VIRTUE AND THE GOOD LIFE IN THE EARLY CONFUCIAN TRADITION

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1 VIRTUE AND THE GOOD LIFE IN THE EARLY CONFUCIAN TRADITION Youngsun Back ABSTRACT This essay examines the role of virtue and the status of non-moral goods in conceptions of the good human life through an exploration of the thought of Confucius and Mencius. Both Confucius and Mencius lived in quite similar worlds, but their conceptualizations of the world differed from each another. This difference led them to hold different views on the role of virtue and the status of non-moral goods. On the one hand, Confucius highlighted the self-sufficiency of virtue, but he acknowledged and appreciated the intrinsic and instrumental value of non-moral goods. On the other hand, while Mencius underscored the role of virtue as the best means to the best ends, he tried to depreciate the value of non-moral goods. As a consequence, even though their conceptions of the good life were essentially predicated on virtue, they parted company concerning the status of non-moral goods in human life. KEY WORDS: Confucianism, Confucius, Mencius, good life, virtue, contingency 1. Introduction Scholars of religion, philosophy, psychology, and sociology have always been interested, in one way or another, with the question of what constitutes the good human life. 1 Such inquiry has increased rather than abated in recent years, and now is regularly connected with fundamental issues such as the nature of the self and with larger social questions about group, institutional, and social welfare and happiness. 2 Religious Youngsun Back is Assistant Professor in the College of Confucian Studies and Eastern Philosophy at Sungkyunkwan University, South Korea. She is co-editor of Traditional Korean Philosophy: Problems and Debates (Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016). Youngsun Back, ysback@skku.edu 1 Contemporary explorations of this topic would insist that there is no single good life and so would pose the question in terms of good human lives or the like. This does not significantly affect the analysis I will pursue in this essay. 2 For a sophisticated comparative anthology exploring these issues from religious, philosophical, psychological, and sociological perspectives, see David, Boniwell, and Ayers JRE 46.1: VC 2018 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc.

2 38 Journal of Religious Ethics and ethical conceptions of the human good often call on people to sacrifice more mundane, self-centered goods in pursuit of their more demanding ideals, arguing that doing so is in the true interest or realizes the higher purpose of human existence. These and other views about the good life recognize and seek to reconcile what appears to be a tension (if not an outright contradiction) between pursuing moral goodness and personal profit or, as I will describe it, between virtue and more mundane goods such as wealth, power, and status. This essay investigates a rich and complex discussion of this tension and its reconciliation within the early Confucian tradition: how two prominent Confucian thinkers conceive of virtue and mundane goods in their conceptions of the good life. In his discussion of the notion of happiness in early Chinese thought, Philip J. Ivanhoe remarks that for both Confucians and Daoists, happiness lies in following the Way (Dao 道 ) (2013, 264). Particularly for Confucians, a life lived in accordance with the Way is a life of virtue. One who leads a virtuous life, Ivanhoe adds, is freed from a broad range of common [human] concerns, fears, and anxieties and in their stead experiences a unique sense of comfort, ease, and peace, the feeling that one is properly oriented, situated, and playing one s role in the world (2013, 269). This is basically what the good life meant for early Confucians as well as most of their followers. Living a good life depends on whether or not one lives virtuously. However, does this mean that living virtuously makes one s life fully good? Confucians believed that virtues are necessary for a good life, but I think whether virtues are sufficient for a good life is quite another matter. We might, then, ask a further question: whose life is better that of the Sage King Shun 舜 or that of Yan Hui 顏回? 3 Both Shun and Yan Hui are renowned for their utmost virtue; however, Shun became a king and is said to have lived an extremely long life, while Yan Hui, whom Confucius (Kongzi 孔子 ) held dearest among his disciples, lived in poverty and died young. According to the Confucian conception of the good life, both Shun and Yan Hui lived virtuous lives, and thus they are considered to have lived good lives. However, we can still pose the question of whether we can make evaluative judgments that would allow us 3 Yan Hui is also known as Yan Yuan 顏淵. This question is inspired by the central question of Julia Annas s study of ancient Greek ethics: whether the virtuous person on the rack is happy. According to Annas s explanation, it was absurd to Aristotle that the virtuous person on the rack is happy because his conception of the good life includes not only virtue but also other kinds of bodily and external goods. Against the Aristotelian additive view of happiness, however, the Stoics made a contrasting claim that the virtuous person on the rack is happy because that person considered virtue to be sufficient for happiness. For Aristotle, virtue is necessary but not sufficient for a good life, whereas for the Stoics, virtue is both necessary and sufficient for a good life (Annas 1993).

3 Virtue and the Good Life 39 to express preferences among various different virtuous lives, for example, a virtuous life that was coupled with a successful career (like that of Shun) and a virtuous life that was tragically cut short (like that of Yan Hui). What if we pose this specific question to Confucius and Mencius (Mengzi 孟子 )? 4 My speculation is that Confucius would say that Shun had a better life, whereas Mencius would consider both lives to be more or less equally good. In this essay, I will support this speculative conclusion by examining and comparing the thought of Confucius and Mencius as found in the Analects (Lunyu 論語 ) and Mencius (Mengzi 孟子 ), respectively. I argue that both Confucius and Mencius believed that the good life is predicated on virtue, but that they parted company concerning the status of other goods, which I call non-moral goods. 5 On the one hand, Confucius acknowledged and appreciated the value of non-moral goods, and hence he believed that a virtuous life equipped with other kinds of favorable goods is better than a virtuous life devoid of them. On the other hand, Mencius tried to depreciate the value of non-moral goods, and for him, a virtuous life is good irrespective of the presence of other favorable goods. My analysis shows that the different status of non-moral goods in each of their conceptions of the good life is due to the different emphasis each placed on the role of virtue: Confucius highlighted the self-sufficiency of virtue, whereas Mencius underscored the role of virtue as the best means to the best ends. To go a step further, their differing views on the role of virtue and the status of non-moral goods result from their different understandings of the world. As I will argue, Confucius and Mencius lived in worlds that were quite similar, but Confucius saw his world as largely contingent but significantly moral, while Mencius saw his world as largely moral and insignificantly contingent. Accordingly, in the first section, I provide a general description of the good life in early Confucianism and single out a particular, but prominent, form of the good life in order to show how this form of life is closely related to Confucian understandings of the world. Based on this general outline, in the second and third sections, I analyze the role of virtue and the status of non-moral goods in the thought of each thinker. In the final section, I summarize the views of Confucius and Mencius and how the role of virtue and the status of non-moral goods relate to their different understandings of the world. This essay explores the general issue of 4 One of the reasons I have chosen to look at both Confucius and Mencius is that I do not hold the view that Mencius was merely an ardent follower of Confucius. Rather, I believe that Mencius s development of Confucius s ideas brought about significant changes in the original teachings of Confucius. This essay sheds light on how Mencius differed from Confucius on the issue of the good human life. 5 I will explain this term in the next section.

4 40 Journal of Religious Ethics the good life and the role that virtue and non-moral goods play in early Confucian conceptions of the good life. While this study is focused on the thought of these two early Confucian thinkers, its insights and implications are applicable to wider, global discussions of the character of the good human life. 2. Virtue, Non-Moral Goods, and the Good Life As Ivanhoe explains, the good life prescribed in the Analects and Mencius is a life following the Way, that is, a life in pursuit of virtue. However, if we examine the details of the good life, we encounter different accounts of how such a life might be achieved. For instance, Confucius once said, Eating coarse rice and drinking water, leaning upon my bent arm for a pillow there is joy to be found in such things! (Analects 7.16). 6 Mencius mentioned that three important joys of the gentleman are the well-being of family members, one s complete integrity, and the education of talented students (Mencius 7A20). 7 In his account, Bryan Van Norden lists a series of activities that constitutes the good life for Confucians: participation in communal ritual activities, aesthetic appreciation, intellectual activities, acting for the good of others, participation in human relationship, the joy that comes from virtuous activities, and appropriate sadness at loss (2007, ). Accordingly, there are many constituents of the good life in the Confucian view and the good lives lived by virtuous individuals can be realized in different ways. However, in order to answer the question of the choice between the lives of Shun and Yan Hui, I focus on two main constituents of the good life: virtue and a specific set of favorable goods. 8 In contrast to virtue (moral goods), I call the second set of goods non-moral goods. Moral goods refer to the virtues, and there are a number of different virtues, including benevolence, filiality, loyalty, courage, righteousness, wisdom, and so on. Non-moral goods, as the name suggests, are those things which do not belong among the moral goods, and there are also a number of different kinds of non-moral goods, such as health, power, wealth, honor, family, friends, and so on. 6 The Analects consists of 20 books, and the first number refers to book number and the second to passage number. For the translation of the Analects, I generally follow D. C. Lau s translation Confucius (1979) and modify when necessary. 7 For the translation of the Mencius, I generally follow D. C. Lau s translation (1970) and modify when necessary. 8 This will remove complexities in answering the question of whose life is better. For example, suppose one values personal relationship more than anything else. Then, this person would answer that Yan Hui s life is better than Shun s life. For Yan Hui was beloved by his teacher, but Shun had family members who ceaselessly tried to harm him (fortunately, as the story goes, Shun s vicious family members repented their wrongdoings and returned to good in the end). Therefore, narrowing down the range of what constitutes the good life will help us to maneuver our discussion successfully.

5 Virtue and the Good Life 41 However, I will not go into the details of specific virtues and just lump them together as moral goods. Also, for the purpose of this essay, I will pick out a specific set of items among non-moral goods, that is, health, power, wealth and honor. This is mainly because these specific non-moral goods feature prominently in the discussions of the good life in the Analects and Mencius, but also because these non-moral goods are regarded as having a close connection to virtue. Therefore, they provide us with a good vantage point for comparisons between virtue and non-moral goods, and the roles these two main components play in attaining a good life. Like most of us, Confucius and Mencius valued life and its longevity more than death, and wanted success more than failure. What they meant by success is primarily political success. As is known, Confucius and Mencius tried to get political positions throughout their lifetimes. Political positions (power) are often accompanied with wealth (salary) and honor (recognition). These non-moral goods health, power, wealth, and honor are what people conventionally desire. What is important to note is that early Confucians generally believed that good people live healthy and long lives, whereas bad people suffer illness and encounter untimely death; good people enjoy wealth and power, whereas bad people live in poverty and lowly positions. 9 In other words, for early Confucians the world was a moral place, where good people flourish and bad people suffer. Elsewhere, I call this general, broadly conceived, connection between one s moral worth (moral goods) and non-moral outcomes (non-moral goods) moral economy. 10 Nevertheless, just as our economy sometimes suffers depression and hyper-inflation or even collapses, moral economy does not always function well: good people sometimes suffer and bad people often get by or even succeed. During his lifetime, Confucius witnessed the fates of several good but unfortunate people: his favorite disciple, Yan Hui, encountered an untimely death (Analects 6.3) and another disciple, Bo Niu 伯牛, suffered a fatal illness (Analects 6.10). Neither Confucius nor Mencius succeeded in their political missions. I call this failure of moral economy contingency : a case in which a connection between one s moral worth and non-moral outcomes appears to be broken so that the world is felt to be beyond human control and perhaps even beyond human comprehension. Accordingly, for these early Confucians, the world was a moral place where benevolent people tended to live longer lives (Analects 6.23) and 9 However, among the set of non-moral goods, health or longevity is more prominent in the Analects and less so in the Mencius. This is a topic worth further investigation. 10 For a fuller discussion of this topic, see Back 2016.

6 42 Journal of Religious Ethics obtain high political positions, but at the same time, the world was a contingent place, where some good people s lives ended without earning recognition or even encountered tragic ends (Analects 6.3, 11.7, 18.1). 11 No one lived in a perfect moral world, and Confucius and Mencius knew that one s virtue did not always guarantee favorable non-moral goods. Despite this shared assumption, however, their understandings of the world are significantly different from one another. In order to mark their differences, I call Confucius s moral economy a voluntarist moral economy and Mencius s moral economy a naturalistic moral economy. 12 I will explain each system, respectively. The key to understanding Confucius s system is that moral economy is the norm and contingency is the exception. As a result, normally a good person will live a flourishing life, but sometimes, anomalously fails to do so. What is of greater significance, however, is that it is one s voluntary choice to live up to the normative principle of moral economy and to disregard or even reject exceptional cases as legitimate or meaningful (Analects 7.16). Regardless of actual happenings in the real world, Confucius tried to organize his own world meaningfully and firmly around his belief in moral economy. This is why I call his moral economy voluntaristic. Mencius also lived in an imperfect moral world. However, his conception of moral economy and contingency differed from that of Confucius. First of all, unlike Confucius, who believed that moral economy sometimes can fail, Mencius believed that moral economy is always at work. In order to highlight the unerring workings of moral economy, he tried to provide logical and plausible accounts of these workings. For instance, he said that when the world is filled with cruel and brutal rulers, people naturally long for a benevolent leader as if they were plants waiting for rain in drought; and when a virtuous person appears, people are drawn to him like water flowing downward (Mencius 1A6). This is naturally because people like and are attracted to those who care for them, while they hate and seek to avoid those who harm them. Unlike Confucius, who emphasized one s voluntary determination to live up to the workings of moral economy, Mencius highlighted that the workings of moral economy are akin to a natural process. This is why I call Mencius s moral economy naturalistic. 11 Here, contingency does not mean randomness. In other words, what warrants attention and further explanation in Confucian discourse is not the untimely death of just anyone, but the untimely death of good people. The cases of contingency are thus comprehended in moral terms as well. See Back 2016, In my earlier work, I call Mencius s system a rationalistic moral economy. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer, I have changed it to a naturalistic moral economy.

7 Virtue and the Good Life 43 Despite the support of his naturalistic account of moral economy, the world in which Mencius lived was still a contingent place; good people often suffered and bad people sometimes succeeded. However, his notion of contingency has different ethical implications than that of Confucius. In Confucius s thought, contingency, exceptional though it may be, connotes the failure of moral economy, whereas in Mencius s thought this is not necessarily so. For Mencius, moral economy is always at work, but there are other contingent factors that contribute to the shaping and timing of final outcomes. To put it another way, he separated out contingent factors from the workings of moral economy. On the surface, Mencius s notion of contingency does not appear to be that different from Confucius s notion of contingency because both of them suggest that one s virtue does not always guarantee favorable outcomes. Flowers are supposed to bloom, but sometimes they fail to do so for various reasons. 13 Nonetheless, there is a critical difference between their ways of dealing with contingency. Confucius s focus was more on the fact that moral economy can fail, and he paid careful attention to how people respond to such events. On the other hand, Mencius was more interested in why flowers sometimes fail to bloom and he identified various reasons that affect the whole process. His focus was more on the point that the process of moral economy can be affected by non-moral factors. As he separated out contingent factors from the process of moral economy, he was able to safeguard the workings of moral economy. In other words, one s virtue may have an unhappy ending due to contingent factors, but this does not mean that moral economy is defective or inoperative. To summarize, Confucius believed that the world revolves around the normative principle of moral economy and tried to marginalize its occasional failure as anomalous deviations. Even if the world did not follow the principle of moral economy, what was important for Confucius was one s voluntary determination to live up to the norms of moral economy. In contrast, Mencius s naturalistic moral economy is always at work despite various obstacles. He was confident that one s moral excellence would bring favorable outcomes in the end, albeit perhaps not in the near future or even one s lifetime (Mencius 1B14). This is how they viewed the world: Confucius saw his world as largely contingent but significantly moral, whereas Mencius saw his world as largely moral and insignificantly contingent. 3. Confucius: Virtue and Non-Moral Goods The two poles of moral economy and contingency have a direct bearing on the role of virtue. In the world of moral economy, a virtuous life leads 13 This analogy is adopted from Analects 9.22.

8 44 Journal of Religious Ethics to a good life, including the achievement of non-moral goods such as health, wealth, power, and honor. The problem, however, is that too strong a conviction in moral economy easily runs counter to the call for genuine moral action: Good people are rewarded; therefore, I should act well. 14 Mark Csikszentmihalyi points out that moral hypocrisy was one of the main targets of external criticisms of early Confucians; for instance, Robber Zhi 跖 in the Zhuangzi 莊子 attacks Confucians saying that the real motive for Confucians moral behavior is the prospect of personal gain in wealth, power, and fame (2004, 48 49). 15 On the contrary, the contingency of the world, unattractive and undesirable though it may appear at first, is the best bulwark against the possible dangers posed by an excessive belief in moral economy. In a contingent world where virtues do not guarantee the expected outcomes, virtues are less likely to turn into mere means to non-moral ends, and people s expectations of their deserved outcomes can be reduced to a certain degree. Accordingly, Confucius s recognition of the world s contingency enabled him to turn people s attention away from non-moral concerns and toward their moral development. Thus, he said, If wealth were an attainable goal, I would be willing even to act as a guard holding a whip outside the market place. If it is not, I shall follow my own preferences (Analects 7.12). 16 Since non-moral goods such as health, wealth, power, and honor are not guaranteed through human agency, Confucius opted for what he valued most: following the Way and cultivating virtues. Confucius directed his attention and energy away from what he could not completely control (non-moral outcomes) to what he could control (self-cultivation) F. H. Bradley writes, To do good for its own sake is virtue, to do it for some ulterior end or object, not itself good, is never virtue; and never to act but for the sake of an end, other than doing well and right, is the mark of vice (1927, 56). 15 According to Mark Csikszentmihalyi, this is one of the three major external criticisms of Confucians in the late Warring States period. The first is moral hypocrisy and superficiality of Confucian ritual; the second is the inefficacy of Confucian self-cultivation program due to the belief in ming; and the third is the counter-productiveness of Confucian selfcultivation on a social scale. He argues that this indictment of Confucian moral motivation became the background for a theory of material virtue in the excavated Wuxing 五行 and Mencius, a theory that virtues manifest themselves as observable physiological changes in the body. See Csikszentmihalyi 2004, This passage has been interpreted in different ways: one interpretation is that wealth is not something worth pursuing, and another interpretation is that wealth is not something attainable through human effort. I follow the second, more literal, translation. 17 Michael Ing characterizes this shift of interest from mundane concern to selfcultivation as an inward turn. Edward Slingerland initiated this reading of inward turn in his study of the notion of ming (1996, 576). Amy Olberding describes this reading as an account of autonomy and freedom (2013, ). Ing s term inward turn arose as a way to challenge this dominant reading of early Confucianism among scholars (2012, 74 78).

9 Virtue and the Good Life 45 Confucius redirects peoples attention repeatedly in the Analects. He wrote, Don t worry because you have no official position, and instead worry about your qualifications. Don t worry because no one appreciates your ability, instead seek to be worthy of appreciation (Analects 4.14). 18 One should worry about one s lack of virtue and ability, but not about mundane concerns like wealth, power, and honor. According to Ivanhoe, in Confucius s attempt to redirect people s attention and effort, he not only moderated people s expectations regarding their deserved outcomes, but also actively discouraged their expectations that there would be a tight linkage between one s moral worth and its non-moral outcomes. Ivanhoe remarks: One must pursue virtue as an expression of one s ideal of the good life and remain committed to it even in cases when the normal, non-moral good benefits of virtue are not forthcoming (2007, 215). This is exactly the reason why the gatekeeper evaluated Confucius as one who keeps working toward a goal the realization of which he knows to be hopeless (Analects 14.38). Through his own life, Confucius taught that even if one knows for sure that one s virtue will not bring favorable outcomes, one should continue to cultivate virtue. The point of being a gentleman does not lie in achieving non-moral ends, but solely in the process of cultivating virtues. Virtues are not a mere means to non-moral ends, but virtues are ends in themselves and the proper and dominant ends of human life. Nevertheless, the realization that his goal will not be achieved does not make Confucius a sullen pessimist or a sulky fatalist. Even though his political mission may have turned out to be a failure, his project of selfcultivation succeeded in itself. According to Confucius, the process of selfcultivation is like this: As in the case of making a mountain, if, before the very last basketful, I stop, then I shall have stopped. As in the case of leveling the ground, if, though tipping only one basketful, I am going forward, then I shall be making progress (Analects 9.19). The process of self-cultivation is like making a mountain and leveling the ground. Even if we do not complete the process, we advance as much as we proceed. Likewise, regardless of success or failure in the non-moral realm, what one has practiced in the process of cultivation remains in oneself. The virtues one has accumulated in oneself are complete and intact. Just as flowers are always fragrant whether there is a person who can smell them or not, one s virtues are always beautiful and worth pursuing. 19 For 18 A similar theme is repeated in Analects 1.1, 15.19, and This simile of flower is borrowed from the excavated text Failure and Success Depend on Times (Qiong da yi shi 窮達以時 ). Similar to Confucius s view, this text also introduces the notion of contingency. It claims that a person s moral action cannot ensure its corresponding outcomes, and that a person cannot understand the mysterious operations of the world. Furthermore, like Confucius, it also introduces the self-sufficient theory of virtue:

10 46 Journal of Religious Ethics Confucius, virtues are ends in themselves and self-rewarding; they are self-sufficient. 20 However, Confucius s theory of the self-sufficiency of virtue is not without problems, particularly given the characteristics of Confucian ethics. Most Confucian virtues are basically relational and social, which means that they require external conditions. For instance, at a theoretical level, it is impossible for orphans to cultivate filial piety (xiao 孝 ) simply because they do not have a proper object of that particular virtue. 21 This might be one of the reasons that Sima Niu 司馬牛 bemoaned the fact that he did not have a brother; he lacked the context of practicing and enjoying brotherhood (ti 悌 ). Upon hearing Sima Niu s lamentation, Zixia 子夏, Confucius s disciple, admonished him: I have heard that life and death are a matter of fate (ming 命 ); wealth and honor depend on Heaven. The gentleman is respectful and faultless, reverent and ritually proper in his dealings with others. For him, everyone in the world is his brother. Why would the gentleman worry about not having brothers? (Analects 12.5). 22 In her study of ancient Greek understanding of luck, Martha Nussbaum points out that any strict view of the self-sufficiency of virtue requires a quite radical rethinking of the elements of a life that makes for flourishing (1986, xiv). 23 Likewise, Zixia redefined regardless of whether one is recognized by Heaven or by other worthies, one s virtue and merits are intact. Both Confucius and the author of Failure and Success Depend on Times present a quite similar solution to the failure of moral economy: virtues are self-sufficient. For a detailed textual study of the Failure and Success Depend on Times, see Meyer 2011, 53 76, One important aspect of a virtuous life in Confucius s thought is that it brings a sense of profound joy (Analects 6.9, 7.15). According to Ivanhoe, Confucius s joy is, however, not a private emotion or matter of taste, but an ethical response that arises when one accords with something beyond oneself, such as the Way, and thereby sheds a narrow and overly self-centered conception of oneself (2013, ). 21 Of course, an orphan who is adopted can develop filial piety toward her adoptive parents. Furthermore, having parents and siblings is not just regarded as providing the context for practicing and acquiring relevant virtues. Having a family is intrinsic to human happiness. 22 According to commentaries, Sima Niu actually had a brother, Huan Tui 桓魋, who tried to kill Confucius as seen in Analects 7.23, but he disowned him. 23 According to Nussbaum, a self-sufficient view of virtue is profoundly controversial. This view, on the one hand, narrows the scope of human flourishing into a virtuous state of character, which is least dependent on external conditions; on the other hand, it excludes many important aspects of a human life, which are often dependent on external conditions, as unrelated to human flourishing. By quoting Aristotle, she points out that this kind of life is so impoverished as to be not worth living. Olberding also makes the same point; the portrayal of the good life in the Analects that is exclusively based on the notion of selfsufficient virtue transpires in conditions that ordinary people would find deplorable and cruelly tragic. However, I think, Confucius, instead of omitting significant aspects of human life, tried to redefine and reincorporate them to make our life much richer and fuller. See Nussbaum 1986, xiii xiv; Olberding 2013, 432.

11 Virtue and the Good Life 47 the standard concept of brotherhood from one based on biological relationship into one with a moral basis. 24 Zixia claimed that one s virtue is not merely self-sufficient; it can reconstruct and reorganize one s life in a much more meaningful way. The virtuous way of life can turn even the most miserable human event into a happy one. Confucius employed the same strategy concerning his political failure. Someone asked Confucius, Why do you not take part in government? and his answer was: The Documents says, Oh, simply by being a good son and friendly to his brothers a man can exert an influence upon government. In so doing a man is, in fact, taking part in government. How can there be any question of his having actively to take part in government? (Analects 2.21). By imparting political significance to ethical conduct in the domestic realm, Confucius explained away his own failure in politics. In his radical redefinition of politics, even a small action within the family is considered an active participation in political activity. As a result, one s success in domestic relationships can have important political implications; in this respect, Confucius s political failure is not truly a failure. However morally desirable and ethically superior these radical solutions might be, they do not amount to practical solutions to the problem. They do not change the facts that Sima Niu did not have a brother and that Confucius indeed failed in his political pursuit. Most important of all, Confucius himself did not just remain satisfied with his own moral perfection. Flowers are fragrant wherever they are situated, but Confucius preferred to be a flower growing on the edge of a sidewalk rather than a flower in a remote valley. He wanted to be recognized, appreciated, and thus employed by rulers to implement his Way in the world. Confucius once said, The gentleman hates not leaving behind a name when he is gone (Analects 15.20). As a result, he was devastated when he realized that he would not be able to do as the sage kings had done for the world: I am done for! (Analects 9.9) and Ah! Heaven is abandoning me! Heaven is abandoning me! (Analects 11.9). His disappointment and frustration reveals how eager he was for a successful political career. Consequently, we find two different images of Confucius in the Analects: one as the kind of person who keeps on trying despite knowing that it is to no avail, and the other as a person more like other ordinary human beings who strive for success and are deeply troubled when they 24 However, Zhu Xi s 朱熹 commentary shows a certain reservation about Zixia s redefinition of brotherhood, because treating everyone in the world as his brother sounds like Mozi s 墨子 doctrine of impartial care (jian ai 兼愛 ). Zhu Xi said, Probably, Zixia wanted to relieve Sima Niu s worry and so he cannot but say this. [Therefore] those who read this passage should not misunderstand the [original] intention [of Zixia] (Zhu Xi 1983, 134).

12 48 Journal of Religious Ethics fail. These two different accounts of Confucius are the central issue of Amy Olberding s award-winning article Confucius Complaints and the Analects Account of the Good Life (2013). She observes that there are two conflicting accounts regarding the good life in the Analects. Onecomesfrom Confucius s more abstract and reflective claims; here, Confucius taught his disciples that a life of virtue brings us a sense of profound joy. The other account is the narrative depiction of Confucius s own life; on several occasions of his misfortunes, Confucius expressed complaints, sorrow, and remorse. What troubles Olberding is that a majority of studies on Confucius rely on the first account, but do not pay due attention to Confucius s more spontaneous remarks about his own life. 25 By incorporating this less studied narrative account of Confucius s life, she tries to complicate the conception of the good life appearing in the Analects. According to Olberding, unlike his general claims about the good life, the narrative depiction of his life indicates that Confucius did not completely abandon mundane concerns for conventional, worldly success. Like most of us, Confucius retained desires for non-moral goods (the desirable), but unlike most of us, he maintained a proper stance toward them in relation to his aspiration for virtues (the admirable). 26 Olberding writes: Rather than ceasing to care about ordinary, prosaic goods, he engages in a continuous process of calibrating his desires, resolutely regulating them so that his caring about prosaic goods never trumps or overmasters his desire for the admirable. That is, he resolves never to betray the admirable in pursuit of the desirable, even while he wants both. (2013, 433) Olberding argues that instead of liberating himself from ordinary desires, Confucius adjusted his desires between non-moral goods and virtues in proper order: the orientation toward desires here thus altered, though it is not transformed (2013, 433). Focusing on the depiction of Confucius s suffering and despair, she successfully returns Confucius s life to the ordinary from the wholly other. I think she is absolutely right about this point; Confucius s teachings do not intend to transcend ordinary lives, but fulfill them. His project does not aim to liberate us from ordinary, mundane concerns. 25 I think Ing and Olberding are certainly moving in the right direction because the dominant reading of early Confucianism, whether we call it either an inward turn or an account of freedom and autonomy, does not take into full account these conflicting images of Confucius. 26 Olberding uses Linda Zagzebski s terms admirable and desirable to refer to virtue and what I call non-moral goods, respectively (2013, 419). However, it seems to me that Zagzebski s terms are a bit more complicated because she points out that while people have these two basic evaluative attitudes, the virtuous person also desires what other people admire (virtues) (2006, 66).

13 Virtue and the Good Life 49 Olberding s attention to the tension between the two accounts of the good life in the Analects is insightful, and her attempt to complicate the characterization of the good life is worthwhile. Particularly noteworthy is her point that what is truly extraordinary about Confucius is not that he obtained a clean and profound joy through cultivating virtues, but rather the way he navigated his loss: He wishes the world were otherwise, but he does not wish he had done otherwise (2013, 434). Confucius obtained, according to her, not a clean joy, but a clean conscience. 27 I have several points of disagreement with Olberding s analysis, but the most relevant for this essay is her treatment of the admirable and the desirable, that is, moral and non-moral goods. Olberding seems to treat the two categories as completely separate. On the one hand, Confucius strived for virtue, and on the other hand, he kept his desires for non-moral goods. Confucius s excellence was found in his self-conscious and deliberate management of the two in their proper order. I agree that Confucius did not completely free himself from mundane concern for non-moral goods. As his occasional disappointment and frustration reveals, Confucius longed for recognition and political success. However, in my view, Confucius s concern for non-moral goods is categorically different from that of ordinary people. Certainly Confucius cherished life and disliked death and wanted success more than failure. He suggested that non-moral goods obtained through proper means are worthy of possession and enjoyment (Analects 7.16). Like most of us, Confucius appreciated the intrinsic value of nonmoral goods; but unlike most of us, he also acknowledged another important value of non-moral goods, that is, their instrumental value. 28 Nonmoral goods play important roles in the fulfillment of moral cultivation. For example, high political position provides an opportunity to implement an ideal Confucian society. This is what all the sage kings carried out and this may have been the main reason why Confucius bemoaned his political failure on several occasions (Analects 9.9, 11.9). 29 Moreover, 27 In his response to Olberding s article, Ing tries to problematize her notion of clean conscience. Ing writes, What makes Confucius admirable, in this view, is not necessarily his clean conscience, as much as it is his continued devotion to meaningful things that can at times conflict with each other or even lay beyond his power to determine (2015, 569). 28 For the discussion of two functions of non-moral goods in the Aristotelian ethics of eudaimonia, see Cooper The instrumental values of non-moral goods are what Olberding seems to have missed in her treatment of the admirable and the desirable, at least in her essay. However, I do not think that she would disagree with me on the instrumental role of non-moral goods in the Confucian cultivation program. 29 According to Csikszentmihalyi, the most popular interpretation during the Han 漢 dynasty (206 BCE 220 CE) is that Yan Hui s death was considered as a sign from Heaven that Confucius would not succeed in becoming the sage king. For a detailed discussion of this passage, see Csikszentmihalyi 2011.

14 50 Journal of Religious Ethics a range of roles experienced during a normal span of life provides opportunities to acquire a diverse set of virtues. 30 It is a simple truth that one cannot truly understand being a parent without oneself being a parent. This may have been one of the reasons why Confucius showed such grief on the death of Yan Hui because, as Ivanhoe notes, That person is denied the chance to fulfill his or her true destiny as a human being (2002, 224). This is precisely the understanding of Confucius s teachings that we find in an essay by the Neo-Confucian philosopher Cheng Yi 程頤,who lived ( ) during the Song dynasty, entitled, What Kind of Learning was it that Yan Hui Loved? (Yanzi suohaohexue lun 顏子所好何學論 ). Cheng Yi commented on Yan Hui s untimely death: Since he [Yan Hui] loved to learn, had he been granted a few more years, he soon would have been fully transformed. This is why Confucius said, What a great misfortune that his allotted life was so short! Confucius was aggrieved that Yan Hui had not attain sagehood (2004, 578). In this passage, Cheng Yi seems to interpret Confucius as feeling more regret over the fact that Yan Hui died before attaining sagehood than over the simple fact of his death. This implies that non-moral goods are cherished not solely because they are precious in themselves, but, more importantly, because they help people to cultivate their virtues more broadly and more completely. In order to be a fully human, we need to live out a natural life span. For this reason, I think Confucius s complaints are not just complaints that he did not get all he wished for himself, as Olberding suggests. More accurately, from the outset, they are regrets and remorse that he was not able to get all he wished for others as well: that is, he was not able to implement the Way in the world. Accordingly, I believe Olberding is mistaken when she says, In a willingness to use one s own suffering as spur, reconciling oneself to ungenerous fate and persisting in the hope that where one cannot best fate for oneself, one may improve it for others (2013, 435). Olberding s interpretation downplays Confucius s initial concern for others. I think it is not that Confucius tried to do for others after he realized his own ungenerous fate. Rather, I think, Confucius s sorrow came from the very fact that he cannot do more for others and the world. 31 In this sense, his sorrow is more tragic than Olberding 30 Ivanhoe points out, To follow the Way is to live out a full human life and fulfill the various role-specific duties that life presents at its different stages (2002, 224). 31 It is obvious that Confucius tried to make a better society for others, but this does not mean that he believed that he could eliminate all contingency from the world and make sure that everyone got what they deserved. For Confucius, contingency is in a way an unavoidable fact of human life and humans cannot completely understand the deep intentions of Heaven. In my view, it was not until Xunzi 荀子 that we find a Confucian who tried to overcome the ungenerous facts of human life and secure the workings of moral economy in the human realm.

15 Virtue and the Good Life 51 interprets it to be. In my view, she overlooks the complex and nuanced relationship between virtue and non-moral goods in early Confucianism. Confucius did not deliberately privilege his aspirations for virtues over prosaic, mundane concerns. Rather, his desires for non-moral goods were predicated on his pursuit of virtues. His desire for non-moral goods is not ordinary desire, and this is why I argue that his concern for non-moral goods is categorically different from ordinary people s desire. Confucius valued health, wealth, power, and honor, not merely because they are valuable in themselves, but also because they play significant roles in fulfilling, perfecting, and broadening virtues. As a result, I do not think that there are two competing accounts of the good life in the Analects a general, abstract claim and a narrative depiction, as Olberding claims. 32 I also do not think that the two different images of Confucius mentioned above, a figure who keeps on trying and a figure who can be deeply troubled, necessarily illustrate Confucius s extraordinary yet ordinary humane characteristics. More fundamentally, I think they are the reflections of a deep tension in Confucius s ethical thought. 33 On the one hand, virtues are the best means to a good life and good society, as the belief in moral economy promises. 34 On the other hand, virtues are ends in themselves, a point that the contingency of the world draws attention to. These two views of virtue create an interesting tension. Even if virtues promise the best kind of life at the moment when we use them as a means to pursue certain consequences, they lose their authenticity and can no longer be called genuine virtues. This reflects what David Nivison calls a paradox of virtue (1996, 31 44): virtues are a means to non-moral goods, but virtues cannot be used as a means to such 32 I also oppose Olberding s interpretation that Confucius s general claims about the good life may be hortatory and consolatory. Of course, Confucius s description of profound joy may have appeared to some of his disciples to be appealing and attractive, and so they may have considered it as a motivation for their pursuit of virtue or as a compensation for the losses in the process of following the Way. If this is all they thought, though, I think they did not understand the genuine message of Confucius s teaching. 33 Ivanhoe also points out an inherent tension in early Confucian ethics: On the one hand we are told that the Way is the only means to a good society and that following the Way is the most satisfying of lives, and yet we are told that these should not be our only or even our primary motivation for pursuing the Way. We are to pursue the Way because it is the Way, not just for the good consequences associated with it (1991, 58). 34 Here, what I mean by a good life is not just in ethical terms. A good life is morally correct, but at the same time, supplied with non-moral goods. In addition, what I mean by the best means is that moral living is the most proper means to such a good life. For instance, one can achieve wealth from various means, but only a virtuous person is worthy of possessing and enjoying wealth, and only a virtuous person can use wealth properly to make his virtuous life meaningful.

16 52 Journal of Religious Ethics ends. 35 On the contrary, virtues are also self-sufficient and self-rewarding, and thus, Yan Hui was able to be content with a single bowl of rice and a ladle of water. However, if Yan Hui s virtuous life was completely selfsufficient and self-rewarding, why did Confucius lament his untimely death and why did he say Yan Hui s short allotment is unfortunate? Why did he deplore his own political failure? It is because he believed that virtues are supposed to bring favorable non-moral goods, and these nonmoral goods are significant for his ethical project. One of the most difficult tasks for Confucians was to cope with these two opposing views on the role of virtue: virtues as ends in themselves versus virtues as the best means. In my view, however, Confucius s voluntarist moral economy seems to have inclined him slightly toward the self-sufficiency of virtue. In the following sections, I turn to examine how Mencius managed this problem in his own way. 4. Mencius: Virtue and Non-Moral Goods Unlike Confucius, Mencius s strong confidence in moral economy does not seem to be much in need of a theory of virtue as self-sufficient. In Confucius s view, even if one s virtue fails to bring favorable outcomes, the virtues accumulated in oneself are intact and self-rewarding. On the contrary, in Mencius s naturalistic moral economy, virtues are still the most powerful means to favorable non-moral goods. He believed that moral economy is always at work and so moral excellence will eventually overcome the adversities of contingent extra-moral factors and finally bring favorable outcomes. How, then, did Mencius deal with the latent problem of the role of virtue as a means for non-moral ends? As we have seen, this aspect of virtue easily distorts the genuine value of virtue, that is, doing good for its own sake. Interestingly, Confucius s acceptance of contingency loosened the tight linkage between virtue and non-moral outcomes. This entailed the shift of one s focus from mundane concerns to one s own moral development: an inward turn. Mencius s solution, however, was much more radical than Confucius s theory of contingency and the self-sufficiency of virtue. Mencius pursued the complete moralization of human life: he tried to depreciate the value of non-moral goods, and instead, to put greater emphasis and increased value on virtues. Once non-moral goods 35 Ivanhoe also notes, Even though virtue is a necessary constituent of certain highly desirable ends, one cannot intentionally use virtue in order to achieve such goals. To do so is to aim at and focus attention upon the wrong ends, which will undermine both the practice and cultivation of virtue (2007, 251). Bryan Van Norden also mentions this aspect of virtue in Confucian ethics (2007, 303).

17 Virtue and the Good Life 53 have lost much of their value, there is no great danger that virtue degenerates into a mere means to achieve those not-so-valuable goods. 36 As pointed out earlier, non-moral goods have two distinct values: intrinsic and instrumental. Favorable non-moral goods are in themselves desirable; people desire life over death, wealth over poverty, and success over failure. Favorable non-moral goods also play important roles in the fulfillment of moral cultivation; a full life span provides an arena where one can fulfill various roles and acquire diverse virtues, and a political position provides an opportunity for one to implement the Way in society. As we saw, Confucius appreciated both the intrinsic and instrumental values of non-moral goods. In contrast, Mencius depreciated or even denied both types of values of non-moral goods. First, he did not attribute much intrinsic value to non-moral goods. For instance, Mencius asserted that even if various luxuries were obtained through proper means, he would not take pleasure in them (Mencius 7B34). At times, Mencius seems to even reject the intrinsic value of non-moral goods. The reason for his negation is found in the following passage: Those people who acquire virtue, wisdom, skill, and cleverness are always found in adversity. The estranged subject and the son of a concubine conduct themselves with caution and watch out for troubles with prudence, and therefore succeed (Mencius 7A18). 37 To put this the other way around, people in ease and comfort find it difficult to achieve moral excellence, since the non-moral goods favored by people, such as wealth, power, and honor, often do more harm than good in the pursuit of goodness. 38 This is why Mencius said, People thrive from sorrow and calamity and perish from comfort and joy (Mencius 6B15). Hence, Mencius pointed out another dimension of non-moral goods: in addition to being the outcomes of one s actions and objects of enjoyment, non-moral goods become the conditions for further actions and they can be an obstacle to moral cultivation. Consequently, not only did Mencius depreciate the intrinsic value of non-moral goods, but he also warned of the possible danger that nonmoral goods could estrange people from their moral pursuits. 36 We should keep in mind that this is from the perspective of the moral agent. Mencius seemed to think that the ascetic view toward non-moral goods would be efficient and salubrious for individual moral agents. However, this does not mean that he completely negated the value of non-moral goods. Rather, he kept emphasizing the significance of non-moral goods in the moral improvement of people. He acknowledged that without the basic necessities of life, the majority of people could not cultivate virtue. 37 A similar issue appears in Mencius 6B Humans are thus often caught in a double bind: on the one hand, people want to have a happy life (in the conventional sense of a physically and emotionally satisfactory life), but the very state they try to reach contains the seeds of their decline and fall. It is only the truly virtuous person (or the extremely cautious person) who can escape this dilemma or maintain the delicate balance between the two poles.