W bile comparing the ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia and NWFZ in

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Chapter V ZOPFAN AND NWFZ: A COMPARISON W bile comparing the ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia and NWFZ in South Pacific it will be relevant here to compare the concepts of NWFZ and zone of peace and then apply it to respective regions. In Southeast Asia. since the concept of NWFZ is included in the proposal of ZOPFAN, the comparison will be made in context of NWFZ and ZOPFAN. ZOPFAN and NWFZ The idea of ZOPFAN or NWFZ "has its origin in the same basic survival urge". 1 It means that both these concepts emerged out of the desire of countries of a particular region to denuclearize and demilitarize the region. The notice behind this was to free themselves from the excessive intervention of the great powers and the arms race. If we.see the cases of Southeast Asia and South Pacific the urge to survival can be seen very clearly. George W.Shepherd. "Developing Collective self-reliance in the none ofpeace". IDSA Journal, vol.l5. no. I. July-Sep. 82. p.22. 143

In the case of Southeast Asia the extended intervention was too much. The Cold War era seeped into the region in such a way that the regional conflicts almost became an extension ofthe Super Power rivalry. Be it the Vietnam war or the Cambodian imbroglio. the situation flexed up because of the intervention by great powers. 2 The Four powers active in the region were the US earstwhile Soviet Union, China and Japan. In this situation the countries of Southeast Asia realized their vulnerability towards external dangers. 3 The urge for survival led them to think about neutralizing the area. Since the nuclear threat was implicit in this situation the proposal for NWFZ was included in ZOPFAN. South Pacific got exposed to nuclear danger since the beginning of nuclear age. The nuclear tests conducted by US, Britain and France made the people suffer physically as well as due to environmental destruction. The tests by USA on Bikini made people to think that they are being used as experimental arrivals. Moreover the problem of dumping of radio-active wastes was also there. There was a fear of South Pacific becoming a dustbin for nuclear wastes. 2 3 See Chapter II for details, pp.48-55. As has been described in Chapter II, pp.42-45. 144

Apart from this the presence of US bases with nuclear capabilities made Australia a target for nuclear attack. In this situation the idea of NWFZ evolved in the region as an effort by the regional constructs to protect themselves from the nuclear threat. 4 The concepts of ZOPFAN and NWFZ are regional efforts and hence the proposal has to emerge from within the region concerned.n In cases of Southeast and South pacific also the proposals for ZOPFAN and NWFZ emerged out of the desire of countries of the respective regions from militarization and nuclearization. 6 The concern of regional countries for growing external intervention in Southeast Asia made them to take the step on their own. In South Pacific the treaty declaring the region as nuclear weapon free zone is a result of a strong anti-nuclear involvement during 1980s. Inspite of the opposition from the US and France the South pacific countries under the auspice of South Pacific Forum went forward with the idea and signed the Treaty of Rarotonga in 1985. 4 5 6 For details see Chapter II. pp.42-55. As has been described in Chapter I. p.29. See Chapters III and IV for details. 145

Pointing out the difference between zone of peace and nuclear weapon free zone Danfulani Shuaibu Ahmed explains, "While the NWFZ demands imperatively that no nuclear weapons be introduced within an agreed area, the zone of peace suggests the creation of an assumed state of affairs, a polity in which collective peace is not threatened or jeopardised by the conduct of any of the member states in a specific zone". 7 This implies that while NWFZ stands for security against nuclear weapons ZOPFAN talks about an overall security system for a particular region. It means, not only freeing the region from rivalry of great powers but also promoting regional co-operation. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971 included two aspects in it. firstly to free the region from external interference and secondly to make efforts towards regional co-operation. On the other hand NWFZ stands only for freeing the regional from nuclearization. The Treaty of Rarotonga talks about preventing the possession, stationing, testing of nuclear weapons or dumping of radio-active wastes in the declared zone. 8 7 8 Danfulani Shuaibu Ahmed, "The Changing Global Geostrategic Theater and the Zone of Peace and Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone: A Review", Scandinevian Journal of Development Alternatives, vol.ii, No.2, June 92, p.65. For details see Chapter IV, pp.l24-25. 146

Thus NWFZ talks about preventing a particular region from nuclear weapon or in other words preventing horizontal proliferation and also roll back proliferation if 'it has already been occurring or denuclearising a region on the other hand zone of peace is about demilitarizing a region in which at first the region is prevented from rivalry of external powers and removal of military bases etc. At the second stage collective self reliance is achieved through peaceful settlement of disputes, peaceful co-existing etc. Hence NWFZ is needed for an area which is exposed to nuclear danger while zone of peace is needed for a region exposed to excessive militarization and external interference. 9 Thus ZOPFAN is a much more broader concept and if achieved, will be an ideal state of affairs. That is why practically it is difficult to obtain this goal. It needs a global vision which undermines individual interests of the countries. 10 NWFZ is a concept concerned only with nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. On the other hand ZOPFAN is concerned 9 10 For details see Chapter I. pp-4-7. Ahmed, no. 7. p. 147

with any form of weapons. Simultaneously NWFZ can be considered as a component of ZOPFAN and can be a step forward in direction of a wider goal of ZOPFAN. Conceptually, after comparing ZOPFAN and NWFZ it will be relevant to compare them on the basis of conditions prevailing in the two regions. In Southeast NWFZ is included in the proposal of ZOPFAN. How ever it is still in the form of proposal and the countries of Southeast Asia have not been able to implement it in the form of a treaty. They have failed to work out a treaty for the proposals of ZOPFAN or NWFZ. In case of South Pacific, the treaty declaring the region as a nuclear free zone has come into force. Thus. it has to be seen as to why the countries of Southeast have. till date. failed to workout a treaty for either ZOPFAN or NWFZ for their region and secondly how relevant there two concepts are for the respective regions. But first it has to be seen that how similar or dissimilar were the conditions prevailing in the region. This came to be discussed under following heads. 148

Importance of Two Regions Both Southeast Asia and South Pacific have great geostrategic importance because of some of the most important sea routes passing through these regions. Being at the great maritime crossroads. these regions got exposed to the great power rivalry. Security of transport lanes always remained a concern of great powers and made them meddle into affairs of the regions. Moreover both the regions are rich in mineral and marine resources which is also a reason for external interests in the Southeast Asia arid South Pacific. 11 Economic Conditions Economically, the two regions are quite different. In the case of Southeast Asia most of the countries are economically sound and are committed to free market economy. The United States is the biggest trading partner. Because of the dependence union trade the Southeast Asian countries had to adopt a liberal attitude towards external powers active in the region which has become a hinderance II As has been described in Chapter I. p.5. 149

in the achievement of ZOPFAN. 12 In South Pacific except for Australia and New Zealand all the other countries are under developed and heavily depend on foreign aid and concession and loans. Due to this economic vulnerability these countries fail to take a fine stand on the issue relating to the region such as nuclear testing and implementation of the South Pacific nuclear free zone. Inspite of the fact that the US and France has refused to sign the protocols of the treaty France has continued nuclear testings at Mururoa and the US still maintains nuclear bases in Australia. The South Pacific countries have failed to exert pressure for effective implementation of treaty. 13 External Intervention As far as intervention of external powers is concerned the two regions face different situations. In case of Southeast Asia the involvement was much greater. The four powers active in the region were the US. earstwhile Soviet Union. China and Japan. The US interest in the region apart from trade and access was also to contain 12 13 As has been described in Chapter I, pp.4-7. ibid.. pp. 10-11. 150

the communist threat. The ASEAN countries always remained a close partner and an political ally. The policies in the region were always shaped according to the so called 'communist threat'. The Vietnam war and the Cambodian crisis pulled Washington more and more into the affairs of Southeast Asia. For the countries of Southeast Asia presence of the US was important for security and stability of the region. 14 With the device of cold war. settlement of Cambodian conflict and normalization of US. Vietnamese relations.the US Vietnamese relations, the US role in Southeast Asia has mainly become economic. The second most important player in Southeast Asia can said be China. Due to the geographical proximity, traditional considerations. historical sphere of influence, Southeast holds more a important for China. It is an integral part of China's security environment. 15 China was heavily involved in the Cambodian conflict and at present it is also one of the parties in the conflicting claims over islands in South China Sea. Its presence remains one of 14 15 As has been described in Chapter II. p.48-49. For details see Robert S.Ross, "China Strategic View of Southeast Asia: A region in Transition". Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.l2. no.2. Sept. 1990, pp.10 1-19. 151

the major concerns for the countries of South East Asia. 16 The presence of earstwhile Soviet Union in the region was mainly dominated by its policies towards the other block. The Cambodian conflict started the heavy Soviet involvement which continued till the settlement of the conflict and the demise of the cold war. 17 Japan's role in Southeast Asia was mainly confined to economic interests. It has shaped its policies for the region according to the guidelines of the US. However. Japan displayed a major role in the settlement of Cambodian conflict. 18 16 17 18 Aain Gerard Marsol, "Chinese Perspective", Southeast Asia under New Balance of Power. (New York: Praeger Pub. 1974) pp.67-74 also RobertS. Ross, "China and post Cambodian Southeast Asia: Cooping with Success", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, vol.519, Jan 1992, pp. See Chapter II for details. See Chaiwat Khamchoo, "Japans Role in Southeast Asia: 'Plus ca change... "Pacific Affairs, vol.64, no. I, Spring 1991, pp. 7-22, also Partdah Abdul Samad and Mokhtar Muhammad. "Japan in Southeast Asia: Its Diplomatic Economic and Militancy Commitment", The Indonesian Quarterly, vol.22, no.3. Third Quarter 1994, pp.260-269. 152

. The Southeast Asia had four major external powers which were active in the region. The region was exposed to Super power rivalry with active interference by China and Japan which influenced and intensified the regional conflicts. In South Pacific since the very start of nuclear age the region was exposed to massive nuclear activities of great powers. Although the regions did not figure on top priorities of the great powers. it proved to be an attractive site for nuclear tests and dumping of radio active wastes. Nuclear testings was started by the US and was followed by Britain and France. After 1963 the US and Britain stopped these tests with the signing of Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). France still continues with these tests which is a. matter of great concern for the countries of South Pacific. Moreover there are also US nuclear installations in Australia. The island states have long been concerned about the nuclear activities in the region and hence the need for a nuclear-weapon-free zone was felt. But effective implementation of the treaty is not an easy task. It will be difficult to make French government stop nuclear tests in the region. Now that it has again announced to resume the tests from September. There is also the problem of existing security arrangements which make the effective implementation of the treaty 153

a difficult task. 19 The Intemal Atmosphere Greg Fry,says, "the fate of any nuclear-free-zone proposal largely depends on the situations within the zone concerned. If there is armed conflict between the states in the region or threat of such it would seriously affect the chances of gaining agreement on a NWFZ". 20 If we apply this statement in the case of Southeast Asia the internal situation can be considered as the greatest hurdle in the realization of ZOPFAN. The most pressing problem which the region faced was the Cambodian conflict. It made Southeast Asia a 'Cockpit' of great power rivalry end also polarised the regional countries. The Cambodian conflict which had already involve the United State earlier took a new shape in 1975 with communist victories in Indo-China. It gave a major blow to the concept of ZOPFAN. but it also injected a new emergency in the security efforts of ASEAN. Later in 1978 Vietnam 19 20 As has been described in Chapter II. Greg Fry, "A Nuclear Free Zone for the Pacific: Problems and Prospects", Working Paper 75, SDSC, Australian National University, Canberra. 1989, p.6. 154

invaded Cambodia. The Khmer- Vietnamese conflict also gave rise to Sino-Vietnamese antagonism. This made Vietnam clo~er to earstwhile Soviet Union and it entered into an alliance with Soviet Union. Thus the Cambodian conflict induced great power rivalry involving the US, Soviet Union and China. 21 On the regional level Thailand involved Vietnamese occupation as a national threat. Vietnam also started making incursions in the Thai territory. There was also the refugee problem form Cambodia and Vietnam. All this was a matter of grave concern for the ASEAN. ASEAN, from the very start had deplored the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. This situation completely decided the region into two blocs but also made regional security as the most important issue on ASEAN's agenda. Since all the countries of the region are not members of ASEAN, it was difficult to reach on an agreement concerning regional security although a greater need for ZOPFAN was felt. 22 With the end of cold disintegration of Soviet Union. end of 21 22 As has be-en described in Chapter III, pp.loi-103. ibid.. pp. 108-110. 155

Cambodian conflict, withdrawal ofvietnamese forces, the situations has changed to a large extent. Vietnam has been given an observer's status in ASEAN and is likely to become a member of the ASEAN in near future. It will be easier to co-operate with it. But the presence of China and its activities in the South China Sea is still a matter of concern. The settlement of Cambodian conflict does not however put an end to the problem in Southeast Asia. At present the most serious and urgent security issue in the region is the dispute in South China sea. It is one of the most strategic waterways in the world and also has enormous living and non-living resources. There are two groups of disputes firstly between China and Vietnam over Parcels; Secondly. among the six countries over Spratlys, These six countries are China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. The recent Chinese activities have become a cause of great concern. There is also a fear that China might use military force to lay claim over these islands. ASEAN issues China a greatest threat today. Its willingness to finalise a peaceful solution of South China Sea is shows in the resolution passed in Manila Ministerial Summit of ASEAN. But the conflict claim of regional powers. presence of China 156

and its unacceptability to recognise Taiwan as are of the parties make peaceful settlement a difficult task. 23 Thus. the conflicts of Cambodia and South China Sea, not only made Southeast Asia and China of great power rivalry but also polarised the region in such a way that any consensus on ZOPFAN was difficult. In this context, the situation in South Pacific were different. The atmosphere was conducive. There was almost no chance of interregional conflict except for few cases like New Caledonea, Fiji and border disputes between PNG and Indonesia. In New Caledonea the indigenous 'Kanaks' are demanding independence from French Colonial masters. The countries of South Pacific sympathise with the demands of Kanaks. 24 In case of Fiji after 1987 elections, the National Federation Party, under the leadership of Dr. Titnoci Bavedra, was voted to 23 24 For details see Chapter III, pp.l 03-107. As has been described in Chapter II. 157

power who was the supporter of native Indians. The Indian settlers were taken there as indentured labourers work on the sugar plantations, by the British. Later they played a very important role in the development of the country. But politically they were week. After the victory of Dr. Bavadra, there was a coup by Lt. Col. Sitiveni Rabuka on 14th May 1987 to assert Melanesian political supremacy. The South Pacific Forum expressed grave concern over this development and also offered assistance in solving the crisis. 25 But these developments never affected the growing concern for nuclear activities. All the countries of South Pacific Forum got united on the nuclear issue. Thus the antinuclear movement continued and finally culminated in the signing of South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty. Thus we see that the internal situation is Southeast Asia is not favourable for the realization of ZOPF AN as it was in the case of South Pacific where it was easier to conclude a treaty for nuclear 25 For details see Ramesh Thakur, "India and Overseas Indians: The case offiji". Asian Survey, vol.25, no.3, March 85, pp.356-70 & Ganganath Jha. "Politics and Society in the South Pacific "Foreign Affairs Report", vol.36, Nos.ll412. Nov-Dec 87, pp. 158

weapon free zone. But in Southeast Asia as the nuclear danger was implicit in the prevailing situations the SEANSWFZ has also been emphasised. Lately, it has become more relevant. The comparison between technical and legal Asia and South Pacific can be made under following heads. South Pacific NWFZ covers all the countries of the South Pacific since all of them have signed the treaty. 26 But in case of Southeast Asia the four non-members of ASEAN i.e.. Vietnam. Cambodia, Laos and Burma will have to be persuaded into joining the treaty if it covers into forces. 27 Renunciation of Nuclear Explosive Devices In this case the parties are prohibited to develop. manufacture 26 27 See chapter Ill, for details. The London Suppliers group, "Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon Free covers, Ideas, Problem, Prospects and Proposals", UN Regional Disarmament for Asia-Pacific. (New York: UN 91 ), p.20. 159

or obtain, possess, control or to station nuclear weapons. 28 As far as South Pacific is concerned, the treaty has already agreed to this provision there. Moreover, most of the countries of the region were incapable of developing nuclear weapons as it was much more easier to achieve this objective. 29 In Southeast Asian case also since except Burma and Brunei all the countries have signed NPT it will not be very difficult to achieve this objective. 30 Testin~t and Dumpln~t In case of testing of nuclear explosive devices and dumping of radio-active wastes the situation in the two regions are not quite similar. In Southeast Asia there is no direct threat of testing or dumping. So it will not be difficult to achieve this condition. 31 28 29 30 31 See chapter I, pp.29-36. See chapter II, pp.l0-11. Muthiah Alagappa, "A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects", Australia outlook, vol.41, no.3. Dec.l987, p. 177. See chapter II, pp.42-45. 160

But in South Pacificm testing and dumping were the two major issues which had prompted the countries of the region to declare the region nuclear-free. In fact the continuing French nuclear testing was the major cause behind the treaty of Rarotonga. 32 Since France has not signed the protocols of the treaty and so the condition has not been achieved so far. 33 Stationin~ and Transit of Nuclear Weapons The question of stationing and transit of nuclear weapons is the most controversial issue. The treaty of Rarotonga has left it to individual parties to decide whether to allow visits by foreign ships or aircraft into their territories. 34 The draft treaty of NWFZ also deals with the problem in the same moreover. 35 Ban on the transit can also stand against the law of the sea that is why it remains to be controversial issue. 32 33 34 35 As has been discussed in chapter II. pp.58-60. See chapter IV, pp.l33-134. See chapter IV, p.l24. Suppliers Group, no.l5, p.204. 161

The question of port visits also remains controversial looking at the reaction of United States to the ban of nuclear armed ships into its waters. The ANZUS got fractured. 36 In Southeast Asia also the difficulty may arise since all the countries have security treaty arrangements with great powers. Other Provisions Among other provisions like verification and control etc. the two treaties will hold more or less similar conditions. For verification both accept IAEA inspection system.: 37 Hurdles impendini the Realization/Implementation of SPNWFZ, ZOPFAN In South Pacific where the NWFZ treaty is already in force it has to be seen what really hinders the successful implementation of the treaty. The first major problem is that France and US who are main actors in the region have declined to sign the protocols of the treaty. In this case France has continued With the nuclear testings 36 37 As has been discussed in detail in chapter III. See chapter III and chapter IV. 162

whereas US still maintains nuclear bases in Australia.:~R But this very situation makes the treaty more relevant for the region. There is a greater need for the effective implementation of the treaty now, once France has announced to resume nuclear testings at Maruroa. In Southeast Asia after the settlement of Cambodian conflict which was the greatest hurdle. the situations have become a bit smoother. But conflicting claims over South China Sea and presence of China are still a major hurdle in the realization of ZOPFAN. Moreover the diminished presence of the US and earstwhile Soviet Union could lead to an outbreak of military conflict over the dispute of South China Sea. In this situation one can very well understand the relevance and validity of concepts like ZOPFAN and NWFZ. 38 As has been described in chapter II. 163