Critically evaluate community- based approaches to counter- terrorism and counter- radicalisation. This essay critically examines community- based approaches to counter- terrorism and counter- radicalisation and their application after the terrorist attacks of both 9/11 and 7/7 in the case of the United Kingdom. Beginning with a short discussion of community- based approaches in general and their increased prominence after the terrorist attacks in London in 2005, the essay will then assess the advantages of community- based approaches as compared to more traditional counter- terrorism strategies. This will be followed by a critical discussion of community- based approaches to counter- terrorism and how the different forms it can take can impact on its effectiveness. The essay will then consider why community- based approaches are still vital to counter- terrorism and radicalization and what aspects are important in order for them to focus upon communities instead of targeting them. Finally the essay will conclude that although community- based approaches are difficult to implement they are vital for counter- terrorism and counter- radicalisation and will offer the long- term solution to these problems. However, opposition from parts of society cannot be discounted and constitutes a part of the consequences of these approaches that have to be dealt with. Community policing and engagement is not a new principle (Brown 2007: 239), however, its use within counter- terrorism strategies is new (Klausen 2009: 408). Before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and 7/7 communities were already regarded as an important resource in the attempts to deal with social problems like crime, anti- social behaviour or unemployment (Spalek and Lambert 2008: 258). Following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the United States, the UK government focused mainly on the international threat of terrorism, and their tactics employed mirrored this outward look (Briggs et al. 2006: 12). However, on 7 July 2005 the terrorist attacks in London followed, carried out by British Muslims and citizens (McDonald 2011: 183) from respectable families (Briggs et al. 2006: 12). These attacks highlighted the threat from home- grown terrorism (Klausen 2009: 404) and revealed that some communities were separated from the state and had links to radicalisation. They had supported those that carried out the attacks and had kept the information to themselves instead of sharing it with the authorities (McDonald 2011: 183). Thus, [1]
following the attacks much attention focused on the idea that communities can defeat terrorism and (Spalek and McDonald 2012: 20) work with communities now seemed to hold a particular significance (Spalek and Lambert 2008: 258). The engagement with Muslim communities was regarded as especially important (Spalek, Lambert and Haqq Baker 2009: 170) as they are seen as the best actors to intervene and take pre- emptive action when a member of their community is drawn to extremist views (Briggs et al. 2006: 15). Community- based approaches aim at building good relations between the police and the community, and are implemented by the police alongside local authorities, community organisations and other local actors (Briggs 2010: 971). This idea of community engagement as approaches to counter- terrorism is also part of the UK government s counter- terrorism strategy CONTEST launched in 2003. CONTEST is a broad- ranging counter- terrorism strategy that is made up of four parts: Pursuit, Preparedness, Protection and Prevention (Meer 2012: 12). Prevent is the strand that has the greatest focus on community engagement and work with Muslim communities (Awan 2012: 63) including strategies of persuasion, negotiation, and agenda- setting as well as policing in order to prevent young people from subscribing to the ideas of extremists and marginalise extremists themselves (Bonino 2012: 17). Critical engagement with strategies for counter- terrorism and counter- radicalisation is necessary to be able to reflect on engagement issues with Muslim communities and the effects these strategies have (Spalek and Lambert 2008: 260). This reveals that community approaches are an important addition to more traditional counter- terrorism strategies (Brown 2007: 248). These traditional approaches are hard engagement strategies such as surveillance, policing and the implementation of anti- terror laws (Spalek and Imtoual 2007: 186), but also include preventative arrest and extradition, [ ] low visible activities of intelligence (Bonino 2012: 15). Their implementation is often insensitive and frightening (McDonald 2011: 180), and they often have negative effects such as further alienating communities, withdrawal from the work with the state, creating hostility towards law enforcement agencies and greater support for terrorists (Brown 2007: 242-243, Pickering et al. 2008: 91). Community- based approaches to counter- terrorism on the other hand can be termed [2]
soft approaches and are important and helpful to supplement the hard strategies. Engaging with communities, promoting dialogue and participation (Spalek and Imtoual 2007: 189) is less alienating and can make communities and their members more willing to cooperate with the state and the police to prevent terrorism (Spalek and McDonald 2012: 22). This is vital as bad relations with communities are problematic for the police; these relationships give the police its legitimacy and the police require the communities cooperation (Pickering et al. 2008: 93). New technologies and traditional methods have not been able to get all information needed to successfully counter terrorism and possible attacks, and traditional methods do not work well with organisations like al- Qaida that are morphing, fluid, and decentred (Innes 2006: 224). Al- Qaida cells also do not lend themselves to penetration and even if one is successfully penetrated their independence leads to little insights on other groups (Innes 2006: 232). Traditional methods of intelligence gathering are able to detect threats related to people already known, but because the cells are unconnected the threat a newly formed group poses might not be detected (Innes 2006: 230). This is where communities can be crucial because terrorists and people deemed at risk of being radicalised are integrated in or at least part of a community (Klausen 2009: 408, Briggs 2010: 972). There are some things only members of a community can notice and some suspicions might only become visible when the observations of several people are put together (Spalek and McDonald 2012: 22-23, 25). Communities can thus be an early warning system (Briggs 2010: 972-973) and serve as important sources of information and intelligence (Briggs et al. 2006: 15), warning of emerging threats but also able intervene themselves to prevent members of their community from becoming violent extremists (Briggs 2010: 972-973). Additionally, communities can help when assess[ing] [ ] the validity of intelligence the police has received from other agencies and determine whether someone really is a threat (Spalek and McDonald 2012: 25). Soft approaches like community engagement might also make communities more willing to approve of or engage in hard approaches to counter- terrorism (Spalek and Imtoual 2007: 190) and take into consideration that global grievances only matter if they can be connected to local grievances. Especially Muslim communities suffer some of [3]
the worst indicators of deprivation, discrimination and social exclusion and engagement with them might help to address these grievances (Briggs et al. 2006: 13) and take the passive legitimisation these provide for terrorists (Briggs et al. 2006: 14). Compared to the hard and increasingly intrusive counterterrorism strategies pursued (Brown 2007: 247), for example by countries such as France, community- based approaches to counter- terrorism seem like a good alternative (Klausen 2009: 417). However, one also needs to consider the impacts these approaches can have on communities, their rights and their standing in society (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011: 151). This is because there are different community- based approaches and not all of these approaches are as useful or helpful as the above comparison with hard strategies and the idealis[ation] and romanticis[ation] [of][ ] the notion of communities countering terrorism might make one believe (Spalek and McDonald 2012: 20). Community engagement to counter terrorism and radicalisation is a highly politicised arena and discussions about many issues impact on its implementation (Spalek and Lambert 2008: 261). Therefore there is the possibility that although well intentioned a community- based approach to counter- terrorism targets Muslim communities and instead of fostering trust it can lead to further alienation and the worsening of grievances these communities already have (Spalek and McDonald 2012: 20). The Prevent strand of the UK government s counter- terrorism strategy CONTEST is an example of these problems (Spalek and McDonald 2012: 20). Most criticisms centre on its main focus on the British Muslim population (O Toole et al. 2012: 56) while other forms of violent extremism and the threat emanating from them were not mentioned. Instead of focusing on Muslim communities, the approach targeted them, which led to the alienation of some parts of the Muslim community (Spalek 2010: 799). It also targeted the wrong people and endangered some of the projects that were promoting cooperation (Bonino 2012: 18). The active citizen duties of Muslims were mainly seen in the light of counter- terrorism (Spalek and Lambert 2008: 258) and seemed to imply that Muslim communities themselves are the locus of the issue of extremism (Spalek and Imtoual 2007: 193-194). It also aimed to promote a mainstream form of Islam, something that was greatly criticised [4]
(O Toole et al. 2012: 57), and seemed to attempt to adapt and change the life worlds of Muslim communities in Britain (Meer 2012: 12). The issue of counter- terrorism was also mixed with social cohesion, questions about Britishness and which sort of behaviour should be encouraged (Spalek and Lambert 2008: 261). It included normative assumptions about what kinds of Muslim identities should be engaged with (Spalek and Lambert 2008: 260) excluding those Muslims considered to be radical and including only those deemed legitimate (Spalek and Imtoual 2007: 186). For example the government preferred to work with Sufis although they had little knowledge of al- Qaeda activity and even less street credibility to tackle it (Lambert 2008: 33), instead of focusing on which groups would be best to target extremism (Spalek and Lambert 2008: 261). Prevent also seemed to imply that members of Muslim communities should spy on each other and report suspicions to the police, something many Muslims were greatly upset with (Spalek and McDonald 2012: 20). Although the counter- terrorism strategy was reviewed in 2010 which also included an adaption of Prevent (Awan 2012: 63) and some important changes were made, the new Prevent also includes a number of significant continuities (O Toole et al. 2012: 56). The new strategy states, for example, that no money will be given to organisations that do not subscribe to mainstream British values or that hold extremist views, thus it still excludes certain groups from engagement and does not consider that Muslim communities are very complex (O Toole et al. 2012: 59). Prevent thus remains problematic. Additionally to these specific problems there are also more general problems that community- based approaches to counter- terrorism face, problems that also affect the Prevent strategy and that members of communities as well as police officers do not necessarily have influence on (Silk 2012: 73). Overall, these problems make the approach difficult to implement and reveals that people involved will face many challenges. The relationships to be built and programmes to be implemented all play out within the context of the aftermath of 9/11, the great focus on Muslims that has been existent ever since and the new terrorism discourse. New terrorism has become a popular term that is used to describe Islamist terrorism [ ] [as] an unpredictable global danger (Spalek 2010: [5]
790), and has led to the creation and otherisation of suspect communities, particularly of Muslim communities (Spalek 2011: 195) that are constructed as groups that requir[e] state surveillance and control (Spalek 2010: 795). The identities and citizenship of Muslims are increasingly problematized (Spalek 2010: 795), especially certain groups such as Salafis and Islamists are greatly stigmatised and conflate[ed] with terrorists (Spalek, Lambert and Haqq Baker 2009: 170). Community- based approaches are also part of and implemented within the broader approach to counter- terrorism and radicalisation. While on the one hand engagement and cooperation are promoted, there are also new anti- terror laws that can be used disproportionately against Muslims and that can lead to greater surveillance and control of these communities (Spalek and Imtoual 2007: 190-191). In the UK there has been an increase in methods used such as stop- and- search [ ], control orders and pre- charge detention (McDonald 2011: 178), which have negatively affected Muslim communities (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011: 151).Therefore, not all strands of the counter- terrorism strategy CONTEST work well together, for example actions taken under the Pursue strand with its focus on hard tactics can also increase distrust in the state and hinder effective community engagement under Prevent (Spalek 2010: 796). Muslim communities often feel they have been unfairly targeted and treated as a suspect community, reducing their trust in both the police and the state (Awan 2012: 64). The foreign policy of a country can also be a source of grievance and opposition to the state (Jackson et al. 2012: 71). In the UK many Muslims perceive the UK government to be part of a broader war with Islam which also affects cooperation (Silk 2012: 74). Simultaneously debates over engagement work between the police and Muslim communities have become extremely public and politicised which also affects efforts to build relationships (Silk 2012: 73). The media environment is often hostile (Briggs 2010: 972), and especially Muslim males have been presented in a negative light (Abbas 2007: 293). Parts of the public have also criticised engagement with groups commentators deem as fundamentalist or extremist (Silk 2012: 76), and regard the state as helping to further Islamic extremism (Spalek and Lambert 2008: 262). [6]
No approach to counter- terrorism and counter- radicalisation will provide society with full security. Community- based approaches feature risks just as other approaches do (Briggs et al. 2006: 17) and like community engagement in other areas there will be failure [ ] [and] success, as some interventions will not achieve the intended result (Lambert 2008: 31). However, hardware is useless without the software (Briggs et al. 2006: 17) and some problems simply need the cooperation of and work with communities to be addressed effectively (Klausen 2009: 408). This is because although the concept of community is problematic, communities constitute sites at which the social world is experienced, acted upon and understood (Spalek and McDonald 2012: 21). Thus community- based approaches are vital for counter- terrorism and counter- radicalisation (Spalek, Lambert and Haqq Baker 2009: 183) and will provide the long- term solution to terrorism (Briggs 2010: 981). What is needed, however, is a community- focussed approach instead of one that targets them. An approach that finds local solutions to local problems through partnership work between communities, the police and other organisations, relationships that involve equality, transparency and legitimate cooperation (Spalek and McDonald 2012: 22) and takes into consideration what they contribute to society (Awan 2012: 66). This means that community- based strategies have to become more inclusive (Spalek and Imtoual 2007: 197) because it is not useful to exclude groups who have the most experience with the issue (Klausen 2009: 415). Some young Muslims could easily rehabilitated to nonviolent politics (Lambert 2008: 32). But the people intervening need to have credibility and influence, and sometimes their ability to understand the motivations [ ] is [ ] rooted in a history of personal experience (McDonald 2011: 181). Therefore they are often excluded from community- based approaches conducted on the terms of the government. However, the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) in London provides an example of a community focused and inclusive strategy, and for alternative [ ] future engagement (Spalek, Lambert and Haqq Baker 2009: 177). The MCU works with groups such as Salafis or Islamists that usually would not be part of engagement work because of their perceived links with terrorism (Spalek, Lambert and Haqq Baker 2009: 177). Both groups are often conflated with terrorism, partly [7]
because al- Qaida uses changed strands of their thought for its own propaganda. However, this is one of the reasons why Salafis and Islamists are so well placed to intervene with people seen at risk because they often have the best antidotes to al- Qaeda propaganda (Lambert 2008: 34). The MCU work is also a good illustration of a relationship in which the actors are partners (Lambert 2008: 32) which matters because in a community focused approach the communities need to be partners not just informants (Spalek 2010: 800). What should also be taken into account are the community perceptions of the legitimacy or not of violence (Spalek and McDonald 2012: 21). Communities are likely to see the engagement work differently than the police does, thus their views should be taken into consideration (Spalek and Lambert 2008: 263). There can be tensions between the needs of state security and community security (McDonald 2011: 180), as threat perceptions might differ causing communities to feel more targeted. While the state might see terrorism as the most significant real threat that Britain faces today, many in the Muslim communities regard other problems as more pressing because terrorists or violent extremists only form a very small part of the overall Muslim population (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011: 175). Community engagement and policing should thus not only concentrate on counter- terrorism measures but help with other issues facing the communities, too. Muslims lack economic opportunities, and are also generally excluded, disadvantages, alienated, misrepresented and vilified (Abbas 2007: 288-289). A conception of threat created by the state that does not consider these factors and problems that matter to communities will gain little acknowledgement and cooperation (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011: 175). Addressing their problems in relation to unemployment, poverty and their integration into society, seeing them as part of a plural Us is vital (Modood 2006: 53). They have to be protected from discrimination and racism (Modood 2006: 53), because it makes them feel alienated, less part of the society (Abbas 2007: 291) and these experiences are exploited by al- Qaida to recruit people (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011: 151). By tackling these problems support and passive support for terrorist within the community that provides them with invaluable sources of funding, manpower, legitimacy can be reduced (Spalek and McDonald 2012: 21). Legitimacy and transparency are also vital when it comes [8]
to policing (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011: 176). Officers should be open about the fact that their role is concerned with counter- terrorism, and there should be information- sharing about related issues to build trust and increase cooperation (Spalek and McDonald 2012: 25). What also needs to be build and established is community consent and participation in the actual governance of the various strategies and approaches that are applied (Spalek and McDonald 2012: 24). Sometimes hard approaches are still required when the soft ones failed (Lambert 2008: 33), but it is important to then have the consent of the community, so that if the police becomes active the consequences for relationships are less severe. This is especially the case when the police makes a mistake (Briggs et al. 2006: 15) such as the raid in Forest Gate in June 2006 that turned out to be an intelligence and policing disaster (Abbas 2007: 295). Additionally other forms of extremism need to be addressed, as they also pose a threat to society (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011: 175). Overall, community- based approaches to counter- terrorism and counter- radicalisation are difficult to implement because there are many variables that affect them. But they are crucial in tackling the root causes of terrorism, and will provide the long- term solution to it. They also foster trust between the police and the communities, and this local trust might be able to extent and affect trust at the national or systemic level. However, even if implemented as a community focused approach that does not target the communities it wants to work with, problems will remain. By engaging with Muslim groups perceived as fundamentalist, the white indigenous population might feel that their identity is being betrayed and given away, maybe creating an increase in right wing activism. Other communities might resent funding being focused on certain other communities and criticise or turn away from the state. But these problems can be tackled, too and despite the challenges good relations between the police and communities can survive, and provide a better solution to the problem of violent extremism than an approach that fails to include communities in its efforts. [9]
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