UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL Dear delegates, Welcome to UFRGSMUN s 2010 United Nations Security Council! Our staff members have been working hard throughout this year to provide you the best UNSC experience, so here is a little more about them. Camilla Corá is a third year International Relations student at UFRGS. In 2008 she participated in UFRGSMUN as the representative of Indonesia to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and in 2009 she participated for the first time as assistant-director of the UNSC. This year she is one of the UNSC s directors and she is currently on exchange at Gent University. Raquel Tebaldi has participated as a delegate of Indonesia in SPECPOL for the first time at UFRGSMUN 2008 and 2009 was her first year as a staff member as one of the assistant-directors of the UNSC. She is currently on her third year of the International Relations course at UFRGS and has just returned from one semester of exchange under the Erasmus Mundus programme in Belgium. Alexandre Spohr is an International Relations undergraduate student at UFRGS. He is in his fourth semester. In 2009 he participated in UFRGSMUN as the representative of Bulgaria to the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This is his first participation as a staff member. Isadora Loreto da Silveira is a 4th semester International Relations undergraduate student at UFRGS. She participated as a delegate of Turkey in CCPCJ at UFRGSMUN 2009 and this is her first participation as a staff member. Pedro Brittes is a 6th semester International Relations undergraduate student at UFRGS. He participated as delegate of Lybia in UNSC at UFRGSMUN 2009 and as delegate of Islamic Republic of Iran in UNSC at AMUN 2010. This is his first participation as a staff member. Athos Munhoz is a 6th semester International Relations undergraduate student at UFRGS. He participated as delegate of Croatia in SPECPOL at UFRGSMUN 2008, as delegate of Japan in CCPCJ at UFRGSMUN 2009, and as delegate of the Islamic Republic of Iran in UNSC at AMUN 2010. This is his first participation as a staff member. ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 1

This year s simulation will deal with two very difficult situations in the African continent: the cases of Congo and Sudan. The document we prepared is a good starting point to understanding these issues, so we strongly advise you to seek other complementary sources for you preparation. We hope you ll have a great experience with us! Sincerely, Camilla Corá Director Raquel Tebaldi Director Alexandre Spohr Athos Munhoz Isadora Silveira Pedro Brittes Assistant-Director Assistant-Director Assistant-Director Assistant-Director ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 2

INTRODUCTION The UNSC The United Nations Security Council is the primary body of the organization in maintaining international peace and security, as defined by the UN Charter. The UNSC is formed by fifteen members, of which five are permanent and ten are selected by the General Assembly for two year terms. The five permanent members of the Security Council are China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States, and they hold what is commonly known as veto power. That means that if any of these five members vote against a resolution or clause, for instance, it will automatically fail. The remaining 10 countries are elected by the General Assembly, which has demonstrated through the years the tendency to elect five members from Asia and Africa, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America and two from Western Europe and other states. The sessions of 2010 will be composed of the following States: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom and United States of America. The Presidency of the Council is held by its members in turns of one calendar month each. The order of the presidencies is defined by the English alphabetical order of their names. The main characteristic of the UNSC, which detaches it from other UN organs, is that it is the only committee in the organization with the power to impose binding resolutions on nations. It is also in the Council s mandate the right to make use of force by authorizing military and peacekeeping operations. However, the organ s first action, when a complaint related to a threat to peace if brought before it, is to recommend to the parties to try and reach a peaceful solution. It may also help the ceasing of the dispute by investigating or mediating the conflict if so needed. The Council has also, on many occasions in which the dispute had led to fighting, ordered cease-fires and imposed economic sanctions or collective military embargoes. At last, the UNSC may recommend the suspension or expulsion, by the General Assembly, of a Member State that continually violates the principles of the Charter. This committee is, therefore, crucial to the peacekeeping objectives of the United Nations, and its relevance goes way ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 3

beyond security and geopolitics, affecting also the lives of the populations directly involved in the conflicts it strives to solve. ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 4

TOPIC AREA A: THE SITUATION IN SUDAN By Alexandre Spohr, Camilla Corá, Isadora Silveira and Raquel Tebaldi 1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 1.1. The Formation of the Sudanese State Like many other African countries, Sudan was first composed of many different ethnic groups, which gradually became united. Bearing in mind the existence of more than 300 groups 1, the Sudanese population can be divided into three major religious groups: the Muslims (70%), the Animists (15%) and. the Christians (5%) (CIA World Factbook, 2010). Furthermore, the division between North and South has always been important in Sudan, since their ethnic and religious compositions are very different. Following the patterns of North Africa, Northern Sudan is composed mainly by followers of the Islamic religion, while the South has been strongly influenced by Christian and Animist beliefs (JANES, 2009). The country was colonized by the Egyptians and Ottomans as of 1821, but the domination period was ended by a revolution organized by an Islamic cleric who managed to expel the dominators and unify Central and Northern Sudan in 1885. His death, however, left the country to be ruled by an administration that enforced a strict code of Islam. In 1899, an alliance between England and Egypt invaded the country and proclaimed the English-Egyptian Condominium, which consisted in the colonization of Sudan by both countries. After the First World War and the Egyptian Revolution of 1919, in which Egypt achieved independence from Great Britain with Sudanese help, the movement for Sudanese independence was initiated by nationalist groups, being kept hidden from the colonial authorities. During the following years, Egypt tried to incorporate Sudan s territory to its own, supporting the National Unionist Party (which advocated the North s integration with Egypt), while England worked to insufflate Sudanese patriotism in the inhabitants of the region and defended the Umma (Islamic Nation) 1 Available at http://search.globescope.com/sudan/index.php?page=history-of-the-sudan. Last access: July 19, 2010. ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 5

Party, which stood for Sudanese unity, an alliance that made independence a possible option. In 1956, the newly elected Parliament issued the Declaration of Independence. 1.2. The Emergence of the Civil War (1955-1972) The way the independence was achieved did not satisfy the southerners, as the new government tried to spread Islamism throughout the entire country, which led the country into civil war between the Northern Administration and the Southern rebels in the middle of the 1950s. One of the main complaints of the Southerners was the establishment of Arabic as the only official language, which frequently excluded the southerners from the decision-making process (JANES, 2009). Many governments ruled the country since then, but all of them had difficulties to cope with the administrative issues and the civil war. In 1969, Jaafar Muhammad el- Nimeiri seized power and made attempts to put an end to the conflict by promising more autonomy to the South, as he no longer counted on the political support of the northern elites and was relatively isolated. In 1972, this promise was fulfilled with the Addis Ababa agreement, which stated that the South would have its own regional assembly and would be able to vote parts of the legislation (which were considered offensive to the Southerners) not to follow. The agreement attempted to promote peace by integrating groups of rebels to the government security forces, but ended up generating more conflicts between them. A new Constitution, issued in 1973, determined Islam as the official religion of Sudan, but recognized Christianity as the religion of a large portion of the Sudanese people (MATT, 2006). In 1983, Nimeiri provoked great discontentment, mainly in the South, when he instituted the Islamicization (US Department of State, 2010), which implemented the use of Islamic Law to punish certain crimes, with Southerners and other non-muslims residing in the North also becoming susceptible to such punishments, such strong action took place in the wake of the discovery of oil in the South and of the flow of arms provided by the USA. The Islamicization campaign, combined with the redivision of the South in three provinces, adopted still in 1983, in an abrogation of what had been agreed on the Addis Ababa accords, triggered a general offensive of the newly formed Sudan People s Liberation Army (SPLA), especially because such redivision was done without a popular referendum and on the sidelines of the Constitution. The country ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 6

quickly plunged into its so-called Second Civil War between the South, mainly represented by the Sudan People s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), and the North, represented, for its turn, by the central government. The SPLM/A had been founded in that same year, when a Southern Sudanese Army commander, Coronel John Garang, joined the mutinous Southern Army troops and supported the insurgency campaign against Khartoum. The SPLM/A's original objectives were to establish a united secular Sudan, where the Sudanese people could enjoy religious freedom, and some form of limited regional autonomy for the South (JANES, 2009). 1.3. The Second Civil War (1983-2005): From Nimeiri to Bashir Growingly isolated from popular opinion, Nimeiri s regime did not survive much longer. He was ousted in 1985 and in the following year elections were held, under which a civilian government led by Sadiq Al Mahdi took power. In 1988, the coalition government concluded a peace agreement with the SPLA, but although the agreement delineated greater religious and political autonomy for the South and determined the end of Islamic law, the political crisis and the Southern rebellion were not significantly altered. Before the agreement s implementation, however, a military coup led by General Omar Al Bashir ousted the government in June 1989. Bashir ran the country from then on, representing the interests of the North, but only in 1993 he officially took on the title of President, when a Transitional National Assembly was formed. However, the ruler de facto was generally believed to be the leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF), Hassan Al Turabi, since his organization, which would later become the National Congress Party (NCP), provided the political support and ideological basis for Bashir's regime. Furthermore, although Bashir's government was very unpopular, power maintenance was ensured by the suppression of dissidents and expelling of opposition forces, which caused new rebellion outbreaks to arise among northern factions (MALWAL, 1990). In the 1996 elections, when the Transitional National Assembly was replaced by the National Assembly, Turabi formalized his position, becoming the speaker of the new Parliament, which was dominated by NIF supporters. ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 7

Meanwhile, the 1990s witnessed a growing sense of alienation from Khartoum in the western and eastern regions of Sudan. Along that decade, a succession of regional efforts to bring an end to the Sudanese civil war would take place. In 1993, the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya started seeking a peace initiative for Sudan under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) 2, which promulgated the 1994 Declaration of Principles (DOP), a document that aimed at identifying the essential elements necessary to a fair and comprehensive peace settlement. However, the Sudanese Government did not sign the DOP until 1997, after suffering major losses to the SPLA on the battlefield. In that same year, Khartoum signed a series of agreements with rebel factions under the banner of "Peace from Within 3, ending military conflict between the government and significant rebel factions. Those agreements paralleled the terms and conditions of the IGAD agreement, calling for a degree of autonomy for the South and its exercise of the right of selfdetermination and regional autonomy. Around the 1996 electoral year, the increasing pressure from the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) an umbrella organization 4 for anti-government forces and Sudan's international isolation seemed to lead the government to adopt new methods. In 1998 a new law determined the return of the multi-party system, but required parties that contested the elections to adhere to an Islamist political agenda. Consequently, the main opposition (formed by the NDA and the SPLM) rejected these changes and, apart from the National Congress Party (the renamed NIF), only small parties registered (JANES, 2009). In December 2000, Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held and led to Bashir s reelection as President. The main opposition parties, including the Umma Party and the PCP, did not take part in the elections. The Umma also turned down an 2 The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which had been founded in 1986 by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. The State of Eritrea became the seventh member in 1993 and suspended its membership in 2007. The main purpose of IGAD is regional development and cooperation (IGAD, 2010). 3 The Peace from Within process in Sudan was a reflection of concerns that at that time the Sudan people could not rely on foreign guidance and assistance in their search for peace, given the unwillingness of several states to assist the country in the search for a lasting peace (The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, 2002). 4 An umbrella organization is a body that has other organizations as members, and works to represent the collective interest of these members before other bodies such as the government and community (HAMILTON & BARWICK, 1993, apud MELVILLE, 1999). ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 8

offer to join the government right after the poll, claiming that it would only participate in a government in which all political organizations were represented (JANES, 2009). In 2001, increased interest in Sudan led Kenya to reinvigorate the IGAD initiative. Between 2002 and 2004, the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the SPLM/A met in continuous negotiations to debate on the issues concerning the Abyei area and the states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. During this period, these parties agreed upon a series of crucial accords, which would later be compiled and generate the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In February 2003, in addition to the historical struggles for land and power, conflict burst in the historically overlooked Darfur region. In that year insurgency broke out against the government after its forces undertook a policy of suppression of rebel groups formed by a wide range of ethnicities, spilling the fighting towards the civilian population (TANNER, TUBIANA, 2007). In this respect, two peacekeeping missions were created to act in the region, a UN mission (UNMIS) and a hybrid mission constituted of UN and African Union (AU) forces (UNAMID). 1.4. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and further developments In January 2005, the ruling NCP and the SPLM/A signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), formally ending the civil war. The agreement provided for a Government of National Unity, with the South being granted self-government for a sixyear period, after which there would be a referendum on the possibility of secession. In addition, it was agreed that the residents of the Abyei area would cast a separate ballot simultaneously to the southern referendum to decide whether Abyei will retain its special administrative status in the North or become a part of the South. Furthermore, it was also accorded that the Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States are to hold a popular consultation in 2011, in order to ascertain the views of the areas populations on the CPA. In the following months, the NDA signed a reconciliation agreement with the central government that enabled it to become part of the power-sharing government; and John Garang, the chairman of the SPLM/A, was sworn in as the first Vice President of ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 9

Sudan 5. However, his death rose political tensions, especially because he was replaced by Salva Kirr Mayardit, a former rebel in the First Civil War and a member of the SPLM/A. This was followed by the formation of a power-sharing Government of National Unity and the arrangement of an autonomous Government for Southern Sudan. On March 4 th 2009, Bashir had an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes and crimes against humanity due to his actions regarding the Darfur conflict. He has since then had a second arrest warrant issued to include charges of genocide, but not replacing or revoking in any respect the first one (ICC-02/05-01/09). A presidential poll was held in April 2010, having as the main candidate the NCP s Omar al-bashir running for presidential re-election against the SPLM representative. Despite the movements against the poll, Omar al-bashir was declared winner, and in the semi-autonomous South, former rebel leader Salva Kiir was reelected President of the Southern region. 2. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 2.1. The Oil Issue 2.1.1. The Economic and Political Importance of the Oil Sector Sudan is considered a minor and relatively recent player among major oil producers, with proven reserves ranging between 5 to 6.4 billion barrels (SIDAHMED, 2009). Oil was first discovered in the country in the late 1970s, and exploration started in the following decade. However, due to the unstable situation of the country, the American company Chevron, which had discovered several oil fields in the South, had to abandon its concessions in 1985. A Canadian company named Arakis took concessions in 1993, and in 1996 a limited production for the domestic market started. 5 According to the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, the President of the Government of Southern Sudan shall, inter alia, serve as First Vice President of the Republic of the Sudan in circumstances determined by that Constitution. Moreover, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Sudan (1998), Part III, article 44 The President of the Republic shall appoint two Vice-Presidents having the same qualification of the President, and appoint assistants and advisers, and define their seniorities and functions ( ). ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 10

The fields remote location, however, made export impracticable and therefore hampered exploitation. In order to be able to invest in infrastructure to improve exportation, a consortium was formed by Arakis (then purchased by another Canadian company, Talisman) with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Malaysia's Petronas and Sudan's Sudapet (JANES, 2009). The construction of a pipeline that would transport oil from the South to Port Sudan (in the North) started in 1998, and by mid- 1999 it was already operational. In that same year exportation started. Today, there are four oil refineries in Sudan, and the oil companies have built significant developments in infrastructure (MOGHRABY, 2009). Sudan has begun supplying oil products to Ethiopia and Kenya and eventually envisages a pipeline network to supply markets in the African Horn. However, several campaigns by human rights groups have made it difficult for Western companies to continue operations in Sudan, at least until a settlement of the various conflicts is reached. In such scenario, China consolidates its position as an important commercial partner to Sudan along with other Asian countries, and as the main destination of the Sudanese oil (LARGE, 2008). 2.1.2. Oil and wealth-sharing Oil acted as one of the driving forces in concluding the CPA, in the sense that it was agreed that wealth should be shared and not fought for (SIDAHMED, 2009). It was established that, starting with a transitional administration in 2004, oil revenues in the South would be divided 50% to Khartoum, 48% to the Southern administration and 2% to the producer states governments (idem). The accelerated growth of oil exports has transformed Sudan s economy, which experienced GDP growth rates over 10% in 2006 and 2007 (IMF Country Report, 2009). Still according to the IMF, oil accounted for 95% of Sudan s total exports and 60% of government revenue in 2008, thus making economy very vulnerable to the drop in oil prices. Additionally, in the South, the government s income is currently almost entirely originated from oil. Therefore, with the low efficiency of governmental institutions and widespread corruption, an independent South Sudan runs the risk of becoming an import-dependent country, subject to the resource curse that has affected other mineral-exporting economies (HARNEIT-SIEVERS, 2010). ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 11

Nowadays, the oil industry is exceptionally profitable in Sudan since oil companies are exempted from tax payment in the country, and most contracts were negotiated when the price of oil was very low. As today s prices are higher, foreign companies are profiting immensely and leaving Sudan with a very small share of the produced wealth (MOGHRABY, 2009). 2.1.3. Domestic and Foreign Interests The development of Sudan's oil industry transformed the control of the oil-rich southern areas into Khartoum s primary strategic goal. The SPLA, in turn, aimed at oil installations as legitimate targets. Even so, oil companies operating in Sudan arguably run a greater reputational than capital risk, as they are under intense criticism from human rights groups for the forced resettlement of non-arab villages away from the exploration zones (JANES, 2009). The strategic behavior of international oil companies in Sudan has been deeply driven by political pressures from several governments and organizations. However, European oil companies, such as Lundin and OMV, protected by the European Union's political standpoint of "constructive engagement" in Sudan, were able to profit. Eastern parastatals, led by China, on their turn, have established a dominating presence in Sudan (PATEY, 2007), mainly due to the NIF s political evolution. Accordingly, Sudan is the China National Petroleum Corporation's largest international operation (LARGE, 2009). Since 2005, South Sudan s regional relations have increasingly turned toward East Africa, and an independent South Sudan is likely to interact even more closely with that region. For both North and South Sudan, the oil sector holds potential for economic development and bilateral cooperation, at the same time that it represents a tangible risk of renewed conflict, if border disputes and issues around revenue sharing remain unsolved (HARNEIT-SIEVERS, 2010). 2.2. The Abyei, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan Regions The three regions of Abyei, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan are dealing with the process of deciding whether they will integrate North or South Sudan after the possible secession, which will be decided by one of the 2011 referenda. The economic ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 12

importance of these regions is one of the biggest concerns for both SPLM and NCP due to the oil reserves located in those areas. They have also been the most damaged areas of Sudan during the Civil Wars. 2.2.1. Abyei s Referendum According to the Addis Ababa peace agreement, the Southern Provinces are Bahr el Gazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile. However, because of ethnic and cultural similarities, Abyei has always fought together with the South, and its right of integrating the South was previewed by the same agreement (PETER, 2010). There are two main groups in the region, the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya. The first group defends the Southern vision and, performing a dominant role in Abyei, favors its integration with the South (EUISS, 2009). The second group fought against the first during the Civil Wars and supports the government. Having less political expression, the Misseriya might be treated unequally if Abyei secedes with the South (PETER, 2010). The existence of big oil revenues in Abyei makes the demarcation of its borders one of the biggest worries of both North and South Sudan. The CPA established that the borders should be decided by the Abyei Border Commission (ABC), but its decision, which was ultimately taken to The Hague, was widely contested, leading to the non-implementation of the borders established. UNMIS reports showed that no improvement has been made in the boundaries demarcation (S/2010/168). The exploitation of Abyei s oil resources is shared by the two parts of the country and other groups, with a prevalence of the North, which holds 50% of the net oil revenues (ISN, 2010). Until the 2011 referendum, Abyei shall be administered by an Executive Council elected by its residents. The referendum is scheduled to take place together with the one on the secession of South Sudan. situations 2.2.2. Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, their importance and current Both Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, also called Nuba Mountains, are very important producers of oil and gas, besides other raw materials and precious stones ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 13

(MATUS, 2006). There have been many contentions over their possession, to which the CPA established a balancing act by which the NCP and the SPLM would swap the rule over the two regions. Currently, Blue Nile is ruled by a SPLM governor, and South Kordofan by a NCP one (PETER, 2010). The support of Blue Nile to the Southern cause is mainly due to the repression of non-muslim people and the Islamicization campaign established in 1983. As a result, the people from the south of this region joined the SPLM (PETER, 2010). Unlike Abyei, however, the CPA has not established a referendum for these two regions; instead, popular consultations have been scheduled. This process has raised many questions, as their way of development and possible effects are unknown, and it is likely to become a reason for a future conflict (idem). 2.3. National Elections and Referendum on South s Secession 2.3.1 The Elections and the possibility of fraud The National Elections that took place in April 2010 were the first multiparty presidential poll since the one in 1986, which elected Omar al-bashir. Along with the referendum on South s Secession, it was supposed to determine the future of the North- South relations. The presidential poll had initially 72 candidates, although it is said that only the main two had enough financial resources to compete properly (HAKES & ELSON, 2010). According to the CPA, the two parties, NCP and SPLM, were supposed to have implemented provisions to guarantee free and fair elections, which should have evidenced changes in the governance that proved the existence of a new democratic Sudan. However, neither were the parties able to implement the provisions nor has the governance showed any changes (EUISS, 2009). Furthermore, these elections were considered by some as a means for the NCP to recover its old legitimacy, which has been deeply damaged by the war against the SPLM (O BRIEN, 2009). As such, a renewed legitimacy would be the key to deal with possible threats from the rebels and to guarantee the government s ability to implement strong measures. These possibilities are currently unlikely for the government due to the weakness of its armed forces, in comparison to the proven strength of the Southern military power, which menaces the ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 14

likelihood of survival of the regime (ICG Africa Briefing 72, 2010). In addition, the possibility of fraud was always considerable in view of the democratic history of the country. On March 31 st Yassir Arman, the SPLM presidential candidate, withdrew his candidacy and accompanied his party in the boycott movement, which had been initiated by other government oppositionist parties (HAKES & ELSON, 2010). The boycott was based on fraud suspicions and alleged undemocratic and unconstitutional conditions for the elections (EUISS, 2009). The opponents, mainly the ones that participated in the All Political Parties Conference (APPC) 6, had proposed a set of measures to favor the democratization of the system and the elections, but these were not adopted due to the absence of the NCP in the Conference. In addition, the so-called improper conditions for the elections were partly caused by the disagreement on some points of the CPA between the NCP and the SPLM, such as the North-South border demarcation and the legal reform (O BRIEN, 2009). Moreover, after the occurrence of the polls, the NCP was accused of defrauding the votes and of intimidating Southern and other opponent region s voters (SuGDE and SuNDE, 2010). Nonetheless, SPLM leader Salva Kiir is said to have agreed with the results after they were announced. 2.3.2. The Secession Referendum and the Political Forces Involved It was decided in the Machakos Protocol of 2002, and later incorporated into the CPA, that the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter alia, through a Referendum to determine their future status. The same agreement states that, after the six year Interim period (2005-2011), there shall be an internationally monitored referendum, organized jointly by the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, for the people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession (MACHAKOS PROTOCOL, 2002). Despite worries that both the poll and the referendum wouldn t be free and fair according to European standards, and that their results would be accepted mainly because of political criteria (EUISS, 2009, p.21), the occurrence of the elections 6 The All Political Parties Conference was the gathering of almost all Sudanese political parties, except for the NCP, organized by the SPLM in Juba in September 2009. The parties discussed a set of political matters, mainly related to the implementation of CPA, and issued a joint declaration. ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 15

increases the probability of the referendum to take place in the original schedule, even though there have been complaints of fraud. Another issue to be considered is the fact that the SPLM does not have an ultimate position on whether the idea of unity is desirable or not, which is mainly due to the party being divided in two factions, the secessionists and the unionists. In addition, it is important to consider the measures to be taken to maintain peace whether the country is divided or not. The intensive planning of the elections by both parties resulted in short-term solutions, leaving long-term issues, such as the post-referendum period, not thoroughly planned. Thus, it is estimated that the situation of Sudan can develop into four different scenarios, with the possibilities of war and segregation at the center of the denomination. The referendum will have a key role in the development, since its terms may influence the creation of a new military conflict between the parts, as the South might fight for independence if this is not the result of the referendum. Another possibility is that the North might start a conflict for the control of the oil exploitation if secession occurs (LIJN, 2009). Hence, the possible scenarios for the post-referendum situation are basically as follows: unity and war, unity and peace, secession and war or secession and peace (idem). The chances of war will be determined by the democratic changes at the center that should occur in order to provide a peaceful future for Sudan, whether the South becomes independent or not (ibidem). 2.4. Darfur and the Destabilization of the Country Bordering with Chad and the Central African Republic, Darfur is Sudan s largest region, with sedentary African farmers being predominant, and the Fur and Masalit being the dominant ethnic groups. The rest of its population consists mainly of nomadic Arab tribes. For years, the central government in Khartoum has favored the Arabs in Darfur, distancing itself from the Fur leaders (Human Rights Watch, 2004). In addition, many governments since the 1980s have utilized militias from Darfur and Kordofan (the murahaleen ) against southern rebels (idem). In 2003, conflict broke out in Darfur, after the signing of the Machakos Protocol in the previous year and the reassurance of the neglect of Khartoum towards the region. By 2006, the death toll in Darfur was calculated at roughly 300,000 by the UN, and refugees amounted to 2,5 million, and both numbers have risen quickly since ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 16

then (SaveDarfur Briefing Paper, 2008). The conflict arose when, seeking to put an end to the hegemony of Khartoum over the Darfurian native establishment, two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), advocated armed struggle to force the NCP government to allow immediate autonomous rule independent from Khartoum, as well as fair wealth sharing. Government response came in the form of attacks against the civilian population from which these rebel groups were originated, namely the Fur and Masalit (Human Rights Watch, 2004). In May 2006, a SPLM/A faction signed the Darfur Peace Agreement with the government, but the JEM and another SLM/A (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army) faction refused to sign it. Moreover, as the government is not willing to revise the central principles of the CPA, achieving peace in Darfur has become tactically harder than solving the North South conflict (EL-AFFENDI, 2007). The Darfur rebels (JEM and SLM/A) have their own criticism of the CPA, for it has made a deal which would have rendered their demands for a fairer share of power practically impossible. The Darfur conflict must be seen, however, not only as a local conflict, but also as an international crisis. Although international involvement has been significant, it has also been at times contradictory, poorly coordinated and lacking in long-term planning. Apart from the UN missions, many countries have been involved in different degrees in the Darfur crisis. China, for example, has received heavy criticism for supporting the Khartoum regime. The USA, on its turn, referred to the crisis as genocide in 2004 and lobbied for tougher UN resolutions. Later on, that country also pressured Sudan s government and rebel groups to sign the DPA in 2006, and imposed bilateral sanctions in 2007 (FRIDE, 2008). Another issue is the border of the Central African Republic (CAR) with Sudan and the region of Darfur, which is in some ways the most vulnerable of the CAR s frontiers, as it touches the remotest part of the country. The presence of nearly 20,000 Sudanese refugees (idem) in the east of the Central African Republic has led to strained relations with Khartoum in the past, as it accused the CAR of allowing its territory to be used as a conduit for arms supply to the SPLA which has been consistently denied by Bangui (JANES, 2009). Despite the efforts of several African monitoring groups in 2006, the penetrability of the CAR's borders means that the country's use as a potential ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 17

rear base by rebels and spillover of conflicts from Sudan and Chad will remain a grave security issue. 2.5 The Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) The core challenge of the CPA s implementation has been how to manage the different aspirations from NCP and SPLM. Ever since its signing, several events have made its implementation difficult and slow-paced, such as the death of South Sudan President John Garang and his succession by Salva Kiir, known to be a secessionist; the failure in solving the Darfur crisis and the resulting diversion of diplomatic attention and aid resources; the Abyei dispute; and the issuance of two arrest warrants against Omar Al Bashir by the International Criminal Court (DE WAAL, 2010) In 2005, when the CPA was negotiated, the revenue projections made transformations in the socio-economic sphere a tangible possibility within six years. With Garang dead and Ali Osman weakened, however, the CPA was reduced to a formula, requiring diplomatic action by external parties (idem). 2.5.1. Divergent Political Interests According to the NCP, the CPA gave the Southerners privileged status: the SPLM not only controlled the South, but also had a major stake in the North. From the perspective of the ruling party, the implementation of the wealth-sharing and powersharing determinations of the CPA offered material incentives to the Southern elites, leading them to believe that their economic interests depended on the national unity (ibidem). However, among the SPLM and its constituencies, mostly in the South, political views about the CPA diverged. Garang headed the faction that supported the idea of a New Sudan, defending an agenda that aimed at enabling the marginalized and non-arab fraction of the Sudanese population to be represented at the center of state power. Nevertheless, most Southerners considered the CPA as a prelude to independence, with the formal commitment to unity as a mere concession in order to make the agreement acceptable to the international community. The SPLM electorate within Northern Sudan including non-arab minorities such as the Nuba and Blue Nile ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 18

people endorsed Garang s vision of a united and secular Sudan, but many of them did not properly understand the provisions of the CPA, as they expected to be allowed to vote in the Southern referendum, joining their areas to Southern Sudan. According to the text of the CPA, however, this is only possible for the people of Abyei. Among the non-ncp Northern Sudanese, the CPA had yet a different significance: for the opposition political parties, the realization of national elections represented their biggest chance in politics. The rebelled Darfurians, though, related to Garang s New Sudan vision, since they considered Darfur a victim of a dominant center much like the South and identified the solution in a transformation of the country s central politics (ibidem). 2.5.2. The Role of the SPLM/A and the NCP The SPLM/A possesses political will but lacks political power to fully implement the dispositions of the CPA. Many of the difficulties they have faced continue to this day, all of which relate to the division of wealth and power and have a direct bearing on the 2011 referenda (ICG Africa Briefing 50, 2008). Thus, the role of the SPLM has ultimately been that of pressuring the NCP as much as possible in order to stress the importance and urgency of implementing the CPA. On the other hand, the NCP reportedly only conceded as much as he did in the CPA because of his expectations that an electoral partnership with the SPLM could transform the NCP s status from an international pariah into an internationally accepted governing party (ibidem). Their calculations, however, were frustrated by Garang s death. Since then, NCP s actions have been based on a strategy aiming at the preservation of power and control of resources, and the party s strict control of the military forces, intelligence apparatus and oil management has allowed it to avoid the political transition promised in the CPA. Without the trust that existed between SPLM/A leader Garang and NCP leader Taha to drive the process, and with Taha s subsequent marginalization inside the NCP, the party s main effort has been devoted to keeping the SPLM weak and focused on the South (ibidem). 3. PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 19

3.1. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and previous accords The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in January 2005 and delineated the conditions for a permanent ceasefire and the implementation of security arrangements. Also, the CPA combined the following accords firmed between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A in previous years: The Machakos Protocol (2002) recognizes that the Southerners have the right to control and govern affairs in their region and thus are entitled to determine their future through a referendum (Machakos Protocol, 2002). The Protocol determines that a transition would begin with the Pre-Interim Period, in which the cessation of hostilities and the preparation for a comprehensive ceasefire should be observed. The Interim Period was scheduled to start six months after the beginning of the Pre-Interim Period, in 2005, and to last six years, during which time a comprehensive ceasefire should be implemented. More specifically, the Pre-Interim Period started with the signing of the CPA, in 2005, which put an end to the 21-year-old civil war. At the end of the Interim Period, which will take place in July 2011, there will be an internationally monitored referendum for the people of South Sudan to decide for either unity or secession (idem). Finally, the Protocol recognizes the religious freedom of the Sudanese population and establishes the structure of the political framework of governance in the country (ibidem). The Protocol on Power Sharing (2004) ratifies and details the structure of governments in Sudan as first delineated in the Machakos Protocol (Protocol on Power Sharing, 2004). According to it, the government would function at national, Southern Sudan, state and local levels, which should collaborate and respect each other and their decisions. Furthermore, the Protocol sets a series of determinations regarding human rights, such as the right to personal liberty, the abjection of slavery and torture, the right to a fair trial and the right to vote and to be elected. Moreover, the Protocol determines the establishment of a Government of National Unity, which would be shared by the National Congress Party, the SPLM and other northern and southern political forces (idem). The Agreement on Wealth Sharing (2004) establishes the equitable allocation of the Sudanese wealth and the transfers made by the National Government to Southern Sudan. The Agreement also establishes the creation of the National Land Commission ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 20

and the Southern Sudan Land Commission, which should cooperate on matters of ownership of land and subterranean natural resources. Furthermore, the Agreement delineates the principles that should be included in further negotiations on the development of the oil sector, creating a National Petroleum Commission (NPC) to formulate public policies and strategies for the oil sector, as well as monitor and assess their implementation. The Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict (2004) asserts that this region is a bridge between the north and the south and thus would be granted special administrative status during the Interim Period, during which the region would belong to both Western Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal, and its revenues would be divided between the National Government, the Government of South Sudan, the two aforementioned regions and the two major peoples of the area (Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict, 2004). At the end of that period, and simultaneously with the Southern Sudan Referendum, the residents of Abyei will cast a separate ballot to decide, regardless of that referendum s result, if the region will maintain its special administrative status in the North or become a part of Bahr el Ghazal. The Protocol also sets the creation of the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) to define and demarcate the borders of the area, a process which has notably faced difficulty so far (BEKOE, CAMPBELL & HOWENSTEIN, 2005). The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States (2004) defines the borders of these states and reaffirms the democratic character of the popular consultations as a possibility to determine the future of the regions populations, but does not prescribe that they should take place. Instead, the Protocol s text determines that the comprehensive agreement should be subjected to the will of the people of the two States through their respective democratically elected legislatures (Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, 2004). Finally, according to the Agreement on Security Arrangements (2003), should unity be the decision of the referendum, an army composed by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA would be formed. During the Interim Period these forces would remain separate, but equally respected as Sudan s National Armed Forces. Furthermore, the Agreement determines that an internationally monitored ceasefire would come into effect as of the signing of the CPA. ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 21

In an annex to the CPA, the parties request the UN to constitute a peace support mission to monitor the agreement, as provided for under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Accordingly, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was formed in 2005 (S/RES/1590/2005). 3.2. Action under the scope of the United Nations The Security Council Resolution 1547 of 2004 is still considered one of the landmarks of UN operations in Sudan. This resolution, adopted unanimously by the Council, represented the first concrete step towards establishing a UN Mission to aid the CPA, which at the time still had not been signed. Therefore, the document established the deployment, for an initial period of three months, of a mission later known as UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS), dedicated to preparing for the international monitoring foreseen in other accords (S/RES/1547/2004). Resolution 1556 of that same year extended the political mission in 90 days as the conflict in Darfur escalated and endorsed the efforts of the African Union regarding the monitoring of Darfur. Furthermore, this resolution posed a series of prohibitions of sales and supplies of arms and related material to all non-governmental entities and individuals operating in the states of North Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur (S/RES/1556/2004). Following a series of ceasefire violations by all parties, UNSC Resolution 1564 was adopted still in 2004, calling for international support towards the efforts of the African Union and ordering all armed groups to cease violence. The creation of an international commission of inquiry was also requested in order to investigate the reports of human rights violations and genocide in the country, especially Darfur. Finally, by this resolution the UNSC declares that, in the event of non-compliance with its resolutions by the Government of Sudan, it shall consider taking additional measures ( ) such as actions to affect Sudan s petroleum sector and the Government of Sudan or individual members of the Government of Sudan (S/RES/1564/2004). After the signing of the CPA in 2005, the Security Council approved Resolution 1590, which established the creation of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and determined its essential tasks, namely (i) to support the implementation of the CPA; (ii) to facilitate and coordinate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons and to provide humanitarian assistance; (iii) to assist the ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 22

parties of the CPA in cooperation with other international actors in the mine action sector; (iv) to contribute with international efforts regarding human rights and the protection of civilians in Sudan (S/RES/1590/2005). This resolution determined also the transference of all functions previously performed by UNAMIS to UNMIS, as well as established that the UNMIS would have up to 10.000 military personnel and an appropriate civilian component, including up to 715 civilian police personnel (idem). The deployment personnel evolved steadily but behind schedule, being close to full strength by the end of 2006. Resolution 1591, approved a few days later, created a Committee of the Security Council formed by its members to assist and monitor the implementation of a series of measures taken in previous Resolutions and thereafter, such as the freezing of all funds, financial assets and economic resources under the member States jurisdictions that related directly or indirectly to individuals who impede the peace process and constitute a threat to the stability in Darfur and the region (S/RES/1591/2005). Through Resolution 1593 of that same year the Council decided to report the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, which ended up leading to the conviction of Omar Al-Bashir and others for a variety of counts, including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in Bashir s case (ICC -02/05). After the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006, the Secretary- General suggested to the Security Council that a UN peacekeeping force might be needed in Darfur to ensure the compliance of all parties with the accord (S/2006/1591). In reaction to that, the Council adopted Resolution 1706 in August of the same year, deciding to expand the mandate of UNMIS to Darfur, pending authorization of the Sudanese Government of National Unity. However, the idea of a peacekeeping operation ran solely by the UN was strongly opposed by the Sudanese Government, which led the Council to refer to the alternative of strengthening the AMIS, before eventually transferring authority to an AU/UN hybrid peacekeeping mission. This option received the consent of the Sudanese Government, and in July 2007 the UNSC determined the creation of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), through Resolution 1769, for an initial period of 12 months, which was later extended several times. According to this document, the operation s mandate includes: (i) the protection of personnel, facilities, installations and equipment in the ufrgsmodelunitednations2010 23