (rethrow) 12.2 96.8 97.1 96.8 0.1 WAITE (rethrow) 12.2 96.6 96.9 96.6 0.1 GORDON (rethrow) 12.4 96.6 97.8 96.7 0.2 MORPHETT 13.1 96.5 96.9 96.5 0.1 DAVENPORT (rethrow) 13.9 96.3 96.1 96.3 0.0 HAMMOND 14.9 96.2 97.3 96.4 0.2 SCHUBERT (rethrow) 15.0 96.3 96.5 96.3 0.0 KAVEL (rethrow) 15.1 95.7 96.5 95.8 0.1 FINNISS (rethrow) 16.0 95.9 97.6 96.1 0.2 GOYDER 17.3 95.4 96.9 95.6 0.2 BRAGG 18.9 96.6 96.5 96.6 0.0 MACKILLOP (rethrow) 20.9 96.3 98.7 96.6 0.3 CHAFFEY (rethrow) 21.1 97.2 97.5 97.2 0.0 FLINDERS (rethrow) 28.6 97.6 98.1 97.6 0.1 AVERAGE, LIB 96.3 97.1 96.4 0.1 AVERAGE, ALL 95.8 96.7 96.0 0.1 SOURCE: calculated from official but as-yet-unpubhshed results of the State election 1997, from the State Electoral Office.

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 8A: EFFECT OF DECLARATION VOTES ON THE TWO PARTY PREFERRED VOTE IN EACH SEAT, 1993 SWING 2PP 2PP EFFECT OF TO ORDINARY ALL DECLARATION LOSE VOTES VOTES VOTES ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) PRICE 11.1 60.9 61.0 0.1 RAMSAY 10.0 60.2 59.9-0.2 HART 8.6 58.4 58.5 0.1 -- - TAYLOR 8.1 58.6 58.0-0.7 SPENCE 7.8 57.7 57.7 0.1 ELIZABETH 7.7 57.2 57.6 0.3 PLAYFORD 2.8 52.3 52.7 0.3 GILES 2.5 53.2 52.4-0.8 ROSS SMITH 2.2 52.0 52.1 0.1 NAPIER 1.2 51.4 51.1-0.3 A VERAGE, ALP 56.2 43.8 56.1 43.9-0.1 LEE 1.2 51.2 51.1-0.1 HANSON 1.3 50.9 51.2 0.3 REYNELL 1.3 51.2 51.2 0.0 KAURNA 2.9 52.8 52.8 0.0 ELDER 3.5 53.7 53.4-0.3 WRIGHT 4.1 54.2 54.0-0.1 ~- PEAKE 5.7 56.6 55.6-1.0 FROME 5.8 55.5 55.7 0.3 EYRE 6.6 55.4 56.5 1.1 TORRENS 6.6 56.2 56.5 0.3 NORWOOD 7.5 56.8 57.4 0.6 MITCHELL 9.5 59.3 59.4 0.0 MAWSON 9.7 59.7 59.6-0.1 FLOREY 10.5 ~---~- 60.4 60.4 0.0 COLTON 10.6 60.6 60.5-0.1 UNLEY 11.6 61.8 61.5-0.3 HARTLEY 13.3 62.8 63.2 0.4 ADELAIDE 14.2 64.3 64.1-0.2 COLES 16.0 66.2 65.9-0.3 LIGHT 16.5 66.3 66.4 0.1 NEWLAND 17.5 67.7 67.4-0.3 BRIGHT 19.1 69.3 69.0-0.3 FISHER 20.8 71.0 70.7-0.3 MORPHETT 22.0 72.1 71.9-0.2 GORDON 22.3 72.1 72.2 0.1 DAVENPORT (rethrow) 22.3 72.7 72.2-0.5 GOYDER 23.4 73.4 73.3-0.1 WAITE (rethrow) 24.0 74.2 73.9-0.3 KAVEL 24.4 75.2 74.3-0.9 FINNISS 24.5 74.6 74.4-0.2 HEYSEN 24.6 74.4 74.5 0.1 CUSTANCE 24.6 RIDLEY 25.2 74.8 75.1 0.3 MACKILLOP 27.8 77.7 77.7 0.0 BRAGG 28.8 79.2 78.7-0.5 CHAFFEY (rethrow) 29.1 79.6 79.0-0.6 FLINDERS (rethrow) 30.7 80.7 80.6 0.0 AVERAGE, LIB 34.7 65.3 34.9 65.1-0.2 AVERAGE, ALL 39.3 60.7 39.4 60.6 0.1-0.1 SOURCE: calculated from data published In: South Australia. State Electoral Office, 1996, Statistical Returns for General Elections 11 December 1993 and By-elections 1994, State Electoral Office, Adelaide.

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 8B: EFFECT OF DECLARATION VOTES ON THE TWO PARTY PREFERRED VOTE IN EACH SEAT, 1997 SWING 2PP 2PP EFFECT OF TO ORDINARY ALL DEC LARA TlON LOSE VOTES VOTES VOTES ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) PRICE 24.5 74.6 74.4-0.2 SPENCE 23.4 74.3 73.3-1.0 HART 22.8 73.0 72.7-0.3 TAYLOR 22.3 72.9 72.2-0.7 NAPIER 21.2 (rethrow) 71.4 71.1-0.3 RAMSAY 18.3 68.9 68.2-0.7 ROSS SMITH 14.9 65.1 64.8-0.3 ELIZABETH 14.4 64.6 64.3-0.3 PLAYFORD 13.1 63.5 63.0-0.5 GILES 11.5 63.0 61.4-1.6 TORRENS 10.2 60.4 60.1-0.3 LEE 7.2 57.2 57.1-0.1 PEAKE 7.1 57.4 57.0-0.4 KAURNA 5.9 56.3 55.9-0.4 HANSON 5.6 56.2 55.5-0.7 REYNELL 3.8 53.8 53.7-0.1 WRIGHT 3.2 53.3 53.1-0.2 ELDER 2.7 52.6 52.7 0.1 FLOREY 1.5 52.0 51.4-0.6 MITCHELL 1.0 51.1 50.9-0.2 NORWOOD 0.8 51.6 50.7-0.9 A VERAGE, ALP 61.6 38.4 61.1 38.9-0.5 HARTLEY 0.6 50.2 49.8 49.5 50.5 0.7 STUART 1.7 50.6 51.6 1.0 FROME 3.0 51.9 52.9 1.0 COLTON 4.1 53.9 54.0 0.1 UNLEY 4.6 54.2 54.5 0.3 MAWSON 4.8 54.8 54.7-0.1 ADELAIDE 5.5 55.1 55.4 0.3,-- ----~--~-.~,-- BRIGHT 6.2 56.4 56.1-0.3 LIGHT 6.4 56.3 56.3 0.0 COLES 7.9 57.3 57.8 0.5 NEWLAND 8.1 57.9 58.0 0.1 FISHER 9.9 59.7 59.8 0.1 _.---- HEYSEN (rethrow) 12.2 62.3 62.1-0.2 WAITE (rethrow) 12.2 61.8 62.2 0.4 GORDON (rethrow) 12.4 62.0 62.3 0.3 MORPHETT 13.1 63.0 63.0 0.0 DAVENPORT (rethrow) 13.9 62.6 63.8 1.2 HAMMOND 14.9 63.8 64.8 1.0 SCHUBERT (rethrow) 15.0 65.4 64.9-0.5 KAVEL (rethrow) 15.1 65.0 65.0 0.0 FINN ISS (rethrow) 16.0 66.0 65.9-0.1 GOYDER 17.3 67.6 67.2-0.4 BRAGG 18.9 69.0 68.8-0.2 MACKILLOP (rethrow) 20.9 70.7 70.9 0.2 CHAFFEY (rethrow) 21.1 71.4 71.0-0.4 FLINDERS (rethrow) 28.6 78.4 78.5 0.1 AVERAGE, LIB 39.0 61.0 38.8 61.2 0.2 A VERAGE, ALL 48.8 51.2 48.5 51.5-0.3 0.3 SOURCE: calculated from official but as-yet-unpublished results of the State election 1997, from the State Electoral Office.

---~-~~- ---.~----- -~-~.-- ~-.--.-,-- ----~-.---.---.--~--- INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 9A: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DECLARATION VOTES AND ORDINARY VOTES IN EACH SEAT,1993 SWING 2PP 2PP DIFFERENCE EFFECT OF TO ORDINARY DECLARATION (DECLARATION DECLARATION LOSE VOTES VOTES MINUS ORDINARY) VOTES ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) ALP RETAINED THESE PRICE 11.1 60.9 62.0 1.1 0.1 RAMSAY 10.0 60.2 57.9-2.2-0.2 HART 8.6 58.4 59.8 1.4 0.1 TAYLOR 8.1 58.6 53.8-4.8-0.7 SPENCE 7.8 57.7 58.3 0.6 0.1 ELIZABETH 7.7 57.2 60.5 3.2 0.3 PLAYFORD 2.8 52.3 55.5 3.1 0.3 GILES 2.5 53.2 45.7 54.3-7.5-0.8 ROSS SMITH 2.2 52.0 52.9 0.9 0.1 NAPIER 1.2 51.4 48.7 51.3-2.7-0.3 AVERAGE, THE ALP RETAINED 56.2 43.8 55.4 44.6-0.8 0.8-0.1 0.1 ALP LOST THESE TO LIB LEE 1.2 48.8 51.2 49.9 50.1-1.1-0.1 HANSON 1.3 49.1 50.9 47.1 52.9 2.0 0.3 REYNELL 1.3 48.8 51.2 48.4 51.6 0.4 0.0 KAURNA 2.9 47.2 52.8 47.4 52.6-0.2 0.0 ELDER 3.5 46.3 53.7 48.8 51.2-2.5-0.3 WRIGHT 4.1 45.8 54.2 46.8 53.2-1.0-0.1 PEAKE 5.7 43.4 56.6 52.9 47.1 9.6-9.6 1.0-1.0 TORRENS 6.6 43.8 56.2 41.1 58.9 2.7 0.3 NORWOOD 7.5 43.2 56.8 39.4 60.6 3.8 0.6 MITCHELL 9.5 40.7 59.3 40.3 59.7 0.3 0.0 MAWSON 9.7 40.3 59.7 40.9 59.1-0.5-0.1 FLOREY 10.5 39.6 60.4 40.0 60.0-0.4 0.0 UNLEY 11.6 38.2 61.8 40.2 59.8-2.0-0.3 NEWLAND 17.5 32.3 67.7 35.3 64.7-3.0-0.3 AVERAGE, THE ALP LOST TO LIB 43.4 56.6 44.2 55.8 0.8-0.8 0.1-0.1 LIB RETAINED THESE FROME 5.8 55.5 58.6 3.1 0.3 EYRE 6.6 55.4 63.5 8.1 1.1 COLTON 10.6 60.6 59.8-0.8-0.1 HARTLEY 13.3 62.8 65.4 2.5 0.4 ADELAIDE 14.2 64.3 62.9-1.4-0.2 COLES 16.0 66.2 63.1-3.1-0.3 LIGHT 16.5 66.3 67.6 1.4 0.1 BRIGHT 19.1 69.3 66.6-2.7-0.3 FISHER 20.8 71.0 68.4-2.6-0.3 MORPHETT 22.0 72.1 70.4-1.6-0.2 GORDON 22.3 72.1 73.0 0.9 0.1 DAVENPORT (rethrow) 22.3 72.7 69.0-3.7-0.5 GOYDER 23.4 73.4 72.0-1.4-0.1 WAITE (rethrow) 24.0 74.2 72.1-2.1-0.3 KAVEL 24.4 75.2 67.2-8.0-0.9 FINNISS 24.5 74.6 71.9-2.8-0.2 HEYSEN 24.6 74.4 74.9 0.5 0.1 CUSTANCE 24.6 RIDLEY 25.2 74.8 77.2 2.4 0.3 MACKILLOP 27.8 77.7 77.3-0.4 0.0 BRAGG 28.8 79.2 76.0-3.2-0.5 CHAFFEY (rethrow) 29.1 79.6 71.4-8.2-0.6 FLINDERS (rethrow) 30.7 80.7 80.3-0.4 0.0 AVERAGE, LIB RETAINED 29.5 70.5 30.5 69.5 1.1-1.1 0.2-0.2 AVERAGE, ALL 39.3 60.7 40.2 59.8 0.9-0.9 0.1-0.1.. SOURCE: calculated from data published In: South Australia. State Electoral Office, 1996, Statistical Returns for General Elections 11 December 1993 and By-elections 1994, State Electoral Office, Adelaide... ~-- -- - ------ ------_.-

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 9B: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DECLARATION VOTES AND ORDINARY VOTES IN EACH SEAT, 1997 SWING 2PP 2PP DIFFERENCE EFFECT OF TO ORDINARY DECLARA TION (DECLARATION DECLARA TION LOSE VOTES VOTES MINUS ORDINARY) VOTES ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) ALP RETAINED THESE PRICE 24.5 74.6 73.1-1.5-0.2 SPENCE 23.4 74.3 66.2-8.1-1.0 HART 22.8 73.0 70.4-2.6-0.3 TAYLOR 22.3 72.9 67.7-5.2-0.7 NAPIER 21.2 (rethrow) 71.4 69.1-2.3-0.3 RAMSAY 18.3 68.9 63.9-5.0-0.7 ROSS SMITH 14.9 65.1 62.6-2.5-0.3 ELIZABETH 14.4 64.6 62.9-1.7-0.3 PLAYFORD 13.1 63.5 59.3-4.2-0.5 GILES 11.5 63.0 52.1-10.9-1.6 AVERAGE, THE ALP RETAINED 69.1 30.9 64.7 35.3-4.4 4.4-0.6 0.6 LIB LOST THESE TO THE A'LP TORRENS 10.2 60.4 39.6 58.2 41.8-2.2 2.2-0.3 0.3 LEE 7.2 57.2 42.8 56.6 43.4 ~ 0.6-0.1 0.1 PEAKE 7.1 57.4 42.6 53.7 46.3-3.7 3.7-0.4 0.4 -- KAURNA 5.9 56.3 43.7 53.7 46.3-2.6 2.6 ---0.4 0.4 HANSON 5.6 56.2 43.8 52.1 47.9-4.1 4.1-0.7 0.7 REYNELL 3.8 53.8 46.2 52.9 47.1-0.9 0.9-0.1 0.1 WRIGHT 3.2 53.3 46.7 52.1 47.9-1.2 1.2-0.2 0.2 ELDER 2.7 52.6 47.4 53.1 46.9 0.5-0.5 0.1-0.1 FLOREY 1.5 52.0 48.0 47.8 52.2-4.2 4.2-0.6 0.6 MITCHELL 1.0 51.1 48.9 49.5 50.5-1.6 1.6-0.2 0.2 NORWOOD 0.8 51.6 48.4 46.5 53.5-5.1 5.1-0.9 0.9 AVERAGE, LIB LOST TO THE ALP 54.7 45.3 52.4 47.6-2.3 2.3-0.3 0.3 LIB RETAINED THESE HARTLEY 0.6 50.2 49.8 45.7 54.3-4.5 4.5 0.7 STUART 1.7 50.6 56.0 5.4 1.0 FROME 3.0 51.9 58.6 6.7 1.0 COLTON 4.1 53.9 54.7 0.8 0.1 UNLEY 4.6 54.2 56.2 2.0 0.3 MAWSON 4.8 54.8 54.0-0.8-0.1 f'.delaide 5.5 55.1 56.4 1.3 0.3.._---- -- --------- -~--- BRIGHT 6.2 56.4 54.5-1.9-0.3 LIGHT 6.4 56.3 56.0-0.3 0.0 COLES 7.9 57.3 61.4 4.1 0.5 NEWLAND 8.1 57.9 58.7 0.8 0.1 FISHER 9.9 59.7 60.2 0.5 0.1 -- ------ - ------- HEYSEN (rethrow) 12.2 62.3 61.2-1.1-0.2 WAITE (rethrow) 12.2 61.8 64.2 2.4 0.4 GORDON (rethrow) 12.4 62.0 64.4 2.4 0.3 MORPHETT 13.1 63.0 63.6 0.6 0.0 DAVENPORT (rethrow) 13.9 62.6 70.7 8.1 1.2 HAMMOND 14.9 63.8 69.7 5.9 1.0 SCHUBERT (rethrow) 15.0 65.4 61.3-4.1-0.5 KAVEL (rethrow) 15.1 65.0 64.5-0.5 0.0 FINNISS (rethrow) 16.0 66.0 65.4-0.6-0.1 GOYDER 17.3 67.6 64.6-3.0-0.4 BRAGG 18.9 69.0 67.9-1.1-0.2 MACKILLOP (rethrow) 20.9 70.7 71.7 1.0 0.2 CHAFFEY (rethrow) 21.1 71.4 67.5-3.9-0.4 FLINDERS (rethrow) 28.6 78.4 78.9 0.5 0.1 AVERAGE, LIB RETAINED 39.0 61.0 37.8 62.2-1.1 1.1-0.2 0.2 AVERAGE, ALL 48.8 51.2 47.0 53.0-1.8 1.8 0.3 0.3 SOURCE: calculated from official but as-yet-unpubllshed results of the State election 1997, from the State Electoral Office.

INFORMATION PAPER 16 : MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE loa: TWO PARTY PREFERRED VOTE IN EACH SEAT IF THERE HAD BEEN THE SAME NUMBER OF DECLARATION VOTES IN EACH SEAT, STATE ELECTION 1993. RANK ALL VOTES LESS EQUALS ACTUAL APPLY ADD ORDINARIES GIVES US FINAL LESS EQUALS I ORDINARIES DECSEFFECT DECS2PP rom1decs FINAL COUNT 2PP ORDINARIES DECSEFFECT SWING ACTUAL ACTUAL ACTUAL ACTUAL HYPOTHETICAL ACTUAL HYPOTHETICAL ALL VOTES ACTUAL EXPECTED TO ALL ORDINARY EFFECT OF DECLARATION DECLARATION ORDINARY VOTES (actual ordinary votes ORDINARY EFFECT OF LOSE VOTES VOTES DEC VOTES VOTES VOTES (ind. ord. ticket votes) plus hypothetical dec votes) VOTES DEC VOTES ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB TOTAL ALP LIB TOTAL ALP LIB TOTAL ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB (%) 10/0) (%] (%L.[%) 10/0).roAl].(%1 (%) (%) (No) (No) (No) (No) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) PRICE 11.1 61.0 39.0 60.9 39.1 0.1 62.0 38.0 1387 850 2237 10310 6626 16936 11697 7476 19173 61.0 39.0 60.9 39.1 0.1 RAMSAY 10.0 59.9 40.1 60.2 39.8-0.2 57.9 42.1 1296 941 2237 10671 7063 17734 11967 8004 19971 59.9 40.1 60.2 39.8-0.3 HART 8.6 58.5 41.5 58.4 41.6 0.1 59.8 40.2 1339 898 2237 9635 6863 16498 10974 7761 18735 58.6 41.4 58.4 41.6 0.2 TAYLOR 8.1 58.0 42.0 58.6 41.4-0.7 53.8 46.2 1204 1033 2237 9405 6640 16045 10609 7673 18282 58.0 42.0 58.6 41.4-0.6 SPENCE 7.8 57.7 42.3 57.7 42.3 0.1 583 41.7 1303 934 2237 9803 7200 17003 11106 8134 19240 57.7 42.3 57.7 42.3 0.1 ELIZABETH 7.7 57.6 42.4 57.2 42.8 03 605 39.5 1353 884 2237 9147 6831 15978 10500 7715 18215 57.6 42.4 57.2 42.8 0.4 I PLAYFORD 2.8 52.7 47.3 523 47.7 0.3 55.5 44.5 1240 997 2237 8866 8072 16938 10106 9069 19175 52.7 47.3 52.3 47.7 0.4 GILES 2.5 52.4 47.6 53.2 46.8-0.8 45.7 54.3 1022 1215 2237 8945 7866 16811 9967 9081 19048 52.3 47.7 53.2 46.8-0.9 ROSS SMITH 2.2 52.1 47.9 52.0 48.0 0.1 52.9 47.1 1184 1053 2237 8460 7805 16265 9644 8858 18502 52.1 47.9 52.0 48.0 0.1 NAPIER 1.2 51.1 48.9 51.4 48.6-0.3 48.7 51.3 1090 1147 2237 8780 8300 17080 9870 9447 19317 51.1 48.9 51.4 48.6-0.3 TOTAL, ALP 12420 9950 22370 94022 73266 167288 106442 83216 189658 AVE, ALL ALP 56.1 43.9 56.2 43.8-0.1 0.1 55.4 44.6 1242 995 2237 9402 7327 16729 10644 8322 18966 56.1 43.9 56.2 43.8-0.1 0.1 LEE 1.2 48.9 51.1 48.8 51.2-0.1 49.9 50.1 1116 1121 2237 8350 8771 17121 9466 9892 19358 48.9 51.1 48.8 51.2-0.1 HANSON 1.3 48.8 51.2 49.1 50.9 0.3 47.1 52.9 1054 1183 2237 8254 8548 16802 9308 9731 19039 48.9 51.1 49.1 50.9 0.2 REYNELL 1.3 48.8 51.2 48.8 51.2 00 48.4 51.6 1084 1153 2237 8005 8385 16390 9089 9538 18627 48.8 51.2 48.8 51.2 00 KAURNA 2.9 472 52.8 472 52.8 0.0 47.4 52.6 1061 1176 2237 7684 8601 16285 8745 9777 18522 47.2 52.8 47.2 52.8 00 ELDER 3.5 46.6 53.4 46.3 53.7-0.3 48.8 51.2 1091 1146 2237 7654 8886 16540 8745 10032 18777 46.6 53.4 46.3 53.7-03 WRIGHT 4.1 46.0 54.0 45.8 54.2-0.1 468 53.2 1047 1190 2237 8463 10003 18466 9510 11193 20703 45.9 54.1 45.8 54.2-0.1 PEAKE 5.7 44.4 55.6 43.4 56.6-1.0 52.9 47.1 1184 1053 2237 7391 9656 17047 8575 10709 19284 44.5 55.5 43.4 56.6-1.1 FROME 5.8 44.3 55.7 44.5 55.5 0.3 41.4 58.6 926 1311 2237 8294 10329 18623 9220 11640 20860 44.2 55.8 44.5 55.5 0.3 EYRE 6.6 43.5 56.5 44.6 55.4 1.1 36.5 63.5 817 1420 2237 6938 8624 15562 7755 10044 17799 43.6 56.4 44.6 55.4 1.0 TORRENS 6.6 43.5 56.5 43.8 56.2 0.3 41.1 58.9 919 1318 2237 7458 9576 17034 8377 10894 19271 43.5 56.5 43.8 56.2 03 NORWOOD 7.5 42.6 57.4 43.2 56.8 0.6 39.4 60.6 881 1356 2237 6903 9064 15967 7784 10420 18204 42.8 57.2 43.2 568 0.5 MITCHELL 9.5 40.6 59.4 40.7 59.3 0.0 40.3 59.7 902 1335 2237 6891 10061 16952 7793 11396 19189 40.6 59.4 40.7 59.3 0.0 MAWSON 9.7 40.4 59.6 40.3 59.7-0.1 40.9 59.1 915 1322 2237 7653 11317 18970 8568 12639 21207 40.4 59.6 40.3 59.7-0.1 FLOREY 10.5 39.6 60.4 39.6 60.4 0.0 40.0 60.0 894 1343 2237 7076 10795 17871 7970 12138 20108 39.6 60.4 39.6 60.4 0.0 COLTON 10.6 39.5 60.5 39.4 60.6-0.1 40.2 59.8 900 1337 2237 6783 10431 17214 7683 11768 19451 39.5 60.5 39.4 60.6-0.1 UNLEY 11.6 38.5 61.5 38.2 61.8-0.3 40.2 59.8 898 1339 2237 6521 10566 17087 7419 11905 19324 38.4 61.6 38.2 61.8-0.2 HARTLEY 13.3 36.8 63.2 372 62.8 0.4 34.6 65.4 775 1462 2237 6288 10624 16912 7063 12086 19149 36.9 63.1 37.2 62.8 0.3 ADELAIDE 14.2 35.9 64.1 35.7 64.3-0.2 37.1 62.9 830 1407 2237 5685 10225 15910 6515 11632 18147 35.9 64.1 35.7 64.3-0.2 COLES 16.0 34.1 65.9 33.8 66.2-0.3 36.9 63.1 825 1412 2237 5844 11466 17310 6669 12878 19547 34.1 65.9 33.8 66.2-0.4 LIGHT 16.5 33.6 66.4 33.7 66.3 0.1 32.4 67.6 724 1513 2237 5708 11214 16922 6432 12727 19159 33.6 66.4 33.7 66.3 0.2 NEWLAND 17.5 32.6 67.4 32.3 67.7-0.3 35.3 64.7 789 1448 2237 5712 11989 17701 6501 13437 19938 32.6 67.4 32.3 67.7-0.3 BRIGHT 19.1 31.0 69.0 30.7 69.3-0.3 33.4 66.6 746 1491 2237 5302 11963 17265 6048 13454 19502 31.0 69.0 30.7 69.3-0.3 FISHER 20.8 29.3 70.7 29.0 710-0.3 31.6 68.4 706 1531 2237 5152 12625 17777 5858 14156 20014 293 70.7 29.0 710-0.3 MORPHETT 22.0 28.1 719 27.9 72.1-0.2 29.6 70.4 661 1576 2237 4683 12087 16770 5344 13663 19007 28.1 719 27.9 72.1-0.2 GORDON 22.3 27.8 72.2 27.9 72.1 0.1 27.0 73.0 603 1634 2237 4964 12855 17819 5567 14489 20056 27.8 72.2 27.9 72.1 0.1 DAVENPORT (rethrow) 22.3 27.8 72.2 27.3 72.7-0.5 31.0 69.0 694 1543 2237 4828 12852 17680 5522 14395 19917 27.7 72.3 27.3 72.7-0.4 GOYDER 23.4 26.7 73.3 26.6 73.4-0.1 28.0 72.0 626 1611 2237 4769 13164 17933 5395 14775 20170 26.7 733 26.6 73.4-0.2 WAITE (rethrow) 24.0 26.1 73.9 25.8 74.2-0.3 27.9 72.1 624 1613 2237 4419 12713 17132 5043 14326 19369 26.0 74.0 25.8 74.2-0.2 KAVEL 24.4 25.7 74.3 24.8 75.2-0.9 32.8 67.2 734 1503 2237 4167 12603 16770 4901 14106 19007 25.8 74.2 24.8 75.2-0.9 FINNISS 24.5 25.6 74.4 25.4 74.6-0.2 28.1 719 630 1607 2237 4560 13422 17982 5190 15029 20219 25.7 74.3 25.4 74.6-0.3 HEYSEN 24.6 25.5 74.5 25.6 74.4 0.1 25.1 74.9 561 1676 2237 4426 12892 17318 4987 14568 19555 25.5 74.5 25.6 74.4 0.1 CUSTANCE 24.6 RIDLEY 25.2 24.9 75.1 25.2 74.8 0.3 22.8 77.2 509 1728 2237 4367 12967 17334 4876 14695 19571 24.9 75.1 25.2 74.8 0.3 MACKILLOP 27.8 22.3 77.7 22.3 77.7 0.0 22.7 77.3 507 1730 2237 4136 14430 18566 4643 16160 20803 223 77.7 223 77.7 00 BRAGG 28.8 21.3 78.7 20.8 79.2-0.5 24.0 76.0 537 1700 2237 3584 13643 17227 4121 15343 19464 21.2 78.8 20.8 79.2-0.4 I CHAFFEY (rethrow) 29.1 210 79.0 20.4 79.6-0.6 28.6 71.4 640 1597 2237 3757 14616 18373 4397 16213 20610 21.3 78.7 20.4 79.6-0.9 FLINDERS (rethrow) 30.7 19.4 80.6 19.3 80.7 0.0 19.7 80.3 441 1796 2237 3347 13954 17301 3788 15750 19538 19.4 80.6 19.3 80.7 0.0 TOTAL, LIB 28857 51675 80532 216016 405917 621933 244873 457592 702465 AVE, ALL LIB 34.6 65.4 34.7 65.3-0.1 0.1 36.3 63.7 802 1435 2237 6000 11275 17276 6802 12711 19513 34.9 65.1 34.7 65.3 0.1-0.1 TOTAL, ALL 41276 61626 102902 310038 479183 789221 351314 540809 892123 AVE, ALL 39J 60.9-393 _6.0.7 -~_.0.2_ ---.102 598.. 897 1340 2237 674.0 10417 17157 7637 11757 19394 39.4 60.6 39.3 60.7 0.1 -.0.1 SOURCE: Caculated from data published in: South Aus~aia State E1ectora Office, 1996, Statistica Returns for Genera Elections 11 December 1993 and By-elections 1994 State E1ectora Office, Adelaide.

INFORMATION PAPER 15: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE lob: TWO PARTY PREFERRED VOTE IN EACH SEAT IF THERE HAD BEEN THE SAME NUMBER OF DECLARATION VOTES IN EACH SEAT, STATE ELECTION 1997. i i...... ~...,.,..,,~... RANK ALL VOTES I L"I>I> I "'-IUALI> ORDINARIES DECS EFFECT SWING ACTUAL ACTUAL ACTUAL TO ALL ORDINARY EFFECT OF LOSE VOTES VOTES DEC VOTES ALP LIB I ALP LIB 1 ALP LIB 1 ALP LIB ('!o) ('!o) _.. ('!o) ('!o) ('!o) ('!o) ('!o) ('!o) PRICE 24.5 74.4 74.6-0.2 SPENCE 23.4 73.3 74.3-1.0 HART 22.8 72.7 73.0-0.3 TAYLOR 22.3 72.2 72.9-0.7 NAPIER 21.2 (rethrow) 71.1 71.4-0.3 RAMSAY 18.3 68.2 68.9-0.7 ROSS SMITH 14.9 64.8 65.1-0.3 ELIZABETH 14.4 64.3 64.6-0.3 PLAYFORD 13.1 63.0 63.5-0.5 GILES 11.5 61.4 63.0-1.6 TORRENS LEE 10.2 60.1 60.4 ----~---..-5IT-.- 57.2-0.3 ~.-.. PEAKE 7.1 57.0 57.4-0.4 KAURNA 5.9 ---- 55.9 56.3.-- ~.--- HANSON 5.6 55.5 56.2-0.7 REYNELL 3.8 53.7 53.8-0.1 WRIGHT 3.2 53.1 53.3-0.2 ELDER 2.7 52.7 52.6 0.1 FLOREY 1.5 51.4 52.0-0.6 MITCHELL 1.0 50.9 51.1-0.2 NORWOOD 0.8 50.7 51.6-0.9 TOTAL, ALP AVERAGE, ALP HARTLEY 0.6 49.5 50.5 50.2 49.8-0.7 0.7 STUART 1.7 51.6 50.6 1.0 FROME 3.0 52.9 51.9 1.0 COL TON 4.1 54.0 53.9 0.1 UNLEY 4.6 54.5 54.2 0.3 MAWSON 4.8 54.7 54.8-0.1 1 ADELAIDE 5._5 _. ~ _~ ~ BRIGHT 6.2 56.1 56.4-0.3 LIGHT 6.4 56.3 56.3 0.0 COLES 7.9 57.8 57.3 0.5 NEWLAND 8.1 58.0 57.9 0.1 I- FISHER.~_ ~ ~ ---.9~ HEYSEN (rethrow) 12.2 62.1 62.3-0.2 WAITE (rethrow) 12.2 62.2 61.8 0.4 GORDON (rethrow) 12.4 62.3 62.0 0.3 MORPHETT 13.1 63.0 63.0 0.0 DAVENPORT (rethrow) 13.9 63.8 62.6 1.2 HAMMOND 14.9 64.8 63.8 1.0 SCHUBERT (rethrow) 15.0 64.9 65.4-0.5 KAVEL (rethrow) 15.1 65.0 65.0 0.0 FINN ISS (rethrow) 16.0 65.9 66.0-0.1 GOYDER 17.3 67.2 67.6-0.4 BRAGG 18.9 68.8 69.0-0.2 MACKILLOP (rethrow) 20.9 70.9 70.7 0.2 CHAFFEY (rethrow) 21.1 71.0 71.4-0.4 FLINDERS (rethrow) 28.6 78.5 78.4 0.1 TOTAL, LIB AVERAGE, LIB TOTAL, ALL AVERAGE,ALL SOURCE: calculated from official but as-yet-unpublished results of the State election 1997. from the Slate Electoral Office. ACTUAL DECS2PP APPlY ADD ORDINARIES GIVES US FINAL LESS I EQUALS TO 2749 DECS FINAL COUNT 2PP ORDINARIES DECSEFFECT ACTUAL HYPOTHETICAL ACTUAL ~ HYPOTHETICAL ALL VOTES ACTUAL EXPECTED DECLARATION DECLARATION OR. DINARY. V. OTES. (actu.al ordinary vot.es ORDINARY EFFECT OF VOTES VOTES -.Jin.cl. om. ticket votes] Qlus hypojl!eti~dec vote l VOTES DEC VOTES ALP LIB ALP LIB TOTAL 1 ALP LIB TOTAL ALP LIB TOTAL I ALP LIB I ALP LIB 1 ALP LIB ('!o) ('!o) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (N.Q.L (tio.) _(No.) _ ('!o) ('!o) ('!oj ('!ol ('!o) ('!o) 73.1 26.9 2010 739 2749 11539 3929 15468 13549 4668 18217 74.4 25.6 74.6-0.2 66.2 33.8 1820 929 2749 11752 4057 15809 13572 4986 18558 73.1 26.9 74.3-1.2 70.4 29.6 1935 814 2749 11864 4384 16248 13799 5198 18997 72.6 27.4 73.0-0.4 67.7 32.3 1861 888 2749 11299 4194 15493 13160 5082 18242 72.1 27.9 72.9-0.8 69.1 30.9 1900 849 2749 11125 4454 15579 13025 5303 18328 71.1 28.9 71.4-0.3 63.9 36.1 1757 992 2749 10585 4779 15364 12342 5771 18113 68.1 31.9 68.9-0.8 62.6 37.4 1721 1028 2749 9701 5196 14897 11422 6224 17646 64.7 35.3 65.1-0.4 62.9 37.1 1729 1020 2749 10873 5961 16834 12602 6981 19583 64.4 35.6 64.6-0.2 59.3 40.7 1630 1119 2749 10710 6154 16864 12340 7273 19613 62.9 37.1 63.5-0.6 52.1 47.9 1432 1317 2749 9781 5737 15518 11213 7054 18267 61.4 38.6 63.0-1.6 58.2 41.8 1600 1149 2749 9751 6396 16147 11351 7545 18896 60.1 39.9 60.4-0.3 56.6 43.4 1556 1193 -~ 9129 6829 15958 10685 8022 18707 57.1 42.9 57.2 t--:::_0'7.1--- 1--53.7 _~ _~. 1273 _~ 9429 6987 16416 10905 8260 19165 56.9 43.1 ~_ t--:::-0",-.5 i 53.7 46.3 1476 1273 2749 8891 6908 15799 10367 8181 18548 55.9 44.1 56.3-0.4 52.1 47.9 1432 1317 2749 8666 6766 15432 10098 8083 18181 55.5 44.5 56.2-0.6 52.9 47.1 1454 1295 2749 8946 7673 16619 10400 8968 19368 53.7 46.3 53.8-0.1 52.1 47.9 1432 1317 2749 8771 7688 16459 10203 9005 19208 53.1 46.9 53.3-0.2 53.1 46.9 1460 1289 2749 8060 7268 15328 9520 8557 18077 52.7 47.3 52.6 0.1 47.8 52.2 1314 1435 2749 8622 7953 16575 9936 9388 19324 51.4 48.6 52.0-0.6 49.5 50.5 1361 1388 2749 8311 7957 16268 9672 9345 19017 50.9 49.1 51.1-0.2 46.5 53.5 1278 1471 2749 7795 7312 15107 9073 8783 17856 50.8 49.2 51.6-0.8 33634 24095 577291 205600 128582 334182 1 239234 152677 391911 1602 1147 2749 9790 6123 15913 11392 7270 18662 I 61.0 39.0 I 61.5 38.5 I -0.5 0.5 45.7 54.3 1256 1493 2749 7821 7747 15568 9077 9240 18317 49.6 50.4 50.2 49.8-0.7 0.7 44.0 56.0 1210 1539 2749 7605 7805 15410 8815 9344 18159 48.5 51.5 50.6 0.8 41.4 58.6 1138 1611 2749 7994 8635 16629 9132 10246 19378 47.1 52.9 51.9 0.9 45.3 54.7 1245 1504 2749 7557 8845 16402 8802 10349 19151 46.0 54.0 53.9 0.1 43.8 56.2 1204 1545 2749 7266 8589 15855 8470 10134 18604 45.5 54.5 54.2 0.3 46.0 54.0 1265 1484 2749 7481 9072 16553 8746 10556 19302 45.3 54.7 54.8-0.1 ~_~~ ~...1I4L_6709 8248.14957 7908 9798 17706 44.7 55.3 55.1 0_.2_ 45.5 54.5 1251 1498 2749 7228 9342 16570 8479 10840 19319 43.9 56.1 56.4-0.3 44.0 56.0 1210 1539 2749 7367 9492 16859 8577 11031 19608 43.7 56.3 56.3 0.0 38.6 61.4 1061 1688 2749 7224 9695 16919 8285 11383 19668 42.1 57.9 57.3 0.6 41.3 58.7 1135 1614 2749 7077 9721 16798 8212 11335 19547 42.0 58.0 57.9 0.1 ---.TI:L~_~ ~ 2~_ 7099 10537 17636 8193 12192 20385 40.2 59.8 59.7 38.8 61.2 1067 1682 2749 6216 10273 16489 7283 11955 19238 37.9 62.1 62.3-0.2 35.8 64.2 984 1765 2749 5912 9558 15470 6896 11323 18219 37.9 62.1 61.8 0.4 35.6 64.4 979 1770 2749 6648 10834 17482 7627 12604 20231 37.7 62.3 62.0 0.3 36.4 63.6 1001 1748 2749 5748 9767 15515 6749 11515 18264 37.0 63.0 63.0 0.1 29.3 70.7 805 1944 2749 5957 9958 15915 6762 11902 18664 36.2 63.8 62.6 1.2 30.3 69.7 833 1916 2749 5700 10050 15750 6533 11966 18499 35.3 64.7 63.8 0.9 38.7 61.3 1064 1685 2749 5973 11297 17270 7037 12982 20019 35.2 64.8 65.4-0.6 35.5 64.5 976 1773 2749 5536 10293 15829 6512 12066 18578 35.1 64.9 65.0-0.1 34.6 65.4 951 1798 2749 5673 11010 16683 6624 12808 19432 34.1 65.9 66.0-0.1 35.4 64.6 973 1776 2749 5411 11292 16703 6384 13068 19452 32.8 67.2 67.6-0.4 32.1 67.9 882 1867 2749 4877 10844 15721 5759 12711 18470 31.2 68.8 69.0-0.2 28.3 71.7 778 1971 2749 5132 12411 17543 5910 14382 20292 29.1 70.9 70.7 0.1 32.5 67.5 893 1856 2749 4892 12235 17127 5785 14091 19876 29.1 70.9 71.4-0.5 21.1 78.9 580 2169 2749 3644 13219 16863 4224 15388 19612 21.5 78.5 78.4 0.1 27034 44440 71474 I 165747 260769 426516 192781 305209 497990 1040 1709 2749 6375 10030 16404 7415 11739 19153 38.7 61.3 I 38.9 61.1-0.1 0.1 60668 68535 1292031 371347 389351 760698 432015 457886 889901 47.0 53.0 I 1291 1458 2749 7901 8284 16185 9192 9742 18934 48.5 51.5 I 48.8 51.2-0.3 0.3 0_.1_

INFORMATION PAPER 16; MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 11A: ACTUAL 2PP VOTE AND EXPECTED 2PP VOTE IF THERE HAD BEEN THE SAME NUMBER OF DECLARATION VOTES IN EACH SEAT, STATE ELECTION 1993. SWING ACTUAL EFFECT OF EXPECTED TO DEC LARA TION EFFECT OF LOSE VOTES DEC VOTES ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) PRICE 11.1 0.1 0.1 RAMSAY 10.0-0.2-0.3 HART 8.6 0.1 0.2 TAYLOR 8.1-0.7-0.6 SPENCE 7.8 0.1 0.1 ELIZABETH 7.7 0.3 0.4 PLAYFORD 2.8 0.3 0.4 GILES 2.5-0.8-0.9 ROSS SMITH 2.2 0.1 0.1 NAPIER 1.2-0.3-0.3 AVERAGE, ALP -0.1 0.1-0.1 0.1 LEE 1.2-0.1-0.1 HANSON 1.3 0.3 0.2 REYNELL 1.3 0.0 0.0 KAURNA 2.9 0.0 0.0 ELDER 3.5-0.3-0.3 WRIGHT 4.1-0.1-0.1 - - - "----- PEAKE 5.7-1.0-1.1 FROME 5.8 0.3 0.3 EYRE 6.6 1.1 1.0 TORRENS 6.6 0.3 0.3 NORWOOD 7.5 0.6 0.5 MITCHELL 9.5 0.0 0.0 MAWSON 9.7-0.1-0.1 --------- FLOREY 10.5 0.0 0.0 -" COLTON 10.6-0.1-0.1 UNLEY 11.6-0.3-0.2 HARTLEY 13.3 0.4 0.3 ADELAIDE 14.2-0.2-0.2 COLES 16.0-0.3-0.4 LIGHT 16.5 0.1 0.2 NEWLAND 17.5-0.3-0.3 BRIGHT 19.1-0.3-0.3 FISHER 20.8-0.3-0.3 MORPHETT 22.0-0.2-0.2 GORDON 22.3 0.1 0.1 DAVENPORT (rethrow) 22.3-0.5-0.4 GOYDER 23.4-0.1-0.2 WAITE (rethrow) 24.0-0.3-0.2 KAVEL 24.4-0.9-0.9 FINNISS 24.5-0.2-0.3 HEYSEN 24.6 0.1 0.1 CUSTANCE 24.6 RIDLEY 25.2 0.3 0.3 MACKILLOP 27.8 0.0 0.0 BRAGG 28.8-0.5-0.4 CHAFFEY (rethrow) 29.1-0.6-0.9 FLINDERS (rethrow) 30.7 0.0 0.0 AVERAGE, LIB 0.1-0.1 0.1-0.1 AVERAGE, ALL 0.1-0.1 0.1-0.1 SOURCE: Table 10A.

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 11 B: ACTUAL 2PP VOTE AND EXPECTED 2PP VOTE IF THERE HAD BEEN THE SAME NUMBER OF DECLARATION VOTES IN EACH SEAT, STATE ELECTION 1997. SWING ACTUAL EFFECT OF EXPECTED TO DECLARATION EFFECT OF LOSE VOTES DEC VOTES ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%).~ PRICE 24.5-0.2-0.2 SPENCE 23.4-1.0-1.2 HART 22.8-0.3-0.4 TAYLOR 22.3-0.7-0.8 NAPIER 21.2 (rethrow) -0.3-0.3 RAMSAY 18.3-0.7-0.8 ROSS SMITH 14.9-0.3-0.4 ELIZABETH 14.4-0.3-0.2 PLAYFORD 13.1-0.5-0.6 GILES 11.5-1.6-1.6 TORRENS 10.2-0.3-0.3 LEE 7.2-0.1-0.1 PEAKE 7.1-0.4-0.5 KAURNA 5.9-0.4-0.4 HANSON 5.6-0.7-0.6 REYNELL 3.8-0.1-0.1 WRIGHT 3.2-0.2-0.2 ELDER 2.7 0.1 0.1 FLOREY 1.5-0.6-0.6 MITCHELL 1.0-0.2-0.2 NORWOOD 0.8-0.9-0.8 AVERAGE, ALP -0.5 0.5-0.5 0.5 HARTLEY 0.6-0.7 0.7-0.7 0.7 STUART 1.7 1.0 0.8 FROME 3.0 1.0 0.9 COLTON 4.1 0.1 0.1 UNLEY 4.6 0.3 0.3 MAWSON 4.8-0.1-0.1 ADELAIDE 5.5 0.3 0.2 --.-----~-~-~..----..-- BRIGHT 6.2-0.3-0.3 LIGHT 6.4 0.0 0.0 COLES 7.9 0.5 0.6 NEWLAND 8.1 0.1 0.1 FISHER 9.9 0.1 0.1.. ~--..- HEYSEN (rethrow) 12.2-0.2-0.2 WAITE (rethrow) 12.2 0.4 0.4 GORDON (rethrow) 12.4 0.3 0.3 MORPHETI 13.1 0.0 0.1 DAVENPORT (rethrow) 13.9 1.2 1.2 HAMMOND 14.9 1.0 0.9 SCHUBERT (rethrow) 15.0-0.5-0.6 KAVEL (rethrow) 15.1 0.0-0.1 FINNISS (rethrow) 16.0-0.1-0.1 GOYDER 17.3-0.4-0.4 BRAGG 18.9-0.2-0.2 MACKILLOP (rethrow) 20.9 0.2 0.1 CHAFFEY (rethrow) 21.1-0.4-0.5 FLINDERS (rethrow) 28.6 0.1 0.1 AVERAGE, LIB -0.1 0.1-0.1 0.1 AVERAGE, ALL -0.3 0.3-0.3 0.3 SOURCE: Table 10B.

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 12A: COMPARING METHODS OF ALLOCATING DECLARATION VOTES A. Pro-rata allocation of declaration votes 2PP TOTAL 2PP all carrying the 2PP value for all declaration votes, ALP LIB VOTES ALP LIB of ALP:L1B 52.9:47.1% (No) (No) (No.) (%) (%) FOR REFERENCE ACTUAL RESUL TS, PEAKE Total formal ordinary votes 7391 9656 17047 43.4 56.6 Total formal declaration votes 1077 957 II 2034 I 52.9 411 Total, all formal votes, PEAKE 8468 10613 19081 44.4 55.6 Allocate dec votes Apply 2PP vote Add ordinary pro-rata of 52.9:47.1 votes Total votes for each booth Actual %of all Allocate to declaration (Actual results) formal formal declaration votes votes ordinary votes ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB TOTAL ALP LIB votes pro rata JNol (No) (No) (No) (No) (No) (No.) (%) (%) Brooklyn Park 1768 10.4 211 112 99 745 1023 857 1122 1979 43.3 56.7 Brooklyn Pk Sth 1143 6.7 136 72 64 433 710 505 774 1279 39.5 60.5 Cowan dill a (s2) 282 1.7 34 18 16 145 137 163 153 316 51.6 48.4 Flinders Park 2859 16.8 341 181 161 1291 1568 1472 1729 3200 46.0 54.0 Hindmarsh 1019 6.0 122 64 57 602 417 666 474 1141 58.4 41.6 Kidman Park 1105 6.5 132 70 62 443 662 513 724 1237 41.5 58.5 Kidman Pk Sth 2753 16.1 328 174 155 1010 1743 1184 1898 3081 38.4 61.6 Lockleys 1918 11.3 229 121 108 511 1407 632 1515 2147 29.4 70.6 Lockleys North 1236 7.3 147 78 69 448 788 526 857 1383 38.0 62.0 Thebarton 850 5.0 101 54 48 533 317 587 365 951 61.7 38.3 Torrensville (s1) 2114 12.4 252 134 119 1230 884 1364 1003 2366 57.6 42.4 Total formal ordinary votes 17047 100.0 II 2034 I Total formal declaration votes I 2034 ]1 Total, all formal votes 19081 1077 957 7391 9656 8468 10613 19081 44.4 55.6 SEGMENT 1 Brooklyn Park 857 1122.3 1979 43.3 56.7 Brooklyn Pk Sth 505 774.2 1279 39.5 60.5 Cowandilla (s2) 163 152.8 316 51.6 48.4 Total formal votes in this segment 1525 2049 3574 42.7 57.3 SEGMENT 2 Flinders Park 1472 1728.5 3200 46.0 54.0 Lockleys North 526 857.4 1383 38.0 62.0 T orrensville (s 1 ) 1364 1002.7 2366 57.6 42.4 Hindmarsh 666 474.2 1141 58.4 41.6 Thebarton 587 364.7 951 61.7 38.3 Total formal votes in this segment 4614 4427 9042 51.0 49.0 SEGMENT 3 Kidman Park 513 724.0 1237 41.5 58.5 Kidman Pk Sth 1184 1897.6 3081 38.4 61.6 Lockleys 632 1514.7 2147 29.4 70.6 Total formal votes in this segment 2329 4136 6465 36.0 64.0 SEGMENT 1 1525 2049 3574 42.7 57.3 SEGMENT 2 4614 4427 9042 51.0 49.0 SEGMENT 3 2329 4136 6465 36.0 64.0 TOTAL FORMAL VOTES ALL SEGMENTS 8468 10613 19081 44.4 55.6 ACTUAL RESULTS, PE)KE, 1993 8468 10613 19081 44.4 55.6 SOURCE: Calculated from data published In: South Australia. State Electoral Office, 1996, Statistical Returns for General Elections 11 December 1993 and By-elections 1994. State Electoral Office, Adelaide.

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 12B: COMPARING METHODS OF ALLOCATING DECLARATION VOTES B: The Commission's method: 2PP 2PP pro-rata allocation of declaration votes, all carrying TOTAL ALP LIB ALP LIB the average 2PP value for all ordinary votes. VOTES (No) (No) (%) (%) FOR REFERENCE" ACTUAL RESULTS, PEAKE, 1993 Total formal ordinary votes 17047 7391 9656 434 56.6 Total formal declaration votes 2034 1077 957 52.9 411 Tota/, all formal votes, PEAKE 19081 8468 10613 44.4 55.6 SEGMENT 1 Brooklyn Park 1768 745 1023 42.1 57.9 Brooklyn Pk Sth 1143 433 710 37.9 62.1 Cowandilla (s2) 282 145 137 51.4 48.6 Total formal ordinary votes, this segment 3193 1323 1870 41.4 58.6 % of formal ordinary votes in Peake 18.7 So add 18.7% of formal declaration votes in Peake 381 Apply 2PP percentages of ordinary votes 381 158 223 41.4 58.6 Total formal votes in this segment 3574 1481 2093 41.4 58.6 SEGMENT 2 Flinders Park 2859 1291 1568 45.2 54.8 Lockleys North 1236 448 788 36.2 63.8 Torrensville (s1) 2114 1230 884 58.2 41.8 Hindmarsh 1019 602 417 59.1 40.9 Thebarton 850 533 317 62.7 37.3 Total formal ordinary votes, this segment 8078 4104 3974 50.8 49.2 % of formal ordinary votes in Peake 47.4 So add 47.4% of formal declaration votes in Peake 964 fa,pply 2PP percentages of ordinary votes 964 490 474 50.8 49.2 Total formal votes in this segment 9042 4594 4448 50.8 49.2 SEGMENT 3 Kidman Park 1105 443 662 40.1 59.9 Kidman Pk Sth 2753 1010 1743 36.7 63.3 Lockleys 1918 511 1407 26.6 73.4 Total formal ordinary votes, this segment 5776 1964 3812 34.0 66.0 % of formal ordinary votes in Peake 33.9 So add 33.9% of formal declaration votes in Peake 689 Apply 2PP percentages of ordinary votes 689 234 455 34.0 66.0 Total formal votes in this segment 6465 2198 4267 34.0 66.0 SEGMENT 1 3574 1481 2093 41.4 58.6 SEGMENT 2 9042 4594 4448 50.8 49.2 SEGMENT 3 6465 2198 4267 34.0 66.0 TOTAL FORMAL VOTES ALL SEGMENTS 19081 8273 10808 43.4 56.6 ACTUAL RESULTS, PEAKE, 1993 19081 8468 10613 44.4 55.6 SOURCE: Calculated from data published In: South Australia. State Electoral Office, 1996, Statistical Returns for General Elections 11 December 1993 and By-elections 1994, State Electoral Office, Adelaide.

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 12C: COMPARING METHODS OF ALLOCATING DECLARATION VOTES C. Pro-rata allocation of declaration votes 2PP TOTAL 2PP according to the proportion of ALP or LIB ALP LIB VOTES ALP LIB votes lodged at the booth (No) (No) (No.) (%) (%) FOR REFERENCE ACTUAL RESUL TS, PEAKE Total formal ordinary votes 7391 9656 17047 43.4 56.6 Total formal declaration votes I 1077 957 11 2034 52.9 47.1 Tota/, all formal votes, PEAKE 8468 10613 19081 44.4 556 Actual % of2pp Allocate Add ordinary votes: 2PP results ALP or LIB vote declaration votes Total votes for each booth at each booth pro rata ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB TOTAL ALP LIB (No) (No) (%) (%) (No) (No) (No) (No) (No.) (%) 1%) Brooklyn Park 745 1023 10.1 10.6 109 101 854 1124 1978 43.2 56.8 Brooklyn Pk Sth 433 710 5.9 7.4 63 70 496 780 1276 38.9 61.1 Cowandilla (s2) 145 137 2.0 1.4 21 14 166 151 317 52.5 47.5 Flinders Park 1291 1568 17.5 16.2 188 155 1479 1723 3203 46.2 53.8 Hindmarsh 602 417 8.1 4.3 88 41 690 458 1148 60.1 39.9 Kidman Park 443 662 6.0 6.9 65 66 508 728 1235 41.1 58.9 Kidman Pk Sth 1010 1743 13.7 18.1 147 173 1157 1916 3073 37.7 62.3 Lockleys 511 1407 6.9 14.6 74 139 585 1546 2132 27.5 72.5 Lockleys North 448 788 6.1 8.2 65 78 513 866 1379 37.2 62.8 Thebarton 533 317 7.2 3.3 78 31 611 348 959 63.7 36.3 Torrensville (s1) 1230 884 16.6 9.2 179 88 1409 972 2381 59.2 40.8 Total booth votes 7391 9656 100.0 100.0 Declaration votes I 1077 957 I I 1077 957 I PEAKE 8468 10613 8468 10613 19081 44.4 55.6 SEGMENT 1 Brooklyn Park 854 1124 1978 43.2 56.8 Brooklyn Pk Sth 496 780 1276 38.9 61.1 Cowandilla (s2) 166 151 317 52.5 47.5 Total formal votes in this segment 1516 2055 3571 42.4 57.6 SEGMENT 2 Flinders Park 1479 1723 3203 46.2 53.8 Hindmarsh 690 458 1148 60.1 39.9 Lockleys North 513 866 1379 37.2 62.8 Thebarton 611 348 959 63.7 36.3 Torrensville (s1) 1409 972 2381 59.2 40.8 Total formal votes in this segment 4702 4368 9070 51.8 48.2 SEGMENT 3 Kidman Park 508 728 1235 41.1 58.9 Kidman Pk Sth 1157 1916 3073 37.7 62.3 Lockleys 585 1546 2132 27.5 72.5 Total formal votes in this segment 2250 4190 6440 34.9 65.1 SEGMENT 1 1516 2055 3571 42.4 57.6 SEGMENT 2 4702 4368 9070 51.8 48.2 SEGMENT 3 2250 4190 6440 34.9 65.1 TOTAL FORMAL VOTES ALL SEGMENTS 8468 10613 19081 44.4 55.6 ACTUAL RESULTS, PEA1KE, 1993 8468 10613 19081 44.4 55.6 SOURCE: Calculated from data published In: South Australia. State Electoral Office, 1996, Statistical Returns for General Elections 11 December 1993 and By-elections 1994, State Electoral Office, Adelaide.

INFORMATION PAPER 16 : MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 120: COMPARING METHODS OF ALLOCATING DECLARATION VOTES: SUMMARY TABLE ACTUAL RESULTS, Declaration votes not allocated to booths 2PP TOTAL 2PP TOTAL ALP LIB VOTES ALP LIB VOTES (No) (No) (No.) (%) (%) (%) Segment 1 1323 1870 3193 41.4 58.6 100.0 Segment 2 4104 3974 8078 50.8 49.2 100.0 Segment 3 1964 3812 5776 34.0 66.0 100.0 Total formal votes in all segments 7391 9656 17047 43.4 56.6 100.0 Total formal declaration votes 1077 957 2034 52.9 47.1 100.0 TOTAL, ALL FORMAL VOTES, PEAKE 8468 10613 19081 44.4 55.6 100.0 TABLE 12A: pro-rata allocation of declaration votes, all at ALP:LlB 52.9%: 47.1 % 2PP TOTAL 2PP ALP LIB VOTES ALP LIB (No) (No) (No.) (%) (%) Segment 1 1525 2049 3574 42.7 57.3 100.0 Segment 2 4614 4427 9042 51.0 49.0 100.0 Segment 3 2329 4136 6465 36.0 64.0 100.0 Total formal votes in all segments 8468 10613 19081 44.4 55.6 100.0 Total formal declaration votes TOTAL, ALL FORMAL VOTES, PEAKE 8468 10613 19081 44.4 55.6 100.0 TABLE 12B: The Commission's method: pro-rata allocation of declaration votes, at each booth's 2PP% 2PP TOTAL 2PP ALP LIB VOTES ALP LIB (No) (No) (No.) (%) (%) Segment 1 1481 2093 3574 41.4 58.6 100.0 Segment 2 4594 4448 9042 50.8 49.2 100.0 Segment 3 2198 4267 6465 34.0 66.0 100.0 Total formal votes in all segments 8273 10808 19081 43.4 56.6 100.0 Total formal declaration votes TOTAL, ALL FORMAL VOTES, PEAKE 8273 10808 19081 43.4 56.6 100.0 TABLE 12C: Pro-rata allocation of declaration votes according to the proportion of ALP or LIB votes taken at the booth 2PP TOTAL 2PP ALP LIB VOTES ALP LIB (No) (No) (No.) (%) (%) Segment 1 1516 2055 3571 42.4 57.6 100.0 Segment 2 4702 4368 9070 51.8 48.2 100.0 Segment 3 2250 4190 6440 34.9 65.1 100.0 Total formal votes in all segments 8468 10613 19081 44.4 55.6 100.0 Total formal declaration votes 0.0 TOTAL, ALL FORMAL VOTES, PEAKE 8468 10613 19081 44.4 55.6 100.0 SOURCE: Tables 12A to 12C.

State election 1977 (actual results) ALP LIB J%) (%) INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAl BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRAliA TABLE 13: TWO PARTY PREFERRED RESULTS AT SOUTH AUSTRALIAN STATE ELECTIONS, 1977 TO 1997 1976 EDBC boundaries 1983 EDBC boundaries 1991 EDBC boundaries 1994 EDBC boundaries State election 1979 (actual results) ALP LIB (%) J%) State election 1982 (actual results) ALP LIB (%) (%) State election 1982 (Jaensch estimates) ALP LIB (%) J%) State election State election 1985 (actual results) 1989 (actual results) ALP LIB ALP LIB (%) (%) (%) (%) State election 1989 State election 1993 (Newton estimates) (actual results) ALP LIB ALP LIB (%) (%) (%) (%) State election 1989 (Newton estimates) ALP LIB (%) (%) State election State election 19 M (EDBC estimates) 1997 (actual results) ALP LIB ALP LIB (%) (%) (%) (%) Adelaide Albert Park Alexandra Ascot Park Baudin Bragg Briggs Bright Brighton Chaffey Coles Colton Custance Davenport Elder Elizabeth Eyre Finniss Fisher Flinders Florey Frome Giles Gilles Glenelg Gordon Goyder Hammond Hanson Hart Hartley Hayward Hen ley Beach Heysen Kauma Kavel Lee Light MacKiliop Mallee Mawson Mitcham Mitchell MorpheU MtGambier 66.2 64.1 30.2 62.5 66.7 34.7 58.1 404 48.6 25.8 724 44.1 33.8 35.9 69.8 37.5 33.3 65.3 41.9 59.6 514 74.2 27.6 55.9 57.9 53.9 24.7 51.7 55.7 28.9 45.3 35.9 37.8 194 60.5 40.1 42.1 461 75.3 48.3 44.3 71.1 54.7 64.1 62.2 806 39.5 59.9 63.9 652 30.5 59.3 65.5 33.6 50.8 34.3 48.7 23.8 71.0 37.9 36.1 34.8 69.5 40.7 34.5 664 49.2 65.7 51.3 76.2 29.0 62.1 39.6 604 29.8 70.2 38.8 61.2 not available 21.8 (E) 78.2 (E) 22.0(E) 78.0 (E) 67.0 33.0 53. 7 46.3 63.9 36.1 62.8 37.2 554 44.6 40.5 59.5 32.8 67.2 254 (E) 74.6 (E) 22.9 77.1 44.6 554 35.5 64.5 604 39.6 55.1 44.9 59.3 31.2 39.3 26.1 56.5 38.8 614 (E) 504 48.6 40.7 68.8 60.7 73.9 43.5 61.2 38.6 (E) 49.6 514 49.0 51.0 25.7 74.3 32.8 67.2 21.2 (E) 78.8 (E) 470 53.0 17.5 82.5 54.3(E) 45.7 (E) 44.7 55.3 444 55.6 CONTINUES 594 37.6 24.9 41.8 60.0 54.0 33.3 34.8 20.0 (E) 56.6 27.0 60.7 (E) 48.5 47.8 40.6 624 75.1 58.2 40.0 46.0 66.7 65.2 80.0 (E) 434 73.0 39.3 (E) 51.5 52.2 46.0 64.0 25.0 63.0 27.0 66.0 49.0 34.0 41.0 30.0 28.0 74.0 35.0 48.0 25.0 56.0 62.0 32.0 46.0 60.0 50.0 54.0 38.0 40.0 350 61.0 400 60.0 43.0 47.0 54.0 36.0 75.0 37.0 73.0 34.0 51.0 66.0 59.0 70.0 720 26.0 65.0 52.0 75.0 44.0 38.0 68.0 54.0 40.0 50.0 46.0 62.0 60.0 65.0 39.0 60.0 40.0 57.0 53.0 50.6 62.9 34.8 63.7 32.5 674 51.6 33.7 41.6 33.7 35.8 (R) 72.2 (R) 342 51.1 284 (R) 58.2 64.2 37.6 49.1 62.5 52.8 57.3 41.2 38.3 40.7 494 37.1 65.2 36.3 67.5 32.6 484 66.3 584 46.7 58.1 34.0 55.1 30.0 61.8 49.0 29.3 36.9 66.3 29.9 64.2 (R) 34.1 27.8 (R) 63.9 (R) 65.8 314 48.9 46.9 71.6 (R) 23.1 (R) 41.8 51.8 35.8 56.6 624 50.9 37.5 47.2 42.7 58.8 61.7 59.3 33.6 43.9 54.5 49.1 54.0 34.9 34.5 37.1 66.1 33.9 57.3 41.7 58.3 39.0 63.5 36.5 54.3 45.3 54.7 40.0 40.1 59.9 27.5 CONTINUES 53.3 41.9 66.0 44.9 70.0 38.2 51.0 70.7 63.1 70.1 65.9 36.1 (R) 68.6 53.1 76.9 (R) 48.2 434 664 56.1 45.5 50.9 46.0 65.1 65.5 62.9 42.7 61.0 45.7 60.0 72.5 48.7 32.0 47.3 29.2 47.3 49.1 30.1 37.0 54.7 65.6 46.5 34.6 47.2 23.7 52.0 45.7 55.8 27.5 31.6 55.5 72.2 47.6 352 53.2 33.2 57.9 39.3 26.3 52.4 53.0 40.7 51.3 68.0 52.7 70.7 52.7 50.9 69.9 63.0 45.3 344 53.5 654 52.8 76.3 48.0 54.3 44.2 72.5 684 44.5 27.8 524 64.8 46.8 66.8 42.1 60.7 73.7 47.6 47.0 59.3 35.9 21.3 31.0 21.0 (R) 34.1 39.5 25.5 27.8 (R) 46.6 57.6 43.5 25.6 29.3 194 39.6 44.3 524 27.8 26.7 48.8 58.5 36.8 25.5 47.2 25.7 48.9 33.6 22.3 404 40.6 28.1 CONTINUES 64.1 78.7 69.0 79.0 (R) 65.9 60.5 74.5 72.2 (R) 53.4 424 56.5 744 70.7 80.6 (R) 604 55.7 47.6 72.2 73.3 51.2 41.5 63.2 74.5 52.8 74.3 51.1 66.4 77.7 59.6 594 71.9 48.7 31.3 48.9 29.2 44.2 49.2 37.7 55.1 62.8 34.5 47.2 23.2 51.9 44.5 57.8 28.1 32.7 29.5 54.9 72.0 50.8 35.2 53.6 33.2 58.1 39.8 25.1 50.1 52.6 40.2 513 1 68.7\ 51.11 70.7! 55.8) 50.81 62.3: 44.9: 37.21 655: 52.8) 76.9: 48.1: 554: 42.21 71.9: 67.3: 705) 451: 28.0: 49.21 648: 464) 668: 41.9: 602: 74.91 499 1 474) 59.81 35.9 20.7 31.8 21.0 31.2 394 27.8 46.5 52.7 24.7 29.3 19.7 39.1 41.9 54.3 28.5 27.5 25.0 48.2 58.7 37.8 25.5 47.6 26.0 49.0 34.8 20.6 40.8 40.6 27.6 CONTINUES 64'1 446 55.. 79.31 31.2 68.8 68.21 43.9 56.1 790:29.0 (R) 71.0 (R) 68.8: 42.2 57.81 60.61 460 54.01 722:36.2 (R) 63.8 (R) 53.5) 52.7 47.3 47.31 64.3 35.7 75.3: 34.1 (R) 65.9 (R) 70.?! 40.2 59.81 80.3)21.5 (R) 78.5 (R) 60.9: 514 48.6 58.1: 47.1 52.9 4571 614 38.6 71.5:377 (R) 62.3 (R) 72.5) 32.8 67.2 75.0i 352 64.8 51.8) 55.5 44.51 41.3: 727 27.3 62.21 49.5 50.5i 74.5:379 (R) 62.1 (R) 524: 55.9 44.1 74.0)35.0 (R) 65.0 (R) 51.0: 57.1 42.9 652: 43.7 56.3 794129.1 (R) 70.9 (R) 5921 45.3 54.7 594) 50.9 49.1 7241 37.0 63.0

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA Murray Murray Mallee Napier Newland Norwood Peake Playford Price Ramsay Reynell Ridley Rocky River Ross Smith Salisbury Schubert Semaphore Spence Stuart Taylor Todd Torrens Unley Victoria Waite Walsh Whyalla Wright 1976 EDBC boundaries State election 1977 State election 1979 State election 1982 (actual results) (actual results) (actual results) ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 40.0 70.9 59.8 60.2 674 67.0 694 41.8 72.2 69.5 72.2 77.3 73.9 56.5 47.5 60.1 34.6 73.2 60.0 29.1 40.2 39.8 32.6 33.0 30.6 58.2 27.8 30.5 27.8 22.7 26.1 43.5 52.5 39.9 654 26.8 34.1 59.5 43.9 49.9 57.8 55.1 60.5 36.9 684 60.8 63.5 (E) 70.2 66.9 454 39.9 52.3 32.0 66.7 65.9 40.5 56.1 50.1 42.2 44.9 39.5 63.1 316 39.2 394 69.2 53.6 59.1 69.5 64.7 66.1 39.7 75.6 72.5 60.6 30.8 464 40.9 30.5 35.3 33.9 60.3 244 27.5 36.5 (E) 70.0 (E) 30.0 (E) 29.8 77.9 22.1 33.1 70.0 30.0 546 48.6 514 60.1 45.5 54.5 47.7 56.6 434 68.0 334 66.6 33.3 680 (E) 32.0 (E) 1983 EDBC boundaries State election 1982 State election 1985 State election 1989 (Jaensch estimates) (actual results) (actual results) ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB (%) - (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 32.0 71.0 49.0 56.0 67.0 64.0 75.0 74.0 68.0 75.0 72.0 74.0 52.0 52.0 32.0 58.0 75.0 68.0 29.0 51.0 44.0 33.0 36.0 25.0 26.0 32.0 25.0 28.0 26.0 48.0 48.0 68.0 42.0 25.0 31.4 73.5 51.5 56.3 65.7 694 74.3 74.2 68.7 684 72.0 55.9 55.0 31.7 60.7 67.0 68.6 26.5 48.5 43.7 34.3 30.6 25.7 258 31.3 274 67.2 49.9 52.5 60.0 59.1 66.6 66.7 64.0 25.7 (R) 72.2 (R) 31.6 64.0 28.0 63.6 (R) 44.1 52.8 45.0 52.3 68.3 26.8 39.3 56.3 33.0 60.9 72.6 32.8 50.1 47.5 40.0 40.9 334 33.3 36.0 27.8 (R) 360 364(R) 47.2 47.7 73.2 43.7 39.1 1991 EDBC boundaries State election 1989 (Newton estimates) ALP LIB (%) j%) 61.2 50.6 51.6 52.9 59.8 66.0 63.9 58.9 29.3 63.3 63.9 63.9 54.5 504 37.2 ~B ~4 ~4 4~1 ~2 34~ 3&1 ~.1 m7 36.7 36.1 36.1 45.5 49.6 62.8 State election 1993 (actual results) ALP LIB (%) (%) 51.1 32.6 42.6 444 52.7 61.0 59.9 48.8 24.9 52.1 57.7 580 43.5 38.5 26.1 (R) ~] ~4 ~4 ~6 ~J ~~ 4~1 ~.2 7~1 47.9 42.3 42.0 56.5 61.5 73.9 (R) 55.6 444 46.0 54.0 1994 EDBC boundaries State election 1989 State ele";m 19 93 State election 1997 (Newton estimates) (EDBC estimates) (actual results) ALP LIB ALP LIB ALP LIB (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 65.6 51.0 53.6 54.1 594 65.9 64.7 57.6 63.3 32.8 64.1 45.1 65.1 54.5 50.8 36.6 57.0 34,J 49.01 464l 45.9l 40.6l 341l 35.31 4241 36.71 67.21 35.9\ 54.9l 34.91 45.51 49.21 634\ 43.01 564 334 42.6 45.1 52.1 61.0 60.3 47.5 52.1 27.6 57.7 41.1 594 43.5 38.5 25.7 46.8, 43.6l 71.1 (R) 28.9 (R) 66.6l 42.0 580 5741 50.7 49.3 54.9l 57.0 43.01 47.9l 63.0 37.0 39.0l 744 25.6 39.71 68.2 31.81 52.51 53.7 46.3 47.91 64.8 35.21 724135.1 (R) 64.9 (R) 42.3: 73.3 26. 58.9l 484 51.6 40.61 72.2 27.8 56.51 60.1 39.9 61.51 45.5 54.5i 74.3\37.8 (R) 62.2 (R) 53.21 53.1 46.91 State-wide 534(El 46.6 (E) 1 44.9 (E) 55.1 (E)! 50.9 (El 49.1 (El 50.9 49.1 53.2 (Rl 468 (Rl : 47.9 (Rl 52.1 (Rl 47.9 52.1! 39.1 (R) 60.9 (R) 47.9 521! 39.1 60.9:485 (R) 51.5 (R) NOTES: Results marked (R) are from rethrows conducted by the State Electoral Office. Results marked (E) are Jaensch's estimates of the ALP: LIB two party preferred vote. Note that Jaensch did not calculate an estimated ALP: LIB two party preferred vote for Flinders at the 1977 State election. SOURCES: Jaensch, D, 1977, The 1977 Elections in South Australia: a statistical analysis, Flinders University Politics Department Occasional Monograph No.6, Adelaide. Jaensch, D, 1979, The 1979 Elections in South Australia: a statistical analysis, Flinders University Politics Department Occasional Monograph No.7, Adelaide. Jaensch, D, 1983, The 1982 Elections in South Australia: a statistical analysis, Flinders University Politics Department Occasional Monograph No.8, Adelaide. Newton, J, 1992, The 1991 Electoral Redistribution in South Australia: 1989 voting statistics transferred to the new House of Assembly boundaries, Research Service Information Paper No. 11, Parliamentary Library of South Australia, Adelaide. SA. State Electoral Department, 1978, General Elections 1977: Statistical Returns, SA Parliamentary Paper 144 of 1978-79. SA. State Electoral Department, 1980, Periodical and General Elections 1979: Statistical Returns, SA Parliamentary Paper 132 of 1980-81. SA. State Electoral Department, 1982, Periodical and General Elections 1982: Statistical Returns, SA Parliamentary Paper 145 of 1982-83. SA. State Electoral Department, 1986, General Elections 1985: Statistical Returns, SA Parliamentary Paper 145 of 1986-87. SA. State Electoral Department, 1991, Periodical and General Elections 1989: Statistical Returns, SA Parliamentary Paper 161 of 1991-92. SA. State Electoral Office, 1996, Statistical Returns for General Elections 1993 and By-elections 1994, State Electoral Office, Adelaide. SA. Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission, 1994, 1994 Report, The CommisSion, Adelaide. 1997 electoral results are official but as-yet-unpublished data from the State Electoral Office.

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 14: SWINGS AT STATE ELECTIONS, 1977 to 1997 (swing to ALP 1976 EDBC boundaries 1983 EDBC boundaries 1991 EDBC boundaries 1994 EDBC boundaries SWING to ALP SWING to ALP SWING to ALP SWING to ALP 1977 to 1979 1979 to 1982 1982 to 1985 1985 to 1989 1989 to 1993 1989 to 1993 1993 to 1997 (actual results) (estimated) (actual) (estimated) (estimated) (estimated) (percentage points) (percentage points) (percentage points) (percentage points) Adelaide -8.3 6.0 4.6-3.9-12.8-12.8 8.7 Albert Park -10.2 11.3-1.1-4.8 Alexandra -5.5 5.8 9.8-0.8 Ascot Park -10.8 7.7 Baudin -11.0 9.8 0.7-8.6 Bragg -5.8 4.7 5.5-2.5-10.7-10.6 10.5 Briggs 1.4-5.6 Bright 2.6-2.6-16.3-17.1 12.1 Brighton -12.8 5.5 Chaffey -4.5-1.6-0.3-4.4-8.2-8.2 8.0 Coles -10.8 11.0 0.6-4.7-13.2-13.0 11.0 Colton -9.6-98 6.6 Custance 3.7-3.8-4.6 Davenport -6.5 4.4 7.8-1.7-9.2-9.9 8.4 Elder -8.1-8.6 6.2 Elizabeth -11.8 10.5-1.8-8.3-8.0-10.1 11.6 Eyre -4.0-2.2-0.8-2.8-3.0 Finniss -9.0-9.8 9.4 Fisher -9.7 9.0 3.1-4.2-17.9-17.9 10.9 Flinders not available 0.2 3.4-5.3-4.3-3.5 1.8 Florey -13.4 10.2 2.2-6.4-12.4-12.8 12.3 Frome -1.4-2.6 5.2 Giles -3.4-3.5 7.1 Gilles -7.4 4.0 2.2-7.6 Glenelg -7.8 4.9 Gordon 0.3 04 9.2 Goyder -2.5 2.0 5.6-4.0-4.9-5.2 5.3 Hammond -4.5 10.2 Hanson -9.1 6.3 3.1-5.2-6.7-6.7 7.3 Hart -13.7-13.3 14.0 Hartley -5.4 5.0 2.5-8.0-10.8-13.0 11.7 Hayward 2.8-3.7 Henley Beach -10.3 4.9 3.3-3.3 Heysen 3.2-6.3-9.7-9.7 12.4 Kaurna -6.0-6.0 8.3 Kavel -5.6 7.6-1.7-3.8-7.5-7.2 9.0 Lee -9.0-9.1 8.1 Light -6.5 2.0 5.7-3.6-5.7-5.0 8.9 MacKiliop -4.0-4.5 8.5 Mallee -5.0-1.2 Mawson -9.5 9.6 5.1-8.8-12.0-9.3 4.5 Mitcham -21.3 9.5 1.7-2.7 Mitchell -7.1 6.4 3.5-9.2-12.4-12.0 10.3 Morphett -5.7 3.8 2.3-5.3-12.6-12.6 9.4 MtGambier -4.2 3.4-6.9-12.6 Murray -5.9 5.3 Murray Mallee -0.6-4.0 Napier -11.5 9.7 2.5-6.3-10.1-9.2 14.7 Newland -15.9 9.6 2.5-1.6-18.0-17.6 8.6 Norwood -10.3 9.2 0.3-3.8-9.0-11.0 8.1 Peake -9.6 11.6-1.3-5.7-8.5-9.0 11.9 Playford -12.0 9.6 5.4-10.3-7.1-7.3 10.9 Price -8.9 5.6-0.7-7.7-5.0-4.9 13.4 Ramsay 0.2-7.5-4.0-4.4 7.9 Reynell -10.1-10.1 6.2 Ridley -4.4 Rocky River -4.9 2.8 Ross Smith -3.8 7.2 0.7-4.7-11.2-11.2 12.7 Salisbury -8.7 11.8 Schubert -52 7.5 Semaphore -8.7 6.5-0.7-2.1 Spence -7.1 7.6-3.6-4.4-6.2-6.4 15.6 Stuart -7.0 3.1-2.0-8.4-4.0 7.3 Taylor -5.9-5.7 12.8 Todd -11.1 3.2 3.9-3.1 Torrens -7.6 5.6-11.0-11.0 16.6 Unley -7.8 4.4 3.0-2.7-11.9-12.3 7.0 Victoria -2.7 1.5-0.3-4.9 Waite -11.1-10.9 12.1 Walsh 2.7-4.4 Whyalla -6.5 1.3-8.0-6.1 Wright -9.6-10.2 6.3 State-wide -8.5 6.0 2.3-5.3-8.9-8.9 9.4 SOURCE: calculated from Table 13.

INFORMATION PAPER 16 MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA SAFE PENDULUM AFTER THE STATE ELECTION OF 1977.-...l(.;..;.AC.;;;TUAL RESU.=..L T;,.;;S;L.)... i SWING I ALP TO LOSE LIB ~ 131+ I 31+1----- I- -1 30 ACTUAL ~29 RESULTS 28 1976 EDBC BOUNDARIES L---------=- :: ~~ce 7:GL_.125 [ 24 Stuart 73.9 'Mlyalla 73.2. 23 Elizabeth 72.4 Ross Smith & Semaphore 72.2 122 21 Napier 709 _ 20 Salisbury 695 ~~.@! 19 I-------Peake 67.4-1 18 Florey & Ptayford 67.0 17 Baudin 66.7 1----- Adelaide _6QL 116 I~ 1 15 t----- Albert Park 64.1 114 I-- Gilles 62.8 13 1---- Ascot Park 62.5 112 -'CM"'itcsh"'ell'-i61.4 111 Hartley 60.4 Norwood 60.2 Un~y_60.1 Newland 59~B [,0_ t -----~~each ~9.3 9 FAIRLY SAFE MEDIAN SEA T Brighton~ 8 7 1---' MaWSOn&T~~~-t 301 --~ --I 291-- ACTUAL 28 RESULTS 1976 EDBC BOUNDARIES 271-- -I 261----- 25 I 74.6 Goyder (Jaensch est. of 2PP) 74.3 Flinders (NATvs ALP) 241 74.2 Davenport 73.9 Mallee 231--- 221--- I 21.-_ 2O~nd;a- 19 1 t--=66.8~k~av-el-- -I 181-. _--I '-- 17'1-------------1 16 t 65.4Vic~ 15~~ 14 131. --1 12'1--_.' _ 111 61.2 Mitcham (Jaensch est. of 2PI} 60.7 Light 60.4 Fisher _lol Q&_f.1UI@)' 59.6 Chaffey 59.5 Glenelg 9 1 ~---- :L~2 R~iver --=-== 55.9 Eyre 1-----------15 5~~n","---. 41._~ -I STATEAVERAGE 534 13 31- -1 MARGINALJ 12 ~ 21~ Torr_""'-- 1 1\ 514 Cdes & Mt Gambier -- V I - - --Morphett 50.4 0. SAFE FAIRLY SAFE PENDULUM AFTER THE STATE ELECTION OF 1979,... :(-.;AC.;;;IUAL RESU,~p:.:;S:L.)... ALP TO LOSE 1 ---131+ I 31+1 --1 30 I---'-ACTUAL --129 RESULTS 28 1976 EDBC BOUNDARIES I- _127 ---126 1- --,25 124 1-123 ---1122 1------------1 21 ~ce 70LI20 I- _-1 19.-_ RossSmith...6!.4.jI8 17 Stuart 66.9 'Mlyalla 66.7 1------------1 16 1- -114 15 Sema.. hore Jaensch es. t. 0.!2PP) 63.5j13. 12 t-- Salisbury 60.8 -I 11 Elizabeth & Price 60.5 L.a. Napier 59.5 1-19 8 I--- ----. Adelaide5~1 ~ke 57.8 _ 7 Baudlri-55. Gilles 55.4 t--- Hartlel'!. 'I~_ ~ _ 5 Mitchell 54.3 4 Albert Park 53.9 Florey 53.7 1- ~5R_12 MARGINAL Ascot Park 51.7 LIB 82.5 Mitcham (Jaensch est. of 2PP 301 80.6 Davenport 29 78.8 Mall.. (Jaensch est. of 2PP) I 28 I 78.2 Flinders (Jaensch est. of 2PP) 271 77.1 Goyder 261- _~_I 25~ 75.3 Alexandra 74.3 Kavel 241----- ---I 23 1 221-- 211 71J...~ 201~isher, 19 181 68.0 Vict~ 17 67.2 Glenelg & Light 16 1 65.9 Murray 15 t ---;;64. <"5 LHi::an:;son:;;;; 14 64.1 Chaffey 131 63.1 Rocky River 121 62.2 CeJes_ 11 1 -,--- - -...101 60.1 Torrens 59:9 Eyre 9 1 - - -- 8 --- --- :Fs~I=:~d- -~ 55.6 Mt Gambier 55.3 Morphell 51 55.0 STATEAVERAGE 54.7 Brighton 4J ~,~.Jodd MEDIAN~ :r~~aws~-=~_--=i 1-- -\ ~ )_.51R_Henley Beach NOTE: The actual swing to lose in any given seat will be the difference between 50.0% and the 2PP vote for thai seat, plus either 1 vole or 0,1%. SOURCE: Table 13. I 50.1 Norwood SAFE FAIRLY SAFE MARGtNAL PENDULUM AFTER THE STATE ELECTION OF 1982 r- (~A~CIUAL RESU,;;.LT;..;;S )... ALP TO LOSE LIB I--- ---131 + I 31+1 --1 I---- ACTUAL _---1 30 RESULTS 129 1976 EDBe BOUNDARIES Spence 77.9-1 28 1---- 127 ~~"'"'126 I---- Ross Smith 75,6 I----- 125 C - 23 -~S"'"a"'lisb"'u:::ry;-c7n2-.;.5-24 1 ---1122 Elizabeth 71.0 21 Semaphore t (Jaensch est. of 2PP) & Stuart 70.0 20 Peake 69.5 _ Na ier 69.2 19 'Mlyalla (Jaensch est. of 2PP) 66.0 18 I- 117 Prioe 66.1 16 ------- Baudin 65.5 _ Albert Park 65.2 15 r Playford 64.7 M ~--~A~dwel~ai de~&~fnlo=re=y~6~3~.9~11 1--- 1 13 1--_~. I12 1------- Mitchell 60.7 11 Hart~60.0 Grli8s094 1---- Ascot Park 59.3 Norwood 59.1 19 1-- ~_---I8 1-- ------17 1- Mawson & Unley 56.6 _--15 MEDIAN SE:;nleJe~~:~~ ~t--14 _ --1 3 I-- ---_-----1 2 I 52.2 301 80.0 Mall.. (Jaensch est. of 2PP) 291-- ----I 281 78.0 Flinders (Jaensch est. of 2PP) 271-1 ~~~~~_ 261 76.2 Davenport 251 75.1 Goyder 24t-1 ----1 23 73.0 Mitcham (Jaensch est. of 2PP) 221-1 211-- ---I 20 1 69.5 Alexandra 19 1 ------1 181-1 1'1 66.7Kavel 66.6 Victoria 16 66.4 Bragg =1 65.7 Chaffey 15 65.2 Li ht 141~--_ 13 62.4 Glenelg 12 62.1 Eyre 1 111 61.2 Fisher 60.6 Murray 60.3 Rocky River...1Il 91---- 81 58.2 Hanson 71- --I 51 54.5 Torrens 41----. ---1 31--. -1 Mt Gambier 51.5 Morphell 51.4 Todd 1 1 51.3 Coles STATEAVERAGE 509 V Bllghton 50 8 0 ~ ----.l SAFE FAIRLY SAFE MARGINAL.., l e c!:< to' "

-----~ 1----------_. SAFE ---------vvaf~~ SAFE -----~-- ----~----- ~ ~-. ----- --~-- -~---- ~- 2... ~~- --.----~- _~~ ~- ~-~~- --~- INFORMA non PAPER 16 MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA PENDULUM AFTER THE STATE ELECTION OF 1982 PENDULUM AFTER THE STATE ELECTION OF 1985 _ --..... --,."""",... --... -....... ' ""...,~ SWING SWING ALP TO LOSE LIB ALP TO LOSE LIB 30 30 ~-- 30 30 29 29 _29 29 JAENSCH JAENSCH ACTUAL ACTUAL -~~- ESTIMATES 26 26 ESTIMATES RESULTS 26 26 RESULTS ON THE BASIS OF ON THE BASIS OF 1963 EDBC BOUNDARIES 1963 EDBC BOUNDARIES THE 1963 EDBC 27 27 THE 1963 EDBC ~~ ~ 27 27 _~ BOUNDARIES BOUNDARIES 26 26 26 26 ---- -~ - -~. ~a & Semaphore & Price ~5 25 25 75 Flinders & Alexandra 25 25 ------~ Semaphore (IND LAB, rethrow) & Price 74.3 Ramsav & Sluart & Elizabelh 74 24 24 -------- Ramsav 74.2 24 24 Napier 73.5 23 23 73 Bragg -- 23 23 -~----~-- Elizabelh (IND LAB, relhrow) 72.2 Spence 72 22 22 72 Davenport Stuart 72.0 22 22 71.6 Flinders (NAT, relhrow) Napier 71 21 21 --------- _~~ ~ 21 21 20 20 70 Custance ~-- 20 20 ~~_~ Pla)'!ord 69.4 19 19 19 19 ~- Ross Smith 66.7 68.6 Murray Mallse Ross Smith 66 16 16._.~_6:8 Victoria & Goyder & MurraLM_allse Sp<lf1ce 66.4 16 16 66.3 Vicloria Briggs 67.4 ~ 67.5 Bragg ---._~ke ~ 17 17 Whyalla 67.0 17 17 -~- ~-- SAFE Briggs 66_._ 16 16 66 Chaffe! ~_~ Maw~ 16 16 66.3 Cuslance <!nd Chaffey Peake 65.7 65.6 Eyre 15 15 65 Eyre & light 15 15 65.2 Alexandra -- PENDULUM AFTER THE STATE ELECTION OF 1989....,...,...--......, SWING ALP TO LOSE LIB 30 30 29 f-- 29 ACTUAL ACTUAL RESULTS 26 26 RESULTS 1963 EDBC BOUNDARIES 1963 EDBC BOUNDARIES f--- 27 27 76.9 Flinders (NAT, rethrow) 1-- 26 26 -- f---~-----~- 25 25 ~~ 24 24 ~ 23 23 73.2 Victoria 72.6 Murray-Mall.. isemaphore (IND LAB, relhrowi 72.2 22 22 72.5 MI Gambier 21 21 70.7 Chaffey 70.1 Custance 20 20 70.0 Bragg -- f--- ~ 19 19 -- 66.6 Eyre 1--- 16 16f-~~ ~~ Napier 67.2 17 17 Ramsay 66.7 66.4 Goyder SAFE Price 66.6 16 16 66.0 Alexandra 65.9 Davenport 65.5 Kav.. 15 15 65.1 Heysen -- SAFE Pla),!ord & Albert Park 64 14 14 Gilles 64.2 14 14 64.2 Davenport (IND LIB, rethrow) Baudin 63.7 Baudin 63 13 13 Mitchell 63.5 13 13 ----~rark62.9 Gilles 62 12 12 _~~~~ ~~_~ ~_ Hartley 62.5 12 12 62.4 Gcyder ~ ~ -- 61.7 Kav" Mawson 61 11 11 11 ~ -----~- 11 Hartley & Mitchell 60 10 1( 60 Mitcham & Kaval 10 10 59.9 MI. Gambier.. _..._._._--_._._-- - - 9 59 Coles 59.3 Light 56.6 Heyson FAIRLY FAIRLY 56.4 Coles SAFE Waislc_:iL_ 6 -----.~-~--- ---... ---..-.-- Florey 58.2 58.3 Milcham --~- ---------_.._._- 57 Morphell ~_!:Ienle! Beach 57.3 7 Norwood & Florey 56 Norwood 56.3 I odd 55.9 -"...._---_.. ---- 5 MEDIAN SEA T Unlet 55.0 ~.- 54.7 Morphell Henley Beach 54 54 Adelaide & Hanson ---------------- ----~--~.~------- -~------ _~ ~~ ~_~ 3 53 MI. Gambier STATEAVERAGE 53.1 3 Hayward 52.6 MEDIANSEAT MARGINAL Unle! & Todd 52 52 Fisher MARGINAL --.~--~----~------. Bright 51.6 Newland 51.5 1 il Newland_~ ~!'! Fisher 51.1 -----STA-tEAVERAGC50~ 1 V V 0 Adelaide 50.6 0 50 Hayward 50 -- 1~noon--- I - - - NOTE: The actual swing to lose in any given seat Will be the difference between 50.0% and Ihe 2PP vote for thai seat, plus either 1 vote or 0.1%. SOURCE: TABLE 13 Ross Smith & Spence 64.0 14 Elizabeth (IND LAB, rethrow) 63.9 14 f-~ ~ -- Sluart (rethrowl 63.6 13 13 63.1 Coles 62.9 Lighl 12 12 r---~~ Briggs 61.8 1---- 11 11 61.0 Mitcham Whyalla 60.9 -- Peake 60.0 10 10 60.0 Morphell Pla)'!ord 59.1 9 r---------- ----~- FAIRLY SAFE --- Albert Park 58.1 --- Mawson 57.3 Gilles 56.6 -- Walsh 56.3 56.1 Hanson Baudin 55.1 - Hartley 54.5 5_. -- Mitch.. 154.3 Henlev Beach 54.0 53.3 Adelaide -~- -- 53.1 Fisher Todd 52.6 ---- Norwood 52.5 -~ MARGINAL Unley 52.3 52.1 STATEAVERAGE --- MEDIAN SEAT Florey 51.6 ---_._- 1 51.0 Bright V ~ 50.9 Hayward ~Newland _ FAIRLY SAFE MARGINAL ":I H Gl C :;d trj W

INFORMATION PAPER 16 MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARJES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA PENDULUM AFTER THE STATE ELECTION OF 1989.-- --'('-N_EWT-" O~~~ZIMr;iA-TE...;S..:..) -, ALP I TO LOSE LIB PENDULUM AFTER THE STATE ELECTION OF 1993 _----...!:,;(A:.:.,;CTUAL RESU-=-LT...;S.:...)..., i SWING 1- ALP I TO LOSE I LIB 1----- -130 I 301- ~ 1 I- 130 301 80.6 Flinders (rethrow) SAFE FAIRLY SAFE NEWTON ESTIMATES -1 29 ON THE BASIS 28 OF THE 1991 EDBC BOUNDARIES 127 1---- 126 1- -125 t---------------1:: l-----i Hart 72.2 122 ~ ~ I21 1--- -120 1- -----119 1 j18 17 1 Price ~{-l16 ~ Elizabeth 65~_-J15 t----;;--~c--,c =_-,-=~14 Ramsay & Spence & Taylor 63.9 R_ossSmith 63.3 13 12 t-- -- ~_~ll1 110 Playford 59.8 ----- ----,.,..~: r ----- ---,:ee. 8 1-- 7 29 I~NEWTON ESTIMATES --- 28 ON THE BASIS OFTHE 27 1991 EDBC BOU~~._ 26 76.3 Flinders 251- I 1 24 73.7 MacKiliop " n.,_-- 22 211--~70"'.7;-C"'h-aff;;-e-Cy ;;-& "'Ri"'dle:C y -- 20 69.9 Custance 19 68.4 Goyder 18 68.0 Brag~ 17 ---------f 66.8 Kavel 16'1- _ 15 65.4 Finniss 64_8 Heysen 14. ------1 131 63.0 Davenport 62.8 Warte 12 1 - --_._-------( 111.1Q 60.7 Light 91 59.3 Morphett 81--- 71---_ SAFE FAIRLY SAFE ~_ ~29 1--- ---128 ACTUAL 27 RESULTS 1991 EDBC BOUNDARIES 126 ---1 25 I- --124 1-_ 1 23 I-- 122 1-- ----- 1 21 _~~~_I20 1--_ 1 19 1-- -1 18 ----11 17 I-- 116 ---1 15 1-- -----114 f------ 1 13 1------_---t 12 f------ Price 61.0 111 10 Ramsay 59.9 I-~-- Hart 58.5 I 9 r- Taylor 58ti0 8 spence 57. Elizabeth 57_6 7 291 79.0 ChaNey (rethrow) 78.7 Bragg 28 -~~7~7.~7~M;-ac~K~iII-op------i 27 ACTUAL RESULTS 26 1991 EDBC BOUNDARIES 25 75.1 Ridley 74.5 Custance & Heysen 74.4 Finniss 24 74.3 Kavel 73.9 Waite (rethrow) 23 73.3 Goyder 221 72.2 Davenport (rethrow) & Gordon 71.9 Morphett 211 70.7 Fisher 2O~ ~ 191 69.0 Bright --- 181-- 171 67.4 Newland 161 66.4 Ught 65.9 Coles 151-1 --- 141 64.1 Adelaide -- 131 63_2 Hartley 1~ "6~1<.5CU~nle~y-------------I 111 60.9 STATEAVEIl4GE - 60.5 Colton 101 60.4 Florev MEDIAN SEA T 59.6 Mawson 91 59.4 Mitchell 8\-- -1 71 57.4 Norwood 56.5 Eyre & Torrens SAFE FAIRLY SAFE MARGINAL Giles tkl.8 Wright 55.6 f-- Hanson 55'5_~5 Elder 54.7.. ~ens 54.S 4 Kaurna 53.2 Mitchell 53.0 3 Peake 52.9 Mawson 52.4 Florey 52_0 Norwood 51.6 1-_ -- 11 Newland 50.6 Unley 50.4 MEiJ. v o ; AT 51 --------- 41 54.3 Frome ----- 53_5 Eyre 3~S-he-r --- - 52.7 Bright & Coles 52.4 Hartiey 21...!~1_ TATE A VEIl4 >E 11 51.3 Adelai~.. 50.9 Colton MARGINAL tiqle: The actual swing to lose in any given seat will be the difference between 50,0% and the 2PP vote for that seat, plus either 1 vole or 0.1%. 1---- -15 _--14 41 54.0 Wnght.. -13 Playford 52.7 Giles 52.4 f---- B9ssSmith 52.1 12, V o 55.7 Frome 55.6 Peake 51- ~ ---I 31 53.4 Elder 52.8 Kaurna 51.2 Hanson & Reynell 51.1~ :;OUKCc: TABLE 13 MARGINAL "' >-- G c ~ t:r "'

PENDULUM AFTER THE STATE ELECTION OF 1989.-J,;,;(N~EW:..;T.ON ESTIMr-:AT.:...;E;,;;;SJ...} -, r- SWING ALP TO LOSE LIB 130 I 301--. -I PENDULUM AFTER THE STATE ELECTION OF 1993......,l,;(E::.::D:;-BC ESTIMA.:..:TE;,;;;SJ...} -, SWING.- ALP TO LOSE LIB 30 I 301 80.3 Flinders 1----------- -------I 79.4 MacKiliop ------ INFORMATION PAPER 16 MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA PENDULUM AFTER THE STATE ELECTION OF 1997...-- ---l(.:...:.ac:::.;tual RESU';=.LT.:.::S:I.,}... SWING ALP TO LOSE LIB 1 ---130 I 301-1----- SAFE NEWTON ESTIMATES 29 ON THE BASIS OF THE 28 1994 EDBC BOUNDARIES 127 J-------- 1 26 ---1 25 1-----------f4 1-123 Hart 72.0 _.122 t=------~-_==l: 1-- --119 ----f8-117 1 16 1-- -~P::-:ri-ce--;;8~5.9n I 1---- Napier 85.6 Tayklr 65.1 '115 Ramsay 64.7 Spence 64.1 14 Ross Smith 63.3 113 Elizabeth 62.8 1 112 29 281 NEWTON ESTIMATES ON THE BASIS OF THE 1994 EDBC BOUNDARIES 27 11----:;:;-;c-=c-::::---- 76.9 Flinders 261-_. I 25 ~1~~~~------- 74.9 MacKiliop 241 " 231. -- ---------I 221t---:;-;-:o-:c----- 71.9 Gordon 21~_::-::::--:: 70.7 Chaney 20 70.5 Hammond --------j 191---=-=~ 68.7 Bragg 18-67.3 Goyder -------- 17 67.2 Schubert 66.8 l\avel 161-- --1 65.5 Finniss 15 64.8 Heysen 14 ----1 13 63.4 Wail_e 121 62.3 Davenport SAFE 1-1 29 EDBC ESTIMATES ON THE BASIS OF THE 1994 EDBC BOUNDARIES 28 27 1 --126 1--._---125,, 124 1. -----l23 1 --- _122 I--- -121 1-- 120 t------ ----'.1:: 17 1 ----116 1 115 14 1 113 112 79.3 Bragg 291-_J9 c O Chaney 28 EDBC ESTIMATES ON THE BASIS 27 OF THE 1994 EDBC BOUNDARIES 26 1 75.3 Finniss 251 75.0 Hammond 74.5 Heysen 74.3 Waite 241 74.0 Kavel ---- 23 72.5 Goyder 72.4 Morphett & Schubert 22 72.2 Daven 71.5 Gordon 21 20 70.7 Fish_er -_-- ] 19'- _".. ---I 181 68.2 Bright 171 ~ 66.8 Coles ' 161 68.6 Newland 151" 65.2 Light.. ---1 141 64.1 Adelaide 131------ _ 121 62.2 Har1Iey --- SAFE 1-- -----11 29 I 291---1 --- 1-. ~128 28~ Flinders (rethrow) ---1 ACTUAL 27 RESULTS 1994 EDBC BOUNDARIES 26 J----- 125 Price 74.4 124 Spence 73.3 r 123 Hart 72.7 ~Ior 72.2 Napier (rethrow) 71.1 21 J----- t 20 119 1 - Ra~Say 682 r: _---1 16 J------ --Ro-ss-S~m-cithc--;;-;64,..8 1 15 Elizabeth 64.3 114 1------ Playford 63.0 113 1---- -1112 27 26, ACTUAL RESULTS 1994 EDBC BOUNDARIES 25 1 ------I 241-1 ----I 231---- 221 --I 211 71.0 Chaney (NAT, rethrow) 70.9 MacKillop (IND LIB, rethrow) 201-- ~ r.68~.8~~~ag-g--- --I 18 1 -.J 171 67.2 Goyder 16 1 ---t 63.8 Davenport (rethrow) 131 63.0 Morphett 62.3 Gordon (IND, rethrow) 62.2 Waite (rethrow) 121 62.1 Heysen (rethrow) SAFE FAIRLY SAFE 1-- 111 Playford~~9 Lee 58.1 18 1-----------c;Gccile"'-'S 57.8 10 Reynell 57.6 Wright 57.0 17 Elder 55.1 15 Hanson 54.9 Torrens 54.5 Peake 54.1 MARGINALI-~a & Norwood 53.6 I- Mitchell 52.6 11 1 -----I 101 60.2 LiQht 59.8 Morphett :t~-~-----i 55.8 Coles 51_.55.4 Frome" 54.9 Stuart --- ------- I 41- -------------1 52.8 Fisher 21 52 1 STA TEA VERAGE I Florey 51.9 I Newland 51.0 I EDIANSEATHar1ley&Unley 50.8 ------1 FAIRLY SAFE MARGINAL 1----- Price 61.0 11 Ramsay 60.3 10 Taylor 59.4 Hart 58.7 Spence 57.7.8 ""_ 7 Napier 56.4 16.5 _ 9Jles 54.3 14 1--- Elizabeth 52.7 f-~~smith & Playford 52.1 1 \1 v 111 61.5 Unley I 60.9 Florey ALSO STA TEA VERAGE 10 60.6 Colton MEDIAN SEA T 59.4 Mitchell 91 59.2 Mawson 58.9 Stuart 81~~ 71 57.4 Norwood 56.5 Torrens 54.9 Peake 53.5 Elder 3 _.53.2 Wright 52.5 Reynell --------- 52.4 Kauma -51.8 Hanso~-----------' 51.0_Le_e FAIRLY SAFE MARGINAL ~... "iles 61.4 11 Torrens 80.1 10 1-- 19 r--- -~L-ee~57... 1-f 1--- Peake 57.0 J7 Kauma 55.9 Hanson 55.5 15 I-------~nell 53.7 4 I.'!'!r:i9ht 53.1 3 ---- - Elder 52.7 12 111-. -1 10 91 59.8 Fisher 81---48.0 Newland 57.8 Coles 71 56.3 Light 56.1 Brigilt 51 55.4 Adelaide 54.7 Mawson 54.5 Unley 54.0 Co~on 52.9 Frome MEDIAN SEA T 51.6 Stuart ---.---- 1-----.- Florey 5..1~ 51.5 STATE AVERAGE Mitchell 50.9 Norwood 50.7 50.5 Hartley FAIRLY SAFE MARGINAL "':I H gj Rl U1 NOTE: The actual s'ning to lose in any given seat will be the difference between 50.0% and the 2PP vote for that sea~ plus either 1 vote or 0.1%. SOURCE: TABLE 13

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 15A: ACTUAL AND HYPOTHETICAL PROPORTIONATE SWINGS, 1979-1982 ACTUAL 1979 RESULTS HYPOTHETICAL 1982 RESUL TS ACTUAL 1982 RESULTS swing 2PP% State election proportionate 2PP% State election swing 2PP% State election to ALP 15.9.1979 swing to ALP 6.11.1982 to ALP 6.11.1982 1977-79 ALP LIB 1979-82 ALP LIB 1979-82 ALP LIB (%) 2PP% 2PP% (%) 2PP% 2PP% (%) 2PP% 2PP% Spence -7.1 70.2 5.0 75.2 7.6 77.9 Stuart -7.0 66.9 4.9 71.9 3.1 70.0 Whyalla (a) -6.5 66.7 4.6 71.3 1.3 68.0 Elizabeth -11.8 60.5 8.3 68.9 10.5 71.0 Semaphore (b) -8.7 63.5 6.1 69.6 6.5 70.0 Ross Smith -3.8 68.4 2.7 71.1 7.2 75.6 Napier -11.5 59.5 8.1 67.6 9.7 69.2 Salisbury -8.7 60.8 6.2 66.9 11.8 72.5 Price -8.9 60.5 6.3 66.8 5.6 66.1 Peake -9.6 57.8 6.8 64.6 11.6 69.5 Playford -12.0 55.1 8.4 63.5 9.6 64.7 Florey -13.4 53.7 9.4 63.1 10.2 63.9 Baudin -11.0 55.7 7.7 63.5 9.8 65.5 Adelaide -8.3 57.9 5.9 63.8 6.0 63.9 Albert Park -10.2 53.9 7.2 61.1 11.3 65.2 Gilles -7.4 55.4 5.2 60.6 4.0 59.4 Ascot Park -10.8 51.7 7.7 59.3 7.7 59.3 Mitchell -7.1 54.3 5.0 59.3 6.4 60.7 Hartley -5.4 55.1 3.8 58.9 5.0 60.0 Norwood -10.3 50.1 7.3 57.2 9.2 59.1 Unley -7.8 52.3 5.5 57.8 4.3 56.6 Newland -15.9 56.1 11.2 55.1 9.6 53.6 Henley Beach -10.3 51.0 7.3 56.3 4.9 54.0 Brighton -12.8 54.7 9.0 54.3 5.5 50.8 Todd -11.1 54.6 7.8 53.2 3.2 51.4 Mawson -9.5 53.0 6.7 53.7 9.6 56.6 Morphett -5.7 55.3 4.0 51.3 3.8 51.5 Coles -10.8 62.2 7.7 54.6 11.0 51.3 MtGambier -4.2 55.6 3.0 52.7 3.4 52.2 Torrens -7.6 60.1 5.3 54.7 5.6 54.5 Hanson -9.1 64.5 6.4 58.1 6.3 58.2 Eyre -4.0 59.9 2.8 57.1-2.2 62.1 Rocky River -4.9 63.1 3.4 59.7 2.8 60.3 Glenelg -7.8 67.2 5.5 61.7 4.9 62.4 Chaffey -4.5 64.1 3.2 61.0-1.6 65.7 Murray -5.9 65.9 4.2 61.8 5.3 60.6 Fisher -9.7 70.2 6.9 63.3 9.0 61.2 Light -6.5 67.2 4.6 62.6 2.0 65.2 Mitcham (c) -21.3 82.5 15.1 67.5 9.5 73.0 Bragg -5.8 71.1 4.1 67.0 4.7 66.4 Victoria -2.7 68.0 1.9 66.1 1.5 66.6 Kavel -5.6 74.3 3.9 70.4 7.6 66.7 Alexandra -5.5 75.3 3.9 71.4 5.8 69.5 Mallee(d) -5.0 78.8 3.5 75.3-1.2 80.0 Davenport -6.5 80.6 4.6 76.1 4.4 76.2 Flinders (e) -3.9 78.2 2.8 75.4 0.2 78.0 Goyder (D -2.5 77.1 1.8 75.3 2.0 75.1 State-wide -8.5 44.9 55.1 6.0 50.9 49.1 6.0 50.9 49.1 SOURCE: Table 13A.

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 15B: ACTUAL AND HYPOTHETICAL PROPORTIONATE SWINGS, 1982-1989 ACTUAL 1985 HYPOTHETICAL 1989 ACTUAL 1989 Est. swing 2PP% State election proportionate 2PP% State election swing 2PP% State election to ALP 7.12.1985 swing to ALP 25.11.1989 to ALP 25.11.1989 1982-85 ALP LIB 1985-89 ALP LIB 1985-89 ALP LIB (%) 2PP% 2PP% (%) 2PP% 2PP% (%) 2PP% 2PP% Price -0.7 74.3 1.6 75.9-7.7 66.6 Semaphore (d) -0.7 74.3 1.6 75.9-2.1 72.2 Whyalla -8.0 67.0 18.4 85.4-6.1 60.9 Elizabeth (b) -1.8 72.2 4.1 76.3-8.3 63.9 Ramsay 0.2 74.2-0.5 73.7-7.5 66.7 Stuart (e) -2.0 72.0 4.6 76.6-8.4 63.6 Spence -3.6 68.4 8.3 76.7-4.4 64.0 Napier 2.5 73.5-5.8 67.7-6.3 67.2 Ross Smith 0.7 68.7-1.6 67.1-4.7 64.0 Peake -1.3 65.7 3.0 68.7-5.7 60.0 Briggs 1.4 67.4-3.2 64.2-5.6 61.8 Albert Park -1.1 62.9 2.5 65.4-4.8 58.1 Playford 5.4 69.4-12.4 57.0-10.3 59.1 Baudin 0.7 63.7-1.6 62.1-8.6 55.1 Gilles 2.2 64.2-5.1 59.1-7.6 56.6 Mawson 5.1 66.1-11.8 54.3-8.8 57.3 Hartley 2.5 62.5-5.8 56.7-8.0 54.5 Mitchell 3.5 63.5-8.1 55.4-9.2 54.3 Walsh 2.7 60.7-6.2 54.5-4.4 56.3 Florey 2.2 58.2-5.1 53.1-6.4 51.8 Norwood 0.3 56.3-0.7 55.6-3.8 52.5 Henley Beach 3.3 57.3-7.6 50.3-3.3 54.0 Todd 3.9 55.9-9.0 53.1-3.1 52.8 Unley 3.0 55.0-6.9 51.9-2.7 52.3 Hayward 2.8 52.8-6.5 53.7-3.7 50.9 Bright 2.6 51.6-6.0 54.4-2.6 51.0 Newland 2.5 51.5-5.8 54.3-1.6 50.1 Fisher 3.1 51.1-7.1 56.0-4.2 53.1 Mt. Gambier -6.9 59.9 15.9 56.0-12.6 72.5 Adelaide 4.6 50.6-10.6 60.0-3.9 53.3 Hanson 3.1 50.9-7.1 58.0-5.2 56.1 Morphett 2.3 54.7-5.3 60.0-5.3 60.0 Coles 0.6 58.4-1.4 59.8-4.7 63.1 Kavel -1.7 61.7 3.9 57.8-3.8 65.5 Mitcham 1.7 58.3-3.9 62.2-2.7 61.0 Heysen 3.2 58.8-7.4 66.2-6.3 65.1 Eyre -0.8 65.8 1.8 64.0-2.8 68.6 Light 5.7 59.3-13.1 72.4-3.6 62.9 Chaffey -0.3 66.3 0.7 65.6-4.4 70.7 Goyder 5.6 62.4-12.9 75.3-4.0 66.4 Murray Mallee -0.6 68.6 1.4 67.2-4.0 72.6 Victoria -0.3 68.3 0.7 67.6-4.9 73.2 Custance 3.7 66.3-8.5 74.8-3.8 70.1 Davenport (a) 7.8 64.2-18.0 82.2-1.7 65.9 Bragg 5.5 67.5-12.7 80.2-2.5 70.0 Alexandra 9.8 65.2-22.6 87.8-0.8 66.0 Flinders (ct 3.4 71.6-7.8 79.4-5.3 76.9 Statewide 2.3 53.2 46.8-5.3 47.9 52.1-5.3 47.9 52.1 SOURCE: Table 13A.

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 15C: ACTUAL AND HYPOTHETICAL PROPORTIONATE SWINGS, 1989-1997 ACTUAL 1993 (EDBC est.) HYPOTHETICAL 1997 ACTUAL 1997 Est. swing 2PP% State election proportionate 2PP% State election swing 2PP% State election to ALP 11.12.93 swing to ALP 11.10.97 to ALP 11.10.97 1989-93 ALP LIB 1993-97 ALP LIB 1993-97 ALP LIB (%) 2PP% 2PP% (%) 2PP% 2PP% (%) 2PP% 2PP% Price -4.9 61.0 5.2 66.2 13.4 74.4 Spence -6.4 57.7 6.8 64.5 15.6 73.3 Hart -13.3 58.7 14.2 72.9 14.0 72.7 Taylor -5.7 59.4 6.1 65.5 12.8 72.2 Napier -9.2 56.4 9.8 66.2 14.7 71.1 Ramsay -4.4 60.3 4.7 65.0 7.9 68.2 Ross Smith -11.2 52.1 12.0 64.1 12.7 64.8 Elizabeth -10.1 52.7 10.8 63.5 11.6 64.3 Playford -7.3 52.1 7.8 59.9 10.9 63.0 Giles -3.5 54.3 3.7 58.0 7.1 61.4 Torrens -11.0 43.5 11.8 55.3 16.6 60.1 Lee -9.1 51.0 9.7 58.7 8.1 57.1 Peake -9.0 54.9 9.6 54.7 11.9 57.0 Kaurna -6.0 52.4 6.4 54.0 8.3 55.9 Hanson -6.7 51.8 7.2 55.4 7.3 55.5 Reynell -10.1 52.5 10.8 58.3 6.2 53.7 Wright -10.2 53.2 10.9 57.7 6.3 53.1 Elder -8.6 53.5 9.2 55.7 6.2 52.7 Florey -12.8 60.9 13.7 52.8 12.3 51.4 Mitchell -12.0 59.4 12.8 53.4 10.3 50.9 NOlWood -11.0 57.4 11.8 54.4 8.1 50.7 Hartley -13.0 62.2 13.9 51.7 11.7 50.5 Stuart -4.0 58.9 4.3 54.6 7.3 51.6 Frome -2.6 58.1 2.8 55.3 5.2 52.9 Colton -9.8 60.6 10.5 50.1 6.6 54.0 Unley -12.3 61.5 13.1 51.6 7.0 54.5 Mawson -9.3 59.2 9.9 50.7 4.5 54.7 Adelaide -12.8 64.1 13.7 50.4 8.7 55.4 Bright -17.1 68.2 18.3 50.1 12.1 56.1 Light -5.0 65.2 5.3 40.1 8.9 56.3 Coles -13.0 68.8 13.9 54.9 11.0 57.8 Newland -17.6 66.6 18.8 52.2 8.6 58.0 Fisher -17.9 70.7 19.1 51.6 10.9 59.8 Heysen -9.7 74.5 10.4 64.1 12.4 62.1 Waite -10.9 74.3 11.6 62.7 12.1 62.2 Gordon 0.4 71.5-0.4 71.9 9.2 62.3 Morphett -12.6 72.4 13.5 58.9 9.4 63.0 Davenport -9.9 72.2 10.6 61.6 8.4 63.8 Hammond -4.5 75.0 4.8 70.2 10.2 64.8 Schubert -5.2 72.4 5.6 66.8 7.5 64.9 Kavel -7.2 74.0 7.7 66.3 9.0 65.0 Finniss -9.8 75.3 10.5 64.8 9.4 65.9 Goyder -5.2 72.5 5.6 66.9 5.3 67.2 Bragg -10.6 79.3 11.3 68.0 10.5 68.8 MacKiliop -4.5 79.4 4.8 74.6 8.5 70.9 Chaffey -8.2 79.0 8.8 70.2 8.0 71.0 Flinders -3.5 80.3 3.7 76.6 1.8 78.5 State-wide -8.8 39.1 60.9 9.4 48.5 51.5 9.4 48.5 51.5 SOURCE. calculated from Table 13.

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 16: TWO PARTY PREFERRED RESULTS AND SWINGS IN METROPOLITAN AND COUNTRY, 1977 TO 1997 (ACTUAL RESULTS) 1977 1979 1982 1985 1989 ALP LIB TOTAL ALP LIB TOTAL ALP LIB TOTAL ALP LIB TOTAL ALP LIB TOTAL ALP (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) ALL METROPOLITAN 2PP vote (No.) 309183 220457 529640 253559 268661 522220 305339 239298 544637 342687 247526 590213 330766 294444 625210 280077 2PP vote (%) 58.4 41.6 100.0 48.6 51.4 100.0 56.1 43.9 100.0 58.1 41.9 100.0 52.9 47.1 100.0 42.5 1993 LIB (No.) TOTAL (No.) 379282 659359 57.5 100.0 ALP (No.) 1997 LIB (No.) 337456 301995 52.8 47.2 TOTAL (No.) 639451 100.0 ALL COUNTRY 2PP vote (No.) 87774 125915 213689 76870 135857 212727 84286 135939 220225 90762 135913 226675 83480 155061 238541 75822 2PP vote (%) 41.1 58.9 100.0 36.1 63.9 100.0 38.3 61.7 100.0 40.0 60.0 100.0 35.0 65.0 100.0 30.1 176250 252072 69.9 100.0 94059 156404 37.6 62.4 250463 100.0 ALL 2PP vote (No.) 396957 346372 743329 330429 404518 734947 389625 375237 764862 433449 383439 816888 414246 449505 863751 355899 2PP vote (%) 53.4 46.6 100.0 45.0 55.0 100.0 50.9 49.1 100.0 53.1 46.9 100.0 48.0 52.0 100.0 39.0 555532 911431 61.0 100.0 431515 458399 48.5 51.5 889914 100.0 SUMMARY SWING IN ALL METRO -9.8 9.8 7.5-7.5 2.0-2.0-5.2 5.2-10.4 SWING IN ALL COUNTRY -4.9 4.9 2.1-2.1 1.8-1.8-5.0 5.0-4.9 SWING IN ALL -8.4 8.4 6.0-6.0 2.1-2.1-5.1 5.1-8.9 I 10.4 4.9 8.9 10.3-10.3 7.5-7.5 9.4-9.4 NOTES: The metropolitan seats were Adelaide, Albert Park, Ascot Park, Baudin, Bragg, Briggs, Bright, Brighton, Coles, Colton, Davenport, Elder, Elizabeth, Fisher, Florey, Gilles, Glenelg, Hanson, Hart, Hartley, Hayward, Henley Beach, Heysen, Kauma, Lee, Mawson, Mitcham, MitcheJl, Morphett, Napier, Newland, Norwood, Peake, Playford, Price, Ramsay, ReyneJl, Ross Smith, Salisbury, Semaphore, Spence, Taylor, Todd, Torrens, Unley, Waite, Walsh and Wright. The country seats were Alexandra, Chaffey, Custance, Eyre, Finniss, Flinders, Frome, Giles, Gordon, Goyder, Hammond, Kavel, Light, Mackillop, MaJlee, Mt Gambier, Murray, Murray MaJlee, Ridley, Rocky River, Schubert, Stuart, Victoria and WhyaJla. NOTES: In constructing the table I had to use estimated two party preferred figures for some seats at some elections. 1977 2PP figures for Goyder and Mitcham are Jaensch estimates, and 1977 2PP figures for Flinders are ALP:NAT because Jaensch made no estimate of the ALP:LlB spl~. 1979 2PP figures for M~cham, Semaphore, Flinders and MaJlee are Jaensch estimates. For 1985 onwards, the State Electoral Office has provided figures for actual rethrows of the results in Davenport, Elizabeth, Semaphore and Flinders (in 1985), Elizabeth, Semaphore, Flinders and Stuart (in 1989), and Davenport, Waite, Chaffey and Flinders (in 1993) and Davenport, Heysen, Napier, Waite, Chaffey, Finniss, Flinders, Gordon, Kavel, MacKiJlop and Schubert (in 1997).

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 17: SIZE OF THE SWING IN VARIOUS SECTORS OF THE PENDULUM. SWING 1977 TO 1979 SWING 1979 TO 1982 SWING 1982 TO 1985 SWING 1985 TO 1989 SWING 1989 to 1993 (1991 (1994 boundaries) boundaries) SWING 1993 TO 1997 SWING IN ALL 8.5 to LIB 6.0 to ALP 2.3 to ALP 5.3 to LIB 8.9 to LIB 9.4 to ALP ALP safe ALP 60% + fairly safe ALP 56% < 60% marginal ALP 50% < 56% 8.9... 11.9,,,...,...,,,,,,,..,,,,,,,,,,...,, 5.7 6.7 9.1 7.6 Q3 6.8 ao a2 1.7 4.5 8.7 8.0... ""... "... "..,"""'''"''""... "... "... ""...,,...,," ""... "... """... ".. "... ",...,,... ".. "... "".. 3.4 3.1 9.9 10.8 10.7 14.3 10.6 marginal LIB 50% < 56% fairly safe LIB 56% < 60% safe LIB 60% + LIB 7.1 5.7 6.7 5.7...,... "'...,,,... "'...,, 3.7 4.4 1.5 1.5 3.1 5.3 6.0 3.5 10.6 12.6 6.8 11.0 12.6 6.7 7.8... 8.7 ""...,'""".,..,,,...,," 9.1 SOURCE: calculated from Figures 2,3,4, and 5, and Tables 15A, 158 and 15C.

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA I AtjLt: 1 ts: ~WINt;;~ A I ~ I A It: t:lt:{; IIUN~, l~rr to l~~r (SWIn~ to ALtJ) 1976 EDBC BOUNDARIES 1983 EDBC BOUNDARIES 1991 EDBC BOUNDARIES 1994 EDBC BOUNDRIES SWING to ALP SWING to ALP SWING to ALP SWING to ALP 1977 to 1979 1979 to 1982 1982 to 1985 1985 to 1989 1989 to 1993 1989 to 1993 1993 to 1997 (actual results) (estimated) (actual) (estimated) (estimated) (estimated) (percentage points) (percentage points) (percentage points) (percentage points) STATEWIDE SWING to ALP -8.5 6.0 2.3-5.3-8.9-8.9 9.4 SWING IN COUNTRY Alexandra -5.5 5.8 9.8-0.8 Chaffey -4.5-1.6-0.3-4.4-8.2-8.2 8.0 Custance 3.7-3.8-4.6 Eyre -4.0-2.2-0.8-2.8-3.0 Finniss -9.0-9.8 9.4 Flinders not available 0.2 3.4-5.3-4.3-3.5 1.8 Frome -1.4-2.6 5.2 Giles -3.4-3.5 7.1 Gordon 0.3 0.4 9.2 Goyder -2.5 2.0 5.6-4,0-4.9-5.2 5.3 Hammond -4.5 10.2 Kavel -5.6 7.6-1.7-3.8-7.5-7.2 9.0 Light -6.5 2.0 5.7-3.6-5.7-5.0 8.9 MacKiliop -4.0-4.5 8.5 Mallee -5.0-1.2 Mt Gambier -4.2 3.4-6.9-12.6 Murray -5.9 5.3 Murray Mallee -0.6-4.0 Ridley -4.4 Rocky River -4.9 2.8 Schubert -5.2 7.5 Stuart -7.0 3.1-2.0-8.4-4.0 7.3 Victoria -2.7 1.5-0.3-4.9 Whyalla -6.5 1.3-8.0-6.1 SOURCE: Table 14.

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 19: MEASURES OF THE SWING PATTERN. STATE ELECTIONS 1977 TO 1993 Swing Deviation Absolute Swing Deviation Absolute Swing Deviation Absolute Swing Deviation Absolute Swing Deviation Absolute Swing Deviation Absolute 1977 from deviation 1979 from deviation 1982 from deviation 1985 from deviation 1989 from deviation 1993 from deviation to the from to the from to the from to the from to the from to the from 1979 mean mean 1982 mean mean 1985 mean mean 1989 mean mean 1993 mean mean 1997 mean mean (actual) swing swing (actual) swing swina lest.) swine swing (actual) swing swing (est.) swing swing (est.) swing swing Adelaide -8.3-0.1 0.1 6.0 0.1 0.1 4.6 2.9 2.9-3.9 1.3 1.3-12.8 4.0 4.0 8.7-85.7 85.7 Albert Park -10.2-2.0 2.0 11.3 5.5 5.5-1.1-2.8 2.8 4.8 0.4 0.4 Alexandra -5.5 2.7 2.7 5.8-0.1 0.1 9.8 8.1 8.1-0.8 4.4 4.4 Ascot Park -10.8-2.6 2.6 7.7 1.8 1.8 Baudin -11.0-2.8 2.8 9.8 3.9 3.9 0.7-1.0 1.0-8.6-3.4 3.4 Bragg -5.8 2.4 2.4 4.7-1.2 1.2 5.5 3.8 3.8-2.5 2.7 2.7-10.7-1.9 1.9 10.5-83.9 83.9 Briggs 1.4-0.3 0.3-5.6-0.4 0.4 Bright 2.6 0.9 0.9-2.6 2.6 2.6-16.3-7.5 7.5 12.1-82.3 82.3 Brighton -12.8 4.6 4.6 5.5-0.3 0.3 Chaffey 4.5 3.7 3.7-1.6-7.5 7.5-0.3-2.0 2.0 4.4 0.8 0.8-8.3 0.5 0.5 8.0-86.4 86.4 Coles -10.8-2.6 2.6 11.0 5.1 5.1 0.6-1.1 1.1 4.7 0.5 0.5-13.2 4.4 4.4 11.0-83.4 83.4 Colton -9.6-0.8 0.8 6.6-87.8 87.8 Custance 3.7 2.0 2.0-3.8 1.4 1.4 4.6 4.2 4.2 Davenport -6.5 1.8 1.8 4.4-1.4 1.4 1.8 6.1 6.1-1.1 3.5 3.5-9.2-0.4 0.4 8.4-86.0 86.0 Elder -8.1 0.7 0.7 6.2-88.2 88.2 Elizabeth -11.8-3.6 3.6 10.5 4.6 4.6-1.8-3.5 3.5-8.3-3.1 3.1-8.0 0.8 0.8 11.6-82.8 82.8 Eyre 4.0 4.2 4.2-2.2-8.1 8.1-0.8-2.5 2.5-2.8 2.4 2.4-3.0 5.8 5.8 Finniss -9.0-0.2 0.2 9.4-85.0 85.0 Fisher -9.7-1.5 1.5 9.0 3.1 3.1 3.1 1.4 1.4 4.2 1.0 1.0-17.9-9.1 9.1 10.9-83.5 83.5 Flinders -3.9 4.3 4.3 0.2-5.7 5.7 3.4 1.7 1.7 ~ -0.1 0.1-4.3 4.5 4.5 1.8-92.6 92.6 Florey -13.4-5.1 5.1 10.2 4.3 4.3 2.2 0.5 0.5-6.4-1.2 1.2-12.4-3.6 3.6 12.3-82.1 82.1 Frome -1.4 7.4 7.4 5.2-89.2 89.2 Giles -3.4 5.4 5.4 7.1-87.3 87.3 Gilles -7.4 0.8 0.8 4.0-1.9 1.9 2.2 0.5 0.5-7.6-2.4 2.4 Glenelg -7.8 0.4 0.4 4.9-1.0 1.0 Gordon 0.3 9.1 9.1 9.2-85.2 85.2 Goyder -2.5 5.7 5.7 2.0-3.8 3.8 5.6 3.9 3.9 4.0 1.2 1.2 4.9 3.9 3.9 5.3-89.1 89.1 Hammond 10.2-84.2 84.2 Hanson -9.1-0.9 0.9 6.3 0.4 0.4 3.1 1.4 1.4-5.2 0.0 0.0-6.7 2.1 2.1 7.3-87.1 87.1 Hart -13.7 4.9 4.9 14.0-80.4 80.4 Hartley -5.4 2.8 2.8 5.0-0.9 0.9 2.5 0.8 0.8-8.0-2.8 2.8-10.8-2.0 2.0 11.7-82.7 82.7 Hayward 2.8 1.1 1.1-3.7 1.5 1.5 Henley Beach -10.3-2.1 2.1 4.9-0.9 0.9 3.3 1.6 1.6-3.3 1.9 1.85 Heysen 3.2 1.5 1.5-6.3-1.1 1.1-9.7-0.9 0.9 12.4-82.0 82.0 Kaurna -6.0 2.8 2.8 8.3-86.1 86.1 Kavel -5.6 2.6 2.6 7.6 1.7 1.7-1.7-3.4 3.4-3.8 1.4 1.4-7.5 1.3 1.3 9.0-85.4 85.4 Lee -9.0-0.2 0.2 8.1-86.3 86.3 Light -6.5 1.7 1.7 2.0-3.9 3.9 5.7 4.0 4.0-3.6 1.6 1.6-5.7 3.1 3.1 8.9-85.5 85.5 Mackillop 4.0 4.8 4.8 8.5-85.9 85.9 Mallee -5.0 3.2 3.2-1.2-7.0 7.0 Mawson -9.5-1.3 1.3 9.6 3.7 3.7 5.1 3.4 3.4-8.8-3.6 3.6-12.0-3.2 3.24 4.5-89.9 89.9 Mitcham -21.3-13.1 13.1 9.5 3.6 3.6 1.7 0.0 0.0-2.7 2.5 2.5 CONTINUES

INFORMATION PAPER 16 : MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA Swing Deviation Absolute Swing Deviation Absolute Swing Deviation Absolute Swing Deviation Absolute Swing Deviation Absolute Swing Deviation Absolute 1977 from deviation 1979 from deviation 1982 from deviation 1985 from deviation 1989 from deviation 1993 from deviation to the from to the from to the from to the from to the from to the from 1979 mean mean 1982 mean mean 1985 mean mean 1989 mean mean 1993 mean mean 1997 mean mean I (actual) swing swing (actual) swing swing (est.) swing swing (actual) swing swing (est.) swing swing (est.) swing swing Mitchell -7.1 1.1 1.1 6.4 0.5 0.5 3.5 1.8 1.8-9.2-4.0 4.0-12.4-3.6 3.6 10.3-84.1 84.1 Morphett -5.7 2.6 2.6 3.8-2.0 2.0 2.3 0.6 0.6-5.3-0.1 0.1-12.6-3.8 3.8 9.4-85.0 85.0 MtGambier -4.2 4.0 4.0 3.4-2.5 2.5-6.9-8.6 8.6-12.6-7.4 7.4 Murray -5.9 2.3 2.3 5.3-0.6 0.6 Murray Mallee -0.6-2.3 2.3-4.0 1.2 1.2 Napier -11.5-3.2 3.2 9.7 3.8 3.8 2.5 0.8 0.8-6.3-1.1 1.1-10.1-1.3 1.3 14.1-79.7 79.7 Newland -15.9-7.7 7.7 9.6 3.7 3.7 2.5 0.8 0.8-1.6 3.6 3.6-18.0-9.2 9.2 8.6-85.8 85.8 Norwood -10.3-2.1 2.1 9.2 3.3 3.3 0.3-1.4 1.4-3.8 1.4 1.4-9.0-0.2 0.2 8.1-86.3 86.3 Peake -9.6-1.4 1.4 11.6 5.7 5.7-1.3-3.0 3.0-5.7-0.5 0.5-8.5 0.3 0.3 11.9-82.5 82.5 Playford -12.0-3.7 3.7 9.6 3.8 3.8 5.4 3.7 3.7-10.3-5.1 5.1-7.1 1.7 1.7 10.9-83.5 83.5 Price -8.9-0.6 0.6 5.6-0.3 0.3-0.7-2.4 2.4-7.7-2.5 2.5-5.0 3.8 3.8 13.4-81.0 81.0 Ramsay 0.2-1.5 1.5-7.5-2.3 2.3-4.0 4.8 4.8 7.9-86.5 86.5 Reynell -10.1-1.3 1.3 6.2-88.2 88.2 Ridley -4.4 4.4 4.4 Rocky River -4.9 3.3 3.3 2.8-3.1 3.1 Ross Smith -3.8 4.5 4.5 7.2 1.4 1.4 0.7-1.0 1.0-4.7 0.5 0.5-11.2-2.4 2.4 12.7-81.7 81.7 Salisbury -8.7-0.5 0.5 11.8 5.9 5.9 Schubert 1.5-86.9 86.9 Semaphore -8.1-0.5 0.5 6.5 0.6 0.6-0.1-2.4 2.4-2.1 3.1 3.1 Spence -7.1 1.1 1.1 7.6 1.8 1.8-3.6-5.3 5.3-4.4 0.8 0.8-6.2 2.6 2.6 15.6-78.8 78.8 Stuart -7.0 1.2 1.2 3.1-2.8 2.8-2.0-3.7 3.7-8.4-3.2 3.2 7.3-87.1 87.1 Taylor -5.9 2.9 2.9 12.8-81.6 81.6 Todd -11.1-2.9 2.9 3.2-2.7 2.7 3.9 2.2 2.2-3.1 2.1 2.1 Torrens -7.6 0.6 0.6 5.6-0.3 0.3-11.0-2.2 2.2 16.6-77.8 77.8 Unley -7.8 0.4 0.4 4.4-1.5 1.5 3.0 1.3 1.3-2.7 2.5 2.5-11.9-3.1 3.1 7.0-87.4 87.4 Victoria -2.7 5.5 5.5 1.5-4.4 4.4-0.3-2.0 2.0-4.9 0.3 0.3 Waite ::111-2.3 2.3 12.1-82.3 82.3 Walsh 2.7 1.0 1.0-4.4 0.8 0.8 Whyalla -6.5 1.7 1.7 1.3-4.6 4.6-8.0-9.7 9.7-6.1-0.9 0.9 Wright -9.6-0.8 0.8 6.3-88.1 88.1 Mean of swings -8.2 5.9 1.7-5.2-8.8 94.4 Mean absolute deviation 2.8 2.9 2.5 2.0 3.2 84.9 No. of observations below mean absolute deviation 25 22 31 25 26 27.0 above 3 X mean absolute deviation 1 0 3 1 0 1.0 above 4 X mean absolute deviation 1 0 0 0 0 0.0 No. of +lie deviations 25 22 27 28 22 20 from sample mean No of -ve deviations 22 25 20 19 25 27 from sample mean I SOURCE: calculated from Table 14.

INFORMATION PAPER 16 : MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 20: FISCHER'S METHOD: PROBABILITY THAT A GIVEN SEAT WOULD CHANGE HANDS WITH A GIVEN SWING. HYPOTHETICAL ELECTION WITH AN 8 9% SWING TO THE ALP ALP SWING TO LOSE Swing No. of standard Area under Probability ACTUAL IN 1989 (Newton est.) required deviations probability of seat RESULTS above 8.9% from mean curve changing hands 1993 Hart 22.3 13.4 5.36 n.a. 0.0 stayed ALP Price 16.1 7.2 2.88 0.4980 0.20 stayed ALP Elizabeth 15.7 6.8 2.72 0.4967 0.33 stayed ALP Ramsay 14.0 5.1 2.04 0.4793 2.07 stayed ALP Spence 14.0 5.1 2.04 0.4793 2.07 stayed ALP Taylor 14.0 5.1 2.04 0.4793 2.07 stayed ALP Ross Smith 13.4 4.5 1.80 0.4641 3.59 stayed ALP Napier 11.3 2.4 0.96 0.3351 16.49 stayed ALP Playford 9.9 1.0 0.40 0.1554 34.46 stayed ALP Reynell 9.0 0.1 0.04 0.0159 48.41 swu~ Lee 8.0-0.9-0.36 0.1406 64.06 swung Giles 5.9-3.0-1.20 0.3849 88.49 stayed ALP Wright 5.7-3.2-1.28 0.3997 89.97 swung Hanson 5.6-3.3-1.32 0.4066 90.66 swung Elder 4.8-4.1-1.64 0.4495 94.95 swung Torrens 4.6-4.3-1.72 0.4573 95.73 swung Kaurna 3.3-5.6-2.24 0.4875 98.75 swung Mitchell 3.1-5.8-2.32 0.4898 98.98 swung Peake 3.0-5.9-2.36 0.4909 99.09 swung Mawson 2.5-6.4-2.56 0.4948 99.48 swung Florey 2.1-6.8-2.72 0.4967 99.67 swung Norwood 1.7-7.2-2.88 0.4980 99.80 swung Newland 0.7-8.2-3.28 n.a. 100.0 swung Unley 0.5-8.4-3.36 n.a. 100.0 swung HYPOTHETICAL ELECTION WITH A 9 4% SWING TO THE ALP LIB SWING TO LOSE Swing No. of standard Area under Probability ACTUAL IN 1993 (Newton est.) required deviations probability of seat RESULTS above 9.4% from mean curve changing hands 1997 Lee 1.1-8.3-3.32 n.a. 100.0 swung Hanson 1.9-7.5-3.00 0.4987 99.87 swung Kauma 2.5-6.9-2.76 0.4971 99.71 swung Reynell 2.6-6.8-2.72 0.4967 99.67 swung Wright 3.3-6.1-2.44 0.4927 99.27 swung Elder 3.6-5.8-2.32 0.4898 98.98 swung Peake 5.0-4.4-1.76 0.4608 96.08 swung Torrens 6.6-2.8-1.12 0.3686 86.86 swung Norwood 7.5-1.9-0.76 0.2764 77.64 swung Frome 8.2-1.2-0.48 0.1844 68.44 stayed LIB Stuart 9.0-0.4-0.16 0.0636 56.36 stayed LIB Mawson 9.3-0.1-0.04 0.0159 51.59 stayed LIB Mitchell 9.5 0.1 0.04 0.0159 48.41 swung Colton 10.7 1.3 0.52 0.1985 30.15 stayed LIB Florey 11.0 1.6 0.64 0.2389 26.11 swung Unley 11.6 2.2 0.88 0.3106 18.94 stayed LIB Hartley 12.3 2.9 1.16 0.377 12.30 stayed LIB Adelaide 14.2 4.8 1.92 0.4726 2.74 stayed LIB Light 15.3 5.9 2.36 0.4909 0.91 stayed LIB Newland 16.7 7.3 2.92 0.4983 0.17 stayed LIB Bright 18.3 8.9 3.56 n.a. 0.0 stayed LIB Coles 18.9 9.5 3.80 n.a. 0.0 stayed LIB Fisher 20.8 11.4 4.56 n.a. 0.0 stayed LIB Gordon 21.6 12.2 4.88 n.a. 0.0 stayed LIB Davenport 22.3 12.9 5.16 n.a. 0.0 stayed LIB Morphett 22.5 13.1 5.24 n.a. 0.0 stayed LIB Schubert 22.5 13.1 5.24 n.a. 0.0 stayed LIB Goyder 22.6 13.2 5.28 n.a. 0.0 stayed LIB Kavel 24.1 14.7 5.88 n.a. 0.0 stayed LIB Waite 24.4 15.0 6.00 n.a. 0.0 stayed LIB Heysen 24.6 15.2 6.08 n.a. 0.0 stayed LIB Hammond 25.1 15.7 6.28 n.a. 0.0 stayed LIB Finniss 25.4 16.0 6.40 n.a. 0.0 stayed LIB Chaffey 29.1 19.7 7.88 n.a. 0.0 stayed LIB Bragg 29.4 20.0 8.00 n.a. 0.0 stayed LIB MacKiliop 29.5 20.1 8.04 n.a. 0.0 st<l}'ed LIB SOURCES: Table 13; Fischer 1991 at p.302; and Karmel and Polasek 1970 at Appendix 1.

INFORMATION PAPER 16 : MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 21: THE CUBE RULE APPLIED TO SOUTH AUSTRALIAN STATE ELECTIONS, 1977 TO 1993. ALP LIB STATE VOTES WON VOTES WON ELECTION WON EXPECTED WON EXPECTED ACTUAL under ACTUAL under (No.) (No). Cube Rule (No.) (No). Cube Rule 1977 396957 27 28 346372 20 1979 330225 20 17 404722 27 1982 389625 25 25 375237 22 1985 433449 29 28 383439 18 1989 414246 24 21 449505 23 1993 355899 10 10 556187 37 1997 431515 21 21 458399 26 19 30 22 19 26 37 26 SOURCES: Expected seat data are calculated from the formula SALP / Sus = [V ALP / VLlSP' reformulated to become SALP = 47x [Vus / VALPP divided by 1+ [VLlB / VALPj3 Calculated from data in: SA. State Electoral Department, 1978, General Elections 1977: Statistical Returns, SA Parliamentary Paper 144 of 1978-79. SA. State Electoral Department, 1980, Periodical and General Elections 1979: Statistical Returns, SA Parliamentary Paper 132 of 1980-81. SA. State Electoral Department, 1982, Periodical and General Elections 1982: Statistical Returns, SA Parliamentary Paper 145 of 1982-83. SA. State Electoral Department, 1986, General Elections 1985: Statistical Returns, SA Parliamentary Paper 145 of 1986-87. SA. State Electoral Department, 1991, Periodical and General Elections 1989: Statistical Returns, SA Parliamentary Paper 161 of 1991-92. SA. State Electoral Office, 1996, Statistical Returns for General Elections 1993 and By-elections 1994, State Electoral Office, Adelaide. NOTE: Totals for 1985 to 1997 include rethrow results for those seats where the final two candidates preferred were not ALP and LIB. Rethrow data were unpublished until 1997.

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 22: CUBE RULE - PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL VOTE REQUIRED TO WIN A GIVEN NUMBER OF Effective 1+ 100 times Vs% = Seats SA SS=(47-SA) SAl Ss cube root of cube root of cube root of VA% (100-VA%) (Party A) SAl Ss SAl Ss SAl Ss 1 0.5 46.5 0.010752688 0.220718641 1.220718641 22.071864100 18.08 81.92 2 1.5 45.5 0.032967033 0.320646586 1.320646586 32.064658600 24.28 75.72 3 2.5 44.5 0.056179775 0.382995200 1.382995200 38.299520000 27.69 72.31 4 3.5 43.5 0.080459770 0.431710815 1.431710815 43.171081500 30.15 69.85 5 4.5 42.5 0.105882353 0.473087196 1.473087196 47.308719600 32.12 67.88 6 5.5 41.5 0.132530120 0.509845038 1.509845038 50.984503800 33.77 66.23 7 6.5 40.5 0.160493827 0.543441471 1.543441471 54.344147100 35.21 64.79 8 7.5 39.5 0.189873418 0.574762011 1.574762011 57.476201100 36.50 63.50 9 8.5 38.5 0.220779221 0.604392962 1.604392962 60.439296200 37.67 62.33 10 9.5 37.5 0.253333333 0.632747996 1.632747996 63.274799600 38.75 61.25 11 10.5 36.5 0.287671233 0.660134066 1.660134066 66.013406600 39.76 60.24 12 11.5 35.5 0.323943662 0.686788734 1.686788734 68.678873400 40.72 59.28 13 12.5 34.5 0.362318841 0.712902776 1.712902776 71.290277600 41.62 58.38 14 13.5 33.5 0.402985075 0.738634610 1.738634610 73.863461000 42.48 57.52 15 14.5 32.5 0.446153846 0.764119964 1.764119964 76.411996400 43.31 56.69 16 15.5 31.5 0.492063492 0.789478634 1.789478634 78.947863400 44.12 55.88 17 16.5 30.5 0.540983607 0.814819414 1.814819414 81.481941400 44.90 55.10 18 17.5 29.5 0.593220339 0.840243853 1.840243853 84.024385300 45.66 54.34 19 18.5 28.5 0.649122807 0.865849258 1.865849258 86.584925800 46.41 53.59 20 19.5 27.5 0.709090909 0.891731221 1.891731221 89.173122100 47.14 52.86 21 20.5 26.5 0.773584906 0.917985868 1.917985868 91.798586800 47.86 52.14 22 21.5 25.5 0.843137255 0.944711988 1.944711988 94.471198800 48.58 51.42 23 22.5 24.5 0.918367347 0.972013159 1.972013159 97.201315900 49.29 50.71 24 23.5 23.5 1.000000000 1. 000000000 2.000000000 100.000000000 50.00 50.00 25 24.5 22.5 1.088888889 1.028792656 2.028792656 102.879265600 50.71 49.29 26 25.5 21.5 1.186046512 1.058523669 2.058523669 105.852366900 51.42 48.58 27 26.5 20.5 1.292682927 1.089341388 2.089341388 108.934138800 52.14 47.86 28 27.5 19.5 1.410256410 1.121414139 2.121414139 112.141413900 52.86 47.14 29 28.5 18.5 1.540540541 1.154935446 2.154935446 115.493544600 53.59 46.41 30 29.5 17.5 1.685714286 1.190130693 2.190130693 119.013069300 54.34 45.66 31 30.5 16.5 1.848484848 1.227265799 2.227265799 122.726579900 55.10 44.90 32 31.5 15.5 2.032258065 1.266658724 2.266658724 126.665872400 55.88 44.12 33 32.5 14.5 2.241379310 1.308695029 2.308695029 130.869502900 56.69 43.31 34 33.5 13.5 2.481481481 1.353849367 2.353849367 135.384936700 57.52 42.48 35 34.5 12.5 2.760000000 1.402715817 2.402715817 140.271581700 58.38 41.62 36 35.5 11.5 3.086956522 1.456051840 2.456051840 145.605184000 59.28 40.72 37 36.5 10.5 3.476190476 1.514843805 2.514843805 151.484380500 60.24 39.76 38 37.5 9.5 3.947368421 1.580408005 2.580408005 158.040800500 61.25 38.75 39 38.5 8.5 4.529411765 1.654552687 2.654552687 165.455268700 62.33 37.67 40 39.5 7.5 5.266666667 1.739850547 2.739850547 173.985054700 63.50 36.50 41 40.5 6.5 6.230769231 1.840124561 2.840124561 184.012456100 64.79 35.21 42 41.5 5.5 7.545454545 1.961380270 2.961380270 196.138027000 66.23 33.77 43 42.5 4.5 9.444444444 2.113775235 3.113775235 211.377523500 67.88 32.12 44 43.5 3.5 12.42857143 2.316365409 3.316365409 231.636540900 69.85 30.15 45 44.5 2.5 17.80000000 2.610998771 3.610998771 261.099877100 72.31 27.69 46 45.5 1.5 30.33333333 3.118698412 4.118698412 311.869841200 75.72 24.28 47 46.5 0.5 93.00000000 4.530654896 5.530654896 453.065489600 81.92 18.08 SOURCE: Calculated from the formula SAlSs = [VA I Vsy reformulated to become VA = (100 x the cube root of SAlSs) I (1+ the cube root of SAlSB).

INFORMATION PAPER 16: MAKING SURE THAT ELECTORAL BOUNDARIES ARE FAIR IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA TABLE 23: CALCULATING AN ESTIMATED OEM: OTHER TWO PARTY PREFERRED VOTE, STATE ELECTION 1997 TWO PARTY FIRST PREFERENCES TOTAL ESTIMATED TWO PARTY PREFERRED VOTE PREFERRED ALP LIB DEM OTHER FORMA FOLLOWING ALP LIB VOTES NAPIER (%) (%) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) ALP DEM (No.) (No.) SAFE ALP PRICE 74.4 11314 3456 3078 17848 11870 5978 SPENCE 73.3 11806 4063 2339 18208 12460 5748 HART 72.7 11847 4052 2842 18741 12499 6242 TAYLOR 72.2 10803 4015 3328 18146 11449 6697 NAPIER 71.1 10642 7242 17884 10642 7242 RAMSAY 68.2 10100 4397 3228 17725 10807 6918 ROSS SMITH 64.8 9085 4849 3442 17376 9865 7511 ELIZABETH 64.3 10282 5703 3857 19842 11199 8643 PLAYFORD 63.0 9833 5743 3807 19383 10757 8626 GILES 61.4 9223 5614 3325 18162 10126 8036 TOTAL, ALP SAFE 111674 71641 FOLLOWING FOLLOWING FOLLOWING FOLLOWING NAPIER FINNISS HEYSEN WAITE WHICH ARE NOT SAFE ALP OR SAFE LIB ALP DEM LIB DEM LIB DEM I LIB DEM (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) TORRENS 60.1 9375 6374 3199 18948 10400 8548 7242 11706 7155 11793 7763 11185 LEE 57.1 8965 6668 3056 18689 10038 8651 7498 11191 7415 11274 7996 10693 PEAKE 57.0 8804 6998 3067 18869 9930 8939 7813 11056 7731 11138 8302 10567 KAURNA 55.9 8195 6855 3351 18401 9298 9103 7614 10787 7538 10863 8069 10332 HANSON 55.5 6023 6021 2359 3800 18203 8892 9311 8479 9724 8423 9780 8813 9390 REYNELL 53.7 7454 7158 4707 19319 8606 10713 7848 11471 7779 I 11540 8262 11057 WRIGHT 53.1 8474 7499 3531 19504 9680 9824 8284 11220 8205 11299 8754 10750 ELDER 52.7 7673 6924 3458 18055 8787 9268 7634 10421 7563 10492 I 8061 9994 FLOREY 51.4 7586 7881 4033 19500 8854 10646 8583 10917 8513 10987 9005 10495 MITCHELL 50.9 7615 7907 3572 19094 8887 10207 8612 10482 8541 10553 9035 10059 NORWOOD 50.7 7419 7919 2849 18187 8693 9494 8606 9581 8537 9650 9018 9169 HARTLEY 50.5 7168 8096 3304 18568 8470 10098 8760 9808 8693 9875 9158 9410 STUART 51.6 7597 8405 2639 18641 8949 9692 9108 9533 9038 9603 9531 9110 FROME 52.9 7581 9260 2747 19588 9071 10517 9962 9626 9891 9697 10383 9205 COLTON 54.0 6006 7690 2267 3225 19188 8856 10332 9859 9329 9803 9385 10192 8996 UNLEY 54.5 5179 7935 2580 3284 18978 8098 10880 10057 8921 10008 8970 10344 8634 MAWSON 54.7 6599 9031 3930 19560 8052 11508 9642 9918 9581 9979 10009 9551 ADELAIDE 55.4 5709 8695 3732 18136 7108 11028 9224 8912 9171 8965 9541 8595 BRIGHT 56.1 5910 9153 4263 19326 7382 11944 9700 9626 9645 9681 10029 9297 LIGHT 56.3 5917 9133 4249 19299 7386 11913 9681 9618 9626 9673 10010 9289 COLES 57.8 6156 9461 3905 19522 7678 11844 10031 9491 9974 9548 10373 9149 NEWLAND 58.0 6009 9268 4223 19500 7500 12000 9824 9676 9768 9732 10158 9342 FISHER 59.8 5849 10225 4593 20667 7494 13173 10767 9900 10712 9955 11092 9575 TOTAL, NOT-SAFE 437742 198108 239634 204827 232915 203309 234433 213898 223843 FOLLOWING FOLLOWING FOLLOWING FINN ISS HEYSEN WAITE I LIB DEM LIB DEM LIB DEM SAFE LIB I (No.) (No.) I (No.) (No.) (No.) (No.) HEYSEN 62.1 3938 9723 5643 19304 10051 9253 10051 9253 I 10051 9253 WAITE 62.2 10550 8335 18885 10550 8335 10550 8335 10550 8335 GORDON 62.3 4442 8463 2571 4658 20134 11203 8931 11162 8972 11450 8684 MORPHETT 63.0 5002 10069 3313 18384 10532 7852 10486 7898 10810 7574 DAVENPORT 63.8 10115 8524 18639 10115 8524 10115 8524 10115 8524 HAMMOND 64.8 4646 10178 4006 18830 10608 8222 10565 8265 10866 7964 SCHUBERT 64.9 4267 10767 4777 19811 11162 8649 11122 8689 11399 8412 KAVEL 65.0 10437 8098 18535 10437 8098 10437 8098 10437 8098 FINNISS 65.9 10890 8107 18997 10890 8107 10890 8107 10890 8107 GOYDER 67.2 4588 11631 3024 19243 12056 7187 12013 7230 12311 6932 BRAGG 68.8 3832 11328 3712 18872 11683 7189 11647 7225 11896 6976 MACKILLOP 70.9 3210 7390 1129 8447 20176 11911 8265 11881 8295 12089 8087 CHAFFEY 71.0 2734 8133 1399 7242 19508 I 12007 7501 11982 7526 12159 7349 FLINDERS 78.5 2170 10689 1307 5373 19539 I 13576 5963 13556 5983 13697 5842 TOTAL, SAFE LIB 268857 I 156781 112076 I 156457 112400! 158720 110137 SOURCE. calculated from official but as-yet-unpubhshed data from the State Electoral Office.