Preventing Extremism and Radicalisation: Guidance

Transcription

1 Preventing Extremism and Radicalisation: Guidance January 2017

2 Any member of staff or student at Springwood High School who have any concerns regarding the issues identified within this guidance should report those concerns immediately and no later than the end of the working day to the Designated Safeguarding Lead (DSL). 1 Introduction The current threat from Terrorism and Extremism in the United Kingdom is real and severe and can involve the exploitation of vulnerable people, including children and young people. This guidance is designed to provide a clear framework to structure and inform our response to safeguarding concerns for those young people who may be vulnerable to the messages of extremism. In addition, it provides details of the local inter agency process and expectations in identifying appropriate interventions based on the threshold of need and intervention model and the Channel process. Radicalisation is defined as the process by which people come to support terrorism and extremism and, in some cases, to then participate in terrorist groups. Extremism is vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas (HM Government Prevent Strategy, 2011). 2 Equality, Diversity and Community Cohesion Springwood High School aims to guide students to understand others, to promote common values and to value diversity, to promote awareness of human rights and of the responsibility to uphold and defend them, and to develop the skills of participation and responsible action. We take extremely seriously our key role in preparing all our young people for life in modern Britain. We aim to encourage working towards a society with a common vision and sense of belonging by all. Communities; a society in which the diversity of people s backgrounds and circumstances is appreciated and valued; a society in which similar life opportunities are available to all; and a society in which strong and positive relationships exist and continue to be developed in the workplace, in schools and in the wider community.

3 3 National Guidance and Strategies PREVENT is a key part of the Government s strategy to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Early intervention is at the heart of PREVENT in diverting people away from being drawn into terrorist activity. PREVENT happens before any criminal activity takes place. It is about recognising, supporting and protecting people who might be susceptible to radicalisation. The PREVENT strategy objectives are: Ideology: respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it. Individuals: prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support Institutions: work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address. All staff should have an awareness of the PREVENT agenda and the various forms radicalisation takes in being able to recognise signs and indicators or concern and respond appropriately. 4 Vulnerability/Risk Indicators The following lists are not exhaustive and all or none may be present in individual cases of concern. Nor does it mean that vulnerable young people experiencing these factors are automatically at risk of exploitation for the purposes of extremism. The accepted view is that a complex relationship between the various aspects of an individual s identity determines their vulnerability to extremism. There is no such thing as a typical extremist and those involved in extremism come from a range of backgrounds and experiences. The following indicators may help to identify factors that suggest a young person or their family may be vulnerable or involved with extremism: Vulnerability Identity crisis: Distance from cultural/religious heritage and uncomfortable with their place in the society around them. Personal crisis: Family tensions; sense of isolation; adolescence; low self-esteem; disassociating from existing friendship group and becoming involved with a new and different group of friends; searching for answers to questions about identity, faith and belonging. Personal circumstances

4 Migration; local community tensions; events affecting country or region of origin; alienation from UK values; having a sense of grievance that is triggered by personal experience of racism or discrimination or aspects of Government policy. Unmet aspirations: Perceptions of injustice; feeling of failure; rejection of civic life. Criminality: Experiences of imprisonment; poor resettlement/reintegration, previous involvement with criminal groups. Access to extremist influences Reason to believe that the young person associates with those known to be involved in extremism Possession or distribution of extremist literature/other media material likely to incite racial/religious hatred or acts of violence Use of closed network groups via electronic media for the purpose of extremist activity Experiences, behaviours and influences Experience of peer, social, family or faith group rejection International events in areas of conflict and civil unrest had a personal impact on the young person resulting in a noticeable change in behaviour Verbal or written support of terrorist attacks First-hand experience of racial or religious hate crime Extended periods of travel to international locations known to be associated with extremism Evidence of fraudulent identity/use of documents to support this Experience of disadvantage, discrimination or social exclusion History of criminal activity A pending decision on their immigration/national status More critical risk factors include: Being in contact with extremist recruiters Articulating support for extremist causes or leaders Accessing extremist websites, especially those with a social networking element Possessing extremist literature Justifying the use of violence to solve societal issues Joining extremist organisations Significant changes to appearance/behaviour

5 5 The Role of Schools From 1st July 2015 all schools became subject to a duty under section 26 of the Counter- Terrorism and Security Act 2015, to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. This duty is known as the PREVENT duty. We recognise our role and responsibilities with regard to this and will ensure; That a member of the SLT is trained in Prevent awareness. That staff will be given appropriate training to understand and respond to this issue That Prevent work sits within the wider safeguarding framework and as such will become a consistent part of our induction training for all new staff. That the school will carry out a risk assessment, and a plan for implementation of any actions to ensure we meet our obligations That Governors will gain an understanding of the duty and monitor our work in this area Establish a single point of contact for Prevent (DSL). Assess and reduce any risk of students being drawn into terrorism. Train staff and governors to recognise radicalisation and extremism. Refer vulnerable people to Channel. Prohibit extremist speakers and events, including the hire of the premises by such groups. Manage access to extremist material. 6 Referral and Intervention Process see appendix B Any identified concerns as the result of observed behaviour or reports of conversations to suggest that the young person supports terrorism and/or extremism, must be reported to the designated safeguarding lead immediately and no later than the end of the working day. Where a young person is thought to be in need/or at risk of significant harm, and/or where investigations need to be carried out (even though parental consent may be withheld), a referral to Norfolk MASH ( ) using referral form VTR1 (appendix A) in line with the Safeguarding Policy. However, it should be recognised that concerns of this nature, in relation to violent extremism, are most likely to require a police investigation (as part of the Channel process). If an allegation is made or information is received about another adult who works in the setting which indicates that they may be unsuitable to work with children because of concerns relating to extremism and radicalisation, inform the Headteacher or Chair of Governors immediately in line with the procedures outlined in our Safeguarding Policy and the Whistleblowing Policy.

6 Key contacts are: Norfolk MASH team ( ) The local police force or dial 101 (the non-emergency number). They can talk to you in confidence about your concerns and help you gain access to support and advice. The Department for Education has dedicated a telephone helpline ( ) to enable staff and governors to raise concerns relating to extremism directly. Concerns can also be raised by to counter.extremism@education.gsi.gov.uk

7 APPENDIX A - Referral Form Person Vulnerable to Radicalisation (VTR) Referral Form Apr 2016 Subject s full Name (include all known inc alias/maiden if relevant) Date and place of birth RESTRICTED WHEN COMPLETE Section 1: Person referring to complete (please expand boxes as required) Full Address Spouse/Partner/Parents names/d.o.b Children/Siblings names/d.o.b Reason for Referral Background and risk issues - Page 4 offers guidance notes (include chronology if known) Faith / Ideology Personal / emotional & Social Risk / Protective factors Referrers full name, role, contact details & date submitted. Date: Once completed, to Norfolk Multi Agency Safeguarding Hub: mash.mase@norfolk.pnn.police.uk

8 Section 2: MASH forward to Special Branch by Deconfliction checks completed by SB, form then returned to MASH MASH complete agency checks This process must only take place after SB deconfliction checks then return to Special Branch MASH system checks (please expand boxes as required) Police inc. CIS, PNC, PND Adult Services Children s Services Education General Health Mental Health Other (please state) Completed by: Date/time: Send to Special Branch by SpecialBranchFIMU@norfolk.pnn.police.uk

9 Section 3: Norfolk Special Branch to complete SPOE to enter on to FIMU sheet then to Prevent lead/deputy SPOE: Sent to: Date: Time: Deconfliction checks by Prevent lead/deputy (local/nat NSBIS, DTU, CMIS) Conflict If yes, stop, back to SPOE; No conflict If no, proceed to next point; Prevent assessment by:... Suitable for CHANNEL support: YES NO If yes, individual needs entering on CMIS at this point. Reasons If No, is there an apparent vulnerability to radicalisation to manage outside of CHANNEL through Prevent Case Management? YES NO If No, is there another safeguarding issue apparent but no signs of a vulnerability to radicalisation? YES Raise this with a MASH supervisor, agree outcome and refer back to MASH by as necessary. NO Decision to close referral made by: Date/Time Detail where rationale is recorded: Referrer notified of outcome By: Date/Time:

10 Guidance notes for completing this referral form This form is to help you refer concerns about an individual who may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. Below are questions which may help you to quantify and structure your concerns. The list is not exhaustive and other factors may be present but they are intended as a guide to help communicate your professional judgement about what has led you to make this referral. Faith / ideology Are they new to a particular faith / faith strand? Do they seem to have naïve or narrow religious or political views? Have there been sudden changes in their observance, behaviour, interaction or attendance at their place of worship / organised meeting? Have there been specific examples or is there an undertone of Them and Us language or violent rhetoric being used or behaviour occurring? Is there evidence of increasing association with a closed tight knit group of individuals / known recruiters / extremists / restricted events? Are there particular grievances either personal or global that appear to be unresolved / festering? Has there been an increase in unusual travel abroad without satisfactory explanation? Personal / emotional / social issues Is there conflict with their families regarding religious beliefs / lifestyle choices? Is there evidence of cultural anxiety and / or isolation linked to insularity / lack of integration? Is there evidence of increasing isolation from family, friends or groups towards a smaller group of individuals or a known location? Is there history in petty criminality and / or unusual hedonistic behaviour (alcohol/drug use, casual sexual relationships, and addictive behaviours)? Have they got / had extremist propaganda materials (DVD s, CD s, leaflets etc.) in their possession? Do they associate with negative / criminal peers or known groups of concern? Are there concerns regarding their emotional stability and or mental health? Is there evidence of participation in survivalist / combat simulation activities, e.g. paint balling? Risk / Protective Factors What are the specific factors which are contributing towards making the individual more vulnerable to radicalisation? E.g; mental health, language barriers, cultural anxiety, impressionability, criminality, specific grievance, transitional period in life etc. Is there any evidence of others targeting or exploiting these vulnerabilities or risks? What factors are already in place or could be developed to firm up support for the individual or help them increase their resilience to negative influences? E.g. positive family ties, employment, mentor / agency input etc.

11 EXIT Or refer to alternative support Mechanism via the MASH Preventing, Extremism and Radicalisation Referral to MASH APPENDIX B Referral Process Determine referral is not malicious, misinformed, or involves illegality Maintain proper record VTR referral sent to MASH Referral to MASH Determine referral is not malicious, misinformed, or involves illegality Maintain proper record Referral sent to SB SPOE Deconfliction checks completed CP determines referral is not malicious, misinformed, or involves illegality CP returns VTR to MASH Not appropriate MASH complete full agency checks and send updated VTR to CP - decision with Head of Safeguarding/Channel Chair to determine if: Appropriate Channel Panel held. Determine suitability for Channel process. Not appropriate Appropriate Seek endorsement Channel Panel Case Collective assessment of support needs based on risk and suitability Develop action plan Identify and procure appropriate support package Review progress Key: SPOE - Single Point of Entry Deconfliction - system checks to avoid conflict with ongoing work MASH Multi Agency Safeguarding Hub SB Special Branch CP Channel Practitioner Review Delivery of support

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