17TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT THE IISS SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE FIRST PLENARY SESSION US LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGES OF INDO- PACIFIC SECURITY

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17TH ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT THE IISS SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE FIRST PLENARY SESSION US LEADERSHIP AND THE CHALLENGES OF INDO- PACIFIC SECURITY SATURDAY 2 JUNE 2018 JAMES MATTIS, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, UNITED STATES

Thank you, John. Good morning, excellencies and fellow ministers, military officers, and thank you to IISS and of course to Singapore, probably the most gracious and competent of hosts we could find anywhere in the world. It is an honour to come before you for the second time as the Secretary of Defense at the Shangri-La Dialogue, which I consider the best opportunity for senior officials to meet, share perspectives and reinforce the significance of a free and open Indo-Pacific region, and in particular to speak to how we will work together to sustain that vision. Last year I came here principally to listen. I was new in office, and I needed to do a lot of listening. And I have visited this region six times since then, and my listening has confirmed for me the high degree of commonality among the nations in this very diverse region. Today I come to share the Trump administration s whole-of-government Indo-Pacific strategy, which espouses the shared principles that underpin a free and open Indo-Pacific. For as Prime Minister Modi reflected last night, a commitment to common values must be a foundation or even the foundation upon which we build a shared destiny. Standing shoulder to shoulder with India, ASEAN and our treaty allies and other partners, America seeks to build an Indo-Pacific where sovereignty and territorial integrity are safeguarded; the promise of freedom is fulfilled; and prosperity prevails for all. In firm support of this vision, America s recently released national-security and national-defence strategies express the Trump administration s principled realism. They take a clear-eyed view of the strategic environment and they recognise that competition among nations not only persists in the twenty-first century, in some regard it is intensifying. Both strategies affirm the Indo-Pacific is critical for America s continued stability, security and prosperity. America s Indo-Pacific strategy is a subset of our broader security strategy, codifying our principles as America continues to look west. In it we see deepening alliances and partnerships as a priority; ASEAN s centrality remains vital; and cooperation with China is welcome wherever possible. And while we explore new opportunities for meaningful multilateral cooperation, we will deepen our engagement with existing regional mechanisms at the same time. In the early years of our republic, President Thomas Jefferson sought to establish America s presence in the Pacific Northwest, the part of the country where I later grew up. President Jefferson anticipated this coastal region of America would become a gateway to the Pacific and open up vast opportunities for increased trade and commerce. America has expanded its engagement and deepened its connectivity across the region ever since. So make no mistake, America is in the Indo-Pacific to stay. This is our priority theatre. Our interests and the region s are inextricably intertwined. Our Indo-Pacific strategy makes significant security, economic and development investments, ones that demonstrate our commitment to allies and partners in support of our vision of a safe, secure,

prosperous and free Indo-Pacific based on shared principles with those nations, large and small. Ones who believe their future lies in respect for sovereignty and independence of every nation, no matter its size; in freedom for all nations wishing to transit international waters and airspace; in peaceful dispute resolution without coercion; in free, fair and reciprocal trade and investment; and in adherence to international rules and norms that have provided this region with relative peace and growing prosperity for the last decades. To these principles, America is true in both word and deed. In our economics, we seek fair competition. We do not practise predatory economics and we stand consistent with our principles. The US strategy recognises no one nation can or should dominate the Indo-Pacific. For those who want peace and self-determination, we all have shared responsibility to work together to build our shared future. As we look to that future, our Indo-Pacific strategy will bring to bear US strengths and advantages, reinvigorating areas of underinvestment. This morning I would like to highlight several themes of our strategy. First, expanding attention on the maritime space. The maritime commons is a global good, and sea lanes of communication are the arteries of economic vitality for all. Our vision is to preserve that vitality by helping our partners build up naval and law-enforcement capabilities and capacities to improve monitoring and protection of maritime borders and interests. Second, inter-operability. We recognise that a network of allies and partners is a force multiplier for peace. Therefore we will ensure that our military is able to more easily integrate with others. This applies to both hardware and software by promoting financing and sales of cutting-edge US defence equipment to security partners and opening the aperture of US professional military education to more Indo-Pacific military non-commissioned officers and officers. Through our security cooperation, we are building closer relationships between our militaries and our economies, all of which contribute to enduring trust. A third theme is strengthening the rule of law, civil society and transparent governance. This is the sunlight that exposes the malign influence that threatens sustainable economic development. Our defence engagements reinforce this theme whether our professional military education or combined military exercises, or in the day-to-day interactions between our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and coastguardsmen and the armed forces from across the region. A fourth theme is the private-sector-led economic development. The United States recognises the region s need for greater investment, including in infrastructure. We are reinvigorating our development and finance institutions to enable us to be better, more responsive partners. US agencies will work more closely with regional economic partners to provide end-to-end solutions that not only build tangible products but also transfer experience and American know-how so growth is high value and high quality not empty promises and surrender of economic sovereignty.

The US stands ready to cooperate with all nations to achieve this vision. While a free and open Indo-Pacific is in all our interests, it will only be possible if we all pull together to uphold it. To protect shared principles, we will continue partnering with the existing regional institutions. Central among these, of course, is ASEAN and the institutions it created, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus and the East Asia Summit, as well as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum and trilateral and multilateral mechanisms of likeminded partners. A central element of our strategy is the strengthening of our alliances and partnerships in terms of mutual benefit and trusted relationships. We are committed to working by, with and through allies and partners to address common challenges, to enhance shared capabilities, to increase defence investment where appropriate, to improve inter-operability, to streamline information sharing and to build networks of capable and like-minded partners. In Northeast Asia, the dynamic security environment continues to underscore the importance of our robust alliance and partner relationships. On the Korean Peninsula, we hold the line with our allies, supporting our diplomats who lead this effort. Our objective remains the complete verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, and the international community is in alignment here, as evidenced by multiple, unanimous United Nations Security Council resolutions. Beyond North Korea, we are focused on modernising our alliances with both the Republic of Korea and Japan, transforming these critical alliances to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. The Department of Defense remains steadfastly committed to working with Taiwan to provide the defence articles and services necessary to maintain sufficient self-defence, consistent with our obligations set out in our Taiwan Relations Act. We oppose all unilateral efforts to alter the status quo and will continue to insist any resolution of differences accord with the will of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. In Southeast Asia, we have reinvigorated our long-standing alliances with the Philippines and Thailand while bolstering our enduring partnership with Singapore. At the same time, we are seeking to develop new partnerships with pivotal players across the region such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam, where we have made historic progress based on shared interests and mutual respect. We continue to support ASEAN s centrality in the regional security architecture and seek to further empower it. The more ASEAN speaks with one voice, the better we can maintain a region free from coercion: one that lives by respect for international law. In Oceania, our alliances and partnerships are based not only on common security interests but also on deeply shared values and a long history of shared sacrifice. Australia remains one of our strongest allies and this year we celebrate our first 100 years of mateship. We are also revitalising our defence partnership with New Zealand. And we modernise these key alliances and partnerships to ensure that they are as relevant to the security challenges of this century as they were to the last.

Our strategy also recognises the importance of the Pacific Islands, America s gateway to the Indo- Pacific and a region where we are stepping up our engagement. The president s budget made good on our long-overdue promise to fund our Compact of Association with Palau, and this is just a down payment on the initiatives to come in this important part of the world. In South Asia we are strengthening our partnerships, particularly with India. Prime Minister Modi s remarks last evening underscored India s role as a leader and responsible steward in the Indo-Pacific region. The US values the role India can play in regional and global security and we view the US India relationship as a natural partnership between the world s two largest democracies based on a convergence of strategic interests, shared values and respect for a rules-based international order. Our regional cooperation is growing in a range of areas consistent with these shared objectives. Our partnership extends beyond the Indo-Pacific region and we welcome India s continued significant contributions to stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan. We are also increasing our engagement with other Pacific allies, such as the United Kingdom, France and Canada, with whom we share enduring interests in the region. A generation from now, we will be judged on whether we successfully integrated rising powers while increasing economic prosperity, maintaining international cooperation based on agreed-upon rules and norms, protecting the fundamental rights of our peoples and avoiding conflict. Our Indo-Pacific strategy informs our relationship with China. We are aware China will face an array of challenges and opportunities in coming years. We are prepared to support China s choices if they promote long-term peace and prosperity for all in this dynamic region. Yet China s policy in the South China Sea stands in stark contrast to the openness of what our strategy promotes. It calls into question China s broader goals. China s militarisation of artificial features in the South China Sea includes the deployment of antiship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, electronic jammers and, more recently, the landing of bomber aircraft at Woody Island. Despite China s claims to the contrary, the placement of these weapons systems is tied directly to military use for the purposes of intimidation and coercion. China s militarisation of the Spratlys is also in direct contradiction to President Xi s 2015 public assurances in the White House Rose Garden that they would not do this. For these reasons and as an initial response to China s continued militarisation of the South China Sea, last week we disinvited the People s Liberation Army Navy from the 2018 Rim of the Pacific exercise as China s behaviour is inconsistent with the principles and the purposes of the RIMPAC exercise, the world s largest naval exercise an exercise in which transparency and cooperation are hallmarks. To be clear, we do not ask any country to choose between the United States and China, because a friend does not demand you choose among them. China should and does have a voice in shaping the international system and all of China s neighbours have a voice in shaping China s role. The US will

continue to pursue a constructive, results-oriented relationship with China. Cooperation whenever possible will be the name of the game, and competing vigorously where we must. Of course, we recognise any sustainable Indo-Pacific order has a role for China, and at China s invitation I will travel to Beijing soon in our open, transparent approach to broadening and deepening the national dialogue between our two Pacific nations. I will end as I began. As a Pacific nation, the United States remains committed to building a shared destiny with this region. The US offers strategic partnerships, not strategic dependence. Alongside our allies and partners, America remains committed to maintaining the region s security, its stability and its economic prosperity a view that transcends America s political transitions and will continue to enjoy Washington s strong bipartisan support. For as President Trump said in Da Nang, We will never ask our partners to surrender their sovereignty or intellectual property. We don t dream of domination. Working together on the basis of shared principles, we can create a future that provides peace, prosperity and security for all: A constellation of nations, each in its own bright star, satellites to none. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, and I look forward to your questions.