Myanmar s National Reconciliation Process: Key Challenges

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9 October, 2017 Myanmar s National Reconciliation Process: Key Challenges Introduction Dr. Samatha Mallemapti * At the opening ceremony of the Second Session of the 21st Century Panglong (second Session)/Union Peace Conference (UPC) which was held from 24 th May to 29 th May 2017 in Nay Pyi Taw, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said, peace and stability will enable the nation to realize its potential as a strong, prosperous democratic federal union, a union that will be the refuge and the pride of our peoples. Finding a lasting peace and national reconciliation to end the ongoing armed conflict between the Myanmar Army/Government and the Ethnic Armed Groups/Organisations (EAGs/EAOs) through political dialogue became a priority for the first civilian government formed by National league for Democracy (NLD) in 2015. According to the government, the UPC will help in achieving democratic federal Union based on democracy and federalism as a solution to country s long-running armed conflict. Whether this initiative will help the government of Myanmar to achieve the goal is the question and the issue brief will touch upon various initiatives taken before the second session of UPC to achieve national reconciliation and the outcome of 21 st Century Panglong conferences and few of the key challenges the government has to address to achieve the goal of national reconciliation. Initiatives taken in the past to achieve national reconciliation Military/Army rule in Myanmar lasted for nearly six decades after independence in 1948 and this led the country into armed conflict. Lack of development, lack of representation in the decision making process, centralised rule, and politicisation of ethnicity only accentuated the demand for secession by various ethnic groups representing various states and regions. Myanmar has 89.8 per cent Buddhist, 6.3 per cent Christian, 2.3 per cent Muslim, and 0.5 per cent Hindu population. 1 Myanmar has seven State assemblies such as Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Shan and Rakhine and regional assemblies such as Ayeyarwady, Bago, Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, Tanintharyi and Yangon and five self administered zones.

The military junta/army imprisoned political leaders the most prominent among them was Aung San Suu Kyi and suppressed dissent by introducing laws that curbed media freedom and freedom of expression. Popular protests for democracy and transparency since 1990s led by the NLD and other political parties and interests groups pressurised the military junta to embark upon constitutional changes and national reconciliation measures. This resulted in first multiparty elections in 1990 and initiation of constitution drafting process involving various stake holders. However, the military refused to acknowledge the election results that gave mandate to the NLD. To legitimise its rule it introduced a constitution in 2008. The constitution reserved one quarter of the seats in the National Assembly for the military and disqualified a person from the Presidency married to a foreigner and who did not have familiarity with the military. 2 The clause disqualified the NLD leader Suu Kyi to become a President.

In March 2011, a new semi-civilian government led by President Thein Sein came to power and his government promised to embark upon various reforms to introduce genuine democracy. 3 Some of the important reforms introduced by Thein Sein government include, for the first time the NLD became legally registered political party; the government extended an invitation for exiles to return home and released high profile political prisoners. 4 Restrictions on blocked internet sites were also lifted and most importantly, Myanmar National Human Rights Commission was established. These measures however, did not stop popular demand for a change and for more democratic space. It was reflected in April 2012 by elections, in which the NLD secured a landslide victory, winning 43 out of 45 seats. However, initiatives taken at political reform had not stopped clashes between EAGs and Myanmar Army in frontier areas. Kachin state witnessed violence as well as Rakhine and Shan states. For example, fighting between the KIA and the Tatmadaw resumed in June 2011 after the collapse of 17-year-old ceasefire. The ensuing violence has resulted in the deaths of thousands and the displacement of over 100,000 civilians. 5 Communal clashes also broke out in Rakhine state between Buddhists and Muslim communities that led to the declaration of state of emergency in 2012. Amidst this background the government initiated national reconciliation measures and the first step in this direction was the signing of Deed of Commitment for Peace and National Reconciliation on 12 th February 2015 and Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) which was signed in October 2015. Signing of Deed of Commitment and the NCA The Deed of Commitment was signed by representatives from the government, army, political parties, EAGs and ministers. Most importantly, it called for building a Union based on democratic and federal principles in the spirit of First Panglong Conference and in accordance with the outcome of political dialogue to ensure freedom, equality, justice and self determination for all citizens. 6 The first 20 th Century Panglong Agreement signed on 12 th February 1947 tried to find a federal solution. The Conference was attended by General Aung San, leader of the pre-independence interim Government, members of the Executive Council of the Governor of Burma, all Saohpas and representatives of the Shan States, the Kachin Hills and Chin Hills. The most important aspect of the agreement was that, it allowed full autonomy in internal administration for frontier areas which was accepted in principle. 7 However, the agreement could not bring peace and stability to the country due to reasons such as politicisation of ethnic identities based on pre and post colonial rule. The British exploited ethnic cleavages and divided the Bamar Nation with other frontier groups such as Shan, Rakhine and Mon for administrative purposes and also used Kachin, Kayin and Chin guerrilla troops against Japanese aggression. 8 Secondly the Assassination of Aung San, architect of Panglong had an impact on implementation of Panglong agreement. The Panglong Agreement though granted full autonomy to frontier areas, did not deal with the question of the right to secession as demanded by Shan and Kachin ethnic groups. Therefore,

issues such as more autonomy and secession had dominated the discourse on building a post colonial state of Myanmar. Therefore, achieving national reconciliation based on the spirit of Panglong conference provided a basis for government to engage with all EAOs and other stake holders to find a solution to armed conflict. The NCA signed in October 2015 between the Myanmar government headed by Thein Sein and eight out of 21 recognised EAOs had taken the national reconciliation efforts a step forward. The signing of NCA was an important first step in reconciliation process and it lasted for more than a year. The table below provides information on NCA signatories and non signatories as of the end of 2016. NCA Group Bilateral Ceasefire Group Non Ceasefire Group Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) United Wa State Army (UWSA) Kachin Independence Organisation/Army (KIO)/(KIA) Karen National Union (KNU) Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA) Ta ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) New Mon State Party (NMSP) Arakan Army (AA) All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) Myanmar Democratic National Alliance Army (MNDAA) Chin National Front (CNF) National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) Pa-Oh National Liberation Front (PNLF) Karen National Progressive Party (KNPP) Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) Peace Council Arakan Liberation Army (ALA) Source: Burma News International, Myanmar Peace Monitor The NCA guaranteed political dialogues and monitoring ceasefires and it also guaranteed the amendment of the constitution. 9 Importantly NCA process mechanism has been ratified into Law with the support of international community. The signing of NCA was witnessed by China, India, Japan, Thailand, UN and the EU along with Diplomats from forty five countries. Various

mechanisms political and technical were established to oversee the implementation of NCA such as Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JCM) the Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM) and the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC). Elections in 2015 The Thein Sein government also conducted multiparty elections in 2015 as part of its political reform agenda. This paved the way for formation of democratically elected government in 30 March 2016 led by first civilian President Mr. Htin Kyaw. Aung San Suu Kyi was appointed as a State Counsellor as she was barred by 2008 Constitution to become a President. In 2015 elections NLD got 80 percent of votes and out of 224 total seats in upper house the NLD secured 135 seats and military backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) 11 seats. In lower house out of 440 seats the NLD got 225 seats where as the USDP could secure 30 seats. 10 Even though these election results were important to solve country s long standing civil war, election results did not alter the influence of military in parliament as 25% of seats in both the houses are reserved for the Army through Constitution. The NLD Road Map for Peace The NLD fought the elections in 2015 on the platform of achieving peace and national reconciliation through political dialogue based on Panglong spirit; establishment of genuine federal democratic union based on the principles of freedom, equal rights and self-determination; resolution of problems between ethnic groups through dialogue based on mutual respect and balanced development of all the States and Regions. 11 The road map proposed by NLD to achieve peace is as follows: - Review and amend the political dialogue framework that was drafted by the previous government led by ex-general Thein Sein. - Continue convening the 21st Century Panglong Conference - Sign a Union peace agreement based on the 21st Century Panglong Conference. - Amend the current Constitution in accordance with the Union agreement - Hold multi-party democratic elections in accordance with the amended Constitution. - Building of a democratic federal union based on the results of the election, revealing the government s ultimate aim. 12 Therefore, in line with the road map the UPDJC was reformed, National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC) was established replacing previous Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC). NRPC became a government organisation under the Ministry of State Counsellor s office. 13 Sub-committees were also formed to hold discussions with indigenous armed organisations that have signed the NCA as well as with those organisations that have not signed the NCA. In parallel with the political dialogues the government also encouraged to set up Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) Forums.

To have the maximum stake holder representation in peace process, State counsellor Suu Kyi also met the delegation of United Nationalities Federation Council (UNFC) led by its chairman U N Ban La. The UNFC represented the EAOs in peace process. The meeting was first of its kind between new government and non signatory groups of NCA. She also met leaders of UWSA and National Democratic Alliance Army NDAA (Mongla) to discuss their participation in UPC. 14 According to the government UWSA assured that they will not ask for secession from the country. 15 Apart from changes to various structures to the peace process as mentioned above, to take the Panglong spirit forward the NLD government conducted first and second session of 21 st Century Panglong Conference/UPC in 2016 and in 2017. It was attended by the President, the State Counsellor, the Vice Presidents, the UNSG, Hluttaw Speakers, the Commander-in-Chief, and representatives from ethnic armed organisation, political parties, the government and Hluttaw, diplomats and UN officials. The NCA signatories and non-nca EAOs have also attended the conference. Outcome of the 21 st century Panglong conferences/upcs (first and second session) The first and second UPCs provided a platform to implement government s road map to peace. First Session Outcome At the first UPC held on 31 st August 2016 in Nay Pyi Taw a common understanding was reached to conclude political dialogue within three to five years; to convene a second UPC; to enable 30 percent women s participation and to honour and put on record NCA signatories. Though the issues agreed upon presented a positive picture, various views pertaining to nature of the state, role of Army, question of secession from the union and separation of powers between centre and states indicated that road map to peace in Myanmar was a complex process. For example, representatives from Army and USDP reaffirmed the need to adhere to the 2008 military-drafted constitution and basic principles of the NCA, whereas EAOs leaders and ethnic political parties called for greater separation of power between the state and central government. The EAOs such as UNFC presented a 10-point agenda to bring the armed forces under civilian administration. It also demanded to reorganise the country into 14 states, with the seven current states preserved, and the seven regions turned into states of nationalities. Another EAO the NDAA urged the government to ensure the future inclusion of the Northern Alliance (comprising AA, TNLA and MNDAA) in peace processes. 16 The AA, TNLA, MNDAA and NSCN- Khaplang group chose not to attend the conference. Process followed to have inclusive Second session of UPC Based on the outcome of the first UPC and to make the peace process more inclusive, the NLD government decided to have three types of dialogues at regional, national and ethnic levels. The Joint Coordinating Body (JCB) for peace process funding was also formed in 20 December 2016 and the funding was allocated to four sectors which were the Ceasefire Sector, the negotiation and dialogue sector, the peace supporting development sector; peace making process of the

national reconciliation and peace centre-nprc sector. 17 Many countries contributed to the peace funding and major donors are China (US$ 3 million) and Japan (granted more than US $12 million to MPC in 2013, in 2016 US$31.7 million donation to UN operations and $7.73 billion over five years to support its peace-building and development). The government also formed five working committees to deal with political affairs, social Affairs, economic affairs, security affairs and land and natural environmental affairs. These committees are formed to compile suggestions and proposals concerning the matters assigned to them for instance through national-level political dialogues. 18 These efforts by the government helped to organise the second UPC in May 2017. Before convening of second secession of UPC the government maintained that, without the commitment of the ethnic organisations for nonsecession from the union, they cannot move forward for discussing related issues such as constitution of respective states, equality and self-determination. 19 Outcome of the second UPC 37 agreements were approved by the UPC and were signed as a part of the Pyidaungsu Accord/Union Accord Pyidaungsu Accord The Accord mentions that it is looking forward to non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity and perpetuation of the sovereignty, based on freedom, equality and justice. The Union Peace Conference 21st Century Panglong 2nd session was held for building up the Union in harmony with the Panglong spirit, based on democracy and federalism which guarantee democracy, national equality and selfdetermination, in accord with the outcomes of the political dialogues. Part One of the Pyidaungsu Accord approved and signed in the conference were twelve agreements on principles of political sector; eleven agreements on principles of economic sector; four agreements on principles of social sector and ten agreements on principles of land and natural environment sector. 20 State Councillor and Chairperson of UPC said that these agreements will form part of the future Union Accord. 21 Table below provides information about some of the salient principles agreed upon on four sectors mentioned above, to be based in Federalism. Political Sector The Sovereign Power of the Union is derived from the citizens and is in force in the entire country. The 3 branches of the sovereign power of the State, namely legislative power, executive power and judicial power should be separated to the extent Economic Sector For Effective implementation of market economy - draw firm policy, law, by-law, rules and regulations at every level such as Union, Regions and States and Self-administered Regions/Zones and promulgate them in order to be able to implement the market

possible. Each ethnic national race must have equality in politics and race, and simultaneously must have the right to keep, protect and upgrade their languages, literatures, traditions and cultures. The State must be set up as the Union based on democracy and federalism and must be formed by Regions and States. Self administered regions and areas must be organised with the names of national races. Multi-Party democratic system must be practised and free and fair elections must be held in accord with the prescriptions included in the Constitution. 22 Social Sector Lay the program systematically that can forge the durable solution for the internally displaced people and refugees due to natural disasters, human activities and armed conflicts without discrimination by following the international norms of human rights. Boost the socioeconomic condition and to effectively safeguard the rights and privileges of the aged, the disabled, women and children regardless of the race, religion and wealth. Prevent and fight against the drug trafficking by laying the plan and implementing it considering the task a national issue pertaining to politics, security and rule of law. 24 economy effectively. - target to alleviate the poverty, to raise the living standard of the people, to narrow down the socioeconomic gap between the rich and the poor and finally aim to achieve sustainable development in promoting the private sector of national economy in line with the policy, law and by-law already set before. Take necessary actions to provide equal opportunities for the economic development in the respective Union, Regions and States and selfadministered Regions/ Zones. Allocate national budget in a fair and equitable manner. 23 Land and natural environmental sector Countrywide land policy that is balanced and support people cantered long-term durable development. Policy based on justice and appropriateness and a policy that reduce central control; Include human rights, international, democracy and federal system norms in drawing up land policy. 25 Both women and men have equal rights to manage the land ownership matters in accordance with the land law.

The issues agreed upon in the agreement provided a broad consensus on issues the centre and states and regions will have to adhere, to achieve national reconciliation. For Myanmar government agreement on the principles mentioned above was a major step forward in its peace road map. However, there are several challenges the NLD government will have to address to complete the peace road map which include participation of non-nca signatories in peace process, role of Army, solving of Rohingya issue and involvement and role of external actors in peace process. These key challenges are discussed below. Key Challenges Participation of non-nca signatories in reconciliation process Overall fifteen ethnic armed groups attended the UPC, including eight signatories to the NCA and seven non signatories who were allowed to participate in the peace conference as observers or guests. These include, UWSA, KIO, SSPP-North and Mongla's NDAA, TNLA, Kokang's MNDAA and AA. Reaching an agreement with these ethnic armed groups based in North-Eastern region of Myanmar is going to be a challenging task for the government. EAOs that have not signed the NCA account for more than eighty percent of country s armed rebels. The Army has been insisting that these EAOs have to denounce their arms before joining the peace process which is not acceptable for these groups. Pangkham Agreement Before the second secession of UPC, non-signatory groups of NCA led by UWSA held a conference from 22 nd to 24 th February 2017 in Pangkham to present an alternative approach to the NCA. The agreement reached at the conference argued that in spite of NCA deliberation, the armed conflict along the Burma-China border in Kachin and Shan States have escalated with no sign of stopping. Therefore, the Agreement demanded the following: - Immediately withdraw the identification as terrorist groups of MNDAA, TNLA and KIA of December 7, 2016 by the Shan State Parliament that is against the will of the people. - Immediately stop all military offensives, in order for the country to be peaceful and start the reconciliation process. 26 - Regarding the NCA, the agreement stated that the government could not replace the historic Panglong Agreement with the NCA and it should be replaced with more justified ceasefire agreement. - The statement also called upon on the government to include the United Nations and People s Republic of China as arbitrator in Burma s peace process. - The groups which participated in the meeting formed Union Political Negotiation Dialogue Committee (UPNDC) and insisted that they have to be represented by this formation in peace talks.

- Regarding capital investment and developmental projects the EAOs participating in the conference opined that, China s One Belt One Road (OBOR) policy is peaceful equal development of all neighbouring countries. This policy is necessary for Burma s economic development and security and as well benefits the arbitrator. 27 Other challenges are rivalry within EAOs for leadership and differences regarding government initiated peace process are also obstacles in achieving the goal of participation of all EAOs in talks. For example, among the EAOs, UWSA is the strongest armed ethnic group with an estimated strength of 30,000 fighters (30,000 on reserve) and enjoys its autonomous enclave along the China-Myanmar border. 28 This group emerged as an important player in representing the EAOs and increasingly taking a leadership role and has become a threat to the UNFC which represents the EAOs in peace process. The future of the UNFC is in doubt in wake of suspensions and resignations from the council such as KN, Pa-o National liberation Organisation (PNLO), CNF, MNDAA, TNLA and KIO and Wa National Organisation (WNO). 29 These groups had left the Council due to reasons such as disagreement over the management of the organization, rivalry for leadership and differences over the strategy to deal with military attacks on areas occupied by EAOs. The KIO is the second largest ethnic organisation and it is unlikely to sign any agreement with the government as long as the other EAOs such as TNLA and AA are excluded from the peace process and NCA. These groups conduct joint military operations and use their territory for defence. The State Counsellor met with the KIO before the second UPC to convince the organisation members to join the NCA, which was not fruitful. Though some of these non-signatory groups had sent their representative to participate in UPC there is a clear dissatisfaction and disagreement about the government s peace road map. Government s handling of political dialogues in states and regions where there is, substantial presence and influence of EAOs was criticised as non-transparent by ALA and KNU. For instance, Myanmar government expressed its reservations about conducting national level political dialogue by ALA, the NCA signatory. In another instance, the government allowed RCSS to hold a dialogue but refused to grant permission to hold a dialogue in Arakan as proposed by RCSS as it was a sensitive area. 30 Due to this, only six of the EAOs that signed the NCA could hold the national level political dialogue. The KNU leader Naw Zipporeach Sein said that the UPC second session had little to offer to the EAOs instead allowed the military to dominate and proper mechanisms were not followed in conducting the UPC such as signing of NCA, drafting a framework for political dialogue and its adoption; holding of national level (ethnic nationality level) political dialogue and convening the UPC as proposed by NCA document. 31 The above mentioned positions taken by some of the EAOs and government s response to these positions in the future will have an impact on holding a future UPC.

Role of Army Another challenge in achieving national reconciliation is to manage military-civil relations as well as Army s influence in security matters of the country. Some argued that the good outcome of the conference was due to the changing policy and attitude of the Tatmadaw and its ardent desire to achieve peace. 32 However, the fact is the military is a dominant institution in the country for most part of its history 33 and the NCA was initiated under the military regime of Thein Sein. Therefore, the Army has a stake in the peace process and non participation in peace process would have led to the isolation of the army from national reconciliation process and eventual dominance of civilian government in future affairs. Army is well aware of this fact and its participation in peace process will ensure a say in the outcome. At the same time, the Army has also involved in continuous clashes with the EAOs in frontier areas for control over territory and economy. For example, the KIA was involved in 82 clashes with the Myanmar Army in 2016 and with the Northern Alliance more than 136 clashes took place. Since 2011 EAOs had expanded in numbers. For example, during 2011-2016, KIA increased its strength from 4000 to 10,000. Other EAOs such as the TNLA increased from 1500 to 5000, the UWSA from 20,000 to 30,000 the SSPP from 1000 to 8000 and the RCSS from 4000 to 8000. 34 Therefore, the Army will continue to pressurise the EAOs to disarm and participate in peace process and adhere to ceasefire. Solution to Rakhine issue Another key challenge in achieving reconciliation in Myanmar is to find a political solution to violence between the Muslim and Buddhist communities in Rakhine state of Myanmar. Since 2012 the state witnessed violence leading to displacement and refugee flow to neighbouring countries. 35 Even under the NLD rule, the Rakhine State witnessed violence and in October 2016 attacks allegedly by Rohingya militants group Harakah al-yaqin on security forces had prompted a new large-scale security crackdown by the Army in northern Rakhine. And 65,000 Rohingya Muslims have sought refugees in neighbouring Bangladesh after the military crackdown. In response, the State Counsellor said that her government is committed to resolution of the complex issue but need time and space to tackle the issue. 36 To find a lasting solution the government established an Advisory Commission on Rakhine State led by Kofi Annan Foundation composed of three international and six national persons of eminence. 37. The NLD government also constituted various mechanisms such as Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Central Committee for the Implementation of Peace and Development in Raphine State and a Commission headed by Vice President Myint Sew to look into the ways to find a solution to violence. The government had refuted the charges of UN and human rights organisations such as Human Rights Watch which held the Army responsible for violence in Rakhine state particularly burning of Muslim houses, killings, disappearances in north Maungdaw. In March 2017 the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) passed a resolution to send an international fact-finding mission to Myanmar to investigate atrocities that the country s army is said to have committed against

Rohingya Muslims. In response, the State Counsellor, said they have disassociated themselves from the resolution because they do not think that the resolution is in keeping with what is actually happening on the ground. 38 In an interview to BBC in April 2017 she also said, there is no ethnic cleansing in Rakhine state. 39 The government denied visas to UN fact finding mission appointed in May 2017 that was formed to compile a report on Rakhine state affairs. UN appointed Marzuki Darusman, a former attorneygeneral of Indonesia, Radhika Coomaraswamy of Sri Lanka and Christopher Dominic Sidoti of Australia to serve as the three members of the UN mission 40. The Stand taken by the NLD government was criticised by many as it seem to be overlooking the real situation on the ground and the role of Army and hard-line Buddhists groups such as Ma Ba Tha in the past in marginalising and in instigating violence against majority Rohingya Muslim community in Rakhine state. This community are seen by many as illegal migrants from Bangladesh. The problem also lies in the fact that more than one million people in the Rakhine state have denied citizenship and basic rights. Some argue that the marginalised population are becoming easy targets for recruitment by jihad groups. 41 Amidst this background, violence in Rakhine State intensified after the attack on Myanmar military by Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) on 25 th August 2017 and resulted in killing of twelve personnel. In counter attack by Myanmar military, according to the government, around 77 ARSA cadre were killed. 42 The military operations that were undertaken to flush out the ARSA militants/terrorists after the incident led to more than thousand civilian deaths largely belonging to Rohingya Muslim community and large scale migration of the community to neighbouring Bangladesh numbering more than 400,000. According to human rights bodies, there is an evidence of systematic attack through persecution and burning of properties by military to drive the Rohingya Muslim community from the State. The government s silence to the plight of Rohingya Muslims was widely criticised by international actors such as UN and many countries expressed their concern on the issue such as India, US, UK, Sweden, Germany, Maldives, Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey. India expressed concern on refugee flow to neighbouring Bangladesh and asked the Myanmar Government to take measures to stop the refugee flow. India also urged a solution based on respect for peace, communal harmony, justice, dignity and democratic values. 43 The UN condemned the Government of Myanmar for not controlling the situation and said that it is a textbook example of ethnic cleansing. 44 Bangladesh passed a unanimous motion in Parliament asking the government of Myanmar to take back Rohingyas. 45 The Kofi Annan Commission made number of significant recommendations on wide ranging issues concerning Rakhine State such as the economic and social development of Rakhine State, citizenship issue, on IDPs, humanitarian and media access, drugs, intercommunal cohesion, security sector, access to justice and border issues and the bilateral relations with Bangladesh. Some of the recommendations are 46 : Increase the participation of Rakhine local communities in the decision making process.

Establish a clear strategy and timeline for the citizenship verification process and clarify the status of those who were denied citizenship. Rakhine and Muslim communities should work constructively with the Government to revitalize the citizenship verification process. Government should ensure freedom of movement of all people in Rakhine State, irrespective of religion, ethnicity or citizenship status. The Government of Myanmar should prepare a comprehensive strategy towards closing all IDP camps in Rakhine State. The strategy should be developed through a constitutional process with affected communities. The Government should cooperate with the international partners to ensure that return/relocation is carried out in accordance with international standards. The Government should ensure full and unimpeded humanitarian access-for both national and international staff-at all times and to all communities in Rakhine State. The Government should provide full and regular access for domestic and international media to all areas affected by recent violence-as well as other areas of the State. The Government should adopt a holistic anti-drugs approach based on public health, community safety, human rights and development. Government should take steps to promote communal representation and participation for underrepresented groups, including ethnic minority groups. In line with Myanmar law, the Government should consider establishing the post of Ethnic Affairs Minister for all ethnic minorities in Rakhine with more than 0.1 percent of the population. The Government of Myanmar and Bangladesh should facilitate the voluntary return of refugees from Bangladesh to Myanmar through joint verification, in accordance with international standards and with assistance from international partners. Responding to the situation, Myanmar State Counsellor addressed the diplomatic community on 19 th September 2017. She said that, We condemn all human rights violations and unlawful violence. We are committed to the restoration of peace, stability and rule of law throughout the State. The security forces have been instructed to adhere strictly to the Code of Conduct in carrying out security operations, to exercise all due restraint, and to take full measures to avoid collateral damage and the harming of innocent civilians. We feel deeply for suffering of all the people who have been caught up in the conflict. 47 State Counsellors position has been reiterated again at the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 21 st September 2017 by the H.E. U Henry Van Thio, Vice-President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. He also, elaborated on initiatives taken by the Government to tackle the problem such as adoption of an integrated national strategy to address the problem,

launch of a committee chaired by the Union Minister of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement to implement the recommendations of the Advisory Commission. At the UN Assembly, countries such as UK, Indonesia, Mauritius, Bangladesh, Denmark, Turkey, Comoros, Pakistan, Maldives, Thailand, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Singapore have spoken on the developments in Rakhine State and asked the Myanmar Government to take humanitarian measures to address the situation and solve the problem. Implementation of Kofi Annan Advisory Commission recommendations was also proposed as a solution to the problem. Support of neighbouring countries Apart from the above mentioned key challenges another challenge for the government is to get the support of neighbouring countries to its national reconciliation efforts. Myanmar share borders with India, China, Thailand Laos and Bangladesh and ethnic groups share cultural and historical links across the border. Continuous conflict in Myanmar is driving refugees and migrants particularly to China, Thailand and Bangladesh. India India supported the peace process initiated by the NLD Government in 2016. The joint statement issued after the visit of Myanmar President U Htin Kyaw to India on 26 th August 2016 as well as the joint statement issued during the first bilateral visit of Indian Prime Minister Mr. Modi to Myanmar on 5-6 th September 2017 specifically mentioned about the ongoing peace process and India s support to the national reconciliation and peace process of the Government of Myanmar under the "21st Century Panglong Conference. 48 India s National Security Advisor (NSA) Mr. Ajit Doval was present during the signing of NCA in October 2015. Indian delegation also attended the peace conference. Peace and stability in Myanmar is a priority to India as it shares 1,624 km border with Myanmar. Both the countries are fighting the insurgency/militancy along the border and have been conducting joint military operations along the border to tackle the insurgency. For example, In June 2015 surgical strike inside Myanmar was carried out by a team of about 70 commandos of the Indian Army which shot down several Naga insurgents belonging to the NSCN-Khaplang militant group along the India-Myanmar border. In September 2017, Indian Army also shot down several Naga insurgents belonging to the same group. There is an understanding between India and Myanmar to tackle the insurgency along the borders and the joint statement during the visit of PM of India to Myanmar in September 2017, recognised that maintenance of security and stability along the common border is essential for the socio-economic development of the peoples of the border areas. In this context, Myanmar reaffirmed its respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India. Both the countries also upheld the policy of not allowing any insurgent group to utilise and undertake hostile acts against each other. After the outbreak of violence in Rakhine state of Myanmar in the last week of August 2017, after ARSA attack on military and subsequent refugee flow to Bangladesh in large numbers, India condemned the terrorist attack and expressed its concern on refugee flow and asked the Myanmar Government to take measures to stop refugee flow to Bangladesh.

Bangladesh Bangladesh is home to large number of Myanmar population numbering 800,000 and above (undocumented Myanmar nationals and Rohingya Muslims, including the refugee flow after the 25 th August 2017 violent incident). This population is mainly staying in Cox s Bazar in two registered camps and makeshift settlements. The Foreign Minister Mr. A H Mahmood Ali, while briefing the diplomatic community in February 2017, on the situation of Myanmar refugees and undocumented Myanmar nationals in Bangladesh said, the presence of huge number of Myanmar Nationals in Cox s Bazar district has not only created formidable challenges for the authorities to manage humanitarian assistances, but also created a number of adverse effects on the overall socio-economic, political, demographic, environmental, humanitarian, security, and also negatively affecting the eco-tourism prospects. Citing the vulnerable nature of this population, networks have emerged in this area for the purpose of human trafficking and smuggling of narcotic drugs. 49 The statement reflects the problem that exists in bilateral relations with Myanmar. The government of Bangladesh is trying to relocate the refugees as well as unauthorised Myanmar nationals residing in Bangladesh to Thengar Char, an Island next to Hatia Island in the Bay of Bengal, after the necessary infrastructure development. Bilateral political visits between the two countries after the NLD formed the government in 2106 suggested that, both the countries are willing to solve differences through discussion and are interested in enhancing security cooperation along border areas. Bangladesh also assured Myanmar that it will not allow any activity in its territory inimical to the interest of Myanmar. 50 In this context, Bangladesh asked for the early repatriation of entire Myanmar population and urgently address the root cause of the problem in the Rakhine State so that Rakhine Muslims are not required to desperately seek shelter across the border 51. Till 2005, Bangladesh had repatriated over 236,599 Rakhine Muslims and UNHRC provided support in the process. However, the Myanmar government in 2005 took a unilateral decision to halt repatriation of Rohingya Muslims. 52 Even though the Government of Bangladesh is providing required humanitarian assistance with the help of UN agencies, repatriation of refugees might become a thorny issue in bilateral relations. In a situation where, there are no proper mechanism in place to screen refuges and for identification, repatriation will take time. Speaking at the UN General Assembly Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina proposed actions which should be taken to deal with the Rohingya crisis such as unconditional stop to the violence and the practice of ethnic cleansing in the Rakhine State, UN fact-finding Mission to Myanmar; creation of safe zones under the UN supervision; return of all forcibly displaced Rohingyas, and the implementation of Kofi Annan Commission Report. The Myanmar Government at the UN proposed the establishment of a joint working group for implementation of repatriation process, based on the experience of 1993, which might address the problem to some extent. During 1992-93, Myanmar and Bangladesh agreed that, Myanmar will take measures to halt the outflow of refugees to Bangladesh, and to accept, after scrutiny, all those carrying Myanmar identity cards, those able to present other documents issued by relevant Myanmar authorities and all those able to furnish evidence of their residence in

Myanmar and all those willing to return to Myanmar 53. UNHRC was involved in resettling and in repatriation process in 1990s. China Myanmar s relations with China have travelled a complicated path for many years owing to factors such as China s alleged support to EAOs, drug and arms trade in frontier areas, opposition to China s investments and instability in border areas. The EAOs who are not part of NCA are present in border areas of Myanmar and China. The UWSA and MNDAA were formed after the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) disintegration in late 1980s. The CPB was supported by China during cultural revolution. 54 The EAOs share historical, cultural, political and economic linkages with the ethnic groups across the border with China. Many reports suggest that many interests groups in China (with or without government backing) had financially supported and supplied arms to insurgent such as KIA, UWSA and MNDAA. 55 Another thorny issue in the peace process is control of drug trade along the border. Drug trade along the border areas is a main source of finance for some of the Border Guard Forces (BGFs), for Myanmar military and for interests groups in China particularly in Yunnan Province. The frontier states with China and Laos are known for production of illicit drugs and Myanmar remains the largest producer of illicit drugs in Southeast Asia. According to a UN report, the Shan state in the north of Myanmar, which hosts a number of conflict areas and ceasefire groups, remains the centre of the country s opium and heroin trade, accounting for 91 per cent of opium poppy cultivation. 56 In Myanmar, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that there are over 133,000 opium producing households. Both the EAOs and Myanmar Army are trying to have control over drug trade leading to occasional clashes. Apart from drug trade, the northern states of Myanmar are also known for many illicit and undercover industries, such as jade and gold mining, timber and opium which has become a lucrative financial source 57. For the last few years attempts have been made to control the drug trade and the Myanmar government with the help of UN is trying to implement a drug reform policy that can contain its production. In June 2017 Myanmar along with Thailand and Cambodia destroyed nearly US $ one billion worth narcotics to show governments resolve against the trade 58. Illegal mining and logging in Northern Myanmar by companies based in Yunnan is also an issue. In the past, Yucheng Group in Yunaan province reportedly donated 10 million RMB to MNDAA in 2015. Above factors are also contributing to unstable border areas due to spill over effects. For instance, in March 2017, clashes between Myanmar Army and MNDAA resulted in refugee flow to China numbering 20,000. According to UN estimates the Myanmar and China border (representing Kachin and Shan states including Kokang region) is home to more than 200,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). 59 Continuous displacement and refugee flow along the border had compelled China to get involved in talks between the government of Myanmar and EAOs in the past. For example, after the clashes broke out between Myanmar Army and groups such as KIA and MNDAA, China had sent Chinese special envoy Sun Guoxiang o talk to UWSA and the National Democratic Alliance Eastern Shan State (NDAA-ESS) to ensure groups participation in

UPC. Some reports suggest that the Northern Alliance participation in second UPC was due to China s persuasion. Therefore maintaining peace and stability in border areas and continuation of economic cooperation between ethnic communities are some other issues in which Myanmar expects cooperation from China. The changed political environment in Myanmar and country s willingness to open its market as well as willingness to engage with international actors for investments in various sectors are attracting many outside powers. China would like to tap the opportunity for investments and will try to secure its investments in Myanmar, which saw a set back during the rule of Mr. Thein Sein. For example, the NLD government showed its willingness to negotiate a much controversial US $ 3.6 billion Myitsone dam project which was cancelled by previous government due to environmental reasons. Peace and stability in Border States in changed political environment is a basic necessity to complete China backed projects such as US $6 billion Mong Ton hydropower facility and oil and gas pipeline projects. China is also investing a lot of money in Kyaukpyu special economic zone which is where the pipeline starts. 60 The proposed gas and oil pipeline is passing through the conflict affected Kachin and Shan states. Therefore, on second session of UPC, China took a position that the 21st Century Panglong Conference was significant and will enhance the mutual understanding and trust between relevant parties, advance the peace process and promote national reconciliation in Myanmar. China appointed Mr. Sun Guoxiang, Special Envoy of Asian Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China to lead the delegation to the UPC. 61 The increasing interest of West, particularly the US is also a concern for China and it does not want the US to involvement in peace process. For example, it strongly objected to the KIA proposal to invite, US and UK as observers in peace process in 2013. 62 Above reasons indicate that China has a complex role to play in Myanmar peace process. Whether the government of China will prevail upon the EAOs to participate in peace process to secure its economic investments or will it allow various interests groups in China to continue to influence EAOs for various political ends will determine the progress of peace process in Myanmar. Thailand As far as the Thailand is concerned, it shares more than 2000 km border with Myanmar. The border areas are hub to drug smuggling and human trafficking. The conflict in Myanmar led to significant presence of refugees and migrants in Thailand. According to UN estimates, Thailand is home to some 103,300 Myanmar refugees, living in nine camps along the Thailand-Myanmar border and composed mainly of Karen, Karenni, Burmese and Mon ethnicity. Refugees first arrived in Thailand in the early 1980s after fleeing ethnic conflict in south-eastern Myanmar due to the clashes between KNU and Myanmar Army and some of the EAO s along the border are KNU, New Mon State party (NMSP) and Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP). In the past, both the countries accused each other of supporting EAOs to destabilise governments and to control drug trade. After the formation of NLD government and as Myanmar opens to the world, ethnic groups are seen as an impediment to cross border trade and investment opportunities. 63 Successful peace

process as both countries realise would bring mutual economic benefits. In this context, during the visit of State Counsellor Aung San Suu kyi to Thailand in July 2016, both the countries have agreed to renew negotiations over disputed border demarcations and repatriation of refugees. Myanmar shares its Eastern and South-Eastern borders with Thailand and some territory is under the control of EAOs to which the Thai government had also staked its claims. For example, area near Three Pagodas Pass and the UWSA military bases on the Thai-Burma border in Thailand s northern provinces of Chiang Mai and Mae Hong Song are some of the disputed border areas. More than a dozen UWSA bases are in southern Shan State, on or over the Thai border. 64 Therefore, security and stability in border areas is dependent on cooperation between EAOs, Myanmar military and Thailand government as well as cessation of hostilities and participation of EAOs in national reconciliation process. Conclusion The 21st Century Panglong Conference initiated by State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in 2016 was a major initiative to achieve national reconciliation. However, the path to peace in Myanmar is complex involving a large number of stake holders. The conflict in Myanmar is the result of colonial and post colonial rule which demarcated boundaries by giving scant regard to traditional boundaries and people to people relations. The UPC has provided a platform to discuss all contentious issues. However, the signing of NCA has not ceased hostilities at frontier areas. At present there seem to be an understanding between the civilian government and the Army regarding the need for a peace process. The situation might change depending on compromises the NLD government is willing to make with the EAOs to include them in peace process. The Accord that was signed in second UPC has not dealt with security issues which might be included in the next UPC. Military has control over defence, border affairs and home. Military s response to violence in Rakhine State in August 2017 was an example. In this context how the government is going to negotiate on security related issues in the future will determine the outcome of UPCs as amendment to the constitution is opposed by Army. Moreover, a few of the points agreed upon on power sharing between centre, state and regions in UPC and its actual implementation are fraught with problems as some of the EAOs are asking for more autonomy and control over self administered areas. Demilitarisation, resettlement, rebuilding of areas damaged by conflict and rights violations are some other basic issues which need the attention of government in conflict zones. The UPC also brought onto the surface the ideological differences between EAOs and brining all under one platform is going to be an enormous challenge for NLD in the next UPC. As far as Rakhine State stability is concerned, implementation of Advisory Commission recommendations led by Kofi Annan might provide solutions to the problem. Abbreviations All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) Arakan Army (AA) Arakan Liberation Army (ALA)