Front. Philos. China 2013, 8(3): 376 387 DOI 10.3868/s030-002-013-0031-3 SPECIAL THEME John Ramsey The Role Dilemma in Early Confucianism Abstract Recently, Sean Cordell has raised a problem for Aristotelians who seriously consider social roles: When the demands of the role conflict with the demands of morality, which norms ought one follow? However, this problem, which I call the role dilemma, is not specific to Aristotelians. Classical Confucians face a similar problem. How do Confucians resolve conflicts between the demands of humaneness (ren 仁 ) and the demands of social roles and the social norms (li 礼 ) that govern these roles? Confucians who favor humaneness, maintaining that other demands are defeasible, offer an externalism about roles. This response is similar to the Aristotelian argument that the demands of human excellence trump other demands. Consequently, Confucian externalism collapses into a virtue ethic. Confucians who favor the demands of li offer an internalism about roles. However, internalism is undesirable because it implies relativism and condones oppressive social institutions. The Confucian role ethicist must offer a tenable solution that steers clear of the pitfalls of both externalism and internalism. Although I do not advance a solution here, I believe a tenable alternative exists. The goals of this paper, instead, are to demonstrate that classical Confucians face the role dilemma and to initiate a discussion about the theoretical apparatus required of Confucian role ethics in order to distinguish it from other ethical theories. I conclude with some programmatic remarks about additional questions and problems that ought to be addressed. Keywords Confucianism, social role, li, ren, role ethics 1 Introduction Recently, Sean Cordell has raised a dilemma for those Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists who take the demands of social roles seriously (Cordell 2011). The problem involves determining what counts as acting virtuously in the context of a particular social role when the demands of the role conflict with the demands of Received February 16, 2013 John Ramsey ( ) Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside, CA 92521, USA E-mail: john.ramsey@email.ucr.edu
The Role Dilemma in Early Confucianism 377 the Aristotelian notion of human excellence. In other words, the dilemma raises a question with regard to how one decides which norms to adhere to in acting. The dilemma is especially relevant when role-specific requirements and constraints on a role occupier s behavior comprise the duties of the role. For instance, as Cordell points out, the obligations of a defense lawyer to protect her client s interests, might conflict with the wider-cast demands of morality. In short, Cordell raises the question of how the Neo-Aristotelian should understand the actions of the virtuous person qua teacher, parent, lawyer, and so on, when the demands of virtue and the demands of one s role conflict. However, this problem, which I call the role dilemma, is not specific to Aristotelians or Neo-Aristotelians. The classical Confucians Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi face a similar problem to the one Cordell raises, albeit in Confucian ethical terms. How does the Confucian gentleman (junzi 君子 ) determine what counts as acting morally or humanely (ren 仁 ) in the context of the demands of his social role? 1 In other words, how does the Confucian resolve conflicts between the demands of humaneness and the demands of loyalty (zhong 忠 ) or the demands of her social roles and the social norms (li 礼 ) that govern these roles? 2 A Confucian who favors the demands of humaneness and maintains that other demands are defeasible in light of humaneness offers an externalism about roles. I call the group of such responses externalism because appealing to obligations external to one s social role obligations resolves the conflict between the obligations. The externalist response is similar to that of the Aristotelian virtue ethicist who argues the demands of human excellence trump other demands; externalism, therefore, collapses into virtue ethics. A Confucian who favors the demands of li and one s roles offers an internalism about roles. I use internalism because this group of responses resolves the conflict between 1 Some brief remarks about humaneness. I acknowledge the rather complicated debate regarding whether early Confucianism has a conceptual analog to morality. However, throughout this paper, I will treat morality and humaneness interchangeably. Also, following P. J. Ivanhoe and Bryan Van Norden, I recognize a distinction, especially in the Analects and Mencius, between humaneness as the perfection or excellence of human individuals and humaneness or benevolence as a specific virtue. One relevant motivation for treating humaneness and morality interchangeably is that the proponent of a Confucian role ethic needs a significant overlap between these two concepts to show how a role ethic is an ethical theory. 2 I am not assuming that the classical Confucians are some variant of virtue ethicists, though I use a virtue ethic vocabulary throughout the paper. I wish to remain agnostic regarding the appropriate ethical classification of Confucianism. However, I am assuming that the three classical Confucians share a similar ethical system they all practice Confucianism and that, though they may use different words, they utilize similarly functional concepts. Mencius uses Confucius notion of sympathetic reasoning (shu 恕 ) once (Mencius 7A1), but Mencius notions of reflection (si 思 ) and extension are functionally similar to shu. So, I assume that ren/junzi and zhong/li function similarly (enough) throughout the three texts.
378 John Ramsey obligations by appealing to obligations internal to one s various roles. Internalism is an undesirable position because it implies a form of cultural relativism and allows for repressive and problematic social institutions. In fact, as I argue below, the problem is intractable for Confucianism if either social roles or the demands and obligations of social roles are constitutive of humaneness constitutive in the sense that becoming Humane requires one to fulfill one s social role obligations. In particular, I have in mind Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont s interpretation of Confucian role ethics an understanding of Confucianism that maintains personhood is constituted by one s social roles and that we cultivate our humaneness through the roles that we occupy. Not all moral theories face the dilemma. Just as the Aristotelian evades the dilemma, arguing that the demands of one s social roles are defensible in light of pursuing truth, excellence, and correct behavior, the Confucian virtue ethicist also evades the dilemma, arguing that the demands of one s social roles are defeasible in light of humaneness. In other words, the Confucian virtue ethicist offers an externalist response. However, the Confucian role ethicist must offer a tenable solution that steers clear of the pitfalls of externalism and internalism, if she wishes to maintain the centrality of social roles and li within the Confucian ethical system. For the purposes of this paper, I consider only internalist and externalist resolutions to this dilemma. Yet, there are alternatives and those who wish to bring classical Confucian insights, especially those of Confucian role ethics, to bear on modern ethics or other philosophical debates need to offer an alternative solution to the dilemma. If it turns out that no viable solution is forthcoming or that solutions distilled from our existing interpretations of Confucius, Mencius, or Xunzi are committed to untenable or undesirable positions, then we will have to reexamine these purported insights. For example, the feminist proponent of a Confucian role ethic must offer an alternative resolution because externalism collapses her view into a virtue ethic and internalism justifies a history as well as structures of gender oppression. I am sympathetic to a role ethic even if it turns out that Confucianism is better understood as a virtue ethic and to the view that there is much insight to be gained in developing this ethic. I also acknowledge that if the Confucian role ethicist cannot offer a tenable solution to the role dilemma, then this dilemma practically constitutes a reductio ad absurdum of a (Confucian) role ethic. The primary goal of this paper is to demonstrate that the classical Confucians face the role dilemma. In effect, I hope to point out a standing problem for Confucian role ethics and initiate a discussion about the theoretical and philosophical apparatus a Confucian role ethics requires, especially the apparatus that would be required to distinguish role ethics from other ethical theories. I also explore the role dilemma and two natural, intuitive strategies for resolving the dilemma, and go on to discuss how neither of these positions is tenable for a role ethic. Then, I
The Role Dilemma in Early Confucianism 379 argue that Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi each face the dilemma. I conclude with some programmatic remarks about the remaining work that needs to be done by raising a number of unanswered and relevant questions regarding the role dilemma in Confucianism. 2 The Role Dilemma The role dilemma arises from the inevitable conflict between the demands and obligations of morality (or humaneness) e.g. the demands of the prevent harm principle and the demands and obligations of a role that one occupies. 3 In other words, the role dilemma exploits an ambiguity in how moral agents decide to act when facing such a conflict: Does a moral agent fulfill her role duties or, rather, her moral duties? For many moral theories, conflicts between roles and morality do not generate the dilemma because role obligations are considered contingent and external to morality. Consider two modern instances of the dilemma: (i) a defense lawyer discovers evidence incriminating her client and wonders whether to obfuscate or withhold the evidence, and (ii) a priest wonders whether he should reveal his parishioner s confession of murder to the police. Examples such as these, as well as the demands of oppressive roles, motivate my investigation. One way to resolve the dilemma is to advocate internalism about roles: The view that either the obligations of one s social role (or the amalgamation of the obligations of one s roles) define or constitute the demands of morality, or role obligations trump purported moral demands. A consequence of internalism is that role obligations are treated as a given by the descriptions of the social roles. The moral agent, because she is in such-and-such a circumstance (i.e. occupying the role) must respond in the right way (i.e. according to the demands of the role). In other words, the standards internal to a role are not accountable to the moral agent s evaluation. Thus, internalism about roles is analogous to the demands of the prevent harm principle. One must prevent harm if one is near to the harm, 3 I am not interested here in resolving conflicts between the demands of two different roles, for example, the conflict that arises from one s obligations as a doctor and as a parent. Moreover, one might maintain that we all possess a fundamental and essential role the role of being a person. This position has the consequence of turning all role conflicts into role-to-role conflicts, avoiding the role dilemma per se. However, two considerations suggest that the person role is a conceptual mistake. The first is relevant to a Confucian role ethic, which maintains that persons are constituted by their roles. Admitting the person role entails a redundancy since persons are constituted by their roles (mother, daughter, person). A Confucian role ethic seems to be offering a nontrivial thesis about personhood. Second, roles are hierarchically relational and person (or friend ) does not suggest a corresponding ordinate or subordinate role as do elder/younger or parent/child.
380 John Ramsey capable of preventing the harm, and is the last resort. The prevent harm principle demands that I save an individual drowning in the deep end of a pool if I am walking by and no one else is around. My obligation to save the drowning person is a given of the situation or circumstances, albeit an entirely contingent given, because it is contingent on my being nearby, can swim, and no one else is around. If I cannot swim and you are in shouting distance and can swim, then the prevent harm principle demands that I get your attention so you can save the person from drowning. My obligation is a given of this alternative situation. So, by analogy, the demands of the role become part of the circumstances in which one must act. One must accept the demands of the role just as one must accept the features of one s circumstances. Yet, the internalist position has its problems. Consider the following case: John Zimmerman has a serious car accident, and his passenger David Spaulding suffers several serious injuries. Zimmerman s insurance company sends Spaulding to the company s doctor for an examination and the doctor discovers an aortic aneurysm. 4 The prevent harm principle suggests that the doctor ought to tell Spaulding of his condition. However, the doctor also has an obligation to his employer, the insurance company; if the doctor were Spaulding s physician, he would have an obligation to Spaulding. The internalist advocates that the doctor fulfill his obligations to his employer and not inform Spaulding of his condition. One internalist strategy, which is a non-starter, accepts that occupiers of some roles must act contrary to morality insofar as they fulfill the demands of the role. A second strategy explains that one s social roles constitute or define one s morality. Thus, morality depends on, and is relative to, the roles one occupies e.g. the morality of the elder son is different from the younger son s or the father s. A third strategy is apologetic, explaining that in discharging one s duty a person does not act contrary to morality because he acts according to the given social norms (a subset of which are role norms) of his time. So, if internalism is correct, we must face one or more undesirable consequences: (i) accepting actions that are contrary to the demands of morality (not informing Spaulding), (ii) accepting a form of relativism (the doctor s actions differ on the basis of his role-relation) or, (iii) accepting a system that justifies repressive and oppressive institutions and roles. Consequently, it is best to abandon internalism and its constellation of resolutions. In the first place, Confucianism does not advance relativism, so the second and third strategies are not tenable positions for the Confucian. Moreover, the internalist position, arguably, mistakenly assumes that role obligations are natural (or essential) features of the world. Hence, the norms that a wife ought to be submissive, deferential to her husband, and remain silent unless spoken to, 4 The details of this example come from Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (1962).
The Role Dilemma in Early Confucianism 381 have historically been thought to be natural or essentially involved with a role. The internalist fails to see how roles and role obligations are social (as opposed to natural or given) and therefore alterable. Moreover, the internalist must acknowledge that adherence to role obligations may prevent revision and rejection of oppressive role-demands. Finally, the internalist position is often and uncharitably attributed to Confucians, especially Confucius, who is caricatured as a curmudgeonly traditionalist, and Xunzi, who is portrayed as accepting a rule- or li-based absolutism (even by those who have a sophisticated view of classical Chinese thought). In short, an internalist resolution forces Confucianism to become a shortsighted ethical system that loses its application in modernity. Alternatively, the externalist maintains that moral agents evaluate, revise, or disobey their role obligations on the basis of a standard external to their role. Two strategies of externalism seem relevant for Confucianism. 5 First, the humaneness-evaluative externalist thinks specific role obligations are defeasible in light of moral demands. Mencius favoring the rescue of one s drowning sister-in-law over observing li, which would demand not touching her, exemplifies the humaneness-evaluative strategy (Mencius 4A17). Second, the ideal-role externalist evaluates current role obligations in terms of the ideal of the role or practice: The obligations that constitute the role are evaluated against the ideal of fathering, teaching, or doctoring. Various calls in the Analects for rectifying names (zhengming 正名 ), for instance when Confucius offers that governing involves making sure that fathers father and rulers rule (Analects 12.11) or when Confucius stresses the consequences of rectifying names (Analects 13.3), suggest the ideal-role strategy. Nonetheless, both externalist camps allow moral agents to assess whether a specific role obligation is consistent with the relevant standard. If the obligation is inconsistent, then the role obligation may be revised or rejected. Consider Analects 9.3 in which Confucius considers revisions to the norms associated with ceremonial li. Confucius willingly accepts a revision to li in wearing silken caps because they are more economical than hemp ones, but he is not in favor of altering the practice of bowing prior to ascending to the king. Although it is unclear from this passage alone whether Confucius advocates a humaneness-evaluative or ideal-role externalism, the anecdote illustrates that Confucius evaluates some li obligations by standards external to those obligations. The externalist advocates evaluating all our roles and their associated obligations. Sometimes, especially in a thoroughly unjust society, 5 Alternatively, an externalist might maintain a third position, that the immersion of oneself within the role creates an ethical standpoint of the role. I will not consider this alternative here, though I am suspicious that Xunzi might exemplify this strategy. For more on identification and the ethical perspective of roles, see Hardimon (1994) and Sciaraffa (2009).
382 John Ramsey many social roles require revision or rejection: Many societies have rejected the king role and feminists advocate (rightly) for a major overhaul of the wife role. By far, externalism about roles seems correct, and moral theories of all stripes consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics employ some version of externalism when explaining why social norms and role demands are defeasible in light of moral demands. However, for the Confucian role ethicist, externalism has its problems. If humaneness-evaluative externalism is correct, then there is little point in articulating a theory of role ethics, since the demands of morality trump role demands. Thus, humaneness-evaluative externalism collapses into a deontology or virtue ethic. Although it might seem that ideal-role externalism is a real alternative to humaneness-evaluative, prima facie reasons suggest otherwise: What informs the ideal of a role? What conceptual resources does one appeal to in recognizing the obligations and norms constitutive of the ideal? Answers to these questions will most likely appeal to humaneness and, so, if these prima facie reasons are correct, then ideal-role externalism does not offer a distinct strategy and will collapse into another moral theory. Moreover, for both externalist camps, current role obligations are useful for moral cultivation, as guidelines for the initiate and markers as to what is socially appropriate. Yet the obligations of li and one s roles are to be dispensed with when they conflict with morality or frustrate moral cultivation. As such, li and roles are instrumental but not necessary for morality. Thus, the Confucian role ethicist cannot accept an externalist solution without undermining key tenets of her view, namely the centrality of role and li obligations in constituting morality. 3 The Role Dilemma in Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi Of course, the problems of internalism and externalism I have discussed are not worrisome if Confucianism does not face the role dilemma. However, the early Confucians do in fact face this dilemma. In this section I examine a few representative passages and argue that the dilemma exists in early Confucian texts. I understand Confucius and his students discussion of ethical ideas in the Analects as involving a web of related, important virtues and ideals rather than offering a unified, doctrinal, or constitutive theory of ethics. 6 One might argue that the role dilemma is a problem only for particular interpretations of the 6 When a constitutive account is suggested, such an account is often offered by disciples and not by Confucius himself. In Analects 1.2 Youzi claims that filial piety and respect for elders constitute ren; Zengzi elucidates Confucius comment about his single thread at Analects 4.15. I do not put much worth in the single thread account of Confucius thought, since it is often understood as a much later interpolation.
The Role Dilemma in Early Confucianism 383 Analects, especially those interpretations that offer a unified or doctrinal account of Confucius ethics. For instance, the single-thread reading faces the dilemma because it directly relates zhong and ren, so the demands of one s roles and of being ren are in inevitable tension. Yet such an interpretation of the Confucian project is often read as a form of internalism about roles. Alternatively, Ames and Rosemont offer a unified reading of the Analects that avoids the pitfalls of uncharitable, internalist interpretations, but their reading is also open to the dilemma. Indeed, their reading is the principal motivation for my raising the dilemma. In fact, unified or doctrinal interpretations aside, the role dilemma is a problem for any reading that assumes the Analects offers a role ethic as opposed to a virtue ethic. Earlier, I cited examples from the Analects meant to motivate different externalist strategies. These passages involved the rectification of names and revisions to certain rituals. I assumed that these passages exemplify the role dilemma. Here, allow me to offer more substantial reasons for believing that Confucius faces the dilemma. The dilemma seeks an answer to the question of which norm is the correct reason for acting when a role-related norm and a moral norm conflict and require different behaviors from an agent. Consider the passage at 12.1 in which Yan Hui asks about humaneness and Confucius replies that restraint and a return to li constitute humaneness. Confucius offers that one should not look, listen, speak, or act in ways that do not accord with li. Yet, elsewhere, for instance in 9.3, Confucius offers revisions of certain li (but not others) and so must think in an externalist vein, perhaps that (some) li are defeasible. Regardless of the interpretation of how the Analects resolves the dilemma, (whether internalist, externalist, or through some alternative strategy) it appears that an agent must decide whether and how to revise li in particular scenarios; the decision is not prima facie over-ridden by morality or role obligations. Alternatively, we might consider indirect attempts to determine whether Confucius faces the dilemma. In a different but related context, Kwong-loi Shun has discussed two interpretative traditions the instrumentalist and the definitionalist readings of the relationship between li and ren in the Analects (Shun 1993). Shun s discussion parallels and supports the point I wish to make regarding the role dilemma. According to Shun, the instrumentalist tradition holds that li are instrumental means for attaining ren and, from the perspective of ren, one might revise or ignore particular li if the li in question are no longer efficient or helpful in developing ren. Shun, thus, cites Confucius favoring silk caps over linen ones (Analects 9.3) and Confucius warning against following li too closely (Analects 3.18). The instrumentalist tradition clearly offers an externalist solution to the role dilemma. On the other hand, the definitionalist account defines ren through adherence to the particular practices of li. This
384 John Ramsey tradition offers a definitionally internalist solution to the dilemma. Although Shun goes on to offer an alternative to these traditional interpretations, we might pause here and reflect. Perhaps these traditions have noticed a missing element or at least, a tension in Confucius ethics regarding how to resolve such conflicts. I take this tension as evidence that Confucius faces the dilemma. The question of whether Mencius faces the role dilemma is straightforward. In fact, Chunyu Kun confronts Mencius with the dilemma at 4A17, when he asks Mencius to choose between the demands of humaneness and the demands of li in asking whether a man should save his drowning sister-in-law or satisfy the obligation to not touch someone of the opposite sex. This exchange poses the question of whether one ought to prevent harm or satisfy their role-duties. Mencius answers that the man should save his drowning sister. Hence, Mencius offers, at least in 4A17, an externalist answer to the dilemma. 7 Also, at 4B24, Mencius relates a story that again exemplifies the dilemma. Yugong Si is ordered by his ruler to kill Zizhuo Ruzi, who informs Yugong that his arthritis prevents him from engaging Yugong. Consequently, Yugong decides not to carry out his king s order but acts Humanely and does not attack Zizhuo that day. Anecdotes like these are not the only indication that Mencius faces the role dilemma. It also emerges when one considers Mencius moral sprout analogy of moral development. Mencius maintains that we are all born with the seeds or sprouts of moral sentiments, which under the right and good environmental conditions flourish into the four cardinal Confucian virtues, ren, yi, li, and zhi. Since the moral sprout analogy does not offer an ordering or a hierarchy of these virtues, it is unresolved which virtue one ought to act in accordance with when moral sensibilities and their developed virtues conflict. This question is further compounded because ren seems to have two senses throughout the Mencius: a narrow sense of ren as the virtue of benevolence (alongside the other three Mengzian virtues), and a wide sense of ren as humaneness. 8 Perhaps, Mencius thinks that obligations issuing from the wide sense of ren trump obligations issuing from the virtue of li or the role-obligations associated with the virtue li. Additionally, if human nature is good (i.e. moral), then the moral sensibilities analogized by the sprouts and their cultivated virtues constrain the boundaries of moral obligations, boundaries that might conflict with or exclude role obligations that are not constrained by morality. Xunzi, as is well known, advocates the Confucian virtues of yi and li. For Xunzi, as in the Analects, li play a crucial developmental role in becoming ren. However, whether li are instrumental or whether only li peculiar to Xunzi s time 7 Interestingly, in the following section of the Mencius (4A18), Gongsun Chou raises another dilemma one that arises from the conflict between one s various roles. 8 For more see Van Norden (2007, 117 120, 214).
The Role Dilemma in Early Confucianism 385 are constitutive of ren is debatable. Once again, how we adjudicate this debate determines whether Xunzi offers an externalist or internalist resolution to the role dilemma. Nonetheless, Xunzi faces the dilemma. One way it arises for him is found in his comments at the beginning of Chapter 19, Discourse on Ritual ( Lilun 礼论 ) of the Xunzi, regarding the purpose of adhering to li. According to Xunzi, the sage kings invented li to limit and train our material desires and ensure simultaneous social stability and satisfaction of those desires. Presumably, li will come into conflict with ren in cases in which (a) the li designed to navigate particular circumstances fail to satisfy our material desires or ensure social order, or when (b) one is in a new situation in which the li cannot resolve a conflict between material desires and a scarcity of resources. Moreover, li might outlive the purpose for which the sage kings created them. In each of these cases, the obligations and responsibilities associated with li are potentially in conflict with the demands of ren. 4 Some Programmatic Remarks about the Role Dilemma Project At the outset, I stated that this paper is a first step in a much larger research endeavor: If a Confucian role ethic is a coherent and distinct philosophical account of morality, it must be able to address problems with, and skepticism of, its position. Given my limited purposes here, I have only presented the role dilemma and demonstrated the problem it poses for the early Confucians. Now, by way of a conclusion, I would like to delineate some remaining questions and lines of thought that should be pursued in developing the moral theory underwriting role ethics. In what follows I present a number of questions and raise an additional problem that proponents of a Confucian role ethic ought to address. The first set of questions involves determining specifically how the early Confucians resolve the dilemma. Other than offering parenthetical suggestions, I have said little here about the solutions to be found in the Confucian texts. So, first, do Confucius, Mencius, or Xunzi offer an internalist or externalist resolution to the dilemma? Of course, one s interpretation of the texts influences which strategies each text offers. For instance, on the instrumentalist reading Shun considers, Confucius is clearly an externalist, but on those readings that maintain that the Analects presents no systematic philosophy, we might not be in a position to determine whether Confucius favors either the externalist or internalist resolution. Also, consider a related question: Which of the above delineated strategies do they each offer? Elsewhere, I investigate Mencius and
386 John Ramsey argue that Mencius provides a humaneness-evaluative externalism. 9 Suppose that we determine that both Mencius and Xunzi offer externalist strategies for resolving the dilemma, then a third question emerges: How are we to square their externalism with their perceived commitment to social roles and li? Or, in other words, what is lost theoretically, if social roles and li are only instrumentally significant in the Confucian ethical theory? Assuming that internalism and externalism have undesirable implications for a theory of role ethics, a second set of questions arises concerning whether there are resources in the respective texts to derive an alternative resolution? Although neither of their individual work directly addresses the role dilemma, Mary I. Bockover and Sarah Mattice offer readings of key Confucian concepts that might provide a foundation for other solutions to the dilemma. Mattice rejects the notion that zhengming understood as rectification of names is the retrieval of a conservative and traditional conception of roles and argues that zhengming is rather a process of intersecting past meanings, present circumstances, and future possibilities (Mattice 2010, 247). Mattice s understanding of zhengming clearly denies an internalist reading of the concept. Her reading might motivate an alternative to externalism and internalism insofar as it enables the moral agent to negotiate the conflict between ritual obligation and moral obligation. Any conflict would fall away. Bockover offers an exciting formulation regarding li: li is the body language of ren. In other words, li is the vehicle for expressing our ren (Bockover 2010, 177). It might seem that Bockover s account of li is just a pithy version of internalism, but when her account is fully described it accommodates Feminist concerns about oppressive roles and pernicious role-obligations. For instance, li that seemingly undermines one s ability to relate with another person is not li. If Bockover s view is extended to address the role dilemma, it might offer an alternative to the existing strategies insofar as it offers criteria for what counts as a legitimate role obligation. Then, we must ask whether these alternatives are plausible and adequate for defending a role ethic. Both Bockover s and Mattice s work is worth pursuing in proposing alternatives to the externalist and internalist solutions. There is at least one other problem the role ethicist must address. In a recent contribution to a festschrift honoring Henry Rosemont, Philip Ivanhoe (2007) argued that Confucianism is a virtue ethic because Confucians recognize authentic and inauthentic ways of fulfilling one s roles insofar as the distinction turns on virtuous and unvirtuous ways of acting. Moreover, because of this distinction, Ivanhoe argues that proponents of a Confucian role ethic often slide into vocabularies of other ethical systems in order to explain how roles ground moral obligations. In other words, social roles do not play a fundamental 9 See my Mengzi s Externalist Solution to the Role Dilemma (draft).
The Role Dilemma in Early Confucianism 387 explanatory role in grounding moral obligation. Ivanhoe s argument contains a quandary similar to the one I have posed with the role dilemma: The role ethicist must explain humaneness and morality in terms other than roles, and in doing so undermines her commitment to the idea that li and their associated obligations constitute morality. However, by providing a tenable resolution to the role dilemma one that avoids the pitfalls of externalism and internalism the role ethicist will have the resources required to address Ivanhoe s challenge and explain how roles play a fundamental explanatory role in grounding moral obligations. References Ames, Roger T. 2011. Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawai i Press. Bockover, Mary I. 2010. Confucianism and Ethics in the Western Philosophical Tradition I: Foundational Concepts. Philosophy Compass 5.4: 307 16. Cordell, Sean. 2011. Virtuous Persons and Social Roles. Journal of Social Philosophy 42.3: 254 72. Hardimon, Michael. 1994. Role Obligations. Journal of Philosophy 91.7: 333 63. Ivanhoe, Philip J. 2000. Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. Ivanhoe, Philip J. 2002. Ethics in the Confucian Tradition: The Thought of Mengzi and Wang Yangming, 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. Mattice, Sarah. 2010. On Rectifying Rectification: Reconsidering Zhengming in Light of Confucian Role Ethics. Asian Philosophy 20.3: 247 60. Rosemont, Henry Jr., and Roger T Ames. 2008. Family Reverence (Xiao 孝 ) as the Source of Consummatory Conduct (Ren 仁 ). Dao: Journal of Comparative Philosophy 7.1: 9 19. Sciaraffa, Stefan. 2009. Identification, Meaning, and the Normativity of Social Roles. European Journal of Philosophy 19.1: 107 28. Shun, Kwong-loi. 1993. Jen and Li in the Analects. Philosophy of East and West 43.3: 457 79. Van Norden, Bryan W. 2007. Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press.