POLS 689 International Law and Cooperation, Spring 2017 Thursday, 9am-11.50am, Allen 2064

POLS 689 International Law and Cooperation, Spring 2017 Thursday, 9am-11.50am, Allen 2064 Instructor: Timm Betz Office: 2060 Allen Building Office hours: W 3-4 & by appointment Phone: (979) 862 2046 Email: timm.betz@tamu.edu COURSE DESCRIPTION This class introduces students to the literature on international law and international cooperation. The class first focuses on some of the major themes in the literature, and then turns to specific institutions and issues. Some of the topics we cover are why international institutions are created; what specific functions international institutions can perform; and the domestic sources and consequences of international cooperation. The goal is to assess the state of the field and to identify potential research questions for future work. The class has no formal prerequisites. We will frequently read articles that make use of game theory or quantitative evidence. The course assumes no prior knowledge of game theory or statistical models beyond what you should have learned in the first semester of the political science graduate sequence. If specific articles require additional discussion of game theory or statistical models, we will do so in class. COURSE OBJECTIVES After taking this class, students should have acquired or improved the following abilities: to identify major ideas in the field; to formulate their own research questions; to develop a theoretical argument; to present and communicate arguments concisely and effectively. COURSE REQUIREMENTS The class meets once a week. You should come to class prepared, having read the assigned material in advance. There is no grade for attending class or for participation. I nonetheless expect you to attend class meetings and to participate in the discussion. The class requires the completion of three types of assignments: article presentations and discussions (20% of the final class grade); four short papers (20% of the final class grade); and a final research paper (60% of the final class grade). More details for each assignment are discussed below. 1

Article presentations. At the beginning of the semester, you will sign up for article presentations and discussions from the articles that are assigned for each class; you also have the option of choosing an article not from the syllabus that matches your interests and goes along with the week s topics. Starting with the second class (January 26), we will have two article presentations each class. The presentations follow conference guidelines (at most twelve minutes for each presentation); you should present the assigned article as if you were the author of the paper. The discussant then provides two to three comments on the article, which should take at most five minutes, ideally less. Short papers. You will submit four short papers, of at most two double-spaced pages each, on topics of your choosing. You do not have to sign up for these papers; just write them whenever the readings provoke an idea that you find worthwhile. However, try to avoid writing all of them in November and December. The papers should build on the assigned readings. View them as outlines for potential research projects you could, for example, propose an extension of an existing argument, sketch a new theory to explain an empirical pattern, or suggest new ways to evaluate an existing argument. The papers are due at 3pm the day before the class on which you are writing. I will return the paper with comments by 9am the day of the class. Feel free to bring up your paper ideas in the class discussion. You are welcome to write more than the required four papers over the course of the semester. Research paper. The research paper should present a theory and research design for a possible paper. The research paper needs to be framed in the relevant literature, has to lay out the theoretical argument, must derive testable hypotheses, and should briefly discuss potential data sources and how these data may be used to evaluate the argument. However, the research paper should not actually evaluate the argument. Instead, focus on the development of your theory, a clear presentation of your argument, and think carefully about how to frame the paper in a literature. You will present a brief version of your paper to the class on April 27. You should incorporate any comments in the final version, which is due on May 11. For short papers as well as the research paper, I want you to focus on coming up with new ideas for research that, at the same time, appear feasible to carry out in the context of a paper or dissertation. Grading for all assignments is on the standard grading scale: A (90-100), B (80-90), C (70-80), etc. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS For missed assignments, I follow the student rules with regard to absences; see, in particular, Rule 7. If you need to miss an assignment for an excused absence, you should provide me, where possible, with advance notice in writing and obtain my confirmation of receipt in writing (such as an email acknowledgement). If advance notice is not feasible, you must provide me with a notification within two working days after the last day of the absence, which should include an explanation of why advance notice was not feasible. If you miss an assignment for an excused absence, I will provide an opportunity to make up for the missed assignment. For late assignments, I will subtract five per cent of the grade for each day the assignment is late, unless you made arrangements for an excused absence with me beforehand (following the 2

guidelines above on excused absences). Days are counted as calendar days: If an assignment that is due on Monday at 6pm is submitted Tuesday morning, I will subtract ten per cent. In other words, do not work all night if you are not able to finish your assignment before midnight. Plagiarism is "The appropriation of another person s ideas, processes, results, or words without giving appropriate credit" (Aggie Honor System Office). This applies to entire papers as well as to passages of work, such as sentences or paragraphs. It also applies if you paraphrase somebody else s work without giving appropriate credit. Whenever you use another person s ideas or words, and regardless of whether it is word for word or paraphrased, you must credit and cite the source appropriately. For more information on what constitutes plagiarism and how to avoid it, please see the library sources at this website. Also be aware of the Aggie Honor Code cheating, plagiarism, and other forms of academic dishonesty will not be tolerated, consistent with the Aggie Honor Code: An Aggie does not lie, cheat or steal or tolerate those who do. I will follow Texas A&M University s procedures when there is evidence of any form of academic misconduct. For details, plese refer to the Aggie Honor website. ACCOMMODATIONS The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is a federal anti-discrimination statute that provides comprehensive civil rights protection for persons with disabilities. Among other things, this legislation requires that all students with disabilities be guaranteed a learning environment that provides for reasonable accommodation of their disabilities. If you believe you have a disability requiring an accommodation, please contact Disability Services, currently located in the Disability Services building at the Student Services at White Creek complex on west campus, or call 979-845-1637. For additional information, please see here. 3

COURSE OUTLINE The following provides an outline of the course. The assigned readings and the order of topics are subject to change. We will read parts of the following books: Robert O. Keohane, 1984. After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Beth A. Simmons, 2009. Mobilizing for Human Rights. International Law and Domestic Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA. James D. Morrow, 2014. Order within Anarchy: The Laws of War as an International Institution. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY. Books and assigned book chapters will be available from library reserves. I INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW January 19 Introduction Peter Gourevitch, 1978. The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics. International Organization, 32(4):881 912. Robert D. Putnam, 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization, 42(3):427 460. Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, 1998. Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions. International Organization, 52(4):729 757. Michael J. Gilligan and Leslie Johns, 2012. Formal Models of International Institutions. Annual Review of Political Science, 15:1 23. Andrew Moravcsik, 2013. Liberal Theories of International Law. In Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, editors, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, chapter 4, pages 83 118. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY. Hendrik Spruyt, 1994. Institutional Selection in International Relations: State Anarchy as Order. International Organization, 48(4):527 557. Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, 2013. Constructivist Approaches to International Law. In Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, editors, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY. 4

II FORMS AND DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION January 26 Cooperation and Institutions Joseph M. Grieco, 1988. Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism. International Organization, 42 (3):485 507. Arthur A. Stein, 1982. Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World. International Organization, 36(2):299 324. Robert O. Keohane, 1984. After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, Chapters 1-7. Stephen D. Krasner, 1991. Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier. World Politics, 43(3):336 366. James D. Morrow, 1994. Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information. International Organization, 48(3):387 423. Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, 1985. Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. World Politics, 38(1):226 254. See also others in special issue. Beth V. Yarbrough and Robert M. Yarbrough, 1990. International Institutions and the New Economics of Organization. International Organization, 44(2):235 259. Orfeo Fioretos, 2011. Historical Institutionalism in International Relations. International Organization, 65(2):367 399. February 2 Forms of Cooperation: Norms, Law, Private Governance Christian Reus-Smit, 1997. The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions. International Organization, 51(4): 555 589. Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, 1998. Why States Act through Formal International Organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(1):3 32. Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, 1999. A Theory of Customary International Law. University of Chicago Law Review, 66(4):1113 1177. Tim Büthe, 2004. Governance through Private Authority: Non-State Actors in World Politics. Journal of International Affairs, 58(1):281 290. James D. Morrow, 2014. Order within Anarchy: The Laws of War as an International Institution. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, Chapters 1-3. Daniel Verdier, 2015. The Dilemma of Informal Governance with Outside Option as Solution. International Theory, 7(1):195 229. Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner, 1974. An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking. Journal of Legal Studies, 3(1):257 286. Kal Raustiala, 1997. States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions. International Studies Quarterly, 41(4):719 740. Erik Voeten, 2001. Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action. American Political Science Review, 95(4):845 858. 5

February 9 Cooperation Problems and Rational Design Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, 2000. Hard and Soft Law in International Governance. International Organization, 54(3):421 456. Judith O. Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, 2000. Introduction: Legalization and World Politics. International Organization, 54(3):385 399. See also the remaining articles in the special issue. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, 2001. The Rational Design of International Institutions. International Organization, 55(4):761 799. Barbara Koremenos, 2005. Contracting around International Uncertainty. American Political Science Review, 99(4):549 565. Allison Carnegie, 2014. States Held Hostage: Political Hold-Up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions. American Political Science Review, 108(1): 54 70. B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen V. Milner, 2001. The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. International Organization, 55(4):829 857. Jeffrey Kucik and Eric Reinhardt, 2008. Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime. International Organization, 62(3):477 505. Johannes Urpelainen, 2011. The Enforcement-Exploitation Trade-Off in International Cooperation between Weak and Powerful States. European Journal of International Relations, 17(4):631 653. Alexander Thompson, 2010. Rational Design in Motion: Uncertainty and Flexibility in the Global Climate Regime. European Journal of International Relations, 16(2):269 296. February 16 Negotiations and International Agreements William Roberts Clark, Erick Duchesne, and Sophie Meunier, 2000. Domestic and International Asymmetries in United States: European Union Trade Negotiations. International Negotiation, 5(1):69 95. David Stasavage, 2004. Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining. International Organization, 58(4):667 703. Thomas Risse and Mareike Kleine, 2010. Deliberation in Negotiations. Journal of European Public Policy, 17(5):708 726.. Timm Betz, 2016. Trading Interests: Domestic Institutions, International Negotiations, and the Politics of Trade. Journal of Politics, (forthcoming). Jongryn Mo, 1995. Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games. American Political Science Review, 89(4):914 924. Bahar Leventoglu and Ahmer Tarar, 2005. Prenegotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining. American Political Science Review, 99(3):419 433. Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and Jon C. Pevehouse, 2007. Vetoing Co-operation: The Impact of Veto Players on Preferential Trading Arrangements. British Journal of Political Science, 37(3):403 432. Yoram Z. Haftel and Alexander Thompson, 2012. When Do States Renegotiate International Agreements? The Case of Bilateral Investment Treaties. Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA. 6

Jeffrey Kucik and Krzysztof J. Pelc, 2013. Measuring the Cost of Privacy: A Look at the Distributional Effects of Private Bargaining. Annual Meeting of the International Political Economy Society, Claremont, CA. February 23 No Class, ISA Meeting III INFORMATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE March 2 Signaling, Commitment, and Information Beth A. Simmons, 2000. International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs. American Political Science Review, 94(4):819 835. Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff, 2002. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. International Organization, 56(3):477 513. Kal Raustiala, 2004. Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in the NAAEC. International and Comparative Law Review, 26(3):389 413. Andrew Kerner, 2009. Why Should I Believe You? The Costs and Consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties. International Studies Quarterly, 53(1):73 102. James R. Hollyer and B. Peter Rosendorff, 2011. Why Do Authoritarian Regimes Sign the Convention Against Torture? Signaling, Domestic Politics and Non-Compliance. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 6(3-4):275 327. Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff, 1997. Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(1):117 146. Andrew Moravcsik, 2000. The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe. International Organization, 54(2):217 252. Tim Büthe and Helen V. Milner, 2008. The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements? American Journal of Political Science, 52(4):741 762. Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse, 2008. Democratization and the Varieties of International Organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52(2):269 294. Bumba Mukherjee and David Andrew Singer, 2010. International Institutions and Domestic Compensation: The IMF and the Politics of Capital Account Liberalization. American Journal of Political Science, 54(1):45 60. Leonardo Baccini and Johannes Urpelainen, 2014. International Institutions and Domestic Politics: Can Preferential Trade Agreements Promote Economic Reform? Journal of Politics, 76 (1):195 214. March 9 Compliance Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, 1993. On Compliance. International Organization, 47(2):175 205. George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, 1996. Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation? International Organization, 50(3):379 406. 7

Anne E. Sartori, 2002. The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes. International Organization, 56(1): 121 149. Brett Ashley Leeds, 2003. Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties. International Organization, 57(4):801 827. Katerina Linos and Tom Pegram, 2016. The Language of Compromise in International Agreements. International Organization, 70(3):587 621. Brett Ashley Leeds, Andrew G. Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, 2000. Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(5):686 699. Joseph M. Grieco, Christopher F. Gelpi, and T. Camber Warren, 2009. When Preferences and Commitments Collide: The Effect of Relative Partisan Shifts on International Treaty Compliance. International Organization, 63(2):341 355. Yonatan Lupu, 2013. The Informative Power of Treaty Commitment: Using the Spatial Model to Address Selection Effects. American Journal of Political Science, 57(4):912 925. Yonatan Lupu, 2015. Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements. American Journal of Political Science, 59(3):578 594. March 16 No Class, Spring Break March 23 Enforcement and Compliance Xinyuan Dai, 2002. Information Systems in Treaty Regimes. World Politics, 54(4): 405 436. Beth A. Simmons, 2009. Mobilizing for Human Rights. International Law and Domestic Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, Part I. Stephen Chaudoin and Johannes Urpelainen, 2015. When is Good News About Pro-Co-operation Lobbies Good News About Co-operation? British Journal of Political Science, 45(2):411 433. Wade M. Cole, 2015. Mind the Gap: State Capacity and the Implementation of Human Rights Treaties. International Organization, 69(2):405 441. Andrew T. Guzman, 2008. How International Law Works. A Rational Choice Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Alexander Thompson, 2009. The Rational Enforcement of International Law: Solving the Sanctioners Dilemma. International Theory, 1(2):307 321. Tanja Boerzel, Tobias Hofmann, Diana Panke, and Carina Sprungk, 2010. Obstinate and Inefficient: Why Member States Do Not Comply With European Law. Comparative Political Studies, 43(11):1363 1390. March 30 Dispute Settlement and Courts Clifford J. Carrubba, 2005. Courts and Compliance in International Regulatory Regimes. Journal of Politics, 67(3):669 689. Todd Allee and Paul K. Huth, 2006. Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover. American Political Science Review, 100(2):219 234. 8

Leslie Johns, 2012. Courts as Coordinators: Endogenous Enforcement and Jurisdiction in International Adjudication. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56(2): 257 289. Stephen Chaudoin, 2014. Audiences Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes. International Organization, 68(4):877 911. Krzysztof J. Pelc, 2014. The Politics of Precedent in International Law: A Social Network Application. American Political Science Review, 108(3):547 564. Ryan Brutger and Julia Morse, 2015. Balancing Law and Politics: Judicial Incentives in WTO Dispute Settlement. Review of International Organizations, 10(2):179 205. B. Peter Rosendorff, 2005. Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO s Dispute Settlement Procedure. American Political Science Review, 99(3):389 400. Michael J. Gilligan, Leslie Johns, and B. Peter Rosendorff, 2010. Strengthening International Courts and the Early Settlement of Disputes. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54(1):5 38. Karen J. Alter, 2013. The Multiple Roles of International Courts and Tribunals: Enforcement, Dispute Resolution, Constitutional and Administrative Review. In Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, editors, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, chapter 14, pages 345 370. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY. Laurence R. Helfer and Erik Voeten, 2014. International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe. International Organization, 68(1):77 110. April 6 Membership and Membership Rules George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, 1998. Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism. International Organization, 52(2):397 419. Michael J. Gilligan, 2004. Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral Agreements? International Organization, 58(3):459 484. Vincent Arel-Bundock, 2017. The Unintended Consequences of Bilateralism. International Organization, (forthcoming). Krzysztof J. Pelc, 2011. Why Do Some Countries Get Better WTO Accession Terms Than Others? International Organization, 65(04):639 672. Christodoulos Kaoutzanis, Paul Poast, and Johannes Urpelainen, 2016. Not Letting Bad Apples Spoil the Bunch: Democratization and Strict International Organization Accession Rules. Review of International Organizations, 11(4): 399 418. Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons, 2006. Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960âĂŞ2000. International Organization, 60(4): 811 846. Daniel Verdier, 2008. Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime. International Organization, 62(3):439 476. April 13 Institutions as Actors Yoram Z. Haftel and Alexander Thompson, 2006. The Independence of International Organizations: Concept and Applications. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(2):253 275. 9

Leslie Johns, 2007. A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats. International Organization, 61(2):245 275. Songying Fang and Randall W. Stone, 2012. International Organizations as Policy Advisors. International Organization, 66(4):537 569. Tana Johnson and Johannes Urpelainen, 2014. International Bureaucrats and the Formation of Intergovernmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot. International Organization, 68(1):175 208. Wilf, Meredith, 2017. Market Forces or International Institutions? The Under-Emphasized Role of IFIs in Domestic Bank Regulatory Adoption. Paper presented at the 10th Annual Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations, Bern, Switzerland, January 12-14. Available at wp.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/peio10_paper_53.pdf. Isabella Alcaniz, 2016. Environmental and Nuclear Networks in the Global South: How Skills Shape International Cooperation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA. April 20 Institutional Change Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization, 52(4):887 917. Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier, 2009. The Politics of International Regime Complexity. Perspectives on Politics, 7(1):13 24. See also others in special issue. Marc L. Busch, 2007. Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade. International Organization, 61(4):735 761. James D. Morrow, 2014. Order within Anarchy: The Laws of War as an International Institution. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, Chapter 7. Johannes Urpelainen and Thijs Van de Graaf, 2015. Your Place or Mine? Institutional Capture and the Creation of Overlapping International Institutions. British Journal of Political Science, 45(4):799 827. VI PRESENTATIONS April 27 Presentations May 11 Research paper due by 6pm 10