Elections Overview 1. What do elections do? 2. Wh do people vote? 3. Tpes of Electoral Sstems 1 2 What do elections do? (1) What do elections do? (2) Choose candidates to represent individual citizens Representative as delegate Make polic as if she/he was reflecting a plebiscite of an electoral district Representative as agent Transfer authorit to representative to decide what is best and attempt to produce an outcome that is best for the district mobilize support for regime, build legitimac, create a sense of civic involvement, disseminate information, etc. 3 4 Wh do people vote? Instrumental Voting (1) 1. Instrumental 2. Expressive 3. Consumptive 4. Avoid Punishment (Defensive Voting?) People ma vote on the chance that the ma have a causal effect on the outcome of the election, and the care who wins the election. The Paradox of Participation If large number of people vote, then there s a vanishingl small chance of having a causal effect on the outcome. As a result, no individual should vote in large elections. If no one votes in large elections, than an individual that votes can determine the outcome 5 6
Instrumental Voting (2) Irrationalit of voting Suppose 1. there are two candidates (Gore,Bush) and for voter x, Gore I x (Bush + $10,000) (where I x means x is indifferent between) 2. There are 1,000,000 voters EU x (Vote for Gore)=$10,000 x p Where p is the probabilit that x is the tie breaking vote in the election. If x has as good a chance as an other voter of being decisive, then p=1/1,000,000 Instrumental Voting (3) Irrationalit of voting If p=0.000001, then EU x (Vote for Gore)=$10,000 x 0.000001 =$.01 Which means if the act of voting involved anthing that x would not do in exchange for a penn, it would be irrational for x to go to vote for Gore 7 8 Expressive Voting Consumptive Voting Perhaps people vote because 1. the care about the outcome and the want other people to know it! Prof. Anna Harve has argued that this is where parties come from from. 2. the want other people to know the are involved It s what one does. Perhaps people vote because the get something out of the act itself 1. It s a happening like a sporting event, or concert. 2. It s a ritual that provides benefits unrelated to outcome 1. Provides sense of communit 2. Civic religion 3. It s valued as an important element of democrac. 1. Its the right thing to do 9 10 Defensive voting? Tpes of Electoral Sstems In some circumstances, people ma vote to avoid punishment. 1. In some sstems voting is compulsor Australia, Soviet Union 2. In some countries voters are coerced into voting b partisans Pluralit Rule Candidate(s) in electoral district with the most votes wins Proportional Representation Parties receive share of legislative seats based on the share of votes the receive in the electoral district Single Transferable Vote Voters rank candidates, an candidate who s total of first preference votes exceeds Droop quota (v/(s+1)) is elected If seats remain un-filled, surplus first preference votes are transferred to voter s second choice Process continues until all votes are filled 11 12
There are five dimensions to electoral sstems W. European examples of Proportional Representation Sstems Number of votes per voter (v) Number of Elector Can voters Legislators elected al partiall per district Formul abstain? (District Magnitude) a (p) (k) (f) Single member districts Can voters cumulate their votes? (c) Countr Electoral Threshold Effective Choice of Candidate within Part Finland, Spain None Yes First post the post (FPP, SMDP) Singlenontransferable vote (SNTV) 1 1 Pluralit 1 k>1 Pluralit Multi-member Districts Belgium, Iceland, No Netherlands Sweden Denmark, Greece, Less than 4% Yes Norwa No Cumulative Vote (CV) Limited Vote (LV) k v>1 k>1 Pluralit k>v>1 k Pluralit es es es no Austria, Luxembourg, Switzerland 4% or more Yes 13 14 German, Ital, Portugal, No Non- sstems What do parties do? Countr France Canada, India, UK, US, Constituenc-Level Seat Allocation Formula 2-Ballot Pluralit 1) Recruitment and socialization of leaders 2) Aggregating interests of social groups 3) Controlling and shaping interests of social groups 4) Stimulating excitement/support/legitimac for regime and/or opposition groups 15 16 In addition, in sstems where elections matter, the: Where do parties come from? 1) raise funds for election campaigns 2) coordinate campaigns of groups of candidates 3) allow individual candidates to place their polic positions in the context of a wider platform 4) shape the polic-making behavior of individual candidates 5) control candidate access to office 6) structure patronage behavior within government bureaucracies 1. the are natural representatives of people with common interests (primordial view) 2. the are teams of office seekers (instrumental view) 17 18
Michel's Iron Law of Oligarch" Parties, to be effective, need to develop an experienced, full time leadership. This leadership will necessaril come to define its interests in a manner that is independent from the rank file of part supporters, it will therefore, not sta true to the polic preferences or ideological concerns that, in part, gave birth to the part in the first place. More succinctl. The leadership of an organization will develop goals that are distinct from the goals of the members of the organization. And, since the are the leaders, their goals will become dominant. 19 20 Duverger s Law(s) Wh does the electoral sstem effect the part sstem? H 1 : The simple-majorit single-ballot sstem favors the two-part sstem. (Duverger 1963, p. 217). H 2 : The simple-majorit sstem with second ballot and proportional representation favor multi-partism (Duverger 1963, p.239) 1. Mechanical Effect 2. Strategic Voting 3. Strategic Entr 21 22 The Mechanical Effect In SMDP sstems, the wa votes get translated into seats rewards large parties and punishes small parties. Duvergerland: A hpothetical polit under SMDP Percentage of Votes b Part in 20 Electoral Districts Business Labor Green 23 24
Since the Green part did not win a pluralit of votes in an district, it gets no seats in legislature Distribution of Legislative Seats under Single-Member District Pluralit Rule Under, each districts delegation looks like the district that elected it Distribution of Legislative Seats under Proportional Representation with 4 Electoral districts 1 2 3 34% 30% 33% 33% 46% Business Labor Green 50% 47% 47% 25 26 But in a sstem, the legislature as a whole looks like the electorate The mechanical effect in the real world. St. Ives Constituence, United Kingdom General Election 0f 1992 Distribution of Seats Under Proportional Representation with No Threshold and "Fractional" legislators Votes % of vote David Harris (Conservative) 24,528 42.9 Andrew George (Liberal Democrat) 22,883 40.1 36% Stephen Warr (Labour) 9,144 16 Graham Stevens (Liberal) 577 1 44% Harris, was elected 27 28 The Mechanical Effect in the Real World... Votes and seats in the UK general election of 1992 The mechanical effect in the UK % of Votes % of Seats Distribution of Votes in 1992 British Election Distribution of Seats in Parliament Conservative 41.9 51.6 Labour 34.9 41.6 18% 5% 3% 4% Liberal Democrats 17.8 3.1 Others 5.4 3.7 42% 42% 51% Conservative Labour Liberal Democrats Other 35% Total 100 100 29 30
Strategic Voting What would ou do if ou 1) Lived in St, Ives in 1992 and ou had had a reasonabl accurate forecast of the 1992 elections, 2) had the following partisan preferences: Labour P Liberal Dem P Conservative Recall Votes % of vote David Harris (Conservative) 24,528 42.9 Andrew George (Liberal Democrat) 22,883 40.1 Stephen Warr (Labour) 9,144 16 Graham Stevens (Liberal) 577 1 Harris, was elected And Labour P Liberal Dem P Conservative 31 32 Strategic Entr Conclusion If ou lived in Duvergerland under SMDP and wanted to serve in the legislature, which part label would ou run under? SMDP discourages the creation of new parties Mechanical Effect Strategic Voting Strategic Entr 33 34 Countr France UK Ital German Ireland Austria Greece Belgium Norwa Sweden Finland Netherlands Sstem 2 Ballot Pluralit Semi- Semi- STV Members of Lower House 577 651 630 656 166 183 300 212 165 349 200 150 Number of Districts 577 651 476 329 41 43 56 30 20 29 15 1 Avg. District Magnitude 1.00 1.00 1.32 1.99 4.05 4.26 5.36 7.07 8.25 12.03 13.33 150.00 35