PS Proseminar in International Relations Theory (Spring 2009)

PS 674-001 Proseminar in International Relations Theory (Spring 2009) Instructor: Dr. Clayton Thyne Course Time: MW 2:00 3:15PM Location: Rm. 0128-NNRH Office: 1651 Patterson Office Tower Office Hours: MW 10-11:30AM or by appointment Email: clayton.thyne@uky.edu Phone: 859-257-6958 COURSE DESCRIPTION This course is the field seminar in international relations designed primarily for students in the political science department. The purpose of this course is to familiarize students with many of the broad themes and theoretical approaches in the international relations research literature, including Realism, Neorealism, Liberalism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, Rational Choice, Constructivism, and Feminism. This course will also further your ability to conduct research in international relations by examining specific international relations research issues, studying the state of current academic research, exploring data currently available for research, and by each student conducting their own original research. In the end, this class will give you a broad theoretical grounding in the international relations literature, which will prove extremely useful when you take other courses in the field of international relations, and when you take your preliminary exams. COURSE TEXTS (all required) Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and David Lalman. 1992. War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives. Yale University Press. Bull, Hedley. 2002. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Third Edition. London: Macmillan. Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons. 2002. Handbook of International Relations. Keohane, Robert, O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton University Press. Keohane, Robert O. 1986. Neorealism and Its Critics. Columbia University Press. Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. Morgenthau, Hans, J. 1967. Politics Among Nations. Russett, Bruce and John Oneal. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: W.W. Norton 1

COURSE REQUIREMENTS AND ASSIGNMENTS Attendance and Participation (25%) Since this is a graduate seminar, students are required to attend each class. Students may only miss classes if they have a legitimate excuse and documentation (note from a doctor). Students will lose 5% of their Attendance and Participation grade for every unexcused absence. This class is discussion oriented. Students must do ALL of the assigned readings before class and be prepared to discuss the readings. Discussion will be evaluated on both the quality and quantity of comments from the student. Attendance is not enough to earn the points for this course requirement, students who do not participate in the class discussion will receive no attendance and participation points. Students should come prepared to answer questions as well as ask questions regarding each of the readings. Examples of questions students should consider when doing the readings include, but are not limited to: 1) What is the research question? 2) What is the researcher s theoretical argument? What assumptions underlie this theory? 3) Is the theory interesting? How does the argument fit into the literature? What does it tell us that we don t already know? 4) Evaluation of the theory: a. If the theory is tested, what consequences are tested, how are concepts measured, and what methods are employed? Do these make sense? b. Is there any evidence (other than anecdotal) that supports the theory? Is there evidence that falsifies it? What might you expect to see that would make you think the theory might be wrong? Does the author provide you with enough of a structure to say this (in other words is the theory falsifiable)? 5) What conclusions does the researcher draw? Does the researcher fully examine the implications of the theory? What are the most significant research findings? 6) To what degree do you think the researcher has answered his/her question? Is this a good example of research? Why or why not? What are the possibilities for related research? How can the research be extended or applied elsewhere? 7) How do the selections we read this week fit together? How do they fit into the course as a whole? Dataset Presentations Part of your participation grade includes a presentation on one or more datasets, which are listed for each week in the course schedule. Nothing formal need be written in regards to the assignment. The student s job will be to explain the dataset and demonstrate how one can/should use the dataset. This discussion should take around 10 minutes and will be completed at the beginning of each discussion. I will present the first dataset as an example. Datasets will be assigned on the first day of class. 2

Research Paper (50%) Each student is required to write an original research paper on any topic in international relations. The paper should be a maximum of 30 pages in length. The topic and approach are irrelevant to the grade; rather it is the completeness of the argument, the rigor of the research, and the presentation of the argument that are important. Examining articles from class will give students a good idea of the format of political science research. The paper will be due in several stages according to the schedule below: Friday, February 6 th (by 3:00 p.m. in my mailbox): Research design, 5-7 pages identifying your research question, a brief description of the literature relevant to your question, the method of analysis you intend to employ, and any data or historical sources you will use to evaluate your hypotheses. Friday, March 20 st (by 3:00 p.m. in my mailbox): First draft, at least 15 pages in length with initial drafts of all of the front-end elements in the paper (i.e., the research question, literature review, and theory should be welldeveloped). This should include a good start on your empirical tests. Friday, April 17th (by 3:00pm; 1 hard copy in my mailbox and email me a draft): Second draft, with all required elements of the paper, should be distributed to the instructor. I will post the papers on the course website for everyone else to read. Students should read each other s papers and come prepared with at least three questions per paper for class on April 29 th. Wednesday, April 29 th : Presentation of paper in class. Each presentation should last 10-15 minutes, leaving 5-10 minutes for questions. Monday, May 4 th : Final paper due (by 5:00pm in my mailbox): You should address questions and comments raised during in-class presentations when preparing your final paper. The paper is due in multiple stages so that I and other students in the class will have an opportunity to give you some feedback along the way. The paper will be given a final grade when I read the final draft, but I will take into consideration the quality of the research design, first draft, second draft, and in-class presentation when determining the final paper grade Final Exam (25%) The exam is take-home and will consist of three or four questions. Each student will answer 2 of the questions, with a maximum length of 10 pages per question. The exam will be similar to the format for preliminary exams administered by the Political Science Department. The exam will be distributed via email on Thurs, May 7 at 5pm. It is due via email on Friday, May 8 at 5pm. 3

Writing Requirements All assignments for this class are all to be typed; no hand written copies will be accepted. Each assignment should be double spaced, use 12 point Times Roman Font, and have 1 inch margins. Citations should follow the standards set by the American Political Science Review and each work should include a bibliography. Each assignment is to be well written. Any paper with significant errors in spelling, grammar, or punctuation will receive a grade reduction (up to 20% of the total value of the assignment). I strong encourage everyone to have their papers proof read by another person prior to submitting them to me or the class. Plagiarism and Cheating Students are advised to retain all notes and drafts for all work until after they receive their final grade. Students should also be aware that the instructor takes matters of plagiarism and cheating very seriously and is prone to imposing the most severe penalty allowed by university rules, which includes, but is not limited to, issuing an automatic grade of 0.0 for the entire course. SPECIAL NEEDS If you have a documented disability that requires academic accommodations, please see me as soon as possible during scheduled office hours. In order to receive accommodations in this course, you must provide me with a Letter of Accommodation from the disability Resource Center (Room 2, Alumni Gym, 257-2754, jkarnes@email.uky.edu). CLASSROOM EXPECTATIONS I expect all students to behave professionally in this class. If you miss a class you are still responsible for the information covered, and the instructor will not provide you with notes. I expect all students who attend class to arrive on time and ready to start class. It is disrespectful to the instructor and your classmates to show up late. During class please refrain from all disruptive behavior, including (but not limited to) reading newspapers, sleeping, talking during lecture, cell phone and pager use, and insulting classmates or the instructor. READINGS Unless otherwise noted, the reading can be accessed from www.jstor.org. You will need to be on a UK computer or internet connection to gain access to jstor. Once on jstor you may search by title or author and limit the search to political science journals under the advanced search option. You may need to use EBSCO Host or a similar cite for some of the more recent readings. 4

COURSE SCHEDULE Below is a preliminary schedule of topics and readings for this course. The schedule is subject to change based on the pace of the class. The instructor will clearly announce any alterations to the course schedule (if any occur). 01/14/09: Course introduction 01/19/09: No class (MLK Day) Week 1 (01/21/09): Thinking Theoretically About International Relations Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Chapter 1 ( Laws and Theories ). This is reprinted in Keohane, Robert O. 1986. Neorealism and Its Critics. Columbia University Press, pages 27-46. Bull, Hedley. 1966. International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach. World Politics 18(3):361-377. Dessler, David. 1991. Beyond Correlations: Towards a Causal Theory of War. International Studies Quarterly, 35 (3): 337-355. Zinnes, Dina A. 1980. Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher. International Studies Quarterly, 24: 315-342. Singer, J. David. 1961. The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations. World Politics 14(1):77-92. DATA SET: EUgene (Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program). o Download EUgene and play around with it (http://www.eugenesoftware.org/). Be sure you know the difference between monadic, directed dyads, and non-directed dyad. Be sure you can load these data into Stata once you ve generated them. Presenter: Clayton Week 2 (01/26-01/28): Realism and Neorealism Morgenthau, Hans, J. 1967. Politics Among Nations. Chapter 1, 3, 11, and 12. Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. pages 1-54. Jervis, Robert. 1978. Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. World Politics 30(2): 167-214. Waltz, Neorealism and Its Critics, Chapters 3-5. Gilpin, Robert. 1988. The Theory of Hegemonic War. Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18 (Spring):591-614. Nuruzzaman, Mohammed. 2006. Beyond the Realist Theories: Neo- Conservative Realism and the American Invasion of Iraq. International Studies Perspectives 7(3):239-253. DATA SET: National Capabilities. o Singer, J. David. (1987). "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816-1985" International Interactions, 14: 115-32. *Presenter: 5

Week 3 (02/02-02/04): Neoliberal Institutionalism I Keohane, Robert. 1984. After Hegemony: Collaboration and Discord in the World Political Economy, Chapters 1-6. Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books. Chapters 1-4, 6-7. DATA SET: Intergovernmental Organizations o Jon Pevehouse, Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke. 2004. "The Correlates of War 2 International Governmental Organizations Data Version 2.0." Conflict Management and Peace Science 21(2): 101-119. Week 4 (02/09-02/11): Neoliberal Institutionalism II Axelrod, Robert and Robert O. Keohane. 1985. Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions. World Politics, 38(1): 226-254. Keohane, Robert, and Lisa L. Martin. 1995. The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. International Security, 20(1): 39-51. Mearsheimer, John. 1994-5. The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security, 19(3): 5-49. Jervis, Robert. 1999. Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate. International Security 24(1)42-63. Keohane, Robert O., Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik (2008-09. Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism. International Organization (forthcoming). DATA SET: COW International War o Sarkees, Meredith Reid (2000). "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," Conflict Management and Peace Science, 18/1: 123-144. 02/16-02/18: No Class (ISA conference) Week 5 (02/23-02/25): Liberalism Doyle, Michael W. 1986. Liberalism and World Politics. American Political Science Review 80(4):1151-1169. Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. International Organization, 51(4): 513-553. Russett, Bruce and John Oneal. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: W.W. Norton, Chapters 1-2. Nita Rudra. 2005. Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World, American Journal of Political Science 49(4):704-730. DATA SET: International Conflict o Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993 2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." Conflict Management and Peace Science 21:133-154. 6

Week 6 (03/02-03/04): Democratic Peace Theory Gleditsch, Nils Petter and Håvard Hegre. 1997. Peace and Democracy: Three Levels of Analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(2): 283-310. Maoz, Zeev and Nasrin Abdolali. 1989. Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33(1): 3-35. Chan, Steve. 1984. Mirror, Mirror on the Wall Are the Freer Countries More Pacific? Journal of Conflict Resolution 28(4): 617-648. Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett. 1993. Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace. American Political Science Review 87(3):624-638. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 1999. An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace. American Political Science Review 93(4):791-807. Kadera, Kelly M., Mark J.C. Crescenzi, and Megan L. Shannon. 2003. Democratic Survival, Peace, and War in the International System. American Journal of Political Science 47(2): 234-247. Gartzke, Erik. 2007. The Capitalist Peace. American Journal of Political Science 51(1):166-191. DATA SET: Polity IV o McLaughlin Sara, Scott Gates, Havard Hegre, Ranveig Gissinger, Nile Petter Gleditsch. 1998. Timing the Changes in Political Structures: A New Polity Database. Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(2): 231-242. Week 7 (03/09-03/11): Rational Choice Fearon, James D. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization 49(3):379-414. Snidal, Duncan. Rational Choice and International Relations. In Handbook of International Relations. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and David Lalman. 1992. War and Reason. Chapters 1-4, 6, 8-9. DATA SET: Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) o http://www.paulhensel.org/icow.html 03/16-03/18: No class (Spring Break) 7

Week 8 (03/23-03/25) Disputing Rationality Walt, Stephen. 1999. Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies. International Security 23(4):5-48. Martin, Lisa. 1999. The Contributions of Rational Choice: A Defense of Pluralism. International Security 24(2): 74-83. Levy, Jack S. 1997. Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations. International Studies Quarterly 41(1):87-112. Jervis, Robert. 1988. War and Misperception. Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18(4):675-700. Levy, Jack S. 1983. Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems. World Politics 36(1):76-99. Quackenbush, Stephen L. 2004. The Rationality of Rational Choice Theory. International Interactions 30:87-107. DATA SET: Events Data (hand-coded) o McClelland, Charles A. (1978). World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) Project, 1966-1978. Third ICPSR Edition. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter- University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Week 9 (03/30): Feminism Tickner, Ann J. 2002. Feminist Perspectives on International Relations. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, eds Handbook of International Relations. Pages 275-291. Tickner, Ann J. 1997. You Just Don t Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists. International Studies Quarterly 41: 611-632. Keohane, Robert O. 1998. Beyond Dichotomy: Conversations Between International Relations and Feminist Theory. International Studies Quarterly 42: 193-198. Murphy, Craig N. 1996. Seeing Women, Recognizing Gender, Recasting International Relations. International Organization, 50(3): 513-538. Peterson, V. Spike. 1998. Feminisms and International Relations. Gender and History 10(3):581-589. Tickner, J. Ann. 2006. On the Frontlines or Sidelines of Knowledge and Power? Feminist practices of responsible Scholarship. International Studies Review 8:383-395. DATA SET: Events Data (machine-coded) o King, Gary and Will Lowe (2003). An Automated Information Extraction Tool for International Conflict Data with Performance as Good as Human Coders: A Rare Events Evaluation Design. International Organization, 57: 617-642. 04/01: No Class (MPSA conference) 8

Week 10 (04/06-04/08): Constructivism Alder, Emanuel. 2002. Constructivism and International Relations. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, eds Handbook of International Relations. Pages 95-118. Wendt, Alexander. 1994. Collective Identity Formation and the International State. American Political Science Review 88(2):384-396. Wendt, Alexander. 1992. Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organization 46(2): 391-425. Ruggie, John Gerard. 1998. What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo- Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge. International Organization 52(4): 855-885. Tannenwald, Nina. 1999. The Nuclear Taboo: the United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use. International Organization 53(3):433-468. Fearon, James and Alexander Wendt. 2002. Rationalism vs. Constructivism: A Skeptical View. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, eds Handbook of International Relations. Pages 52-73. Mitchell, Sara. 2002. A Kantian System? Democracy and Third-Party Conflict Resolution American Journal of Political Science 46(4): 749-759. DATA SET: TIES o Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin Bapat, and Valentin Krustev. 2009. The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971-2000*. Conflict Management and Peace Science 26(1):95-113. http://www.unc.edu/~bapat/ties.htm 9

Week 11 (04/13-04/15): Domestic Politics Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Will H. Moore. 2002. Presidential Uses of Force During the Cold War: Aggregation, Truncation, and Temporal Dynamics. American Journal of Political Science 46(2):438-452. Schultz, Kenneth. 1998. Domestic Political Opposition and Signaling in International Crises. American Political Science Review 92(4):829-844. Smith, Alastair. 1998. International Crises and Domestic Politics. American Political Science Review 92(3):623-638. Graham, Allison. 1969. Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. American Political Science Review, 63(3): 689-718. Bendor, Jonathan and Thomas H. Hammond. 1992. Rethinking Allison s Models. American Political Science Review, 86(2): 301-322. Fearon, James D. 1998. Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations. Annual Review of Political Science, 1: 289-313. (http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.289) Lobell, Steven E. 1999. Second Image Reversed Politics: Britain s Choice of Freer Trade or Imperial Preference. International Studies Quarterly 43(4): 671-693. DATA SET: Alternative Conflict Data o Gleditsch, Nils Petter; Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand, 2002. Armed Conflict 1946 2001: A New Dataset, Journal of Peace Research 39(5): 615 637. Week 12 (04/20-04/22): Bargaining Theories Jonsson, Christer. 2002. Diplomacy, Bargaining and Negotiation. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, eds Handbook of International Relations. Pages 212-234. Powell, Robert. 2006. War as a Commitment Problem. International Organization 60(1):169-203. Putnam, Robert D. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two- Level Games. International Organization 42(3):427-460. Slantchev, Branislav. 2003. The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States. American Political Science Review 97(1):123-135. Filson, Darren and Suzanne Werner. 2002. A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War. American Journal of Political Science 46(4): 819-837. DATA SET: Formal Alliances o Gibler, Douglas M., and Meredith Sarkees. 2004. "Measuring Alliances: the Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Data set, 1816-2000." Journal of Peace Research. 10

Week 13 (04/27): The English School Bull, Hedley. 2002. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Third Edition. London: Macmillan. Parts 1 and 2, pages 3-222. Devlen, Balkan, Patrick James, and Özgür Özdamar. 2005. The English School, International Relations, and Progress. International Studies Review 7(2):171-197. DATA SET: none Week 13 continued (04/29): Paper Presentations See instructions earlier under Research Paper 11