land EE 1 r.lata Intercept Technoloav_Unit

Transcription

1 Ml COITàlHED SB&RET/ORCON/NOFORN CLASSIFIED IT fislss/dmh/ksr/eak FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 05/17/2006 To: General Counsel Inspection Operational Technology Counterterrorism Attn: Attn Attn Attn NSLB Julie F. Thomas IIS ERF EOPS SSA[ UC - From: Approved By: Drafted By: CaseID#: Contact: ÌM. (S) SA dnv Title: INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD MATTERS Synopsis: Pursuant to NFIPM, Section 2-56, the following is a report of an error in a FISA matter. Declassify Arimi ni at-rahvo C^) Reference contact between SA J Division and UC Ele LlUIllU Surveillance Opsrat.inn.g &.qha-r-ing Unit (EOPS) ; contact between SA[ land EE 1 r.lata Intercept Technoloav_Unit (DITU) ; contact between SA and SSA Internet-i nri^l Tprrnrigm Onpr^Fmns Section (ITOS).-I Details: SA of the Division was participating in a 60-day TDY assignment (02/26/ /26/2006) to the Counterterrorism Division, EOPS Unit, when an alleged error in FISA collection occurred. SEj^ET/ORCON/NOFORN U-^, ' " ywfl I I ^» ^... L) - M o b NSL VIO-850 I? r a - OUU

2 Si&RET/ORCON/NOFORN To: General Counsel From:, 7 Re : HQ-C VIO, 05/17/2006 l ±J b7d b7a isij b7a isij i b7d b7a SEjhyST/ORCON/NOFORN 2 NSL VIO-851

3 Sgfi^ET/ORCON/NOFORN To: General Counsel From: Re : HQ-C VI(1), VIO, 05/1' 65/17/2006 b 7 E 3) b7a b7d b7a (S) b7d b7a b7d b7a is)j b7d b7a b7a SEJ&&ET/ ORCON/NOFORN b7a NSL VIO-852

4 S9^ET/0RC0N/N0F0RN To: General Counsel From: t>2 Re-0* HQ-C VIO, 05/17/2006 m b7a 2 A NSL VIO-853

5 S I^ET / ORCON/NOFORN 1U) To: General Counsel From: ^ Re : i^f HQ-C VIO, 05/17/2006 LEAD(s): Set Lead 1: (Action) OPERATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AT ERF - DITU, OUANTICO. VA b7a SECRET/ORC 5 NSL VIO-854

6 (kov ) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Precedence: DEADLINE 05/12/2 006 Date: 05/09/2006 To: General Counsel.Inspection From : Approved By: RA Contact: JSA Attn: NSLB Attn: Internal Investigations N IS UICIiâSSlHED EXC1 Drafted By; Case ID #: 278-HQ-C VIO I-C71404 _ Title: SA SSRA 1 TNTFT.T.THENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD DIVISION Synopsis: Reference: Report of IOB violation for 278-HQ-C VIO Serial HQ-C Serial F-HQ-A Serial F-HQ-A Serial 172 (IOB) VIOLATION Division. (S) Details b7a Contact has been made between writer and Counterterrorism ITOS 1/ CONUS 2 to take corrective measures to jijul> Offals " O f ^ \ NSL VIO-855

7 A To: General Coun.1 From: 1 Re: 2 78-HQ-C VIO, 05/09/2006 include an additional extension from FBIHQ and assurance that future IOB violations will not occur. To avoid future conflicts with pending paperwork between land FBIHQ all future requests will be submitted with a deadline and a tickler will be set for follow-up. A tickler will be set 3 0 days prior to expiration of any Pis for submission of extension EC. A follow-up tickler will then be set for 15 days prior to expiration, and a final tickler will be set for five days prior to extension if no approval has been received from FBIHQ. A 2 NSL VIO-856

8 To: General Coun. _1 From: Re: 2 78-HQ-C VIO, 05/09/2006 LEAD(S): Set Lead 1: (Discretionary) GENERAL COUNSEL AT WASHINGTON. DC For information and action deemed appropriate Set Lead 2 : (Discretionary) INSPECTION AT WASHINGTON, DC For information and action deemed appropriate 3 NSL VIO-857

9 (01/26/1998) JPSÇRE1 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Precedence : ROUTINE Date: 07/17/2006 TO! From: Counterterrorism Inspection Attn: Attn: Attn: Office of the General Counsel NSLB/CTLU I/LX-1 3S100 Contact: SAC, CDC AD, TTO.q T. PONTTS IIS Approved By: Drafted By: Thomas Julie Case ID # : (S HQ-C VIO {Pending) (U! Title:y^) INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD MATTER, IOB 2006j ~ Synopsis:It is the opinion of the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) that this matter need not be reported to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB). Our analysis follows. m (UJ Reference «K Derive Declas^fy G-3 06/20/ HQ-C VIO-" 13S"7 Details By electronic communication (EC)from dated May 9, 2 006, The Field Office reported possie IOB error in conjunction with a counterterrorism investigation. b 2 OIG/DOJ REVIEW: FBI INVESTIGATI OiG.'DOJ INVESTIGATION: DATE: li uhi SECRET NSL VIO-858

10 SECRET To:[ "frield Office From: Office of the General Counsel Re: 278-HQ-C VIO, 07/17/2006 (S). b7a b7a - As required by Executive Order (E.O.) (Sept. 13, 1993) and Section 2-56 of the National Foreign Intelligence Program Manual (NFIPM), OGC was tasked to determine whether the errors described herein are matters that should be reported to the IOB. We believe that the reported activity does not require IOB notification. Section II.C.4. of the October 31, 2003 AG Guidelines states in pertinent part: 4 SECRET NSL VIO-859

11 SECRET To: From: Field Office Ottice of the General Counsel Re: 278-HQ-C VIO, 07/17/2006 :sj The Attorney General 1 s Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations (NSIG) provision regarding the duration of Preliminary Investigations is primarily administrative in nature. It was designed in part to protect the rights of United States persons by limiting the length of time that the FBI can conduct a PI without periodic oversight by the proper authorities. In this instance, OGC is not required to report the potential I OB error because the only investigative activity which undertook with respect to the non-usper subject was to have the results of previously served NSLs analyzed.^ d7e Based upon these facts, in accordance with the terms implementing the reporting requirements of Section 2.4 of EO 12863, it is our opinion that any error which may have been committed by Atlanta need not be reported to the IOB. OGC requests that the Inspection Division retain a record of the report of a potential IOB matter for three years, together with a copy of this opinion for possie review by the Counsel to the IOB. 3 NSL VIO-860

12 S ET To:I 1 Field Office From: Office of the General Counsel Re: 278-HQ-C VIO, 07/17/2006 LEAD(s): Set Lead 1: (Action) INSPECTION AT WASHINGTON. DC OGC requests that the Inspection Division retain a record of the report of a potential IOB matter for three years, together with a copy of this opinion for possie review by the Counsel to the IOB. Set Lead 2: (Info) COUNTERTERRORISM AT WASHINGTON. DC Read and clear. Set Lead 3: (Action) AT For action deemed appropriate. 1 - Ms. Thomas 1 - l IOB Library SECRET 4 NSL VIO-861

13 S^SRET FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/07/2006 To: Inspection General Counsel From: [ ] Sq 8 Contact: Approved By: ^ SSA Attn: IIS, Room Attn: NSLB, Room 7975 Drafted By: F< (U> - CaseID#: Title: (S) Synopsis:To 278-HO-C129Q7^fi-VTn- SA i A / 3Â INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) ERROR report possie IOB error. Der iveotp^qb^t G - 3 Dec 1 a^siiyony^o 6 / 0 7 / ( U ) j A ^ 3. Possie IOB Error: (S) (Ui X) 4. Description of (R)/ S^ÎSÇET 1 li NSL VIO-862 O "U-5C9

14 SJ òret Inspection From: [" 2 78-HQ-C VTO, 06/07/2006 (S) SEJS} NSL VIO-863

15 To: Inspection From: Re: (S) HQ-C VIO, 06/07/2006 LEAD(s): Set Lead 1: (Action) INSPECTION AT WASHINGTON, DC Set Lead 2 : For action deemed appropriate. (Action) GENERAL COUNSEL AT WASHINGTON, DC For action deemed appropriate. NSL VIO-864

16 JSï&SRET FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Precedence ROUTINE Date : 07/14/2006 To; Attn: Attn: CDC SSA From: Counterintelligence Inspection Attn: Attn: CD - 3D IIS CRS Office of the General Counsel National Security Law Bi/anch/CILU/Room 7947 Contact: AGC Approved By: Thomas.Tulip F M E M - Drafted By: m D9 I Case ID #: 278-HQ-C VIO (Pending) Title: ) INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD MATTER Synopsis:{X It is the opinion of the Office of the General Counsel ("OGC")that the referenced matter need not be reported to the Intelligence Oversight Board("IOB"). A copy of this opinion should be retained in the control file for review by counsel to the IOB. (Ü) Reference: (S) Derived F Declassify D e t a i l s. : w a v Q f Electronic: rnmmnni rat i on dated 06/07/2006 / "L, _ II TTI/-1II \ j I (the "EC"), the] field office 1 requested that OGC review the facts of the captioned matter and determine whether it warrants reporting to the IOB. In our opinion, it does not. Our analysis follows. OSG/DOJ REVIEW:] FB! INVESTIGATION. OSG'DOJ INVESTIGATION"^ hl SÉ)S^ET NSL VIO-865

17 sà^çet 'SI xaj dt :s) timely brought this matter to the attention'of the FBI OGC, National Security Law Branch, and the FBI Inspection Division. OGC and the Inspection Division received the matter for review and handling on 6/28/2006. Js^ Section 2-56 of the National Foreign Intelligence Policy Manual (NFIPM) requires the OGC to determine whether the facts discussed above must be reported to the IOB. Section 2.4 of Executive Order (EO) 12863, dated September 13, 1993, mandates that Inspectors General and the General Counsel of Intelligence Community components (in the FBI, the Assistant Director, Inspection Division, and OGC respectively), report to the IOB all information "concerning intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be J^SRET NSL VIO-866

18 SEKRET unlawful or contrary Directive". :o Executive Order or Presidential ^JS^In this case, failure to extend or close the Investigation prior to the date that the Investigation expired constitutes an administrative oversight and was not an attempt to circumvent the preliminary investigation process. Support for this position lies in the fact that the reason for this oversight appears to be the original agent's retirement combined with the subsequently assigned agent 1 s review of the Investigation's file in order to become familiar with the facts therein. Once SA was familiar with the Investigation, she was ae to determine wnether to resume the Investigation or close it. (TJ - minimus ^ts^m reover / the late extension request was de No investigation took place during the time that the Investigation had expired. SA commenced a timely review of the File and discovered that an NSL was outstanding in the Investigation. SA then waited until the requested extension of the Investigation was granted before collecting the documents pursuant to the authority under the NSL. (V) - Based upon the foregoing, this matter will not be reported to the IOB, but will be placed in the control file for a period of three (3) years for review by the Counsel to the IOB. NSL VIO-867

19 SECRET LEAD(s): Set Lead 1: (Info) AT b7 Set Lead 2: Read and clear. (Info) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AT WASHINGTON. DC Set Lead 3: Read and clear. (Discretionary) INSPECTION AT WASHINGTON. DC INSD should retain a record of the report of the potential IOB matter, as well as a copy of the OGC opinion concluding that IOB notification is not required, for three (3)years, for possie review by the Counsel to the IOB. CC: Ms. Thomas IOB Library NSL VIO-868

20 (Rev. 01-' ) SÇC^ET FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Precedence: DEADLINE 06/14/2006 Date: 06/30/2006 To: General Counsel Attn: Inspection Division From : ] SAC Squad Contact: ASAC Approved By: Attn: NSLB Internal Investigations Section Drafted By: Case ID #: ;U)!U) 27 8-HQ-C VIO 278-AT-C71404 Pending) Title: ( u : SA L_r SSA~[ INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD (IOB) VIOLATION ATLANTA DIVISION Synopsis: Reference: Details: Report of IOB violation for Atlanta Division. 278-HQ-C Serial HQ-C Serial F-HQ-A Serial F-HQ-A Serial 172 (S)f b7d (Si (&Ì iiiv ö«jo3 ofe / 7 / 7 / / ^ S&SRET NSL VIO-869 ~C"\ 1 *) ^v? î '"-.'x Hj J s^j "" \ j " 4? I ; b7d

21 To: General Counsel From: Re: 2 78-HQ-C VI, 06/30/2006 This report is made past deadline due to administrative oversight. 2 NSL VI0870

22 X To: General Counsel From: HQ - C VI, 06/30/2006 LEAD (s) : Set Lead 1 : (Discretionary) GENERAL COUNSEL AT WASHINGTON, DC For information and action deemed appropriate Set Lead 2 : (Discretionary) INSPECTION AT WASHINGTON, DC For information and action deemed appropriate I81wc01.ec 2 A NSL VIO-871

23 (Rev ) SE^ET FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Precedence: DEADLINE 06/14/2006 Zo: General Counsel Attn NSLB Date: 07/06/2006 Inspection Division Attn: Internal Investigations Section From: Approved By: Drafted By: IT-l/JTTF Contact : SA Case ID #: 278-HQ-C VIO (Pending)" 278-AT-C71404 (Pending)-. 0*5 (S) Title: 1 ss: SA INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD DIVISION (IOB) VIOLATION Synopsis: Correction of telephone number included in report of IOB violation for Division. Reference: 278-HQ-C VIO Serial AT-C Serial 93 Details : (SJ b7d 'RET NSL VIO-872

24 A To: General Counsel From: Re: 278-HQ-C VIO, 07/06/2006 b7d SE^ET 2 NSL VIO-873

25 To: General Counsel From: Re: 2 78-HQ-C VIO, 07/06/2006 LEAD(s): Set Lead Is (Discretionary) GENERAL COUNSEL AT WASHINGTON. DC For information and action deemed appropriate. Set Lead 2 s (Discretionary) INSPECTION AT WASHINGTON. DC For information and action deemed appropriate. I87wc01.ec SÈCj^ET 3 NSL VIO-874

26 (Rev ) SEJ2flET FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Precedence : To: ROUTINE Date: 7/11/2006 Attn : [ SAC Squad Inspection Attn: Internal Investigative Section Attn: Room From: Approved By: General Counsel National Security Law Branch/CTLU 1/LX-1_3S-100 Contact: Thomas Julie F m m- Drafted By: CaseID#: Title: 278-HQ-C VIO Intelligence Oversight Board IOB) Matter Synopsis:It is the opinion of the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) that the above referenced matter need not be reported to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB). Our analysis follows. Reference: Deriveâ^gçoiïi: G-3 Decla^sxfyÒì«^ XI HQ-C VIO Serial 1474 (Pending) 97»-aT-r71 4D4.qpr^l en I PpriH i nrtl Administrative : This communication contains one or more footnotes. To read the footnotes, download and print the document in Corel WordPerfect. (UJ Details: By electronic communication fec) dated June 30, 2006 and referenced above, the Division reported to the OGC's National Security Law Branch (NSLB) and the Inspection Division this potential IOB matter. 0ÎG/D0J REVIEW- FBI INVESTIGATE 0IG/D0J INVESTIGATION: DATE; lljmi { - NSL VIO-875

27 S^RET "ounterterrorism From: General Counsel -e: h(f 2 ^ 8 - HQ-C VIO, 7/11/2006 b7d m b7d b7d ANALYSIS b7d SEjPREl NSL VIO-876

28 S^SRET U) To: Counterterrorism From: General Counsel Re: y^ 27 --HQ-C VIO, 7/11/2006 i&k As required by Executive Order (E.O.) (Sept. 13, 1993) ani "Section 2-56 of the National Foreign Intelligence Program Manual (NFIPM), OGC was tasked to determine whether the errors described here are matters that should be reported to the IOB. We believe that the reported activity does not require IOB notification. Section 2.4 of E.O mandates that the heads of Intelligence Community components report all information to the IOB that it deems necessary to carry out its responsibilities. That section requires Inspectors General and General Counsel of the Intelligence Community to report."intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive." This language has been interpreted to mandate the reporting of any violation of guidelines or regulations approved by the Attorney General, in accordance with E.O , if such provision was designed in full or in part to protect the individual rights of a United States person. This includes violations of agency procedures issued under E.O , unless they involve purely administrative matters. 3 For the FBI, OGC submits reports to the IOB. 4 I NSIG (Introduction) at 4. Section 2-56 of the NFIPM identifies as reportae to the IOB unauthorized investigations, the use of unlawful methods and techniques, exceeding the authorized scope 2 See EC from Inspection Division to All Divisions; Title: Revised Procedures for the Submission of Reports of Potential Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) Matters, Case ID # 66F-HQ-A Serial 172 at 5-6 (2/10/2005). The FBI is required to maintain for three years records of administrative violations, for possie review by the Counsel to the IOB, together with a copy of the opinion concerning the basis for the determination that IOB notification was not required. Id. at 6. 4 ()*( See icl. at 4. SI^tET A NSL VIO-877

29 S^éRET : 3 : Counterterrorism From: General Counsel Re:X HQ-C VIO, 7/11/2006 of permitted activities, and failing to adhere to minimization requirements. : this instance, the FBI sought telephone records for a telephone number believed to be used by the investigative subject based on current information, 6 and obtained electronic data on a telephone number via an NSL that was properly authorized. Thus, the investigative method was authorized for purposes of E.O See National Foreign Intelligence Program Manual (NFIPM) Section 2-56.G.5. Accordingly, this need not be reported to the IOB pursuant to Section 2.4 of E.O See also id. at 5, identifying reportae matters as including: (1) activities believed to be unlawful or contrary to Executive Orders "i" 13^""" or Presidential directi ves : (?) suspected <"»f the Constitution; (3] 5 W initiating a form of electronic surveillance or a search without authorization from the FISC, or failing to terminate an authorized surveillance at the time prescribed by the Court; and (6) failing to adhere to the minimization or dissemination requirements specified in a FISC Order. b7d ve^ei NSL VIO-878

30 (Rev SÌSCkET BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 07/10/2006 To! From: Inspection Counterterrorism Approved By! Attn: Attn: Attn: IIS ITPS 1/CONUS 4/Team 15 SSA ~1 IA I ssa] SA ZZL 1 General Counsel National Security Law ^ranch/ctlu l/lx-1 3S-123 Contact: a Thomas Julie F p r Drafted By: CaseID#: Ì kdm is2\ 278-HQ-C VIO* (Pending) 278- l36372,_jpen< ing) Titlei INTELLIGENCE OVER S T fwt BOARD (IOB) MATTER Synopsis:(&< It is the opinion of the Office of General Counsel (OGC) that this matter need not be reported to the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB). Our analysis follows. K> Derived Declassi G-3 07/10/2031 Reference: 2 78-HQ-C VIO Serial Rl Li O^-i (S) 0IGID0J REVIEW. FBI INVESTIGATE QlGIDQJ INVESTIGATION: NSL VIO-879

31 SECRET To: Re: Inspection From: General Counsel 2 78-HQ-C VIO, 07/10/2006 tu) Details:Ç&1 By Electronic Communications 15, and referenced above, the reported this potential IOB matter. (EC) dated June Division is) Safeguards are now in place to prevent such proems in the future. Hhas disseminated a revised "sample" EC, to ensure that the correct items will be placed in the lead and attention ocks. Furthermore, FBI HQ (CTD) instructed the field to forebear all investigative activity prior to the receipt of written authorization granting extensions. SECRET 2 A NSL VIO-880

32 RET!U) To: Inspection From: General Counsel Re: Cß^ 2 78-HQ-C VIO, 07/10/2006 Section 2.4 of Executive Order (E.O.) 12863, dated 09/13/1993, mandates that Inspectors General and General Counsels of the Intelligence Community components (in the FBI, the Assistant Director, INSD, and the General Counsel, OGC, respectively) report to the IOB "concerning intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive." By longstanding agreement between the FBI and the IOB (and its predecessor, the PIOB), this language has been interpreted to mandate the reporting of any violation of a provision of the Attorney General Guidelines for National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (NSIG) or other guidelines or regulations approved by the Attorney General in accordance with E.O , dated 12/04/1981, if such provision was designed in full or in part to ensure the protection of the individual rights of U.S. persons. Violations of provisions that are essentially administrative in nature need not be reported to the IOB. The FBI is required, however, to maintain records of such administrative violations so that the Counsel to the IOB may review them upon request. ' ṮT > With regard to the continuation of an FBI PI, Section II.C.4 of the NSIG provides in pertinent part that: (3) Although this provision of the NSIG is primarily administrative in nature, it was designed in part to protect the rights of U.S. persons by limiting the length of time that the FBI can conduct a PI without periodic oversight. (S) S^SÇRET 3 NSL VIO-881

33 SECRET To: Inspection From: General Counsel Re: ^ ^ HQ-C VIO, 07/10/2006 OGC requests that the Inspection Division retain a record of the report of a potential IOB matter for three years, together with a copy of this opinion for possie review by the Counsel to the IOB. 2 Section II.A.1 of the NSIG, which is about Threat Assessments, provides in pertinent part that: The FBI may, without opening a preliminary or full investigation, engage in the following activities to investigate or collect information relating to threats to the national security, including infrirmat-inn r^-n fo 1 (S) 1. In the NSIG, Section VIII, the definition of puicly availae includes "information that is obtained by visiting any place or attending any event that is open to the puic." SÈ^RET NSL VIO-882

34 S^&ET To: Inspection From: General Counsel Re: 2 78-HQ-C VIO, 07/10/2006 LEAD(s): Set Lead 1: (Action) INSPECTION AT WASHINGTON, DC OGC requests that the Inspection Division retain a record of the report of a potential IOB matter for three years, together with a copy of this opinion for possie review by the Counsel to the IOB. Set Lead 2: (Info) CQUNTERTERRORISM AT WASHINGTON. DC Set Lead 3: Read and clear. (Discretionary) For action deemed appropriate. 2 sfe^feet A NSL VIO-883

35 SE^ET To: Counterterrorism From: General Counsel Re; (X 21B - HQ-C VIO, 7/11/2006 LEAD ( s) : Set Lead 1 : (Discretionary) AT For review and action deemed appropriate, Set Lead 2: (Discretionary) COUNTERTERRORISM AT ITOS1/CONUS 2, WASHINGTON, DC Set Lead 3 : For review and action deemed appropriate. (Action) INSPECTION AT WASHINGTON, DC As provided in the Revised Procedures for the Submission of Reports of Potential Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) Matters, retain a record of the report of a potential IOB matter for three years for possie review by the Counsel to the IOB, together with a copy of the OGC opinion concerning the basis for the determination that IOB notification is not required. SJK^ET NSL VIO-884