CHAPTER V THE SIR CREEK DISPUTE AND THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS

Similar documents
THE SIR CREEK BOUNDARY DISPUTE: A Victim of India-Pakistan Linkage Politics

PROPOSALS FROM THE FACILITATORS

South China Sea- An Insight

Federal Law No. 19 of 1993 in respect of the delimitation of the maritime zones of the United Arab Emirates, 17 October 1993

MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES AND ARTICLE 298 OF UNCLOS. Christine Sim 24 August 2017

A Brief of Cambodia s Claims to Baselines and Maritime Zones By: Dany Channraksmeychhoukroth* (Aug 2015)

Seminar on the Establishment of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles under UNCLOS (Feb. 27, 2008)

Unit 3 (under construction) Law of the Sea

Vietnam s First Maritime Boundary Agreement

ISAS Insights No. 2 Date: 21 April 2005 (All rights reserved)

CHAPTER 100:01 MARITIME BOUNDARIES ACT ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS PART I PART II

INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE LAW OF THE SEA. The Rule of Law in the Seas of Asia: Navigational Chart for the Peace and Stability

} { THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES MESSAGE AGREEMENT WITH THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE MARITIME BOUNDARY

ISSUE BRIEF. Deep-rooted Territorial Disputes, Non-state Actors and Involvement of RAW

Geopolitics, International Law and the South China Sea

This document is downloaded from DR-NTU, Nanyang Technological University Library, Singapore.

Implementing UNCLOS: Legislative and Institutional Aspects at a National Level

12 August 2012, Yeosu EXPO, Republic of Korea. Session I I Asia and UNCLOS: Progress, Practice and Problems

IN THE HON BLE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, HEGUE IN THE MATTER OF (AEGEAN SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASE) GREECE... APPELLANT TURKEY...

We Beatrix, by the grace of God Queen of the Netherlands, Princess of Orange-Nassau, etc., etc., etc.

Tokyo, February 2015

India-Pakistan Relations: Post Pathankot

TERRITORIAL SEA AND EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE ACT

and the role of Japan

Joint Marine Scientific Research in Intermediate/Provisional

This article from Hague Justice Journal is published by Eleven international publishing and made available to anonieme bezoeker

TOF WHITE PAPER - SECTION re EXTENDED CONTINENTAL SHELF

Prospects of Pak-Russia Bilateral Relations

TERRITORIAL SEA AND EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 1977 No. 16 ANALYSIS

The Asian Way To Settle Disputes. By Tommy Koh and Hao Duy Phan

India-Pakistan Peace Process: Cautious Optimism

page 1 Delimitation Treaties Infobase accessed on 14/03/2002 DOALOS/OLA - UNITED NATIONS

Confidence and Cooperation in South Asian Waters 5th Annual Symposium Halifax & Washington, September 2005

EU-India relations post-lisbon: cooperation in a changing world New Delhi, 23 June 2010

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA

CHAPTER 371 THE MARITIME ZONES ACT 1989

Pranab Mukherjee s visit to Dhaka By Barrister Harun ur Rashid Former Bangladesh Ambassador to the UN, Geneva.

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA

TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO AND GRENADA ON THE DELIMITATION OF MARINE AND SUBMARINE AREAS

I. Is Military Survey a kind of Marine Scientific Research?

MARITIME ZONES ACT CHAPTER 371 LAWS OF KENYA

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE PAIK

TITLE 33. MARINE ZONES AND PROTECTION OF MAMMALS

The Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act, Act No. 30 of 23 October 1978, as amended by Act No. 19 of 1989

The Belt and Road Initiative: The China-Philippines relation in the South China Sea beyond the Arbitration

Peace Agreements Digital Collection

INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND CONFRONTATIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA FROM A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Game Changer in the Maritime Disputes

Media Briefing by External Affairs Minister at the end of 14th SAARC Summit

Definition of key terms

Policy Recommendation for South Korea s Middle Power Diplomacy: Maritime Security Policy

Prospects for the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea after Hague decision

Confidence and Cooperation in South Asian Waters 12th Symposium Bangkok, Thailand, October 2015

Resolution 211 (1965)

Be Happy, Share & Help Each Other!!!

Basic Maritime Zones. Scope. Maritime Zones. Internal Waters (UNCLOS Art. 8) Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone

The Government of the Republic of INDIA AND

China Pakistan Economic Corridor The Geo Strategic Dimension and Challenges. Majid Mahmood

India - US Relations: A Vision for the 21 st Century

33 CFR PART 329 DEFINITION OF NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES. Authority: 33 U.S.C. 401 et seq.

Submarine Cables & Pipelines under UNCLOS

The South China Sea Territorial Disputes in ASEAN-China Relations Aileen S.P. Baviera, University of the Philippines

Maritime Zones Act, 1999 (Act No. 2 of 1999) PART I PRELIMINARY

Some legal aspects of the drilling rig incident in the South China Sea in

Federal Act relating to the Sea, 8 January 1986

PCA PRESS RELEASE ARBITRATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA

Grenada Territorial Waters Act, No. 17 of 1978

Implications of the Indo-US Growing Nuclear Nexus on the Regional Geopolitics

The Legal Status of the Outer Continental Shelf without a Recommendation from the CLCS UNIVERSITY OF SHIZUOKA SHIZUKA SAKAMAKI

Reset in Pakistan-India Relations

Instrument of Modification of Joint Boundaries

Bangladesh v. India: A Positive Step Forward in Public Order of the Seas

ISAS Insights. Pakistan-India Detente: A Three-Step Tango. Shahid Javed Burki 1. No August 2012

THE PHILIPPINE BASELINES LAW

The United States & South Asia: New Possibilities. It is an honor to appear before the Senate Foreign

The Maritime Areas Act, 1984 Act No. 3 of 30 August 1984

Confidence and Cooperation in South Asian Waters 8th Symposium Bangkok, Thailand, June 2011

Tara Davenport Research Fellow Centre for International Law

Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman Jinnh, The Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985

A BILL FOR [SB. 240] [ ] Maritime Zones 2009 No. C 31. An Act to Repeal the Exclusive Economic Zone Act Cap. E17 LFN 2004 and the

UNCLOS INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR ROLES HELMUT TUERK*

Asian Security Challenges

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA

Pakistan s Policy Objectives in the Indian Ocean Region

The Role of India in Promoting Regional Cooperation in South Asia

confronting terrorism in the pursuit of power

The Law of the Sea Convention

Japan s Position as a Maritime Nation

Republic of Korea PARTIAL SUBMISSION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan INTRODUCTION

LAND AND MARITIME BOUNDARY (CAMEROON v. NIGERIA) 141 ILR 1

DECLARATION OF JUDGE AD HOC FRANCIONI

The Future of UNCLOS Dispute Settlement: Select Issues in the Light of Philippines v China. Iceland 29 June 2018 Dr Kate Parlett

SUBMISSION by. Government of the Republic of Côte d Ivoire. for the

CHAPTER 2. MARINE ZONES ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS

ISAS Brief. China-India Defence Diplomacy: Weaving a New Sense of Stability. P S Suryanarayana 1. No September 2012

MEMO 1 ON SLOVENIA-CROATIA

The strategic environment of the Asia Pacific region : addressing the challenges ahead

Conference Summary: Revisiting and Innovating Maritime Security Order in the Asia-Pacific. Nanjing, China November 2-4, 2016

Transcription:

CHAPTER V THE SIR CREEK DISPUTE AND THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS The India-Pakistan dispute over Sir Creek can be traced back to the pre-independence period, to around 1908, when an argument ensued between the rulers of Kutch and Sind over a pile of firewood lying on the banks of a creek dividing the two principalities. The dispute was taken up by the government of Bombay state, which, in 1914, gave its verdict supported by Map Number B44 and subsequently B74. 1 Nothing significant happened in the next 40-50 years, and the dispute again came alive only in the 1960s. This chapter has been broadly organised in three sections. The first section gives a brief description of the genesis of the dispute and outlines the basic causes of the dispute. The second section is an account of the negotiations between India and Pakistan so far. The last section is an effort to analyse these interactions in the light of the negotiation framework. A History of the Dispute Sir Creek, which is more of a fluctuating tidal channel, is a sixty-mile-long estuary in the _marshes of the Rann of Kutch. The Rann lies on the border between the Indian state of Gujarat and the Pakistani province of Sind. In 1965, after armed clashes, Pakistan asserted that half of the Rann along the 24th parallel was Pakistani territory. India countered that the boundary ran roughly along the northern edge of the Rann. The matter was referred to arbitration and the Indo-Pakistani Western Boundary Case tribunal's Award on February 19, 1968, upheld 90 percent of India's claim to the entire Rann, conceding small sectors to Pakistan. 1. Palash Kumar, 'Sir Creek Row Began Over Pile of Firewood', The Asian Age, 10 November, 1998. 139

The Sir Creek dispute originated after the parties had agreed before the Kutch tribunal to limit their larger dispute over the Rann to the boundary in the north. Well to the south lay an agreed boundary that began at the head of Sir Creek and ran a short distance eastward roughly along the 24th parallel. However, India's contention was that this line moved up sharply at a right angle to meet the northern boundary of the Rann. Pakistan sought to extend the line further eastward and claim half of the Rann along the 24th parallel. The sole issue, therefore, was whether the short agreed boundary from the head of Sir Creek went all the way east or rose at a right angle at its western end to reach the northern limit of the Rann. The tribunal accepted India's case that it did turn north and that the entire Rann was Indian. 2. The dispute hinges on the demarcation of the boundary from "the mouth of Sir Creek to th.e top of si:_cr~k" and from "the top of the Sir Creek eastwards to a point (on land) designated as the Western Terminus." The boundary thereafter has been fixed. A. G. Noorani writes: That the short agreed border from the head of Sir Creek eastward was excluded from the tribunal's consideration was understandable. Unfortunately, the parties agreed also to exclude the boundary from the head of Sir Creek downward to the west, right up to the mouth of the creek on the Arabian Sea; in short, the Indo-Pakistan boundary along Sir Creek. 3, According to a former Pakistani foreign secretary, "The adjudicators in 1968 did not discuss the Sir Creek because in the pre-partition documents the creek was clearly indicated as in Sind which is now in Pakistan". 4 India refutes this claim vehemently. The tribunal noted, "In view of the aforesaid agreement, the question 2. For a better understanding see map in Appendix IV. 3. A. G. Noorani, 'CBMs for the Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek and Wular Barrage,' in Michael Krepon and Amit Sevak, eds., Crisis Prevention. Confidence Building and Reconciliation in South Asia, St. Martin'~ Press, New York, 1995, p.loo. 4. Anwar Iqbal, 'Dialogue on Wular Begins Today as Sir Creek Talks Put Off,' News, 11 October, 1991. 140

concerning the Sir Creek part of the boundary is left out of consideration. " 5 It is this very Sir Creek part of the boundary that has become a bone of contention. India and Pakistan have so far held six rounds of discussions on the dispute. I According to the 1992-93 Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report, the talks failed to make any progress. India asserts that the boundary lies in the middle of the Creek. Pakistan claims that the line lies on the Creek's eastern bank, on the Indian side, and, therefore, the entire Creek is Pakistan's. The delineation of the Indo-Pakistani maritime boundary is linked to this determination. Pakistan insists that the boundary in the Creek first be delimited in order to establish the point on the land from which a sea boundary may be defined. India's concerns center on the maritime boundary. 6 Pakistan,.. ' /'' in its arguments, referred to the map on which India had relied prior to the tribunal and which does show the boundary on the eastern bank, on the Kutch side. Sind had claimed in 1905 that its boundary lay on the Kori Creek, which is well to the south of Sir Creek. A compromise was arrived at in 1913, approved by the Government of India, and recorded in a Resolution of the Government of Bombay, to which the map was attached. The map in the Appendix annexed to the Resolution of the Government of Bombay, dated February 24, 1914, recorded a compromise of the dispute between Kutch and Sind which was then part of the Bombay Presidency. 7 This Resolution is authoritative, and India's earlier reliance on it constitutes an admission in law. 8 Pakistan itself, however, had contended in a May 19, 1958 note that "this map was intended to be no more than an annexure to the Bombay Government 5. Indo-Pakistani Western Boundary Case Tribunal, 19 Feburary, 1968, cited in A.G. Noorani, op.cit., p.100. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid, p.lol. 8. Ibid. 141

Resolution" of February 24, 1914. Pakistan was right. It is the Resolution, not the attached map, that is decisive. 9 This Resolution refers to the Indian government's "sanction" on November 11, 1913, of the Kutch-Sind compromise over Kori Creek which the government of Bombay had spelled out in its letter of September 20, 1913. This letter refers to the line on the accompanying map "from the mouth of the' Sir Creek to the top of the Sir Creek", which ran on the Kutch side. It also contains a provision by the commissioner in Sind that suppo.rts India's stand. It reads : "He observed, however, that the Sir Creek changes its course from time to time and the Western boundary of the area, which it is proposed to surrender to the Rao [of Kutch], should therefore be described as the center of the navigable channel of the Sir Creek." 10 The Secretary to the Bombay government replied, "I am to explain that the term 'navigable' is really inappropriate in the larger sense. The Creek is, of course, tidal, and it is only at certain conditions of the tide that the channel is navigable only to the country craft as far as the point from which the proposed boundary turns due east from the Creek." 11 This does not contradict the Sind commissioner's condition but in fact endorses it. Negotiations on the Dispute During the first round of talks held in Islamabad on June 2, 1989, the Indian and Pakistani delegations were led by the Surveyor-General, Major General S.M. Chadha and the Surveyor-General, Major General Anis Ali Syed, respectively. At these talks, I the two sides only managed to discuss the fundamental aspects of the dispute, but no concrete results eventuated. 9. For details see The Kutch-Sind Border Question, Indian Society of International Law, New Delhi, 1965. 10. A.G. Noorani, op.cit., p.lol. 11. Ibid. 142

Later, at the second and third rounds of talks in 1990 and 1991, talks concluded without making any substantial progress. On October 28-29, 1991 the fourth round of talks were held in Rawalpindi. This time the delegations were led by I. P. Khosla of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and Pakistan's Defence Secretary, Salim Tilani. The Surveyors-General of the two countries also took part in these talks. Although during the talks the political desirability of coming to terms on the delineation of the boundary was apparent, the Surveyor General of Pakistan remained adamant about technical considerations and the linking of the delineation of the maritime boundary with the demarcation of the Sir Creek boundary. The difficulties were compounded by a theoretical debate on what factors should govern the determination of the mid-channel of the Creek which incidentally shifted quite often depending on the pattern of the tides. Concepts of "equidistance" and "equity" in demarcating the maritime boundary from the mouth of the Creek towards the open seas constituted subjects of lively debate but without results. 12 The' fifth round of talks on this dispute were held in New Delhi, on November 5-6, 1992, headed by the Additional Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Nareshwar Dayal and the Additional Secretary in the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Khalid Saleem. Technical experts from the Indian Navy were also part of the talks on this occasion. Although the Indian Navy had done its homework before the talks and had already conducted considerable research on the possible ways of defining a maritime boundary from the sea (whose starting point was undetermined), this issue unfortunately did not figure during the talks. 13 I 12. J.N. Dixit, Anatomy of A Flawed lnheritence. Konark Publications, New Delhi, 1995, p.157. 13. Rear Admiral K.R. Menon, (Retd.), 'Maritime Conflict Resolution and Confidence-Building in South-Asia', Indian Defence Review, October-December, 1995, p.32. Also see Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, 'Trends in Delimitation of India's Maritime Boundaries,' Strategic Analysis. Vol.XXII, No.lO, January, 1999, p.1519. 143

In 1994, an Indian official/technical delegation on the issue carried a "non-paper" to Pakistan which proposed that the delineation of the maritime boundary in the territorial sea could be governed by the 'median'/'equidistant' principle, using the low water lines and low tide elevations of both countries, whereas beyond the territorial sea it could be governed by 'equidistant' as well as 'equitable' principles. 14 Two years later, on September 10, 1996, Pakistan made a declaration that baselines should be drawn straight, consisting of a series of nine straight lines. India, which is yet to draw its base lines, rejected the declaration on the basis that 1 these lines are not in accordance with Article 7(2) of UNCLOS III. Besides, its point K lies off the eastern bank of Sir Creek. 15 But India and Pakistan are in agreement on the horizontal sector of the land boundary. Both agree to delimitation of a boundary line by existing boundary pillars along the horizontal line and fixation of intermediary pillars in the same line. 16 After the fifth round, the talks were shelved for a long time, and consequently, after six years, were again held at the Foreign Secretary level, first in June 1997 and then in September 1998. At these talks, India and Pakistan agreed to form seperate working groups for each of the six issues and one of them was the Sir Creek dispute. Each issue was to be taken up by its concerned working group as apart of a composite dialogue process. The talks of the Sir Creek working group were ultimately held on November 8, 1998 in New Delhi. The Indian side was represented by the Surveyor General of India, Lt. General A.K. Ahuja, whereas the Pakistani delegation was headed by Rear Admiral M. Jameel Akhtar. As a part of the composite dialogue process these talks sought to 14. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, op.cit., p.152. 15. See Government of India, 'Suggestions and Confidence- Building Measures Sent by the Government of India to the Government of Pakistan,' Non-paper, 24 January, 1994. 16. See 'Non-paper' op.cit., 24 January, 1994. 144

promote mutual cooperation and build trust and confidence by addressing the pending outstanding issues. At the talks, the Indian side put forward a proposal for the finalisation of the boundaries on the basis of the following four steps: 1. Allocation. A decision on the basis of which the settlement would be made. 2. Delimitation. This specified the general criteria for the location of the boundary line and its description. This description would or would not be accompanied by illustrative maps. 3. Demarcation. This procedure involved the precise actual relaying of the criteria of delimitation to the ground. 4. Administration. This called for regulating the demarcated boundary and exercising administrative control. The Indian side asserted that in the Sir Creek area the allocation and delimitation were done vide paras 9 and 10 of the 1914 Resolution and illustrated on an accompanying map (B-44). Demarcation and administration was already complete in 1925. Since then, the boundary in Sir Creek has been depicted in the mid-channel by a proper boundary symbol. There was no need to erect pillars in the middle of the Creek, since it is a natural fluid boundary. The administration of this territory remained with Kutch and was so inherited by the Governments of India and Pakistan. 17 Indian officials pointed out that Pakistan, while emphasising the 1914 map, was overlooking the basis on which several such maps had been made. The ruling in 1913 of the Government of Bombay, which resolved the dispute on Sir Creek between the then Maharao of Kutch and the rulers of Sind, was the basis for making several sequential maps. This ruling was subsequently endorsed as a resolution by the Government of India in 1914. 18 17. 'India- Pakistan Talks: Sir Creek,' Hindu, 7 November, 1998. 18. 'India Rejects Pak. Move on Sir Creek,' Hindu, lo November, 1998. 145

India also conveyed to Pakistan that the issue should be addressed while taking into account the overall perspective, so that this boundary, which is already settled and in respect of which all four steps relating to boundary demarcation have already been completed, is fonnalised. 19 Pakistan, while agreeing that the boundary along the horizontal line and in Sir Creek was a settled issue, maintained that in its interpretation the Green Line (denoting the eastern edge of the Creek) of the map, appendixed to the 1914 Resolution, should be transposed on to the ground. Even when it was conveyed by India that the Resolution of 1914 had already been implemented and the Green Line was only a symbolic representation, the boundary being mid-channel, Pakistan persisted with its position on the Green Line boundary. 20 The Indian delegation also proposed that, pending formalisation of the boundary in the Sir Creek, the two sides could consider the delimitation of the India-Pakistan maritime boundary from the seaward side, by commencing at Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) limit and proceeding landwards upto a mutually acceptable limit I according to the provisions of the Technical Aspects of Law of Sea (TALOS). seaward approach, India pointed out, is based on internationally accepted principles and will benefit both countries for the exploitation of resources in their respective EEZ. It is noteworthy that this issue gained importance in view of the continental shelf claims, to be submitted by 2004, to the United Nations by the concerned countries. 21 The Pakistani delegations' assertion at the talks was that it would consider a maritime boundary only after the determination of the land boundary in the Sir Creek area and that both these issues should not be delinked and separated,and needed to be addressed in one package. India alleged that Pakistan's attitude reflected its desire to The 19. 'India-Pakistan Talks; Sir Creek', Hindu, 7 November, 1998. 20. Ibid..21. Ibid. 146

seek an absolute resolution from the map to the exclusion of internationally accepted cartographic procedures as well as the historical developments that have taken place over the years. 22 In recent years, the demarcation of frontiers in this area has shown prospects of major commercial dividends. This border, once defined, can be the basis of I determining maritime boundaries which are usually drawn as extensions on the sea from reference points on land. Maritime boundaries help in defining the limits of the EEZ and the continental shelves. The EEZ which extends to 200 nautical miles can then be subjected to subsequent commercial exploitation. 23 The demarcation of the maritime boundaries has acquired fresh urgency on account of the likely presence of oil and gas along the seabed in this zone. Given the high commercial importance of the area, Pakistan is insisting on defining the extremity of its land frontier in the Sir Creek area in a manner which will give it a control over larger EEZ. The Pakistani EEZ will be enlarged by around 250 square miles in case India accepts the Green Line showing Sir Creek's eastern bank as the land boundary for the purpose of drawing maritime frontiers. Pakistan has rejected the mid-channel principle as proposed by India, pointing out that this principle applies only to a 'navigable channel' and Sir Creek, it says, is non-navigable. 24 Refuting the Pakistani arguments, Chief Hydrographer, Rear Admiral K.R. Srinivasan said, "The mid-channel principle on Sir Creek was endorsed by the 'Para nine and Para ten' of the 1914 resolution. This was represented in the final map of 1925 by the 'proper boundary symbols. " 25 Rejecting the Pakistani claim that the Creek was non-navigable and, therefore, not conducive for commercial use, Indian 22. Ibid. 23. 'India Rejects Pak. Move on Sir Creek Issue,' Hindu, 10 November, 1998... 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 147

officials asserted that the channel could be used for navigation during the entire year, especially during high tides. Pakistani officials needed more time, as unlike India they had not completed the hydrographic survey of the area between Gujrat and Sind. 26 At the November 8, 1998 talks in New Delhi, India objected to Pakistan's bid to internationalise the Sir Creek issue, reiterating that all differences between New Delhi and Islamabad, after the Simla Accord, had to be resolved bilaterally. Pakistan was of the view that India should agree to its proposal to take the dispute to an international tribunal. Speaking on behalf of the Indian delegation, the Joint Secretary, handling Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan in the Foreign Office, Vivek Katiu said, "There is no place at all for any third party intervention in the Indo-Pakistani matters following the Simla accord. " 27 He also said that arbitration was unacceptable under the framework of the composite dialogue between the two sides and all issues were to be addressed by the two sides directly. In the end the talks, however, concluded without any progress being made in terms of resolution. The two sides agreed to continue their discussions in the future. Analysis of the Negotiations After almost six rounds of talks on the Sir Creek dispute, India and Pakistan have failed to come to any reasonable and satisfactory resolution. This reveals that there are some aspects of the dispute which are very difficult to bridge between India and Pakistan. Let us look at these talks from the perspectives of ripeness, pre-negotiation and negotiation. Ripeness. The fact that the sixth round of talks were held after a gap of six years, in 1998, indicates that the leadership in India and Pakistan have again shown a --------------------! 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 148

desire to resolve this dispute peacefully. When I.K. Gujral was the Prime Minister of India, Secretary-level talks were held with Pakistan in June 1997. After his government fell, Atal Behari Vajpayee became the Prime Minister in March 1998. In its one year tenure, the Vajpayee government showed a keenness to resolve various pending disputes and, once again, Secretary-level talks ensued, in September 1998, in which India and Pakistan agreed to address all outstanding issues under the framework of a two-plus-six composite dialogue which also included the Sir Creek dispute. During these talks, it was agreed to hold talks in November 1998, and a high-level delegation met in New Delhi. The Delhi talks were held after a break of six years. In 1991, when talks were last held, the Pakistani Foreign Secretary Sharyar Khan said, "Both the disputes (Wular Barrage and Sir Creek) can be resolved if there is a desire to do so. " 28 In reply, J.N. Dixit, the then Indian High Commissioner in Islamabad observed," A process for peace has been continuing for the last two years. The talks are a step in the right direction and in response to the real needs and aspirations of the peoples of India and Pakistan. " 29 Deep technical differences and the linking of the Sir Creek boundary demarcation with the maritime boundary demarcation have turned out to be the major reasons for the failure of the talks. The problem of the maritime boundary demarcation to determine the limits of the EEZ and continental shelves has been further complicated by the emerging prospects of oil and gas along the seabed in this zone. Oil has increased the stakes of the two parties in the dispute. As the economic importance of the region under dispute gains strength, it will become more difficult to tackle it. Although Sir Creek does not have any strategic significance, it is important in terms of the commercial benefits which can accrue to both countries, if oil and gas are found 28. See Anwar Iqbal, op.cit. 29. Ibid. 149

there. This factor has led to an unrelenting attitude on both sides, diminishing the chances of any compromise. At the same time, the lure of economic benefits may help in resolving the dispute. If both the parties come to the conclusion that ari agreement would bring them dividends, then they may well negotiate seriously. As things stand, there is a great deal of difference between the approach that should be followed regarding how to settle this dispute. Pakistan insists on involving a third party by taking the dispute to an international tribunal. India rejects this idea and repeats that the dispute should be resolved bilaterally in the spirit of the Simla accord without third party mediation. The absence of a willingness to settle the issue.through comp;omise on the basis of an agreed approach will cause a further breakdown between the two. For the moment, in the light of the criteria of ripeness, the dispute does not look ripe for settlement. Preneeotiations. India and Pakistan are basically still in the prenegotiation stage. Although no agreement has been reached in the past six round of talks, the parties have been successful to the extent of defining the problem. They have made their views and standpoints clear to each other, and discussions have so far covered all aspects of the issue. In the process, however, both have held on to different definitions of the dispute. We have seen how wide the differences are between the two sides on the question of linking the two boundaries, the basis of demarcation, the authenticity of the maps, the seaward side delimitation, the median/equidistant and equitable principle, among others. India and Pakistan have so far only a shown commitment to resume the long-stalled talks and nothing more. Some political will in resuming negotiations has also been evident but differences. over the technical issues have eluded resolution. During the negotiations, technical experts from both sides, including the Surveyors-general,.have participated and discussed the issue in minute detail. The 150

exchange of data, maps and other documents, have helped to determine the limits of their incompatible viewpoints. For the futurte, both must find a basis for accommodation of other's standpoints and come up with an implementable final agreement. Neeotiations. The six rounds of talks have made every piece of information available to both the parties and made each other aware of the other's plans. However, neither has showed much signs of compromise. That is the reason why talks have proved futile in producing any settlement. In 1994, India had sent a "non paper" on Sir Creek, but it evoked little interest in Pakistan. 30 There are several unfinished tasks which need to be accomplished for a better understanding of the dispute. Pakistan, unlike India, is yet to complete the hydrographic survey between Gujarat and Sind. Similarly, India has yet to declare its base lines as required by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS). 31 Having said that, after several rounds of discussion, a consensus has developed regarding the horizontal sector of the land boundary and hopefully both will accept the boundary line as defined by the existing boundary pillars along the horizontal line as well as by fixing intermediary pillars on the same alignment if required. 32 Amement. From the preceding analysis, it is clear that there are still many issues relating to the dispute that need to be discussed. The dispute is still in the prenegotiation stage, where every minute detail is being worked out and discussed. Both parties have at least agreed.to resume the talks after a long gap, and this is very encouraging. But it will be some more time before the dispute becomes ripe enough to produce a final agreement. 30. Please refer op.cit., Non-Paper, 24 January, 1994. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 151