LAWS 1021: PUBLIC LAW

LAWS 1021: PUBLIC LAW TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction to Constitutional Law... 9 2. Constitutional Documents and their History... 10 2.1 Statute of Westminster 1931... 10 2.2 The Australia Act 1986 (Cth)... 10 2.3 Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462... 11 2.4 Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545... 11 3. Constitutional Structure and Themes... 12 3.1 Separation of Powers... 12 3.2 The Source of Power... 13 3.3 Federalism... 13 3.4 The Westminster system... 14 3.5 The Rule of Law... 15 3.6 Parliamentary Sovereignty... 15 4. Rigid v Flexible Constitutions... 16 5 Amendment of the Commonwealth Constitution... 16 6. Amendment of the State Constitutions... 16 6.1 Constitutional Amendment... 16 6.1.1 Entrenchment Manner and Form requirements... 16 6.1.2 A-G (NSW) v Trethowan (1931) 44 CLR 395... 18 6.1.3 Taylor v AG (QLD) (1917) 23 CLR 457... 18 6.1.4 McCawley v The King [1920] AC 691... 18 6.2 Manner and Form requirements... 19 6.2.2 West Lakes Ltd v South Australia (1980) 25 SASR 389... 19 6.2.3 South-Eastern Drainage Board v Savings Bank of SA (1939) 62 CLR 603... 19 7. Bill or Charter of Rights... 20 7.1 Competing Models... 20 1

7.1.1 Common law model... 20 7.1.2 Constitutional model... 21 7.1.3 Statutory model... 21 7.1.3.3 Momcilovic v The Queen [2001] HCA 34... 22 7.2 Bill of Rights in Australia... 23 8. Representation of The People In the Legislature... 24 8.1 How to Vote... 24 8.1.1 Langer v Commonwealth (1996) 186 CLR 302... 24 8.2 One vote = One value... 25 8.2.1 AG (Cth); Ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1... 25 8.2.2 MCGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140... 26 8.3 The Right to Vote... 26 8.3.1 Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162... 26 8.3.2 Rowe v Electoral Commissioner [2010] HCA 46... 27 8.4 Territory Senators... 27 8.4.1 WA v Commonwealth (First Territory Senators Case) (1975) 134 CLR 201... 27 9. Appointment and Removal of Judges... 29 9.1 Appointment... 29 9.2 Removal... 29 10. The Separation of Federal Judicial Power... 29 10.1 NSW v Commonwealth (Wheat Case) (1915) 20 CLR 54... 30 10.2 Waterside Workers Federation v J W Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 434... 30 10.3 R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilmaker s Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254... 31 11. The Separation of State Judicial Power... 31 11.1 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51... 31 12. Defining Judicial Power... 32 12.1.1 Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorhead (1909) 8 CLR 330... 33 12.1.2 R v Trade Practices Tribunal (1970) 123 CLR 361 (Tasmanian brewries)... 33 12.1.3 Lane v Morrison (2009) 239 CLR 230... 33 2

12.1.4 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 230... 34 12.2 Judicial Power and Administrative Tribunals... 34 12.2.1 Brandy v HREOC (1995) 183 CLR 245... 34 12.2.2 AG (Cth) v Alinta Ltd (2008) 233 CLR 542... 35 13. Exceptions to the Separation of Federal Judicial Power... 35 13.1 Anomalous exceptions... 35 13.1.1 Lane v Morrison (2009) 239 CLR 230... 35 13.1.2 Harris v Caladine (1991) 172 CLR 84... 35 13.2 Persona Designata and the Incompatibility Doctrine... 36 13.2.1 Drave v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 46 FLR 409... 36 13.2.2 Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57... 36 13.2.3 Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348... 37 13.2.4 Wilson v Minister for ATSI Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1... 37 14. Bills of Attainder and Retrospective Criminal Laws... 39 14.1 Legislative usurpation and interference... 39 14.1.1 Liyanage v The Queen [1971] AC 259... 39 14.1.2 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1... 39 14.2 Retrospective criminal laws (EX POST FACTO LAWS)... 40 14.2.1 Polyukovich v The Queen (War Crimes Act Case) (1991) 172 CLR 501... 40 15. Judicial and Non-Judicial Detention... 40 15.1 Punitive detention... 40 15.1.1 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1... 40 15.2 Protective detention... 40 15.2.1 Kruger v Commonwealth (Stolen Generations Case) (1997) 190 CLR 1... 40 15.3 Immigration detention... 41 15.3.1 Al-Kated v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562... 41 15.3.2 Behrooz v Secretary of Department of Immigration (2004) 219 CLR 286... 41 15.3.3 Re Woolley; Ex parte Applicants (2004) 225 CLR 1... 42 15.4 Control Orders... 42 3

15.4.1 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307... 42 16. Constitution Ch III and the States... 42 16.1 Principles... 42 16.1.1 Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 186 CLR 51... 42 16.1.2 Forge v ASIC (2006) 228 CLR 45... 43 16.1.3 Kirk v IRC (2010) 239 CLR 531... 43 16.2 Preventative detention... 43 16.2.1 Baker v The Queen (2004) 223 CLR 513... 43 16.2.2 Fardon v AG (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575... 44 16.3 Independence and Procedural Fairness... 44 16.3.1 Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (2008) 234 CLR 532... 44 16.3.2 K-Generation v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501... 45 16.3.3 International Finance Trust Company Ltd v NSW Crime Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319... 45 16.3.4 SA v Totani [2010] HCA 39... 47 16.3.5 Wainohu v State of NSW [2011] HCA 24... 48 17. The Nature and Composition of the Executive... 49 18. The Governor-General... 49 19. Sources and Scope of Executive Power... 50 19.1 The Principle of Legality... 51 19.1.1 Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tr 1030... 51 19.1.2 A v Hayden (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 532... 51 19.2 Prerogative Power... 52 19.2.1 AG v De Keyser s Royal Hotel Ltd *1920+ AC 508... 52 19.2.2 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 2) [2009] 1 AC 453 53 19.2.3 Ruddock v Vadarlis (Tampa Case) (2001) 110 FCR 491... 53 19.3 The Nationhood Power... 54 19.3.1 Pape v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1... 55 19.3.2 Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79... 55 4

19.3.3 Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dams Case) (1983) 158 CLR 1... 56 20. Responsibility of Executive to Parliament... 56 20.1 Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 425... 57 20.2 Egan v Chadwick (1999) 46 NSWLR 563... 58 21. Delegated Legislation... 59 21.1 Constitutionality of delegated legislation... 59 21.1.1 Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73... 59 21.2 Statutory rule-making: Judicial review... 60 21.2.1 Evans v State of NSW [2008] FCAFC 130... 60 21.3 Rule-making procedures, including public participation... 61 21.3.1 Watson v Lee (1979) 144 CLR 374... 61 21.3.2 Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (Cth)... 61 21.3.3 Subordinate Legislation Act 1989 (NSW)... 64 21.4 Accountablility to Parliament: Tabling, scrutiny committees and disallowance... 65 21.4.1 Thorpe v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1990) 26 FCR 325... 65 21.4.2 Commonwealth, Regulations and Ordinances Committee... 66 21.4.3 Guidelines on the Committee s Application of its Principles... 66 21.4.4 Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW)... 66 21.4.6 Legislation Review Act 1987 (NSW)... 67 22. Informal Rulemaking... 68 22.1.1 Green v Daniels (1977) 51 ALJR 463... 68 22.1.2 Freedom of Information Act (1982) (Cth)... 69 22.1.3 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) Pt 3... 71 23. The Westminster Tradition... 73 24. Evidence in Court: Public Interest Immunity... 73 24.1.1 Murrumbidgee Groundwater Preservation Association v Minister for Natural Resources [2003] NSWLEC 322... 73 25. Freedom of Information Legislation... 74 25.1 Commonwealth... 75 5

25.1.1 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)... 75 25.1.2 Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth)... 78 25.1.3 Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Act 2010 (Cth)... 79 25.1.4 Commonwealth FOI Reform Companion Guide... 79 25.1.5 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, FOI Reform... 79 25.2 New South Wales... 79 25.2.1 Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW)... 79 25.2.2 Government Information (Information Commissioner) Act 2009 (NSW)... 82 25.2.3 NSW FOI Reform Companion Guide... 83 25.2.4 Office of the Information Commissioner, NSW... 83 26. The History and Development of Administrative Law in Australia... 84 27. Threats to Administrative Law... 87 28. Judicial Review: The Principle of Legality... 87 28.1 The legality/merits distinction... 87 28.2 Statutory Interpretation... 87 28.2.1 Evans v State of NSW (2008) 168 FCR 576... 87 28.3 Introduction to the Grounds of Judicial Review and Judicial Remedies... 88 28.3.1 Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Haneef (2007) 161 FCR 40... 89 29. Common Law... 90 29.1.1 Public Service Board of NSW v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656... 90 30. Statutory Rights to Reasons... 91 30.1 Commonwealth... 91 30.1.1 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)... 91 30.1.2 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)... 93 30.1.3 Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)... 95 30.2 New South Wales... 95 30.2.1 Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) Ch 5 Pt 2 Div 2... 95 30.2.2 NSW Supreme Court, Practice NotE SC CL 3, Administrative Law List [23]... 96 31. Jurisdiction of Courts... 98 6

31.1 Commonwealth Administrative Action... 98 31.1.1 High Court: Constitutional Writs... 98 31.1.2 Federal Court Jurisdiction... 99 31.1.3 Federal Magistrates Court... 100 31.2 State Administrative Action... 100 31.2.1 State Supreme Courts Inherent Jurisdiction... 100 31.2.2 Judicial Review Acts... 100 32. Justiciability... 100 32.1 Is there a matter?... 100 32.1.1 In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257... 101 32.1.2 Mellifont v Attorney General (Qld) (1991) 173 CLR 289... 101 32.1.3 Croome v Tasmania (1997) 191 CLR 119... 101 32.2 Decisions that a Court may decline to review... 102 32.2.1 Thorpe v Commonwealth (No 3) (1997) 144 ALR 677... 103 32.2.2 Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment v Peko-Wallsent Ltd (1987) 75 ALR 218... 104 32.2.3 Habib v Australia (2010) 183 FCR 62... 104 32.2.4 Stewart v Ronalds (2009) 76 NSWLR 99... 105 33. Types of Tribunals... 107 34. Independent Merits Review Tribunals... 107 34.1 Commonwealth: Administrative Appeals Tribunal... 108 34.1.1 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)... 108 34.1.2 Drake v MIEA (1979) 46 FLR 409... 110 34.1.3 Re Drake and MIEA (No 2) (1980) 2 ALD 634... 111 34.1.4 Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority (2008) 235 CLR 286... 111 34.1.5 Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd (1979) 2 ALD 1... 111 34.2 New South Wales: Administrative Decisions Tribunal... 112 34.2.1 Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW)... 112 35. Maladministration: Ombudsman... 116 35.1 Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW)... 117 7

35.2 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth)... 119 36. Corruption: The NSW Independent Commission against Corruption... 120 36.1 Independent Commission against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW)... 120 8

INTRODUCTION 1. INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Written Documents Liberal Democratic Value Conventions The Constitution of Australia was approved by the people of Australian colonies in referenda from 1898 to 1900. The approved draft was enacted by the British Parliament as the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900. Came into force on the 1 January 1901 1788-1855 development of constitutional law o A number of colonies had emerged each with a bicameral legislature 1847 discussion of a federal structure impetus came from Britain 1890 s serious proposals were developed for federation. o Henry Parkes (Premier of NSW) National Australasian Convention (Sydney, 1891) Delegates primarily looked to the Constitution of the USA as the major model of federation. It gave a few powers to the federal government but left a majority of matters to the state. It also provided that the Senate should consist of an equal number of members from each State while the House of Reps should reflect the national distribution of population Two significant 19 th C constitutional commentators. o J Bryce The American Constitution o AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. Civil liberties can be adequately be protected through the common law. Several delegates suggested that the Constitution did not need to incorporate express rights as the rule of law would provide adequate protection. Liberal democratic values include: o Rule of law o Responsible government o Parliamentary sovereignty They pervade constitutional law, although are not clearly articulated. 9

2. CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS AND THEIR HISTORY Australian Constitutions Act 1850 (Imp) NSW Constitution Act 1855 (UK) Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 Australian Constitution Act 1901 Statute of Westminster 1931 Australia Act 1986 (Cth) framework for creating local constitutions. bicameral, responsible government nullified principle of repugnancy Power to amend their own Constitution: s128 Excluded CLVA Removed continued application of imperal laws 2.1 STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER 1931 Excluded the operation of the Colonial Laws Validity Act Repealed the doctrine of repugnancy Shift from British Empire to British Commonwealth of Nations Conventional rule All surviving British legislative and executive powers directly bearing on Dominion affairs were to be used only as requested by the relevant Dominion governments. Australia adopted the Statute by enacting the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942 Removed the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 restrictions on the Parliament of a Dominion such that Commonwealth (not States) could now repeal or amend a UK Act which had previously applied to it: ss1, 2 Sec 4: UK Parliament would only henceforth legislate for the Cth following the request and consent of the Cth Parliament 2.2 THE AUSTRALIA ACT 1986 (CTH) Removed the continued application of Imperial laws in Australian States. The end of the British Parliament to legislate for Australia Removed the doctrine of extraterritoriality: s3 Removed the doctrine of repugnancy Final step in severing all legal ties with the UK. Confirmed the plenary power of the States to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the State Confirmed the constitutional practice that the State Governor acts on the advice of the Premier of the State, not UK government Repealed s 4 of Statute of Westminster (UK Parliament legislating for Cth on request and consent of Cth) 10

2.3 SUE V HILL (1999) 199 CLR 462 Ratio Decidendi: United Kingdom classified as foreign power for the purposes of s44 of the Constitution. s47 of the Constitution provided that "until the Parliament otherwise provides, any question respecting the qualification of a senator..., or respecting a vacancy in either House of the Parliament, and any question of a disputed election to either House, shall be determined by the House in which the question arises". s353(1) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) provided that "the validity of any election or return may be disputed by petition addressed to the Court of Disputed Returns and not otherwise". s354(1) provided that the HC should be the Court of Disputed Returns and should have jurisdiction either to try the petition or to refer it for trial to other specified courts. s376 provided that "any question respecting the qualifications of a Senator... or respecting a vacancy in either House of the Parliament may be referred by resolution to the Court of Disputed Returns by the House in which the question arises and the Court of Disputed Returns shall thereupon have jurisdiction to hear and determine the question". Held, (1) The validity of an election or return could be disputed by petition under s353(1) on the ground of the incapacity of the senator or member returned to be elected. Nothing in s47 of the Constitution suggested that the three categories of question there referred to were mutually exclusive. s44(i) of the Constitution provided that any person who "is a subject or citizen or entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject or a citizen of a foreign power;... shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a senator". Held, a citizen of the UK was a subject or citizen of a foreign power within the meaning of s44(i) of the Constitution and hence was incapable of being chosen as a senator. Therefore, Heather Hill, who stood for Senate in QLD was disqualified because she had not renounced her UK citizenship. Hill s argument so long as the UK retained any residual influence upon Australia it could not be regarded as foreign 2.4 ATTORNEY-GENERAL (WA) V MARQUET (2003) 217 CLR 545 s13 of the Electoral Distribution Act 1947 (WA) provided: "It shall not be lawful to present to the Governor for Her Majesty's assent any Bill to amend this Act, unless the second and third readings of such Bill shall have been passed with the concurrence of an absolute majority of the whole number of the members for the time being of the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly respectively." s6 of the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) provided that "a law made by the Parliament of a State respecting the constitution, powers or procedure of the Parliament of the State shall be of no force or effect unless it is made in such manner and form as may from time to time be required by a law made by that Parliament". The Electoral Distribution Repeal Act 2001 (WA) and the Electoral Amendment Act 2001 (WA) were passed by an absolute majority of the members of the Legislative Assembly of the Parliament of WA but by only a majority of the members of the Legislative Council then present and voting. The Clerk of the Parliaments of WA commenced proceedings in the SC of that State seeking declarations concerning the lawfulness of presenting the Bills to the Governor for assent. Held, s13 of the Electoral Distribution Act applied to the Bills because each was a Bill for an Act to "amend" that Act. Each Bill was for a law respecting the constitution of the State Parliament. Hence s6 of the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) required compliance with the manner and form provisions of s13 of the Electoral Distribution Act. 11

Because definition of electoral boundaries is legally essential to the election of the Parliament, repealing the Electoral Distribution Act must necessarily be a precursor to the enactment of other provisions on that subject of electorial boundaries. s4 of the Acts Amendment (Constitution) Act 1978 (WA) inserted s2(3) into the Constitution Act 1889 (WA). s2(3) provided that every Bill, after its passage through the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly, should, subject to s73 of that Act, be presented to the Governor for assent. Held, that s 13 of the Electoral Distribution Act was not impliedly repealed by the insertion of s 2(3) into the Constitution Act. Per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ. Section 2(3) of the Constitution Act is not directly inconsistent with s 13 of the Electoral Distribution Act and the two provisions can readily be reconciled. Where s 2(3) speaks of "passage through" the Houses of the Parliament it means "due passage" or "passage in accordance with applicable requirements" and does not mean "passage in accordance with the requirements for Bills to which no manner and form provision applied". Is a Bill to repeal the Electoral Distribution Act 1947 (WA) subject to the manner and form provisions in that Act qhich impose special procedures on any Bill to amend this Act? YES amend should be read to include repeal. Is an electoral redistribution Bill a law about the constitution, powers and procedures of the Parliament? YES- constitution extends to features which give Parliament a representative character. 3. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND THEMES 3.1 SEPARATION OF POWERS Judicial review is relied upon for the enforcement of limits on governmental and legislative powers. The judicature must thus be independent of the legislature and the executive. Under the Westminster system, the executive is integrated into the legislature. This is often seen as a contradiction to the very essence of the separation of powers. Montesquieu s The Spirit of the Laws (1784) followed attempts by Aristotle and Locke to divide the powers of government into: the legislature, judicature and executive. Owen Hood Phillips: Some hold that the true distinction lies not in the nature of the powers themselves, but rather in the procedure by which they are exercised. Complete separation would be ineffective and hinder the system s capacity to effect substantial change. administration has become a fourth group of function not clearly distinguished from the traditional three. It is supplementary to the tripartite system. Constitutional separation of powers Structure of constitution o Ch 1 Parliament (Legislature) o Ch 2 Executive o Ch 3 Judicacture Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co Pty Ltd the HCA held that it was impossible, consistent with the British tradition, to insist upon a strict separation between legislative and executive powers. It was found that legislative power may be delegated to the executive, and as a result upheld the validity of delegated legislation. 12

3.2 THE SOURCE OF POWER Sources of Power Legal Popular Initially the Constitution sought its authority as a statute of British Parliament through its legally binding status. Subsequently, succeeding the introduction of the Australia Acts which severed the all residual links to the UK, the constitution obtained its standing as higher law through the will and authority of the people via their agreement to federate. Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) Deane J the legitimacy of the Constitution lies exclusively in the original adoption (by referenda) and subsequent maintenance (by acquiescence) of its provisions by the people. A 1987 survey conducted for the Australian Constitutional Commission found that 47% of Australians were unaware that Australia had a written Constitution. 3.3 FEDERALISM 1/1/1901 Australia became a federation Two distinct models for federalism: US and Canada Australia has emulated the US model and clearly delineated the powers of the States and Commonwealth. o s109 inconsistency: Commonwealth legislation prevails. Australian system sometimes referred to as the Washminster system hybrid of Washington and Westminster. Representation in the Senate is tied closely to the notion of federalism. o Each state has 12 seats in the senate. o ACT and NT have 2 seats each. Wheare s Federal Principle the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent. Two key attributes of Federalism o Robust constitutional system that anchors pluralist democracy (political system where there is more than one centre of power) o Enhances democratic participation through providing dual citizenship in a compound republic (a federal structure in which there are two or more levels of government each of which has the primary if not sole authority for a specific set of collective decisions). o Guarantee that the state will not become one monolithic unitary government. o Federalism helps enshrine the principle of due process limiting arbitrary action by the state. Matthew s four evolutionary phases in Australian federalism. o Co-ordinate federalism o Co-operative federalism o Coercive federalism centralism o Coordinative federalism intergovernmental policy coordination All federations are subject to centripetal (towards the centre) and centrifugal (away from the centre) tendencies. 13

3.4 THE WESTMINSTER SYSTEM Balance of power in the lower house determines the leader of the government. GG acts on advice of the parliamentary leader. Ministers must be MPs (s64) Responsible government rests largely on convention Dicey argued that there were three fundamental principles of British constitutional law o Representative democracy o Parliamentary sovereignty o Rule of law Dicey on Parliamentary Sovereignty o No person or body is recognised by the law as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of parliament. o Judicial legislation must be viewed as operating with the assent of parliament. o The people ultimately have political sovereignty but not legal sovereignty The electors are the political sovereign. The legislature is the legal sovereign. o Parliamentary sovereignty is constrained by two limitations External limitation subjects may disobey rule Internal limitation every power is exercised in accordance with the character and circumstances of the exerciser. (product of social condition) Walker on Parliamentary Supremacy o We cannot leave him *the king+ a sovereign power when we never were possessed of it o Parliament never passes any laws which any substantial section of the population violently opposes. A statute which threatens the central tenets of our democracy can derive no authority from the doctrine of sovereignty. Executive accountability to parliament is often seen as a hallmark feature of the Westminster system it is the only aspect of responsible government enshrined in the constitution o Most effective form of accountability is transparency, a notion also called open government o One critical example is the Freedom of Information Act 1982 Led to more careful management of private documents Easier access to governmental documents. o Independent tribunals Merits review e.g. Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) The role of the Tribunal is to provide independent merits review of administrative decisions. The Tribunal aims to provide a review mechanism that is fair, just, economical, informal and quick. The Tribunal reviews a wide range of administrative decisions made by Australian Government ministers, departments, agencies, authorities and other tribunals. In limited circumstances, the Tribunal can also review administrative decisions made by state government and non-government bodies. Investigative e.g. Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) to investigate and expose corrupt conduct in the NSW public sector to actively prevent corruption through advice and assistance, and to educate the NSW community and public sector about corruption and its effects. 14

3.5 THE RULE OF LAW Dicey s three distinct though kindred conceptions o No man is punishable except for a distinct breach of law established via the standard judicial procedure. excludes the influence of arbitrary power. o No man is above the law o The general principles of the constitution are with us the result of judicial decision Jennings It is an attitude, an expression of liberal and democratic principles, in themselves vague when it is sought to analyse them, but clear enough in their results. Rule of law regarding the criminal law J Hall o The category of crimes should be determined by general rules. o A person should not be punished except for a crime which falls within these general rules. o Penal statutes should be strictly construed. o Penal laws should never have retrospective effect. Social dimension Men not only conform to legal rules under coercion but with a sense of ethical obligation International Commission of Jurists the principles, institutions and procedures necessary to protect the individual from arbitrary government and to enable him to enjoy the dignity of men. 3.6 PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY Born out of Britsih Constitutional 19 th C theory o Parliament can make and amend any law as it chooses. o Parliament cannot bind future parliaments. Limits o o o Courts will recognize/apply laws duly made Limited by constitutional morality Formal procedures/constitutional procedures. 15

AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONS AND THEIR AMENDMENT 4. RIGID V FLEXIBLE CONSTITUTIONS Two types of constitution o Flexible: one under which every law of every description can legally be changed with the same ease and in the same manner by one and the same body. o Rigid: one in which fundamental laws cannot be changed in the same manner as ordinary laws. This establishes a continuum of rigidity Flexible Rigid Flexibility of State constitutions confirmed by the HC in Taylor v AG (Qld) 1917 5 AMENDMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTION The method of amendment of the Commonwealth Constitution is articulated by s128 of the Constitution o Passed by an absolute majority of both Houses, or by one House twice; and o At a referendum, passed by a majority of the people as a whole, and by a majority of the people in a majority of the States. The referendum procedure is regulated by the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1984 (Cth) o s11 electoral Commissioner must send each elector a pamphlet showing the proposed amendment to the Constitution, with arguments for and against the proposal. o s45 It is the duty of every elector to vote at a referendum. The Labor party has been keen to expand the scope of responsibilities of the Commonwealth, whereas the Liberal party has portrayed itself as the protector of a fundamental document. 6. AMENDMENT OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS 6.1 CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT State constitutions are flexible Taylor v AG (Qld) (1917) Each State has the power to amend its own constitution through the ordinary legislative procedures. States owe their existence and juridical basis to ss 106 and 107 of the Cth Constitution Ch V s 106: Saving of Constitution The Constitution of each State of the Cth shall, subject to this constitution, continue as at the establishment of the Cth until altered in accordance with the Constitution of the State. 6.1.1 ENTRENCHMENT MANNER AND FORM REQUIREMENTS EXCEPTION: some aspects of state constitutions may be ENTRENCHED! o There are two main types of entrenching provisions Special majority of referendum (manner) Amending legislation must express its intention to override the earlier law (form) o Double entrenchment: the entrenching provision must protect itself with a manner and/or form requirements. Power to entrench: 16

o The power to enact a law includes the power to repeal or amend the law. Principle of parliamentary sovereignty. o The source of power to entrench must therefore come from a higher source. o Initially is was provided for under the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Imp) s5: Every colonial legislature shall have... full power to make laws respecting the constitution, powers, and procedure of such legislature; provided that such laws shall have been passed in such manner and form as may from time to time be required by any Act of Parliament o The CLVA was replaced by the Australia Acts 1986 (Cth) s6. Although provision was still made for entrenching: a law made after the commencement of this Act by the Parliament of a State respecting the constitution, powers or procedure of the Parliament of the State shall be of no force or effect unless it is made in such manner and form as may from time to time be required by a law made by that Parliament Notes on manner and form o Entrenchment itself does not require any particular procedure. o Entrenching provisions are restricted to manner and form. o Entrenching provisions: Cannot prescribe the contents of future legislation SE Drainage Board Cannot abdicate legislative power. West Lakes v SA Questions to ask: o Does the amending law seek to amend or repeal an entrenched provision contrary to the requirements of the entrenching provision? o If yes, then is the entrenching provision doubly entrenched? If it is not doubly entrenched, then the amending law will also have the effect of impliedly amending the entrenching provision. If it is doubly entrenched, then the manner requirements must be adhered to amend/repeal the entrenching provision before amending/repealing the entrenched provision. o Is the entrenching provision really a manner and form requirement, or s it really an abdication of legislative power? o Is the amending law one respecting the constitution, powers or procedure of parliament? If it is not, then the entrenching provision will be obsolete. If it is, then the entrenching provision must be adhered. 17

6.1.2 A-G (NSW) V TRETHOWAN (1931) 44 CLR 395 Constitutional Amendment Act 1929 (NSW) s2: This amendment was made to prevent the Labor government from abolishing the LC. The Labor government was subsequently elected and passed legislation to abolish the LC without a referendum. Member of the LC sought an injunction to prevent the Bill from being presented to the Governor. The question became whether the NSW Parliament had the power to prescribe to their successors a particular mode by which and by which alone constitution changes may be effected? The court found in the affirmative. 6.1.3 TAYLOR V AG (QLD) (1917) 23 CLR 457 In 1915, the QLD LA passed a bill to amend the constitution by abolishing the LC. It was rejected by the LC. In 1916, the LA passed it again. In 1917, the government proposed to put the bill to a referendum. The QLD Supreme Court granted an interlocutory injunction. This was overturned by the HC 6.1.4 MCCAWLEY V THE KING [1920] AC 691 The Industrial Arbitration Act 1916 (QLD) created a Court of Industrial Arbitration. The president of said Court could also be appointed to the SC. The QLD Parliament can validly enact legislation authorizing an appointment to the SC for a limited sevenyear period and thereby amend the State s constitution by implication. CLVA s5 gives the States full power with respect to its judicial system. 18

6.2 MANNER AND FORM REQUIREMENTS 6.2.2 WEST LAKES LTD V SOUTH AUSTRALIA (1980) 25 SASR 389 Ratio Decidendi: legislature cannot abdicate legislative power. The SA government and a company made a number of agreements regarding the development of a suburb. These agreements were then included in and given the force of legislation. The legislation provided that any amendments to the agreement as provided by the legislation will only be effective if consent is granted in writing by the company. Amendments proposed and no consideration was given to the company s consent. Company brought proceedings to prevent the amendments SA Supreme Court executive cannot fetter Parliament by entering into contractual obligation. Consent of an extra-parliamentary body cannot control the legislature. 6.2.3 SOUTH-EASTERN DRAINAGE BOARD V SAVINGS BANK OF SA (1939) 62 CLR 603 Ratio Decidendi: Parliament cannot be commanded by a prior legislature to express its intention in a particular way. Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s6 "No law, so far as inconsistent with this Act, shall apply to land subject to the provisions of this Act nor shall any future law, so far as inconsistent with this Act, so apply unless it shall be expressly enacted that it shall so apply notwithstanding the provisions of "The Real Property Act 1886"." The sections of the South-Eastern Drainage Acts creating first charges did not contain the expression, "notwithstanding the provisions of "The Real Property Act 1886". This is not an effective form requirement as it prescribes the contents of an Act Parliament has the plenary power to couch its enactments in such literary terms as it may choose. Parliament cannot be commanded by a prior legislature to express its intention in a particular way. 19

HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION 7. BILL OR CHARTER OF RIGHTS Australia is the only democratic country without a national charter of human rights. 7.1 COMPETING MODELS 7.1.1 COMMON LAW MODEL In the absence of any formal, written charter, presumptions of legislative intent may influence the interpretation of legislation where there is ambiguity. Examples of presumptions, legislation does not: o authorise interference with personal liberty o authorise interference with freedom of expression o authorise self-incrimination o remove the court s jurisdiction o apply retrospectively o take away property rights without compensation o deny procedural fairness to persons affected by the exercise of public power Two methods of interpretation: o Restrictive interpretation o Amplifying interpretation used conservatively 7.1.1.1 COCO V THE QUEEN (1993) 179 CLR 427 Ratio Decidendi: Statutory authority to engage in what otherwise would be tortuous conduct must be clearly expressed in unmistakable and unambiguous language. Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld) Offence to use a listening device. Exception: unless a SC judge has issued an approval. Carter J issues an approval to use a listening device which was installed on the premises of Mr. Coco s company. The device was installed by police officers who gained entry to the premises by pretending to be telecommunications worker. This entry constituted a trespass. Evidence procured through the device deemed inadmissible. 7.1.1.2 MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS V TEOH (1995) 183 CLR 273 Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute or subordinate legislation is ambiguous, the courts should favour that construction which accords with Australia s obligations under a treaty or international convention to which Australia is a party The UN CROC was ratified by the Commonwealth Executive in 1990 and entered into force for Australia on 16 January 1991. Article 3(1) provided: "In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration." 20