Global Order of Tianxia: A Research Framework based on China s Political Thoughts for an International Community beyond Anarchy 1

Global Order of Tianxia: A Research Framework based on China s Political Thoughts for an International Community beyond Anarchy 1 Hsin Chih CHEN (Professor, Department of Political Science, National Cheng Kung University) Assuming an anarchical international structure, western original main-stream international relations paradigm argued that actors could only accommodate with anarchical structure with power struggle for survive. However, Chinese political thoughts in the pre-qin era encouraged states to seek the domination position instead and to construct a universal order under heaven, Tainxia. With the purpose to go further beyond the limit of anarchical assumption held by the main international relations paradigm, this article tries to explore new research framework for the improvement of international relations paradigm with ideas which are inspired by the context of the order-orientated Chinese political thoughts in the pre-qin era. Different from the anarchical assumption held by the main international relations paradigms, China classical ideas assumed that the structure of the state of nature will push actors seeking universal order to manage internal and external disorder. This article finds that with combination of material power supremacy, soft resources of economic and culture attraction, as well as the governing legitimacy, Chinese political thinkers have provided to us a different image of how a global community of Tianxia could be constituted. Keywords: State of nature, Anarchy, Hierarchy, Chinese Political thought, International System, Pre-Qin Era 1 Draft, please do not quote without author s permission. 1

Tianxia is the concept of world order developed by the Chinese nation in the early days of the Zhou Dynasty in approximately 1000 B.C. 2 After the Qin Dynasty terminated the long-term chaos of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, it dominated the world, established the empire, and the world view was gradually enriched and expanded. It became the self-identity of the Chinese nation, as well as the main perspective to interpret world order. In addition, it was the main content constructing the tribute system of Chinese empires (Fairbank, 1968). Although various Chinese states in the Xia, Shang, and Zhou Dynasties experienced competitions against one another for a very long time, later generations still firmly believed that the central authority ruling the Central Plains should be the core based on the thinking of grand unification, and they refused to define the competitive relationships among the various actors in Chinese society as international relationships. They were inclined to view the power competitions among various political bodies in Chinese society as the internal power competitions for a unified position in Chinese society. The idea of Under the wide heaven, all is the king's land. Within the sea-boundaries of the land, all are the king's servants, as stated in Chapter Bei Shan of The Book of Odes (Chu, 1976: 209-210), which reflects that the dominance of the Central Plains region is subject to the imagination of an empire of central authority. The differences between internal and external worlds laid the foundation for Chinese society to deal with internal power competitions and external foreign relations. The power competitions of Chinese cultural systems were regarded as internal family affairs of communities, while the divisions and wars among states were regarded as internal separation and a combination of communities, rather than as international interactions. The Records of the Grand Historian, written during the Han Dynasty (100 B.C.), recorded the constant separations, combinations, and changes of empire rulers, and viewed the fights for orthodox authority among various political bodies on the Central Plains in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods as civil wars among the lower level feudatories in the empire 3. Moreover, the Records of the Grand Historian even formed the basis of the current thinking of grand unification. The interpretations of traditional history from the perspective of grand unification explain the reasons why various states fought for orthodox and dominant status. 2 King Wu of Zhou defeated King Zhou of Shang and Zhou Gong Dan pacified various states in the east in 1046 B.C. (Yang, 1999: 12). 3 The interactions among various kingdoms in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods were documented in Hereditary Houses of the Records of the Grand Historian, which is second to the Basic Annals that recorded orthodox dynasties. This implied Si Maqian s perspective to compile history according to order and differences in political bodies and statues (Si, 2002). 2

World view has attracted the attention of the field of international relations in the 21 st century. In the mid-19 th century, the East Asia international order that dominated the Qing Empire was replaced by the Westphalia system, as promoted by the Europe and the U.S., and world view was demoted from a fundamental concept for constructing Chinese international order to a pure Chinese political idea. In the 21 st century, American, European, and Chinese scholars were inspired by the rapid rise of material power of the People s Republic of China, and started to re-explore the theoretical basis of international relations with Chinese political thinking elements, ponder the potential development of international systems in East Asia, and seek a possible basis from the previous tribute system and China s world view, in an attempt to develop a theoretical analysis framework that can replace, supplement, and innovate international relations 4. First, this study inspected the reflection results of the Tianxia theory of scholars from Mainland China in modern times. After reviewing the basic concepts of heaven, Tianxia, and heaven s mandate, as developed by the Zhou Dynasty after it created the concept of Tianxia, this study found that the Chinese world view of Tianxia can be used to analyze and interpret the transfer of international order. The concept of the hegemonic governance of the Chinese world view of Tianxia inspired us for better understanding on the hegemony maintaining. The three-dimensional Global Tianxia perspecties developed from the traditional planar Chinese world view of Tianxia contributes the transformations of global political systems. This study found that, the the idea of variant mandate of heaven ( 天命靡常 ) of the Global Tianxia perspecties of Tianxia can better analyze and interpret the hegemony transfer of hierarchy characteristics. 1. Academia s Concept of the International Relations of the Tianxia System World view is the Chinese nation s crystallization of ideas regarding the governance of political relations among countries. World view of Tianxia was preliminarily developed in the Zhou Dynasty. After Qin s unification of the Central Plains, as well as the separations and combinations of Chinese empires over the past dynasties, world view of Tianxia has become an important element of Chinese 4 Preliminary results were obtained from relevant investigations and studies (Wang, 2006; Yen and Hsu, 2009; Kang, 2010). 3

political thinking. The tribute system, or the Tianxia system, as constructed by the Chinese world view of Tianxia, was the core principle and standardized blueprint for previous international governance systems in East Asia (Fairbank, 1968; Kang, 2010). The Chinese world view of Tianxia once vanished in the 20 th century; however, with the rising strength of the People s Republic of China, it once again became a research issue attracting the attention of international relations academia. Defining Tianxia as a world system is a major attempt of academia in Mainland China to develop the Chinese school of international relations. Chao Tingyang defined Tianxia as a world system with undifferentiated inclusiveness, which broke through the binary opposition of the Westphalian system and allowed the world to develop an order of co-existence. Jen Hsiao regarded Tianxia as cosmopolitanism, and suggested that, if hierarchy can be excluded, the cosmopolitanism of Tianxia will be an important thinking resource for the world (Jen, 2014: 44). However, Jen Hsiao did not explain how to exclude the Chinese central bias of world view. Chao Tingyang used Tianxia as an level of analysis, which includes the concept of world and external scale, as well as the principle of all-inclusiveness (Chao, 2011: 27-48). Tianxia, as defined by Chao Tingyang, included three basic meanings: 1. All of the lands in the world in a geographical sense; 2. Thoughts of all of the people living on all of the lands, namely, public mind; 3. An ideal Utopia of One World, One Family or an attempt to pursue a certain world system, as well as the world government promised by this world system (Chao, 2011: 27-28). However, after 2015, Chao Tingyang changed Tianxia from the highest cultural and political unit (Chao, 2011: 42) to a world system, where the world is the political subject, and it is viewed as the order of co-existence for the overall political unit (Chao, 2015) 5. Such a concept formed a sharp contrast to the idea suggesting that a country is a unit of an international system in western international relations theories and examples. On the one hand, Chao Tingyang defined Tianxia as the highest analysis unit of the world system. On the other hand, Chao suggested that Tianxia is a world system. However, Chao did not provide a clear definition of the world system structure called Tianxia, or the mutual relationship between the unit and the structure, which leads to difficulties in theoretical operations. To define the Tianxia system as a universal level of analysis, Chao Tingyang 5 Chao s English translation of 共在秩序 is order of coexistence. The Chinese and English descriptions of Chao may lead to different understanding by Chinese and English readers (Chao, 2015: 5). 4

attempted to elevate Tianxia from a unique concept in China to a universal concept applicable to the entire world (Chao, 2015: 5). The Tianxia system refers to the cosmopolitanization of the world, and is a dynamic process featured by undifferentiated co-existence. Based on the Tianxia principle of all-inclusiveness, Chao suggested that all political entities belong to Tianxia. Therefore, Tianxia only includes internality, and does not include externality, meaning there is no outsider that cannot be understood and accepted. There is no country, nation, or culture that is identified as an enemy that cannot be resolved. Any countries or places that have not joined the Tianxia system can be integrated by the co-existence order of Tianxia (Chao, 2015: 6). However, Chao Tingyang did not clearly state the definition, process, or approach of integration with Tianxia. In Chao Tingyang s Tianxia system, Tianxia is the highest political analysis unit under which there are countries and families. During the application of the structure of family-country-tianxia, Chao Tingyang suggested that Tianxia means an affair and a value standard that is greater than a country (Chao, 2011: 42). He suggested that, in the political framework of Tianxia-country-family, Tianxia is the highest political unit, as well as the final explanation principle of the overall framework. In other words, Tianxia defines the complete political sphere, and all political issues can be understood and explained according to the concept of Tianxia (Chao, 2015: 10). Therefore, both the explanatory powers of political theories and political legitimacy form the descending order of Tianxia-country-family, where Tianxia is the apex (Chao, 2015: 10). Chao Tingyang suggested that, the concept of a western political system, where individuals are the focus of concern, is a system that can complement the Tianxia system (Chao, 2015: 10). However, there are logical contradictions in Chao Tingyang s idea, which suggests that Tianxia can complement the western perspective; under the situation where they can complement each other, apparently, there is another political system above Tianxia and western political systems. As a result, in terms of logic, Chao Tingyang s Tianxia system is unlikely to be the most extreme political analysis system. Moreover, in Chao Tingyang s Tianxia system, individuals are not the analysis unit of the system. Therefore, it seems that such a system does not inherit the humanistic thought of Chinese traditional Confucianism. Unlike the traditional Confucianism world view that identified Chinese and foreigners, Chao Tingyang adopted Laozi s concept of observing Tianxia from the perspective of Tianxia, and suggested that it is necessary to implement the internalization of the world and make the world becoming an all-inclusive Tianxia, 5

as well as a system that includes internality, while omitting insurmountable externality. In the Tianxia system, people no longer look for irreconcilable enemies, view others as aliens that cannot co-exist with them, or define different values as unacceptable heresy. Therefore, all-inclusiveness is the absolute condition for achieving world peace, general safety, and universal cooperation (Chao, 2015: 14). Chao suggested that, although the internalization of the world may not achieve the ideal of all people belong to one family, such an ideal is possible, and is a sufficiently good world that can be achieved in reality (Chao, 2015: 14). Jen Hsiao also emphasized that, the cosmopolitanism of Tianxia focusing on ethical relationships is highly inclusive, meaning the status relationships of the Chinese and foreigners are convertible. Therefore, there is no absolute self and other, there is no clear separation of friend and foe, and no mandatory voluntary conversion, but equal and integrated conversion where various actors are allowed (Jen, 2014: 45). However, Jen Hsiao s optimistic opinion of the inclusiveness of Tianxia still implies the bias of the supremacy of the Chinese, as the all-inclusiveness nature of the Tianxia doctrine is merely the transformation of status relationships, and neither breaks through the bias of the perceived cultural supremacy of the Chinese, nor omits the cultural segmentation of respecting the Chinese and disrespecting foreigners, thus, it is unlikely to allow cultural integration and flow when Chinese are converted to foreigners. Chao Tingyang confirmed that globalization is a path reachable by the Tianxia system. He suggested that global interdependence, as formed by globalization, is achieving the internalization of the world. When the political scale develops to the level where the world can be seen as a single unit, the coming of global politics means that, under the condition of the internalization of the world, game rules will be re-established, power will be re-constructed, interests and resources will be re-distributed, and history and knowledge will be re-described. Therefore, new political principles and systems are required to guarantee the order of global co-existence and political legitimacy; and even stated that, the internalization of the world will become the final issue of all political issues (Chao, 2015: 15). The perspective of the Tianxia system, as proposed by scholars from Mainland China and discourses regarding the cosmopolitanism of Tianxia, require further clarification. First, the Tianxia system, or the cosmopolitanism of Tianxia, only emphasize the normative advantages of Tianxia, but do not provide specific descriptions of how to construct the world system (Chang, 2011: 91) or how to eliminate the hierarchy of the Tianxia Doctrine to achieve the creative transformation 6

of the Tianxia Doctrine. Moreover, foreign scholars also suspect that, the Tianxia system is nothing more than an attempt to revive the ruling model of Chinese empires (Callahan, 2008; Carlson 2011). Secondly, during the promotion of Chinese Tianxia order, academia circles of Mainland China did not consider that the world view had confirmed that inequality is justifiably rational (Chin, 2006: 9). The world system, as constructed by the world view, seems to stand against the expectations of current global values. Lastly, the fundamental condition of anarchy logic in western international relations theories is the binary competition and co-existence between individuals of legal equality. The traditional world view does not possess an awareness of sovereignty or binary opposition, and only considers the closeness of distance and intimacy of relationships (Chin, 2006: 8). While the Tianxia system and cosmopolitanism of Tianxia outline a beautiful world, they fail to provide any explanation or solution regarding the competitions and power struggles and interactions of political practices around the world. Failure to step over the reality of international society as a sovereign state is another challenge faced by Mainland China during the development of the Tianxia system and the concept of the cosmopolitanism of Tianxia. Beyond the development of ideas and political practices of Tianxia, the world view of Tianxia includes two levels: politics and governance. The politics of the concept of Tianxia involves the political structure shaped by ancient Chinese world views of Tianxia, as well as the basic model of world order. The governance of world view of Tianxia is the cultural spirit of ancient China to govern common affairs through Tianxia (Li, 2011: 111-112). The use of the Tianxia political model is applied to attempt to restore tradition, where the core hierarchical Tianxia order of Chinese empires is implemented, but does not conform to the reality of international society, as constructed by sovereign states, thus, its feasibility and practicality face many problems (Li, 2011: 114). Historical experiences also verified that, the governance effect of the historical stability of the Tianxia system is poor, meaning that Tianxia may not necessarily resolve the issues faced by the current world (Chou, 2008). In terms of theoretical integrity, although world view of Tianxia is an important element of Chinese philosophical thinking, the use of these elements to interpret rigorous international relations theories, converse with international academic groups, and win recognition, remain very difficult challenges (Liu, 2014: 38). Confucianism, world view, and Chinese and foreign order are the three conceptual structures constituting the tribute system, which provide political legitimacy, maintain economic prosperity in the system, and protect the stable 7

functions of East Asia (Chien, 2009). Three cultures: relatives, acquaintances, and strangers exist in the tribute system developed by the Chinese world view. These three cultures, as well as the statuses they create, maintain Tianxia order centered on the tribute system (Shang, 2009). On the other hand, Chinese world view of Tianxia seems to lose to materials. Once the tribute system constructed by the Chinese world view loses to the materialistic world of East Asia, and collapses, the Chinese world view of Tianxia will be abandoned by the rest of the world (Wang, 2012: 64). However, the inclusiveness of the Tianxia concept is a possible approach to analyzing the phenomenon of cooperation between countries. If East Asia is defined as a multicenter regional order, instead of single-centered (Jen, 2013: 10-12), East Asia s operational elements of endogenous order, such as many forms of contacts, tribute trades, voluntary exchanges, peaceful coexistence, and common legitimacy, will be the features of the East Asia order that are different from those of other regions in the world (Jen, 2013: 14-21). Moreover, the rule of the De of Chinese world view thinking of Tianxia, as well as analysis of hegemony s self-control over use of force, are certainly important thought assets that enrich current international-relation theories. Therefore, re-introspection of Tianxia ideas and specific practices, as established in the Zhou Dynasty, will be an important starting point for later generations to obtain the nutrients of the Chinese world view to develop international-relation theories and examples. 2. Origin and Meaning of the Chinese World View of Tianxia The Chinese world view of Tianxia is the Chinese nation s imagined ideal for defining political order. In modern times, Tianxia has been defined as the political order of concentric circles constructed with China as the center. This order reflects the relationship between China and barbarians in four directions using level of courtesy (Kao, 2004: 61). Tianxia is defined as the scope of rule under Confucian moral order, and is viewed as a moral community. In this hierarchical structure of concentric circles, the center of Tianxia is China, while the foreign states surrounding the empire are divided into barbarian states and vassal states according to moral level (Liu and Chin, 2006: 110-111). In brief, Tianxia is the Chinese imagined idea, where they view China as the core of the world. In addition, it is a center-periphery cognitive system constructed under cultural supremacy to interpret the phenomenon of interactions between self and others surrounding political groups. Exploration of the origins of this Chinese world view of Tianxia found that, the so-called theory of the Chinese core order, moral supremacy in the division of the Chinese and foreigners, and the planar 8

geographical perception hidden in the Tianxia order are not the core concepts of the Chinese world view, as constructed at the beginning of the West Zhou Dynasty. On the contrary, heaven (God) inspects the hegemonic legitimacy of the ruling effect of global rulers, and acts as judge. The highly uncertain power and position caused by Variant Mandate of Heaven further request hegemonic countries to be ever be alert to the basic demands of rulers, and understand that the dissatisfaction and complaints of rulers may lead to changed destinies. The concepts of heaven, Tianxia, and Variant Mandate of Heaven, as developed in the beginning of the Zhou Dynasty, are the analysis approaches to observe how hegemonic countries maintain dominant status in the global system. The review of the development process of the Chinese world view at the beginning of the West Zhou Dynasty and the inspection of the bloody war, where the Zhou defeated Yinshang, and the Zhou people colonized various states in the east using their armed forces (Tu, 1979), which showed that the Zhou Dynasty is undoubtedly the best example of the changed hegemony in the international system. After decomposing the hegemonic rule constructed by Yinshang, which used witchcraft to worship the empire, the Chinese world view of Tianxia justified the legitimacy of the Zhou people to become the new hegemony in the international system. The Chinese world view of Tianxia was rooted in the planar geographical perception of self-center, which used the discourse of the mandate-transfer to emphasize that the hegemony in international system must be supported by legitimacy, in order to justify the dominant and leading status of the governance of a new hegemonic state. Moreover, the policy of De ruling for maintaining dominant status was derived from the concept of Variant Mandate of Heaven. The Chinese world view inspired many later generations understanding of the changes and restructuring of the core countries in the international system. 1. International hierarchical order under planar geographical perception The Chinese world view is a geographical description of planar thinking. The term Tianxia has both broad and narrow meanings. In addition to referring to cultural China in the Chinese core theory, 6 it refers to geography, namely, everywhere 6 It is necessary to clarify that, the term China was endowed with the concept of a sovereign country of the Westphalian system in the 20 th century. The meaning and perception of China, as interpreted under sovereignty, are completely different from those of the so-called China from the West Zhou Dynasty to the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. The term China during the Warring States periods at least had seven meanings, and referred to Zhuxia states, Central Plains, nine provinces, Three Jin states, synonyms of capital of emperors, center of the national territory, or a middle-sized country (Chang, 2009: 233). 9

under the sun and the moon, where there are people (Hsing, 1987: 15). The world view of the ancient Chinese population was composed of the center and periphery, where the various cultural populations of ancient times all viewed their own residence as the center. For example, Han and Wei states settled in today s Shanxi Province, Ye state settled in today s Zhejiang, and Ba Shu in ancient times all suggested that their capitals were the center of Tianxia. As the perception of Tianxia by various cultural populations was actually not the same (Lo, 2011: 16), the center perceived by them was also different. If the various directions of Tianxia in geographical descriptions could all view themselves as the center of Tianxia, then central mainland, the Central Plains, and China could be any ethnic state in Tianxia. From a geographical perspective, China and the central mainland are not fixed geographical locations, but self-interpretation and perception. The concept of the four directions composed of east, south, west, and north was established in the Shang Dynasty (Hsing, 1987: 8-9). The Shang people used directions to construct their world. Under the protection of ancestors, the emperors of Shang became the authoritative rulers of the four directions. The perspective of the center and four directions in the Shang Dynasty formed the basic elements of the world view (Hsing, 1987: 12). According to the memory of Zhou Gong Dan, there were interior domains and external domains in the Shang Dynasty 7. Therefore, the center of interior and exterior domains was the emperors of Shang. The division of interior and exterior domains, court officials, and affairs was extended to the Zhou Dynasty, which developed and expanded to the ideal hierarchical ruling model. It was also integrated with the concept of center and four directions to become the basic structure of Tianxia (Hsing, 1987: 14). The historical stereotype of the dynasty changes of the grand unification in the Xia, Shang, and Zhou Dynasties faces new challenges in modern times. Many opinions suggest that, the Zhou Dynasty in the history of the Chinese nation is still significantly different from the sovereign country perceived by later generations 8. In 7 Zhou Gong Dan said, From him Tang the Successful, down to Di-Yi, all completed their royal De ( 德 ) and revered their chief ministers, so that their managers of affairs respectfully discharged their helping duties, and dared not to allow themselves in idleness and pleasure; how much less would they dare to indulge themselves in drinking! Moreover, in the exterior domains, (the princes of) the Hou, Dian, Nan, and Wei (states), with their presiding chiefs and in the interior domain, all the various officers, the directors of the several departments, the inferior officers and employees, the heads of great houses, and the men of distinguished name living in retirement, all eschewed indulgence in spirits. Not only did they not dare to indulge in them, but they had not the leisure to do so, being occupied with helping to complete the sovereign s De ( 德 ) to make it more illustrious, and helping the directors of affairs to reverently to attend to his service. (Shang Shu, Announcement about Drunkenness) (Chu, 1969: 109). 8 Chinese scholars have started to use the term composite state structure (Wang, 2013), as well as the 10

addition, the changes of dynasties in the Xia, Shang, and Zhou Dynasties are not only the changes of internal dynasties, but are also the changes of core dominant power and position in the international system. According to western arguments regarding state-building and modern archaeological discoveries, historians have suggested that the regime at the beginning of the Xia Dynasty was not necessarily a rugged country (Hsu, 1984: 17). For example, under the rule of Yu the Great, there were tens of thousands of states in Tianxia. By the reign of Tang of Shang, there were only three thousand countries 9. In the Xia, Shang, and Zhou Dynasties, there were fierce wars among various states. West Zhou was originally a vassal state under the reign of the emperors of Shang. After West Zhou replaced the Shang Dynasty, it established a kingdom where the regions of Zhou coexisted with vassal states, and Zhou emperors acted as the leaders or overlords of the alliance of vassal states (Tien and Zang, 1996: 10). West Zhou was not a unified kingdom, but an assembly of vassal states. The status as the overlord of emperors of Zhou was established upon the vast and solid economic and military powers of Zhou, and cannot be compared to the monarchy of the future (Tien and Zang, 1996: 17). From the perspective of current international relations theories, such a historical view suggests that the Zhou Dynasty was a hegemonic country, which established a specific authoritative relationship with feudatories in various places. Firstly, the emperors of Zhou could go hunting in various states. Secondly, some of the feudatories, as conferred at the beginning of the Zhou Dynasty, were appointed by the emperors of Zhou to act as ministers in the court of Zhou. Thirdly, feudatories had to pay tribute to the emperors of Zhou to express political obedience. Fourthly, emperors of Zhou could order feudatories to join their army to fight against rebels. Lastly, feudatories were ordered by the emperors of Zhou to supervise vassal states (Tien and Zang, 1996: 15-16). From the current perspective, the emperors of Zhou were not entitled to interfere with internal governance mechanism of vassal states, their establishment or dethronement, and levy taxes from them. Therefore, West Zhou was not the extension of the national central authority, but a relationship between leader and alliances (Tien and Zang, 1996: 12-13) 10. This perspective reflects that the West Zhou Dynasty was a hierarchical authority of hegemonic rule. Emperors of West Zhou were the leaders of international society, and possessed highly advantageous power and played an authoritative and leading role. term community (Hsu, 2015), to refer to the political structure in the three dynasties. 9 The descriptions in the Warring States period said, Under the rule of Yu the Great, there were tens of thousands of states in Tianxia. By the reign of Tang of Shang, there were only three thousand countries (Lu, 1991, Use of People) 10 On the contrary, historical authority of Mainland China, Yang Kuan, still viewed West Zhou as a unified kingdom, and suggested that various domains surrounding the emperors of Zhou were ruled by the Zhou Dynasty (Yang, 1999: 5) 11

In the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, in addition to the descriptions of geographical perception, Tianxia was gradually endowed with ideal inter-state order. The Annals of the Xia of the Records of the Grand Historian stated, Now beyond the Emperor's capital 500 li constituted the Imperial domain. From the first hundred li they brought, as revenue, the whole plant of the grain, from the second the ears, from the third the straw, but the people had to perform feudal services, from the fourth the grain in the husk, and from the fifth the grain cleaned. Five hundred li beyond the Imperial domain constituted the domain of the nobles. The first hundred li formed the allotments to the feudal nobles, the second hundred those to the people employed by the State, and the other 300 those to the various princes. Five hundred li beyond the nobles' domain lay the peaceful domain. In the first 300 li they cultivated learning and the moral duties, and in the other 200 their energies lay in the direction of war and defense. Five hundred li beyond the peaceful domain was the domain of restraint. The first 300 were occupied by the Yi tribes, and the other 200 by criminals undergoing the lesser banishment. Five hundred li beyond the domain of restraint lay the wild domain. Three hundred li were occupied by the Man tribes, and the other 200 li by criminals undergoing the greater banishment. (Si, 2002: 43). The Discourses of Zhou of the Discourses of the States in the Zhou Dynasty stated, In the Emperor s system, imperial domain is in the capital. The domain of the nobles is beyond the capital. The protectors of the feudal lords reside in the peaceful domain. Yi tribes reside in the domain of restraint. Barbarians reside in the wild domain (Tung, 2002: 9-10). The imagination of political forces crossing 2,500 li of the Zhou Dynasty apparently is inconsistent with facts. However, from another perspective, the imagination of the five domains in the Chinese world view reflects the limited material power of the central political body, as well as the self-perception of the progressively decreasing central authority within the geographical range. The gradual refinement of the concept of the five domains also represents that, Chinese world view has been gradually established as the model of political order under the self-centered perception of the Chinese nation. In addition to describing the five domains, the Discourses of Zhou of the Discourses of the States in the Zhou Dynasty also outlined the important characteristic: Not to rule barbarians; not to conquer the domain of restraint and wild domain. The refusal to pursue the idea Under the whole heaven, Every spot is the sovereign's ground; To the borders of the land, Every individual is the sovereign's minister 11 was deliberately ignored by the currently perceived or emphasized 11 Please see <Decade of Bei Shan> of <The Book of Odes> (Chu, 1976: 209-210). 12

Tianxia order. The Discourses of Zhou stated, Daily worshipping, monthly sacrifice, quarterly grand worshipping, annual tribute, and meeting with the Emperor once in a lifetime are the regulations developed by former emperors. If those who reside in the imperial domain do not practice daily worshipping, the Emperor shall perform introspection. If those who reside in the domain of the nobles do not offer monthly sacrifice, the Emperor shall inspect his orders. If those who reside in the peaceful domain do not practice quarterly grand worshipping, the Emperor shall inspect laws and regulations. If those who reside in the domain of restraint do not pay tribute, the Emperor shall inspect the hierarchy. If those who reside in the wild domain do not meet with the Emperor, the Emperor shall perform moral introspection. It went on to say that the Emperor shall not impose punishments until he implements the said procedures according to the order. Therefore, various measures can be taken to punish those who do not practice worshipping, attack those who do not offer sacrifice, crusade against those who do not practice grand worshipping, condemn those who do not pay tribute, and admonish those who do not meet with the Emperor. As a result, there were penal codes for punishment, army for attack, armament for crusade, strict order for condemnation, and words for admonishment. If those who failed to do the above still refused to fulfill their obligations after the orders are issued, the Emperor shall perform moral introspection again, instead of easily declaring war. By doing so, those who reside in the domains nearby the capital will be obedient, and those who reside in the domains far from the capital will be submissive. (Tung, 2002: 12-14) Therefore, armed forces were used to threaten those who resided in the domains nearby the capital, while at most, only words of admonishment were used to warn those who resided in the domains far from the capital. The concept of five domains was prestigious, but not practical. The so-called civil culture and De are to be cultivated to attract remote people was merely an ideal. Not to rule and not to conquer were the actual strategies in real politics (Lo, 2011: 27). Therefore, the Chinese world view of Tianzxia did not request the hegemon to implement undifferentiated authoritative governance over all the others. On the contrary, the Chinese world view of Tianzxia acknowledged that the level of hegemonic governance would be limited by objective factors, such as geographic isolation, and thus, progressively decreased. 2. Emphasis on the justification of changed dynasties Mandate of Heaven was the only source of justification to endow the hegemonic countries in the three dynasties with leading status. Heaven has multiple meanings for the Chinese nation. Heaven is the material opposite to earth, the 13

dominator of personality, unchangeable fate, the sky in nature, and the highest principle involving the universe (Feng, 2014: 70). In addition to being referred to as material opposite to earth in The Book of Odes, The Classic of History, Zuo Zhuan, and Discourse of the States, heaven was referred to as a dominator. Heaven, as mentioned by Confucius in The Analects of Confucius, also represents the dominator (Feng, 2014: 70). In the beginning of the Shang Dynasty and the Zhou Dynasty, heaven generally referred to the God. To be more specific, heaven referred to the court of heaven (Yu, 2014: 36). In Chinese civilization, heaven is the dominator of all living things, and is the source of justification for the norms and rules of the world. The emperors of people on earth used sorcerer spells from the emperor in heaven to obtain the mandate to rule the empire (Yu, 2014: 63). Archaeological discoveries verified that, the Shang Dynasty formed witchcraft politics by controlling the monopoly to communicate with the God in the heaven, such as characters and worshipers. Yin-Yang changes the ancient images of a round heaven, a square earth, the leftward rotation of the heavenly path, the center, and the four directions, where the change of the four seasons used symbolic hints and ritual deification to gradually become the unalterable starting point in people s analogy. The eternal heaven became the external doctrine, meaning heaven was no longer astrology seen by the people, but became the way of heaven, which implied all rationality and constructed the order of knowledge and thought (Ke, 2001: 45-46). Before attacking Jie of Xia, Tang of Shang criticized him as a king without a right way, and a man who lost the justification of rule and dominance. Therefore, Tang of Shang accepted the order from the God of heaven to revolt against Jie of Xia 12. To the emperors of the Shang Dynasty, who claimed to be Da Yin Shang, their dominant status over various vassal states was endowed by the God of heaven, and thus, could not be challenged. 12 Come, multitudes of the people, listen all to my words. It is not I, the little child, who dare to undertake a rebellious enterprise; but for the many crimes of the sovereign of Xia, Heaven has given the charge to destroy him. Now, ye multitudes, you are saying, "Our prince does not compassionate us, but (is calling us) away from our husbandry to attack and punish Xia." I have indeed heard (these) words of you all; (but) the sovereign of Xia is guilty, and as I fear God, I dare not but punish him. Now you are saying, "What are the crimes of Xia to us?" The king of Xia in every way exhausts the strength of his people, and exercises oppression in the cities of Xia. His multitudes are become entirely indifferent (to his service), and feel no bond of union'(to him). They are saying, "When wilt thou, O sun, expire? We will all perish with thee." Such is the course of (the sovereign) of Xia, and now I must go (and punish him). Please see Speech of Tang of The Classic of History (Chu, 1969: 49-50). 14

In order to justify King Wu of Zhou s replacement of the dominant status of King Zhou of Shang in the Tianxia, the early days of the Zhou Dynasty developed the concept of heaven s mandate to justify the Zhou people s leading status in the revolution. Heaven s mandate is the most important concept of the witchcraft culture, as originated from the pre-shang Dynasty. It is the residual memory of the history of ancient religious and political development, and reflects that the king on earth used sorcerers as a medium to monopolize communication with God or heaven. Witchcraft suggested that God or heaven received the worship of a king on earth, and acknowledged the legitimacy of his kingdom and rule, which represented that his kingdom accepted the mandate (Hsu, 2014: 42). However, the formation of the specific concept of heaven s mandate was originated from West Zhou (Yu, 2014: 78). The Emperor of Zhou replaced the hegemonic status of the Emperor of Shang, which undoubtedly denied the Emperor of Shang s mandate and legitimacy to rule. How to justify that the Emperor of Zhou accepted this heaven s mandate, while the Emperor of Shang lost this mandate, was an important challenge faced by the Zhou Dynasty at the beginning of establishing the foundation of rule. In order to persuade the adherents of Yin Shang, Zhou Gong quoted the allusion about how Tang of Shang replaced Jie of Xia because he accepted the mandate. After King Zhou of Shang lost his way, he also lost his mandate to rule Tianxia. The Emperor of Zhou was the successor of mandate favored by the God of heaven, and was viewed by God as an adequate ruler of Tianxia 13. 13 God leads men to tranquil security," but the sovereign of Xia would not move to such security, whereupon God sent down corrections, indicating his mind to him. (Jie); however, he would not be warned by God, but proceeded to greater dissoluteness, sloth, and excuses for himself. Then Heaven no longer regarded nor heard him, but disallowed his great appointment, and inflicted extreme punishment. Then it charged your founder, Tang the Successful, to set Xia aside, and by means of able men to rule the kingdom. From Tang the Successful down to Di-Yi, every sovereign sought to make his De illustrious, and duly attended to the sacrifices. And thus, it was that, while Heaven exerted a great establishing influence, preserving and regulating the House of Yin, its sovereigns on their part were humbly careful not to lose (the favor of) God, and strove to manifest a good-doing corresponding to that of Heaven. But in these times, their successor showed himself greatly ignorant of (the ways of) Heaven, and much less could be expected of him that he would be regardful of the earnest labors of his fathers for the country. Greatly abandoned to dissolute idleness, he gave no thought to the bright principles of Heaven, or the awfulness of the people. On this account God no longer protected him, but sent down the great ruin, which we have witnessed. Heaven was not with him, because he did not make his De illustrious. (Indeed), with regard to the overthrow of all states, great and small, throughout the four quarters of the kingdom, in every case reasons can be given for their punishment; Ye numerous officers of Yin, the case now is this, that the kings of our Zhou, from their great goodness, were charged with the work of God. There was the charge to them, 'Cut off Yin.' (They proceeded to perform it), and announced the execution of their service to God. In our affairs we have followed no double aims; ye of the royal House (of Yin) must (now simply) follow us. May I not say that you have been very lawless? I did not (want to) remove you. The thing came from your own city. When I consider also how Heaven has drawn near to Yin with so great tribulations, it must be that there was (there) what was not right. See Numerous Officers of The Classic of History (Chu, 1969: 132). 15

The concept of Variant Mandate of Heaven was further derived from the theory of mandate transition, which reflects the high uncertainty for the maintenance of the dominant status of the international system in the early days of the Zhou Dynasty. Although the statement of heaven s mandate transition is the foundation of legitimacy to persuade Yin Shang to obey the Zhou people, it also verified that the heaven s mandate offered to the Emperor of Zhou by heaven, the highest dominator, can also be transferred to other people at any time. Therefore, variant mandate of heaven, which also leads to the highly uncertain state of hegemon. Wen Wang of the The Book of Odes outlined the adverse situation of the highly uncertain state of the hegemonic country: Profound was king Wen; Oh! Continuous and bright was his feeling of reverence. Great is the appointment of Heaven! There were the descendants of [the sovereigns] of Shang; the descendants of the sovereigns of Shang, were in number more than hundreds of thousands; but when God gave the command, the appointment of Heaven is not constant. The officers of Yin, admirable and alert, assist at the libations in [our] capital; they assist at those libations, always wearing the hatchets on their lower garment and their peculiar cap. O ye loyal ministers of the king, ever think of your ancestor! Ever think of your ancestor, cultivating your De ( 德 ), always striving to accord with the will [of Heaven]. So shall you be seeking for much happiness. Before Yin lost the multitudes, [Its kings] were the assessors for God. Look to Yin as a beacon; the great appointment is not easily [preserved]. The appointment is not easily [preserved], do not cause your own extinction. Display and make bright your righteousness and name, and look at [the fate of] Yin in the light of Heaven. The doings of High Heaven, have neither sound nor smell. Take your pattern from king Wen, and the myriad regions will repose confidence in you. (Chu, 1976: 232-234). 3. Rule of De for Hegemony Maintenance The concept of the De-ruling ( 德治 ) for maintaining hegemonic governance was derived from the concept of Variant Mandate of Heaven. In order to develop long-term hegemonic domination and be permanently free from being challenged, emperors implementing hegemonic governance must understand the feeling and needs of those who are ruled. At the end of the Xia and Shang Dynasties, Zhou was enlightenment for the Zhou people the dominant status of the Emperor of Zhou would not face the challenges of other emerging states. The leading status to rule various states in the world was conditional; in addition, such a dominant and leading status could not be sustained until certain policies were implemented. Therefore, the 16

rule of De became an important means for the maintenance of this leading status. Today, the meaning of De ( 德 ) in mandarin Chinese is as equal as virtue, however, in the Yin Shang and Zhou Dynasties eras, the original meaning of De was ancestral worship. De was the performance of a behavior or act, but did not have any moral or regulatory meaning (Wang, 1998: 149-150). De was also a spiritual power combined with crusade (Takao Hirase, 2007: 68-69). Since the era of Zhou Gong, the Zhou people started to emphasize that De was behaviors of the political governance of emperors accepting heaven s mandate, such as, the protection of people, diligent governance, cautious penalty, obedience to the teachings of the deceased, and the establishment and maintenance of the order of the rule of rites, in order to be praised by heaven and extend heaven s mandate (Yu, 2014: 106). The establishment of the order of the rites in the Zhou Dynasty centered on De, and its objective was to sustain the heaven s mandate of the established hegemonic governance, without being permanently challenged. The rule of De was an important capacity to assist in the materials and advantages of the armed forces. According to the review of the era of King Wen of Zhou, the Zhou people admitted that, My deceased father, king Wen, completed his merit, and grandly received the appointment of Heaven, to soothe the regions of our great land. The great states feared his strength; the small states thought fondly of his De 14. Respect for De was an important governance attitude for the sustainability of heaven s mandate. The Duke of Shao advised the Emperor of Zhou to recall the lessons of change of past hegemonies; otherwise, the Emperor of Zhou might also face the same fate as Yin Shang did, We should by all means survey the dynasties of Xia and Yin. I do not presume to know and say, "The dynasty of Xia was to enjoy the favoring decree of Heaven just for (so many) years," nor do I presume to know and say, "It could not continue longer." The fact simply was, that, for want of the De of reverence, the decree in its favour prematurely fell to the ground. (Similarly), I do not presume to know and say, "The dynasty of Yin was to enjoy the favoring decree of Heaven just for (so many) years," nor do I presume to know and say, "It could not continue longer." The fact simply was, that, for want of the De of reverence, the decree in its favour fell prematurely to the world. The king has now inherited the decree - the same decree, I consider, which belonged to those two dynasties. Let him seek to inherit (the Des of) their meritorious (sovereigns) 15. The specific acts to maintain the sustainability of hegemony included: Great Heaven has no partial affections; it helps 14 See Successful Completion of the War of The Classic of History (Li and Wang, 2000: 209-216). 15 See Announcement of the Duke of Shao of The Classic of History (Chu, 1969: 120). 17

only the virtuous. The people's hearts have no unchanging attachment; they cherish only the kind. Acts of goodness are different, but they contribute in common to good order. Acts of evil are different, but they contribute in common to disorder. Be cautious! In giving heed to the beginning think of the end;--the end will then be without distress. If you do not think of the end, it will be full of distress, even of the greatest. Exert yourself to achieve your proper merit. Seek to be in harmony with all your neighbors. Be a fence to the royal House. Live in amity with your brethren. Tranquillize and help the lower people. Follow the course of the Mean, and do not, by aiming to be intelligent, throw old statutes into confusion. Watch over what you see and hear, and do not for one-sided words deviate from the right rule 16. It was also necessary to enlighten the defeated Yin people: It was your greatly distinguished father, the king Wen, who was able to illustrate his De and be careful in the use of punishments. He did not dare to treat with contempt (even) wifeless men and widows. He employed the employable, and revered the reverend; he was terrible to those who needed to be awed - so getting distinction among the people. It was thus he laid the foundations of (the sway of) our small portion of the kingdom, and the one or two (neighboring) regions were brought under, his improving influence, until throughout our western land, all placed in him their reliance. The fame, of him ascended up to the high God, and God approved. Heaven accordingly gave a grand charge to king Wen, to exterminate the great (dynasty of) Yin, and grandly receive its appointment, so that the various countries belonging to it and their peoples were brought to an orderly condition. Then your unworthy elder brother exerted himself; and thus it is that you Feng, the little one, are here in this eastern region. The king says, Oh! Feng, bear these things in mind. Now (your success in the management of) the people will depend on your reverently following your father Wen; do you carry out his virtuous words which you have heard, and clothe yourself with them. (Moreover), where you go, seek out among (the traces of) the former wise kings of Yin what you may use in protecting and regulating their people. (Again), you must in the remote distance study the (ways of) the old accomplished men of Shang, that you may establish your heart, and know how to instruct (the people). (Further still), you must search out besides what is to be learned of the wise kings of antiquity, and employ it in tranquillizing and protecting the people. (Finally), enlarge (your thoughts) to (the comprehension of all) heavenly (principles) and De will be richly displayed in your person, so that you will not render nugatory the king's charge. The king says, Oh! Feng, the little one, be respectfully careful, as if you were suffering from a disease. Awful though Heaven be, it yet helps the sincere. The feelings of the people can for the most part be discerned; but it is difficult to preserve (the attachment of) the lower classes. Where you go, employ all 16 See Charge to Zhong of Cai of The Classic of History (Li and Wang, 2000: 331-335). 18