Freedom and Ecological Limits

Transcription

1 Freedom and Ecological Limits Jorge Pinto - March 2018; ejc.pinto@gmail.com Draft sent to the ECPR Joint Sessions, Nicosia, April 2018 Abstract Most of the discussions about the state of the environment assume that we currently live in some sort of sustainable world; taking the Planetary Boundaries as a unit of measure, this cannot be considered to be the case. Thus, getting out of the unsustainability that we live in respecting Earth s limits is of primal importance and the concept of freedom might offer good answers. When discussing the ecological challenge, freedom is hardly a topic. We ll argue that there are two different ways to analyse the relation between the two concepts: on the one hand, freedom being often referred to be in competition with ecological sustainability and the imposed limits it requires and, on the other hand, the impacts in individual s freedom due to ecological catastrophe if strict limits are not implemented. Accepting that freedom is an important topic regarding the ecological challenge, what conception of freedom is better prepared to offer the answers to that challenge? We will compare and confront the liberal conceptions of freedom as non-frustration and noninterference with the republican view of freedom as non-domination and their relation with the ecological limits. We conclude that republican freedom as non-domination is the better placed to justify ecological limits that promote a sustainable future. Keywords Freedom; Ecological limits; Liberalism; Republicanism; Non-frustration; Non-interference; Non-domination 1. Introduction Ensuring ecological sustainability is essential in order to ensure human flourishing and human freedom. What precisely is sustainability and how it can be promoted is a difficult task that we don t intend to perform here. We will focus on the claim that ensuring sustainability is a goal that we should aim at and, to do so, some ecological limits will need to be in place. There s almost a scientific consensus regarding the human-related impact regarding the climate crisis, from the local to the global level. Global climate change is a paradigmatic example as the related impacts will be unpredictable and will impact, although with different levels of severity, all human societies. However, despite the fact that we can assume that we are currently living in a situation of ecological unsustainability, the implementation of strict ecological limits has not taken place and is a topic often disregarded on the grounds of avoiding freedom-limitation.

2 Despite this claim, the study of the impact in terms of freedom as consequence of ecological measures such as limits has not deserved a lot of attention. The fact that other aspects such as environmental rights and environmental justice have received more attention and yet not proven efficient regarding the ecological challenges 1 opens the path for other (complementary) alternatives such as freedom. But what kind of freedom? Discussions on the meaning of freedom have existed for centuries and there are several conceptions associated with different political theories. In this article we will focus on three conceptions of freedom: as non-frustration, as non-interference and as non-domination. The first two can be considered as liberal conceptions, whereas the third is a republican conception of freedom. The political theories behind the conceptions of freedom - liberalism and republicanism - have received some attention in their relation with green politics. Good examples are Wissenburg s approach to green liberalism (Wissenburg, 1998), where he tries to defend a restraint principle that would allocate environmental benefits and burdens in a fair way, or Simon Hailwood s approach on how to be a good liberal (Hailwood, 2004); from a republican perspective, Barry (2008; 2012) and Cannavò (2016) have investigated the possibilities of a green republicanism 2. These approaches focus on the relations between environment and different aspects such as civic virtues, political participation, corruption, the intrinsic value of nature and neutrality regarding the common good. With this article we want to contribute to the discussion about the relation between freedom and ecology, namely regarding the impacts on freedom due to ecological limits. We consider that freedom is a strong and comprehensive concept with a tremendous political potential to engage individuals and public governments to the need to promote it as one of the most important values of the society and thus worth protecting. We will argue that there are two main reasons why freedom and ecological limits are linked, namely the impacts in present freedom due to setting up ecological limits and the potential impacts in future freedom if no strict limits are put in place. To avoid the second scenario, we will focus on how the different conceptions of freedom can accept ecological limits in the present. In the second section of the article we will discuss the need of ecological limits in order to ensure sustainability. In Section 3 a discussion on the relations between freedom and ecological limits is done, followed by a discussion on different conceptions of freedom in Section 4. In the last three sections we focus on the different conceptions of freedom and their relation with ecological limits. 1 It s more difficult to prove this negative claim than the opposite, but see for example solid works on green political theory such as Green (1992), Dobson (2003; 2007), Eckersley (1992), Robbins (2004) or the book edited by Dobson and Eckersley (2006) where the topic freedom is the only one sharing an article with another topic (rights). Freedom, when referred, is only on a very brief note. 2 Other relevant contributions for both theories can be found in Wissenburg and Levy (2004), Bell (2002), Hannis (2016), Stephens (2016), Dagger (2006a), Barry and Eckersley (2008) or Curry (2000).

3 2. Ecological sustainability and the need for limits Defining sustainability and detailing the precise activities it requires is an extremely arduous task. In the past decades, some efforts were made in the attempt to operationalise and clarify what activities are required in order to ensure ecological sustainability. One common aspect seems to be present in most of these approaches: in order to ensure sustainability, some limits need to be respected. One of the first attempts to translate sustainability into a more concrete definition was made in the Brundtland Report, which presented the concept of Sustainable Development, defined as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED, 1987, Ch. 2). This report was preceded by others such as The Club of Rome s Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972), which highlighted the conflict between a non-limited growth-based economy and sustainability. More recently, new attempts have been made in order to further detail how sustainability can be ensured. United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report stressed that human-caused greenhouse gases emissions are responsible for the steep increase of climate change, including global warming (IPCC, 2014). In order to remain below a global temperature increase of 2ºC, which according to the IPCC is essential to avoid passing a tipping point of unpredictable consequences for the planet, a carbon budget was defined. IPCC has thus defined different scenarios considering different amounts of total global carbon emissions and the respective percentages of possibility to remain within a global temperature increase of 2ºC, concluding that it will be necessary to stay within a steadily shrinking carbon budget in order to achieve that objective. Two other indicators that try to translate sustainability into a more graphical and metric format are the Ecological Footprint and the Planetary Boundaries. The Ecological Footprint measures how much nature is being used against the total nature available, concluding that according to the goods and services we currently use, humanity currently needs the regenerative capacity of 1.6 Earths 3 (WWF, 2016). The Planetary Boundaries are a particularly interesting concept that consists in the definition of boundaries for nine Earth system processes that should not be passed in order for the planet to remain within safe operating space (Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al. 2015). The Planetary Boundaries are thus a comprehensive and simple way to assess the health of our planet 4. From the nine system processes, four of them - climate change, biochemical flows, land-system change and biosphere integrity - have already passed beyond the limit, which may lead to dangerous levels of instability in the Earth system and increasing risk for humans (WWF, 2016, pp. 12). Despite the vagueness of the definitions related to sustainability, the need for some limits seems to be a central point of all the approaches to ensure an ecologically sustainable future. This is hardly surprising in a planet where some finite resources (e.g. arable land, 3 See the Global Footprint Network website for further details and updated data on the countries footprints: 4 Kate Raworth has used these Planetary boundaries together with twelve social dimensions in order to develop her Doughnut Economics. It consists in a safe and just space for humanity between a social foundation (not going below a minimum regarding the social dimensions) and an ecological ceiling (not going beyond the Planetary Boundaries) (Raworth, 2017).

4 fossil fuels and minerals) are still being explored and exploited with little consideration regarding their preservation or protection. But if the consequence of the lack of limits in the exploitation of finite resources is their depletion and eventual disappearance, the situation regarding renewable resources might have critical impacts as well, in particular if they become scarcer. If sustainability - independently of its exact definition - might require (strict) limits in terms of consumption and production, why haven t those limits been set in the past, namely when the reports urging the need for limits were published? A possible answer is the technological optimism, which argues that sustainable development is possible even if implying the extraction of finite natural resources and environmental impacts in the short-term. Robyn Eckersley identifies that fact regarding the Limits to Growth report referring that the study (...) spawned a plethora of counterarguments to the effect that the problems were susceptible to technological fix and pricing solutions that would alleviate the negative ecological externalities of economic growth without the need for any fundamental changes in political values or the pattern and scale of economic activity (Eckersley, 1992, pp. 12). Andrew Dobson has a similar understanding, reason why he distinguishes environmentalism as a managerial approach to environmental problems, secure in the belief that they can be solved without fundamental changes in present values or patterns of production and consumption from the clearly distinct concept of ecologism, which requires radical changes in our relationship with the non-human natural world, and in our mode of social and political life (Dobson, 2007, pp. 2-3, our highlight). The limits to growth are then on of the pillars of ecologism. And, after a period where the discourse on limits was less popular, there might be a a renaissance of the debate around the possibility and necessity of a path to prosperity without growth, and a revamped version of the limits to growth thesis in the guise of the idea of planetary boundaries (Dobson, 2016, pp. 301). We might be entering - if not already there - what Serge Latouche called the age of limits (Latouche, 2012). But technological optimism is one of the main replies that critics of limits regularly use; and the technological optimism is two-fold: first, it consists in the belief that technological evolution will (eventually) make real the total decoupling of economic growth from resources consumption and environmental impacts and, second, that future technologies will be capable of repairing the ecological impacts produced until that moment. Data from the past decades has proved, however, that technological optimism might be risky. Total decoupling was arguably not yet achieved and even relative decoupling 5 has had very relative success (Nørgård and Xue, 2016; Vergragt, Akenji and Dewick, 2014). Considering technological solutions as the only (or main) solution to the ecological challenges and, as a consequence, reject strict limits, can then be problematic. As referred, there are no visible proofs of total decoupling and even assuming that new technology for environmental preservation and correction of past impacts will be eventually available, it might simply be too late. Think of geo-engineering or carbon capture proposals, for example; these technologies have been tested for some years now and still without positive results, 5 Jackson defines relative decoupling as a decline in the ecological intensity per unit of economic output. In this situation, resource impacts decline relative to the GDP. But they don t necessarily decline in absolute terms. Impacts may still increase, but at a slower pace than growth in the GDP (Jackson, 2009, pp. 48).

5 while still presented as strong candidates to ensure environmental and economic sustainability. But more critically, this approach to the ecological challenges based on remediation serves as a way to say that life can remain the same, i.e. with our current unsustainable patterns of consumption and production, because, in the future, solutions will be found. Some green theorists follow this technological-optimistic path. In their Ecomodernist Manifesto, nineteen scientists argue that even dramatic limits to per capita global consumption would be insufficient to achieve significant climate mitigation (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2015: pp. 21) and thus only technological improvement can promote meaningful climate mitigation. Instead of reviewing unsustainable practices and critically look into the reasons why the ecological challenges are becoming bigger, their proposal is simply to insist in further development of technological solutions. This kind of solution is supported by other authors, such as Friedman (2009), who claims that only the right market incentives will allow green innovation to take place. It s not surprising that ecologists are, to say the least, reluctant to the ecomodernist approach (Blühdorn, 2000; Eckersley, 2004, pp. 70). Even if new technologies are invented, if they come to work after the massive extinction of species or after passing the Planet Boundaries more than the point of no return, when the catastrophic consequences cannot be reverted, they will not serve their purpose. So rather than assuming a reluctant position regarding altering the existing ways of living and the way global economy is organised, putting all hopes in the technological development, ecologists will rather be interested in changes at individual level - attitudes and behaviours - and at system level - entering a phase of prosperity without the mandatory need for growth (Cf. Jackson, 2009) -, thus preferring the implementation of some limits. This is the line of thought we will follow. We ll consider that sustainability is worth aiming at and that getting out of the current situation of unsustainability will require some limits. 6 Although not going into a deep analysis of what type of specific limits might be required, it s important to distinguish some categories where the limits will apply. The limits as we consider them for this article are both at supply and demand side. This means that eco-modernist approaches that focus only on the supply side (production) ignoring the demand side (consumption) will not be enough. And the limits will apply at different levels, from the individual until the State level. First, at individual level, there might be limits in terms of consumption both in terms of quantity (reduction of the number of options available) and in terms of quality (e.g. interdiction of consumption of some rare and scarce product). Second, these limits in terms of consumption imply as well limits in terms of production. Such production limits might be determined both at individual and collective level (e.g. companies) and an example would be production quotas. Thirdly, there might be limits at State level. Consider the already referred carbon budget that could be divided and attributed in the most equitable and just form to each country, becoming responsible for ensuring that the State would not emit more than the attributed amount of carbon. 6 For a critique on the use of the term sustainability, see Blühdorn, who claims that sustainability paradigm did not simply neglect the irreducibly normative character of environmental policy and politics, but it systematically failed to grasp the actual core of eco-political discourse (Blühdorn, 2016, pp. 264)

6 Such limits can thus be seen as coercive at least by some conceptions of freedom. But will it be the case with all conceptions of freedom? Can t such limits be seen as promoting freedom (or other freedoms) and thus serve as a powerful argument for ecologists, avoiding the exclusively catastrophic discourse? Answering these questions will require further discussion on the concept of freedom. In the next sections we will discuss the conceptions of freedom and their relation with ecological limits, comparing three different conceptions: freedom as non-frustration, freedom as non-interference and freedom as non-domination. 3. Why freedom? The discussions around the concept of freedom are part of the philosophical debates for centuries. This is hardly surprising as a part of the human condition is the quest towards (more) freedom, which requires the belief that freedom, independently of its definition, is achievable and worth aiming at. Being such a powerful concept, it is surprising how little attention has been paid to the possible relations between freedom and green politics (Hannis, 2016; Fragnière, 2016). As we have seen in the previous section, indicators such as the Planetary Boundaries prove that we are currently living in a situation of ecological unsustainability and the urgent need to move to sustainability in order to avoid catastrophic consequences. In the rest of this article we ll try to justify the use of the concept of freedom regarding the ecological challenge, comparing three approaches - the liberal views of freedom as non-frustration and as noninterference and the republican view of freedom as non-domination. This will be done assuming that in order to answer to the ecological challenge will require setting up limits. What are then the possible relations between freedom and ecology and how can both concepts interact? We ll argue that there are two different ways to analyse the relation between the two concepts: on the one hand, freedom being often referred to be in competition with ecological sustainability and the imposed limits it requires and, on the other hand, the impacts in individual s freedom due to ecological catastrophe if strict limits are not implemented. The relationship between imposing strict limits to ensure sustainability and the impact of those limits in terms of freedom can be divided in two groups. In the first, one can find those who argue against strict limits as they would represent an unacceptable attack on freedom and, in the second, those who claim that losing some freedom might be inevitable in order to avoid human oblivion. The former would correspond to a liberal and libertarian view that sees a reduction of the available options as a limitation to freedom 7. Even if recognising the problems related to ecological sustainability, (some) limits would be seen as not acceptable as they would represent a too big impact in terms of freedom (Wissenburg, 1998). The latter would correspond to the eco-authoritarians and deep ecologists who argue, even if with very 7 In this group I m not including those who, like climate change deniers, claim that ecological limits are simply not required.

7 different political reasons, that losing some freedom is the price to pay to ensure ecological sustainability (Cf. Ophuls, 1992; Hardin, 1968; Foreman, 1987) 8. To be fair, this eco-authoritarian and deep ecologist position has been rejected by several ecological thinkers on grounds of freedom preservation. Bookchin, a key-figure of social ecology, has rejected deep ecology arguing that it was a tool for eco-brutalism that puts in first place resource protection rather than starving people (Bookchin, 1987) 9. On a different note, André Gorz writing about the relationship between ecology and freedom warns against the risk of techno-fascism determining the allocation of scarce resources precisely on the grounds of freedom-protection (Gorz, 1977). If the first reason is mostly linked to the impact on freedom if ecological limits are defined, the second reason is linked to the consequences of not setting such limits. Ecologists have repeatedly warned for potential catastrophic consequences linked to our current lifestyle. One example are the unknown worldwide impacts of having an increase of the global temperature of more than 1,5ºC or of passing the threshold of the Planetary Boundaries. Thus, if such consequences are actually observed, strict limitations of individual s freedom might be observed at least in two ways. First, there will be a much smaller set of options available: think that reduction of drinkable water supplies and an increase of extreme weather phenomena that will impact food crops are among the possible consequences of the ecological crisis; second, while the consequences of the ecological crisis become more visible and start impacting the lives of individuals and communities, there s a risk that authoritarian governments take extreme measures to try to oppose them or to allocate at their will scarce resources or that governments go to war in competition for those resources. Moreover, there might be an indirect impact on the individual s freedom who, faced with a more difficult access to resources essential for her survival and flourishing is more prone to accept conditions that will harm her freedom. In all these cases, there will be a clear impact on the individual s freedom, reason why some authors have imagined possible dystopian futures where scarcity leads to the lack of freedom (Cf. Dobson, 2003; Ophuls, 1977). To put it simple: the exercise of freedom might not be possible if healthy ecological systems are not in place. The focus on catastrophic scenarios as consequence of collective inertia regarding the ecological challenges has been used in the past decades as one of the main arguments by the environmentalists to convince people to answer to the ecological challenges. This fear approach can be attributed to the risk of losing hard won freedom and democracy and avoidable human suffering in the near future if corrective and anticipatory and adaptive measures are not put in place (Barry, 2012, pp. 229); but not only it has failed its purpose of engaging the society to act as it might as well reveal itself doing the opposite of what was initially the intention. If we - individuals, communities, nature - are all doomed, why shall we accept strict limits anyway? Why not simply enjoy our lives as much as possible while it is still time? The reasoning could then be: if an ecological armageddon will come anyway, 8 This is as well the case with the dystopian essay by Oreskes and Conway (2014) where a historian from the future explains how authoritarian measures were the only way to avoid the ecological catastrophe. 9 This discussion arose in a moment when a substantial part of the Ethiopian population was suffering from starvation; to this, above mentioned Foreman stated that Ethiopian famine was nature taking its course.

8 future generations and the ecosphere will be impacted independently of my current actions and thus I d better keep my current freedom to live as I want. Green theorists should pay attention to this kind of arguments and the answer to them depends, of course, on the particular type of freedom one is considering. As we will discuss below, setting limits might not represent a reduction of freedom; it might indeed represent an increase of the individual s freedom, proving to be a concept worth exploring when considering green politics. Green conceptions of freedom can support and enhance sustainable ways of life and serve as a source of imaginative, aesthetic, and practical reflection about the world and the human place in it (Lambacher, 2016, pp. 391). 4. Conceptions of freedom Being a prominent topic of discussion within political theory, the study of freedom is a continuing enterprise (Pettit, 2012a, pp. 90). Among the different conceptions of freedom, the distinction presented by Berlin in 1958 is still very popular. In his lecture on Two conceptions of Liberty, Berlin distinguished negative from positive freedom. The former refers to liberty from external restraints, meaning that a person or group of persons is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons (Berlin, 2002, pp. 169), while the latter refers to freedom to live according to one s will and to self-realization. Berlin clearly rejects the positive freedom, claiming that the fact that the State would have to decide what freedoms shall be preserved would lead to tyranny. According to Berlin, to be free was dependent on having the possibility to choose between the maximum number of options - not only the one that we might want in a given moment - without suffering the intentional interference by others that could reduce the number of choices available. In his words, the extent of a man s negative freedom is, as it were, a function of what doors, and how many are open to him; upon what prospects they are open; and how open they are (Berlin, 2002, pp. 41). He clarifies, however, that not all doors are of equal importance and thus the assessment of the evolution of overall freedom can be an agonising problem. This approach, however, has been criticised by various authors. MacCallum, for example, defends a single conception of freedom, claiming that freedom relations are not dual but rather triadic: freedom of an agent X to do Y without hindrances by Z (MacCallum, 1967) 10. Another criticism was made by republicans. While recognising the existence of Berlin s two conceptions of liberty, republicans claim that there s a third conception: freedom as nondomination (Skinner, 2002; 2008; Pettit, 1997). Being presented as a protection from something, republican freedom might be considered as a broadly negative conception of freedom (Pettit, 2003). But not all republicans would agree with this approach 11, claiming that 10 Carter tries to find a common ground for both Berlin and MacCallum approaches, claiming that Berlin s insight [can be captured] without abandoning MacCallum s triadic formula, namely by interpreting the Z in MacCallum s formula as non-specific in nature (Carter, 1999, pp. 32, highlight in the original). 11 This is indeed a key distinction between neo-roman and neo-aristotelian republicans. Lovett (2017) distinguishes civic republicans from civic humanists, which is a variant of republicanism based on active citizenship and participation (Moulakis, 2011).

9 republican freedom requires the active participation of the individuals in the pursuing their community s common good (Honohan, 2002). Another possible way of separating different views and conceptions of freedom is between option-freedom and agency-freedom (Pettit, 2003). Option-freedom is dependent on the character of the options accessible - their number, diversity or significance - and the character of the access - i.e. if the physical possibility is enough to consider the access to a choice as free or if other questions such as a (prospect of) penalisation or reward is relevant as well (Pettit, 2003, pp ). Agency-freedom focus in the individual - the agent - and is not directly linked to the number of options she enjoys. It is rather a matter of social standing or status (...) [where freedom] means not having to depend on the grace or mercy of others, being able to do one s own thing without asking their leave or permission (Pettit, 2003, pp. 394). To be noted that, although not very likely, both option and agency freedom can vary independently. Pettit presents the cases of the free indigent who, although with the possibility of having his agency-freedom protected by the State, doesn t have the means (physical or economic) to exercise is option-freedom; the opposite example would be the one of the lucky slave who, thanks to a benevolent master, has option-freedom but lacks agency-freedom. Within this distinction between option and agency freedom, Pettit distinguished three broadly negative views of freedom: as non-limitation, as non-interference and as non-domination. Non-limitation would be a form of option-freedom, non-domination primarily a form of agency-freedom and non-interference is born of a confusion between the two not answering adequately to either (Pettit, 2003, pp. 402). In his later works, Pettit focused on freedom as non-frustration rather than non-limitation (Pettit, 2011; 2012a; 2012b). Both can be considered has option-freedom approaches and have in common the fact that all sorts of hindrance, be it the ill will of another agent or natural limitations, count as freedom limiting. They both share as well the view that as long as it is physically possible for an agent to choose an option, the agent is free in that decision, independently of all other possible negative or positive (prospects of) consequences. The main difference between these conceptions is that while non-limitation focus is quantitative - the bigger the sheer number of options available to an agent, the freer she is -, the focus of non-frustration is on the protection of the favourite option of the agent. As it will be discussed below, according to non-frustration, avoiding frustration and ensuring freedom requires that only the preferred choice is not blocked or subject of hindrances. From this brief distinction, it becomes clear that freedom as non-frustration is better placed than non-limitation regarding ecological limits; for this reason, that s the conception we ll consider. In the rest of this article we ll thus focus on the views of freedom as non-frustration, as noninterference and as non-domination, considering the two first as liberal approaches and the latter as a republican approach. We ll compare these views with the ecological challenges identified in Section 2, discussing which of the conceptions of freedom is better suited to promote the ecological limits.

10 5. Freedom as non-frustration and Ecological Limits The conception of freedom as non-frustration emerged and became popular with Thomas Hobbes. In his Leviathan, he defined a free man as the one who is not hindered to do what he has a will to (Hobbes, 1996, pp. Ch. 21.2). This means that promoting freedom requires avoiding the agent s frustration in a given choice. Some recent influential theorists of freedom follow this Hobbesian approach in the claim that as long as an option is physically possible, the agent has freedom to choose, independently of the possible consequences (Cf. Steiner, 1994; Carter, 1999; Kramer, 2003). Coercion, threats or even benefits that might be related to a given option will not have an impact in the agent s freedom to choose an option; only the removal of an option, and not its replacement, will count as freedom-limitation. In the highwayman s threat example, where an individual needs to choose between her life and her money under a threat, she would be perfectly free to choose, even if her overall freedom could be reduced because of the threat and coercion. According to this conception, an agent s freedom will only be limited if some hindrance impacts an option that she prefers and has a will to. If an option that the agent is not interested in, a non-preferred option, is blocked but the preferred option is not hindered, than the agent would be free in her choice: There is no frustration if a hindrance blocks you taking an option that, as it happens, you do not want to take anyhow (Pettit, 2012b, pp. 29). The kind of hindrance considered as impacting freedom is very wide. It includes both interpersonal and impersonal, both ill willed actions and natural limitations. Both Berlin and Pettit criticise this view of freedom claiming that, taken to an extreme, it would be too easy to be free in a given choice, being enough for the individual to convince herself that her preferred option was the one available (Pettit, 2011, pp. 696). It would indeed be, should the agent adapt her preferences, stopping to wish the option that is hindered and adapting to a non-hindered option, becoming thus free in their choice (Berlin, 2002, pp. 186). As Pettit argues, according to freedom as non-frustration, a prisoner could make herself free by simply stopping wishing to be free and adapting her preference to prefer staying in prison. Regarding the ecological limits that we claim are necessary, this conception of freedom would face challenges difficult to overcome. The removal of some options would be certain and in order to avoid frustration, you must be lucky enough, or perhaps powerful enough, for none of your choices to be frustrated (Pettit, 2011, pp. 696). It is extremely unlikely, not to say impossible, that the choices removed by ecological limits would not be the preferred of any individual or that all individuals would be lucky or powerful enough to avoid frustration. There s another option left which is all individuals that have their preferred options impacted by the ecological limits to adapt their wishes to the options that will remain available. But this scenario, where a likely big number of individuals will have to change their wishes, is hardly acceptable as a possibility. Moreover, as Pettit notes when presenting his example of the prisoner that makes herself free by wishing to be in prison, if adaptation is required, there will

11 always be a loss in terms of overall freedom (Pettit, 2011, pp. 700; Carter, 1999; Kramer, 2003). It can still be argued that, according to this conception, a smaller set of options might be accepted in the short-term in order to ensure a bigger set of options in the future, but this argument faces two main obstacles. First, it is not clear that limits in the present will avoid limits in the future. If the former are certain, the latter will depend on multiple conditions that might not be observed. Proponents of freedom as non-frustration might refer to the technological optimism and argue that the same way it cannot be ensured that limits in the present will allow us to move from unsustainability, one could continue to live without limits in the present confident that future technological improvements would ensure sustainability. Second, even if limits in the present do indeed ensure a bigger set of options in the future, the beneficiaries of such options will most likely not be the ones impacted in the present by the reduction of options available. The reward, or the perspective of such reward, in terms of future options will then be (too) weak to serve as an argument to limit the present number of options. Moreover, the conception of freedom as non-frustration is associated with the technological optimistic view and to the idea that more than surviving by struggling against nature, human freedom is achieved by mastering nature thanks to improvements at technological level. This approach evolved with liberalism and became popular in the beginning of the XVII century, when philosophers such as Bacon (2017) and Hobbes (2009) claimed that human freedom would be increased by the expansion of the human power in comparison with the nature around. Bookchin claims that the counterpart of domination of nature by man (...) has been the domination of man by nature. So, he follows, both marxism and liberalism see the former as a desideratum that emerges out of the latter (Bookchin, 1987b, pp. 21-2) This conclusion is clearly problematic when thinking of sustainable development and of ecology. 6. Freedom as non-interference and Ecological Limits One of the key differences between non-interference and non-frustration is what both theories consider as limitations to freedom. Non-frustration, as we ve seen above, considers all sorts of hindrances as limiting freedom, whereas non-interference only considers those that are of human origin and deliberate - the ill will of others. So, even if natural limitations might impact your freedom in some instrumental way, those natural hindrances are not limiting your freedom in a given choice. On the other hand, even if endorsed by the people, all interferences will count as limiting freedom (Pettit, 2012a, pp. 80). If non-frustration says that obstacles to a non-preferred option don t limit your freedom, noninterference says that it does. The sense of freedom in which I use this term entails not simply the absence of frustration (which may be obtained by killing desires), but the absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities - absence of obstructions on roads along which a man can decide to walk (Berlin, 2002, pp. 32, highlight added). Miller follows a similar line of thought, referring that interference is an act of coercion or obstruction that an individual will perform in a (quasi)intentional way, which means that such

12 acts count at least as negligent: constraints should be identified as those obstacles for whose existence other men are morally responsible (Miller, 1983, pp. 74-5). Unlike Berlin, however, Miller distinguishes a deliberate obstruction from an obstruction which is a byproduct of an action in pursuit of other ends (Miller, 1983, pp. 73). Both authors agree in the fact that not just removing an option will count as an hindrance affecting freedom; the replacement of a given option by another which is penalised will count as well - and this is yet another difference regarding Berlin s view and Hobbes, who considers that only removing an option counts as limiting freedom 12. Maximising freedom as non-interference requires then the minimisation of (expected) interference, not only avoiding interference to the option that will be the preferred one but as well with other possible options - keeping all doors open. But as it becomes clear, as the interferences considered as freedom-limiting according to this approach don t include impersonal ones, this conception of freedom is less worried about the total number of options, departing in that sense from a pure option-freedom conception (Pettit, 2003). This might open space for accepting some ecological limits as the total number of options will likely be reduced, but doesn t reply to all challenges. Berlin is clear when he says that even if as a mean to increase another liberty, all laws - and certainly the ones we are considering as part of the ecological limits - will curtail some liberty (Berlin, 2002, pp. 41, highlight in the original). This would mean that according to freedom as non-interference, the ecological limits, although curtailing some freedoms, could be accepted and justified under the assumption that the total sum of attainable freedom in the future would be observed. But this line of thought faces some challenges mostly due to the temporal aspect of the ecological challenge. First, it would be extremely difficult to develop a model that could correctly assess and calculate the sum of the future attainable freedom based on present freedom restrictions. If the limits imposed in the present would have an immediate effect limiting freedom, the extent of the pay-off of such freedom curtail would be extremely difficult to quantify. Taking climate change and the possible policies to counter it as an example, one can say that both taxes on carbon emissions and a limitation of the total number of flights authorised will impact the agent s freedom; but it becomes clear that in the second scenario the curtailing of freedom is bigger than in the first where flying would still be possible even if at an extra cost - keep in mind that freedom as non-interference comes in degrees and, thus, is not a matter of status that one has or not. But assessing how both scenarios would impact the future freedom is a herculean task: which of the two situations would provide the best relation present-freedomlimitation versus future-freedom-increase? How would both policies perform in mitigating climate change and protect future options and future freedom? Second, and linked to the previous paragraph, the future freedom-restrictions that are avoided with the limitations in the present might be indirect, whereas the present limitations would be direct. The present ecological limitations via rules, regulations or laws would be directly impacting the agent and considered as an interference; but the future freedomrestriction that the present limits would try to avoid could be indirect. Think of climate change and some of its expected consequences: extreme weather events such as long draughts 12 Carter (1999) and Kramer (2003) follow Hobbes in this particular aspect, arguing that the removal of an option is indeed what counts as an interference limiting the agent s freedom of choice. See Pettit, 2011, pp. 699 and Pettit, 2008, pp for a comment on this.

13 and floods, global temperature increase and the rise of the sea levels, among others. Those events would certainly impact the agent s freedom but in an indirect way, such as limiting their access to food, housing or even land shall they live next to the coast. Justifying direct freedom-restrictions on the grounds of avoiding (possible) future indirect freedom-restriction would then prove to be complicated according to the freedom as non-interference conception. A third aspect was presented by Fragnière who points that given the fact that freedom as non-interference considers as restrictions the interferences of human and intentional origin, it has more difficulties to regulate collective action problems, being insensitive regarding the prudential argument (Fragnière, 2016, pp. 41). It is so, he argues, because a big number of the current environmental-related constraints are impersonal in character which, according to this liberal conception of freedom, would not count as a freedom-limiting interference. However, limits set to avoid the environmental-related impacts in the number of options available to the individuals will be intentional and of human origin, thus counting as limiting freedom. This is indeed a crucial point that liberal conceptions of freedom will have to answer if they want to both protect individual freedom according to their conception of noninterference and move away from a situation of ecological unsustainability. 7. Freedom as non-domination and Ecological Limits Unlike the two liberal conceptions of freedom that we ve discussed in the previous sections, the republican freedom as non-domination is primarily a form of agency-freedom, being a much more ancient conception of freedom (Skinner, 1998). Non-domination refers primarily to the concern about the freedom and the role of the agent in the society - thus being primarily a form of agency-freedom - but can make room for option-freedom as well, although on a secondary level. For freedom as non-domination, the primary goal (...) should be to guard people against domination, [and] the secondary to maximize the range in which, and the ease with which, people can exercise their undominated capacity for choice (Pettit, 2003, pp. 401). In what can we then distinguish non-interference from non-domination? In common they have the fact of, unlike non-frustration, being concerned with protecting (either from interference or from domination) the available choices and not only the prefered one. But they go apart from here. As Lovett says in a simple way, interference is an action, whereas domination is an ability to act (Lovett, 2016, pp. 110). So, according to non-interference, even if an agent A has the ability to act in a coercive way regarding agent B, B s freedom would not be impacted as long as there wouldn t be a (physical or not) action against it. This proves the instability of non-interference: as Berlin criticised the fact that Hobbes s theory of freedom as non-frustration entails that adaptation is a possible means of liberation, the same critic can be made to his theory of freedom which entails that ingratiation is a possible means of liberation in the same way as adaptation in the Hobbesian theory (Pettit, 2011). This clarification is particularly relevant regarding the ecological challenge because, as we have been arguing, ecological limits will imply the reduction of the total number of options, likely via laws and regulations which can be inimical to one variety of freedom [namely as

14 non-frustration and non-interference] while being friendly to the other (Pettit, 2003, pp. 398). Thus, unlike the liberal conceptions of freedom, non-domination opens the path for interferences that might not be an attack to the agent s freedom. But not all laws and interferences will be accepted as non-limiting freedom; rather, only non-arbitrary, or uncontrolled 13 interferences will. What is then a controlled interference? In which situation an ecological limit in the form of a law defined by a government will not be limiting freedom? Lovett answers saying that provided the government issuing those laws or policies is suitably controlled, it will not subject its citizens to domination, and thus not detract from their freedom, which makes him conclude that the rule of law is a necessary condition for our enjoying freedom in the first place (Lovett, 2016, pp. 112). An agent will be free as long as she is not dominated, be it by the State or be it by another agent (as an individual or as a group of individuals). Pettit has a similar understanding and argues that State interference will not be dominating (...) so long as it can be subjected to the effective, equally shared control of the people [which] requires giving people an equally shared form of control 14 (Pettit, 2014, pp. 111; see as well Pettit, 1997, pp. 55-6). From what we ve discussed so far, it seems that there s the possibility - assuming a republican form of government - of setting ecological limits without reducing the agent s freedom, i.e., without increasing the domination she could be under. But apart from the main focus on the agency-freedom, non-domination in a choice, the option-freedom aspect of republican freedom, can offer some paths regarding ecological limits. In one his most recent accounts of non-domination, Pettit refers two kinds of factors that count as hindrances to a free choice: vitiating and invasive. Vitiating factors are the indirect resource failures that affect the agent s possibility to satisfy her will. Such factors affect the use of resources for any purpose and thus are not specifically targeting an agent s specific will; if an hindrance would affect the use of resources for a given choice in a specific way it would then count as an invasion 15 (Pettit, 2012, pp. 37-8). Examples of vitiation are not having the physical capacity or not having the financial possibility to perform a given act. Both situations will count as hindrances but not as interferences because, as we ve seen in the previous section, interferences require the human ill will. It is not clear, however, the extent to which the environmental-related constraints are impersonal. Think of the extraction of rare precious minerals or the overexploitation of fish stocks and the impact in the number of choices of such activities. They might be considered as unintended side-effects of the current socioeconomic system (Fragnière, 2016, pp. 41) but they are hardly impersonal if one considers that the agents responsible for those actions of extraction and fishing are aware of the finite character of the minerals or fish they are extracting or fishing. 13 In his later works, Pettit opts for the use the definition of uncontrolled interference rather than arbitrary, mostly because of the risk of misleading connotations regarding the term arbitrary (see Pettit, 2012b, pp. 58; see as well Lovett, 2012) 14 In the past, he had a similar approach, referring that an interference will not be uncontrolled if forced to track the interests and ideas of the person suffering the interference (Pettit, 1997, pp. 55). 15 The distinction between the two types of hindrance is not always straightforward but see Pettit (2012, pp. 38-9) for a tentative of clarification.

15 Republican theory of freedom acknowledges the existence of structural domination which might create masters that don t want that role 16. And vitiation might be a consequence of such structural domination. It s not necessary to refer to possible conspiratorial bents of marxists (Lovett, 2016) that claim that every economic disadvantage is a deliberate consequence of capitalism to undermine freedom to defend that, regarding ecology, structural conditions will create more hindrances to some individuals than others. This is especially true if one considers ecological issues such as climate change as global. So the recognition of this structural form of domination by ecological elements - let s call it ecological domination - offers a reason for republican non-domination to support strict ecological limits. But what if structural domination regarding ecology is impersonal? Should the vitiations it would produce be dismissed from the concerns of those defending republican freedom? A good answer is given by Lovett when he claims that even if we decline to include a nonvitiation condition in our [republican] conception of freedom, the non-domination condition itself necessarily entails some concern for adequate resourcing (Lovett, 2016, pp. 120). The reason is the fact that resource failing will render people more vulnerable to domination. For this reason, republicans welcome interventions in the market relations and market structure in order to protect freedom. Such interventions can be aimed at protecting women from subjection to men, workers from subjection to employers, and members of some racial, ethnic, or cultural groups from subjection to others - all in the name of both equality and freedom (Dagger, 2006b, pp. 155). And the list of interventions can be extended to ecological-related aspects in order to protect individuals from ecological-related domination via ecological limits. 8. Conclusion In this chapter we have discussed the need to implement ecological limits in order to promote sustainability, which is essential for human flourishing and freedom. We have as well presented freedom as a powerful concept to face the various ecological challenges and to justify ecological limits. We have presented two reasons why the relation between freedom and ecology can be studied and compared three different conceptions of freedom: liberal freedom as non-frustration and as non-interference and republican freedom as nondomination. Both liberalism and republicanism have been studied in relation with green political theory but have focused mostly in aspects other than freedom, such as neutrality, civic virtues, justice and laws. However, such aspects have failed to deliver ecological sustainability, opening space for a complementary element such as freedom. Being focused mostly in option-freedom, the liberal conceptions will have difficulties to justify ecological limits as they would be seen as freedom-limitations. They could indeed justify some limits but hardly to an extent that would allow us to move from the current situation of unsustainability to a situation of sustainability. 16 Pettit gives as example the patriarchal society of the 19th century where, even if not wanting it, male adults would play a dominant role regarding women and child (Pettit, 2012a, pp. 81-2)