against the annuity owner. The annuity owner was represented by Stephen Harris and Katherine Villanueva of Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP.

September 2007 STRUCTURED SETTLEMENT UPDATE Set forth below are summaries of two recent court decisions. Copies of the decisions are attached below. If you have any questions, comments, or additional cases or materials that you would like us to consider, please feel free to send us a reply. R&Q Reinsurance Company v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd. and Gwendolyn Sands Brown a/k/a Gwendolyn Sands United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida (No. 06-14329, 2007 WL 2330899, August 13, 2007) In this declaratory judgment action, the annuity owner sought declaratory and injunctive relief against a factoring company in connection with the factoring company s attempts to enforce a transfer agreement and arbitration award. According to the complaint, the factoring company and the annuitant had executed a transfer agreement that purported to assign to the factoring company the right to certain structured settlement payments in exchange for a lump sum. The annuitant sought to cancel the transfer agreement and gave written notice of her decision to the factoring company. The factoring company then commenced arbitration proceedings against the annuitant and obtained an arbitration award, which purported to approve the transfer agreement. The factoring company filed an action to confirm the arbitration award in Harris County, Texas. The annuity owner was not a party to the arbitration proceedings or the proceedings to confirm the arbitration award. The district court granted the annuity owner s motion for summary judgment, and declared that Rapid may not use the arbitration process to circumvent the statutory requirements for transferring structured settlement payment rights. The court also held that enforcing the arbitration award would violate the applicable structured settlement protection act, and therefore, the arbitration award is unenforceable against the annuity owner. The annuity owner was represented by Stephen Harris and Katherine Villanueva of Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. Pacific Life Insurance Company and Confederation Life Insurance & Annuity Company v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd. and Joyce Allen United States District Court for the Western District of New York (No. 06-6554, 2007 WL 2530098, September 5, 2007) In a similar declaratory judgment action, the annuity owner and annuity issuer sought declaratory and injunctive relief against a factoring company in connection with the factoring company s attempts to enforce a transfer agreement, arbitration award, and judgment confirming the arbitration award. According to the complaint, the factoring company and the annuitant executed a transfer agreement that purported to assign to the factoring company the right to certain structured settlement payments in exchange for a lump sum. A state court in New York denied the factoring company s petition to approve the transfer agreement. When the annuitant sought to cancel the transfer agreement, the factoring company commenced arbitration proceedings against the annuitant and obtained an arbitration award, which purported to approve the transfer agreement. The factoring company obtained a judgment confirming the arbitration award in Harris County, Texas. The factoring company then obtained an enforcement order, which purported to enforce the confirmation judgment against the annuity owner and annuity issuer, which were not parties to the arbitration pro- Insurance Practice Group www.drinkerbiddle.com

ceedings or the proceedings to confirm the arbitration award. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the annuity owner and the annuity issuer, declaring that the purported assignment of the right to receive structured settlement payments... is void and unenforceable. 2007 WL 2530098 at *1. In the hearing on the motion, the court explained that the statutorily-mandated court approval was a condition precedent to a valid transfer, and it was improper for the factoring company to obtain an arbitration award and confirmation judgment in another forum once the court in New York had denied approval of the transfer agreement. See id. at *2 (proceedings). The court further declared that the arbitration award is void and unenforceable, and the factoring company is enjoined from taking any further action in any forum to seek to recover the annuity payments due to [the annuitant]. Id. at *1. The annuity owner and annuity issuer were represented by Stephen Harris and Katherine Villanueva of Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP. If you have questions regarding the information contained in this publication, please contact the authors below: Stephen C. Baker (215) 988-2769 Stephen.Baker@dbr.com Michael J. Miller (215) 988-2782 Michael.Miller@dbr.com Stephen R. Harris (215) 988-2806 Stephen.Harris@dbr.com Timothy J. O Driscoll (215) 988-2865 Timothy.O Driscoll@dbr.com LAW OFFICES CALIFORNIA DELAWARE ILLINOIS NEW JERSEY NEW YORK PENNSYLVANIA WASHINGTON DC WISCONSIN 2007 Drinker Biddle && Reath LLP. All All rights reserved. Drinker A Delaware Biddle limited & Reath liability LLP partnership A Jonathan Delaware I. limited Epstein liability and Edward partnership A. Gramigna, Jr., Partners in Charge of the Jonathan Princeton I. and Epstein Florham and Edward Park, New A. Gramigna, Jersey offices, Jr., respectively. Partners in Charge of the Princeton This Drinker and Florham Biddle & Park, Reath New LLP Jersey communication Offices, respectively. is intended to inform our This clients Drinker and friends Biddle of & Reath developments LLP communication in the law and is to intended provide to information our of clients general and interest. friends It of is developments not intended in to the constitute law and advice to provide regarding information any client s of legal general problems interest. and should It is not not intended be relied to upon constitute as such. advice regarding any client s legal problems and should not be relied upon as such. www.drinkerbiddle.com 2

2007WL2330899 Page 1 of 4 Slip Copy, 2007 WL 2330899 (S.D.Fla.) Motions, Pleadings and Filings Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, S.D. Florida. R & Q REINSURANCE CO., Plaintiff, v. RAPID SE-I-I-LEMENTS, LTD., and Gwendolyn Sands Brown a/k/a Gwendolyn Sands, Defendants. No. 06-14329-CIV. Aug. 13, 2007. Alan Eugene Greenfield, Alan E. Greenfield, P.A., Miami Lakes, FL, Stephen R. Harris, Katherine L. Hersh, Drinker Biddle & Reath, Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiff. Richard Jay Rilling, Richard J. Rilling, P.A., Boca Raton, FL, Monica R. Cavazos, Feldman Law Firm, Houston, TX, for Defendants. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING DEFENDANT S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT K. MICHAEL MOORE, United States District Judge. 1 THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment (DE # 14) and Defendant Rapid Settlements, LTD. s Motion for Summary Judgment (DE # 67). A response and reply were filed to the former. A response was filed on July 18, 2007, and the time for filing a reply has expired. The cross-motions raise largely the same issues. UPON CONSIDERATION of the motions, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court enters the following order: I, Background Plaintiff is obligated to make certain periodic payments to Defendant Gwendolyn Sands Brown a/k/a Gwendolyn Sands ("Brown") in connection with the resolution of a personal injury claim, according to the terms of a written structured settlement agreement signed in 1986 (the "Settlement Agreement"). PL Resp. at 2. The Settlement Agreement includes a clause prohibiting Brown from assigning her right to the payments to a third party. Id. In January, 2006, Brown entered into an agreement (the "Transfer Agreement") to transfer her interest in some of the periodic payments to Defendant Rapid Settlements, Ltd. ("Rapid"). Id. The agreement between Brown and Rapid contains an arbitration provision. Id. at 3. Brown sought to cancel the Transfer Agreement, and Rapid filed a demand for arbitration in Texas pursuant to the Transfer Agreement. Id. at 4. The arbitration resulted in an award which stated that Rapid would be made the beneficiary for certain of the periodic payments. Id. at 4. Plaintiff was not a party to that arbitration. Id. After receiving notice of the arbitration award, Plaintiff filed this Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (DE # 1), seeking an injunction preventing Rapid from "bringing or pursuing any action in Texas to seek to effect a transfer to structured settlement payment rights... or to otherwise compel R & Q to make payments to Rapid... other than by obtaining court approval in [Florida]" in addition to other relief. Compl. at 7. Now, both Plaintiff and Defendant Rapid seek summary judgment. The underlying facts are not in dispute. This Court has previously held that the Federal Arbitration Act (the FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., does not apply to this action, as the FAA only enforces arbitration clauses between parties which have agreed to them, and it is undisputed that Plaintiff did not consent http://web2.west~aw.c~m/resu~t/d~cumenttext.aspx?d~csamp~e=fa~se&sv=sp~it&service=... 9/11/2007

2007 WL 2330899 Page 2 of 4 to arbitration. Order Denying Defendant Rapid Settlement, LTD s Motion to Dismiss (DE # 51). citing Air Line Pilots Assoc., v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866, 118 S.Ct. 1761, 140 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1998); Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 478, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 II. Standard of Review The applicable standard for reviewing a summary judgment motion is unambiguously stated in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 2 Summary judgment may be entered only where there is no genuine issue of material fact. Twiss v. Kury, 25 F.3d 1551, 1554 (11th Cir.1994). The moving party has the burden of meeting this exacting standard. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 19~9_Z~. An issue of fact is "material" if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997). It is "genuine" if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Id. In applying this standard, the district court must view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. However, the nonmoving p arty: may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party s pleading, but the adverse party s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant]." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 20~. In other words, the party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In determining whether this evidentiary threshold has been met, the trial court "must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden" applicable to the particular cause of action before it. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254. Summary judgment may be granted if the nonmovant fails to adduce evidence which, when viewed in a light most favorable to him, would support a jury finding in his favor. Id. at 254-55. Additionally, the nonmoving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial and requires the court to grant the motion for summary judgment. Id. III. Discussion Plaintiff claims that the Transfer Agreement violates the non-assignment clause in the Settlement Agreement, and is therefore invalid. PI. Mot. at 11. Plaintiff also asserts that the arbitration award is invalid and unenforceable, as it validates a transfer for which court approval was never granted, as required by the Florida Protection Act. Id. at 13, citing Fla. Stat. 626.99296(2)(r). Finally, Plaintiff argues that the arbitration award cannot be enforced against it, because it did not consent to the http://web2.west1aw.c~result/d~cumenttext.aspx?d~csamp~e=false&sv=split&se~vice=... 9/11/2007

2007 WL 2330899 Page 3 of 4 arbitration, and would have been an indispensable party to that proceeding. PI. Mot. at 18-21. "3 Rapid claims that the non-assignment clause of the Settlement Agreement does not, by itself, prohibit the assignment in the Transfer Agreement. Def. Resp. at 5-9. Rapid also argues that enforcing the Transfer Agreement or the arbitration award is permissible, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, and that Rapid is not "collaterally estopped from enforcing a transfer agreement that has not been approved by a court." Id. at 6-13. Finally, Rapid claims the arbitration award is enforceable and binding on Plaintiff. Id. at 13-17. This Court will first consider Plaintiff s argument that the arbitration award is invalid and unenforceable, as it validates a transfer for which court approval was never granted, as required by the Florida Protection Act (the "Protection Act"). Id. at 13, citing Fla. Stat. 626.99296. The Protection Act, created to "protect recipients of structured settlements who are involved in the process of transferring structured settlement payment rights," states that a "direct or indirect transfer of structured settlement payment rights is not effective and a structured settlement obligor or annuity issuer is not required to make a payment directly or indirectly to a transferee of structured settlement payment rights unless the transfer is authorized in advance in a final order by a court of competent jurisdiction which is based on [certain] written express findings." Fla. Stat. 626.99296(1), (3)(a). Rapid argues that the Protection act does not cover arbitration awards. Def. Resp. at 14. However, Rapid may not use the arbitration process to circumvent the statutory requirements for transferring structured settlement payment rights. See, e.g., Symetra Life Insurance Co. v. Rapid Settlements, LTD., 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1985 (S.D.Tex.2007); In re Rapid Settlements, LTD., 2007 Tex.App. Lexis 2399 (Tex.App.2007). This Court holds that enforcing the arbitration award would violate the applicable Florida Protection Act, and therefore the award is unenforceable against Plaintiff. As this Court finds the award unenforceable, this Court will not reach the rest of the parties claims and arguments. For the reasons described above, it is IV. Conclusion ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintifffs Motion for Summary Judgment (DE # 14) is GRANTED. Defendant Rapid Settlements, LTD. s Motion for Summary Judgment (DE # 67) is DENIED. All motions not otherwise ruled on are DENIED as moot. The Clerk is instructed to CLOSE this case. DONE AND ORDERED. S.D.Fla.,2007. R & Q Reinsurance Co. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd. Slip Copy, 2007 WL 2330899 (S.D.Fla.) Motions, Pleadings and Filings (Back to top) 2007 WL 1986907 (Trial Pleading) Defendant Rapid Settlement, Ltd. s Answer and Affirmative Defenses (May 23, 2007) 2007 WL 1568475 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) Reply of R&Q Reinsurance Company in Further Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Apr. 2, 2007) 2007 WL 1279180 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) Defendant Rapid Settlements, Ltd. s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment, Filed Subject to Its Previously Filed Motion to Dismiss (Mar. 23, 2007) 2007 WL 919069 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) Defendant Rapid Settlements, Ltd. s Reply to R&Q Reinsurance Company s Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (Feb. 19, 2007) 2007 WL 919067 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) Motion of Plaintiff R & Q Reinsurance Company for Summary Judgment (Feb. 9, 2007) 2007 WL 919068 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) Memorandum of Law in Support of http://web2.west~aw.c~m/resu~t/d~cumenttext.aspx?d~csamp~e=fa~se&sv=sp~it&service=... 9/11/2007

2007 WL 2330899 Page 4 of 4 Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment (Feb. 9, 2007) 2007 WL 617217 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) Answering Memorandum of Plaintiff R & G Reinsurance Company in Opposition to Defendant Rapid s Motion to Dismiss (Jan. 3, 2007) 2:06cv14329 (Docket) (Nov. 17, 2006) END OF DOCUMENT (C) 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. http://web2.west~aw.c~rr~resu~t/d~cumenttext~aspx?d~csamp~e=fa~se&sv=~p~it&service=~~~ 9/11/2007

2007WL 2530098 Page 1 of 5 Slip Copy, 2007 WL 2530098 (W.D.N.Y.) Motions, Pleadings and Filings Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. United States District Court, W.D. New York. PACIFIC LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Confederation Life Insurance and Annuity Company, Plaintiffs, V. RAPID SETTLEMENTS, LTD., Joyce Allen, Defendants. No. 06-CV-6554L. Sept. 5, 2007. Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP, By: Stephen R. Harris, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the Plaintiff. Knauf Shaw, LLP, By: Amy Reichhart, Rochester, New York and The Feldman Law Firm, By: Monica Cavazos-Rosas, Houston, Texas, for the Defendant. DECISION AND ORDER LARIM ER., J. i Upon consideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment brought by plaintiffs Pacific Life Insurance Company and Confederation Life Insurance and Annuity Company (Dkt.# 11), and based on the Court s oral decision, announced on July 30, 2007, (Dkt.# 26), incorporated here by reference, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the purported assignment of the right to receive structured settlement payments, which was memorialized in a Transfer Agreement and Amended Transfer Agreement executed by defendants Rapid Settlement, Ltd. and Joyce Allen, is void and unenforceable; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the June 21, 2006 Texas arbitration award purporting to effectuate the Amended Transfer Agreement is void and unenforceable, and Rapid Settlements, Ltd. has no right to receive, nor are plaintiffs obligated to pay to Rapid Settlements, Ltd., any of the payments due to Ms. Allen; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Rapid Settlements, Ltd. is enjoined from taking further action in any forum to seek to recover the annuity payments due to Ms. Allen; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Rapid Settlements, Ltd. s motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 5) is dismissed as moot. IT IS SO ORDERED. MACRI, J. COURT REPORTER: Christi A. Macri, FAPR, RMR, CRR, CRI Kenneth B. Keating Federal Building 100 State Street Rochester, New York 14614-0222 PROCEEDINGS http://web2.westlaw.c~m/resu~t/d~cumenttext.aspx?d~csample=false&sv=split&service=... 9/11/2007

2007 WL 2530098 Page 2 of 5 THE COURT: I have certainly considered what you have said today, and I have certainly reviewed the papers here and I think I am prepared to make some rulings. I may write further on this, but as I often say, in the interest of the shortness of life, I may not. But I think you certainly have a transcript here. There is-and you can stand or sit if you want, it s not going to take too long here-but at least from plaintiff we do have a motion for summary judgment, and it is the Court s responsibility whenever considering motions for summary judgment to determine if there are material issues of fact. In this case I believe that there are not, and that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I think the case is ripe for that determination. There are several reasons for this. First of all, the agreement that Ms. Allen signed with the Michigan company that we have talked about does contain the anti-assignment clause or the non-assignment clause that was referenced, paragraph 4, that the structured settlement does state specifically that Ms. Allen has the right only to periodic payments and has neither the power nor the right nor authority to accelerate, use as collateral, or assign the annuity contract, language in what I view could not be clearer. I think that language does more than simply set up an action for damages. I think it renders any such agreement void and unenforceable and, therefore, in my view, the Texas arbitrator was without authority to consider Rapid s claims. *2 Clearly the contract with Ms. Allen by Michigan precludes that. Because Ms. Allen lacked the power, the transfer agreement is entirely void under New York law, and I rely on Allhusen vs. Caristo Construction Corp., a 1952 New York Court of Appeals case, 303 N.Y. 446. That s 303, 446 at 451. Also, C.U. Annuity Service Corporation vs. Young, an appellate division case 2001, 722 N.Y.S.2d 236 at 237. That s 722 N.Y.S.2d 236 at 237. And the University Mews case, University Mews vs. Jeanmarie, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 457 at 440-I don t have the cite-citing restatement (second) of contracts. Furthermore, in the C.U. Annuity case, the Court said the fact there was no expressed declaration that the assignment would be void is not necessary. So I think based on the language of the contract itself under well-established New York law, the fact that it contains both the power and the right to assign makes such an assignment void. Furthermore, were that not enough, we have talked about the New York statute, the Structured Settlement Protection Act, and I just think it s as clear as can be under Section 5-1706, that there can be no transfer of such structured payment rights and no obligor-in this case the insurance companyshould be required to make any payment to any transferee-in this case I guess it would be Rapidunless the transfer has been authorized in advance. And Section 1705 indicates where that action should take place, in the county in which the payee resides. As we ve already talked about at some length, I think there is certainly a purpose for this type of statute called paternalistic, if you will, but it s designed to protect individuals who may think it is in their best interest short-term to abandon their annuity rights. In this case, of course, there was a specific New York court determination that the attempted transfer was not in Ms. Allen s best interest, and that court decision was entered in May of 2005. So I don t think this statute or the others that may be in effect around the country could be clearer, and I think it s a condition precedent before there is such a valid transfer-and it seems to me you can infer circumstantially that Rapid understood that because they came to New York in the first instance to seek the petition to file a petition, to get approval-and then it appears once rebuffed, they decided to attempt another avenue. And I don t think that s proper, and f don t think that s what should occur http://web2.west~aw.c~m/resu~t/d~cumenttext.aspx?d~csamp~e=fa~se&sv=~p~it&service=... 9/11/2007

2007WL2530098 Page 3 of 5 here. So I find not only that-well, I find the agreement between Ms. Allen and the Michigan insurance company by its terms precluded Ms. Allen from transferring that she had not the power, nor the rightneither the power nor the right to do so and, therefore, such an attempt was void. Also, Rapid has no rights here because there was a complete failure to comply with the New York statute, the Structured Settlement Protection Act, by getting approval in advance before there was such a transfer. *.,~ I find unpersuasive the arguments that somehow Pacific had some obligation to join in the arbitration, and that because they failed to do so, that the arbitration award should be enforced here. Other courts have commented, and I think it s not unjustified to conclude that this arbitration is simply an attempt to end run the statutes-in this case the New York statute-that provides very specific procedures for doing what Rapid seeks to do here. The attempt to transfer was void. Pacific had no obligation to truck off to Texas to deal with this. The arbitrator was out jurisdiction. The contract, purported transfer, was also not enforceable because of the complete failure to comply with the New York statute which controlled Ms. Allen because she was a resident at the time of the agreement and a resident at the time of the petition for approval for the transfer. I don t see this as a full faith and credit issue. I think the arbitrator simply under New York law was without authority, and these acts do not contravene any federal statute under the Federal Arbitration Act. I think it s rather an attempt by Rapid to get around the state statutes that may not be to their liking. I also think that there s no reason to delay the grant of summary judgment here. There are 56(f) motions which the Court entertains from time to time where individuals have indicated that they need more discovery before the Court can determine such motion. But the Second Circuit here, which, of course, controls, requires before the Court considers such an affidavit-or considered such a request, an affidavit specifically describing what discovery needs to be completed and how the facts that are sought might reasonably be expected to create a genuine issue of material fact and the parties efforts to obtain that discovery and why those efforts were unsuccessful. There s no affidavit before me relating to this purported need for additional time, nor any attempt to comply with the Second Circuit s and this Court s rulings relative to 56(f) practice. I must rely on Agency Development, Inc. vs. Med America Insurance Company. This is a Western District of New York case, 310 F.Sup_p.2d 538, that s 310 F.Supp.2d 538,_ citing with approval the Second Circuit s decision in Paddington, as in Paddington the Bear, Paddington Partners vs. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132, 1138. So I see no bar preventing the Court from granting plaintiff s motion for summary judgment here. Therefore, I will grant the plaintiff s motion for summary judgment, and I will grant the relief, that is, a declaratory judgment, that Rapid has no right to receive any payments from the plan and the structured settlement to Jane Allen. And I find and so rule and grant plaintiff s application that the purported transfer was void, voidable, unenforceable, and that Pacific Life has no obligation of any kind to Rapid, but all obligations are pursuant to the original contract between Michigan and Ms. Allen, only to Ms. Allen. will deny Rapid s motion to dismiss as moot. I m not prepared to grant that part of Pacific s request for injunctive relief as to other acts and other http://web2.west~aw.c~m/resu~t/d~cumenttext.aspx?d~csamp1e=fa~se&sv=sp~it&service=... 9/11/2007

2007WL 2530098 Page 4 of 5 circumstances with other potential-excuse me, claimants or annuitants. It appears that this is the only case involving Pacific Life. I can understand Pacific Life s desire to end this, but I think without more of a showing, and perhaps a proper case where there may be some class relief sought or nationwide relief, I don t think where there s only one plaintiff, one case involving this particular insurance company, that I think it would be-on the record here, on the facts of this case-it may only amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion. So I decline to grant an injunction, except to enjoin Rapid from taking any action in any court to seek to recover the annuity payments to Ms. Allen based on the Court s ruling here. This Court has ruled, and I think if there is further action taken by Rapid, it faces the prospect of some application for contempt for violation of this court order. As I said, Mr. Harris, I may write a decision on this, but I think it s important for the parties to know promptly as possible what the Court s ruling is, and you have it. But I would ask perhaps that you prepare just an order reflecting the Court s decision so there is something in the file. It s obviously not meant to have you write my decision, but just an order with the appropriate decretal paragraphs. MR. HARRIS: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Could you have that to me at least perhaps by the end of the week? MR. HARRIS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Okay. I think perhaps you could route it to Ms. Cavazos-Rosas with approval as to form only. So I hope we ll not have disputes over the-to settle the orders, but-anything else or any other motion that I ve failed to address? MR. HARRIS: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right, thank you. Have safe trips back, both of you. MS. CAVAZOS-ROSAS: Thank you, Judge. MR. HARRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. (WHEREUPON, the proceedings adjourned at 4:33 p.m.) CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. W.D.N.Y.,2007. Pacific Life Ins. Co. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd. Slip Copy, 2007 WL 2530098 (W.D.N.Y.) http://web2.west~aw.c~m/resu~t/d~cumenttext.aspx?d~csamp~e=fa~se&sv=~p~it&service=... 9/11/2007

2007WL 2530098 Page 5 of 5 Motions, Pleadings and Filings (Back to top) 6:06cv06554 (Docket) (Nov. 2, 2006) END OF DOCUMENT (C) 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. http://web2.westlaw.c~m/result/d~cumenttext.aspx?d~csamp~e=fa~se&sv=split&service=... 9/11/2007