No. 15/114 September 2010

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1 No. 15/114 September 2010 & Opinions nalyses AAnalizy i Opinie THE INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS INSTYTUT SPRAW PUBLICZNYCH How to support democracy in Eastern Europe? Recommendations of the 2 nd Polish-Nordic Forum Aleksander Fuksiewicz El bieta Kaca The European Union has returned to the debate on the promotion of democracy in its external relations which has resulted in the issuing of the document: Council Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU s External Relations. EU assistance instruments, such as monitoring of the electoral process, still require review and improvement. First of all, in the countries of Eastern Europe, more emphasis should be placed on strengthening the rule of law, supporting political pluralism, developing educational programmes on the functioning of democracy and supporting independent media. More assistance should also be directed towards civil society organisations. A debate needs to start on the gradual development of horizontal rules that would make EU external assistance dependent on progress in implementing international standards of democracy, while at the same time observing the principle of respecting local conditions. A liberalisation of the visa regime applied to Eastern European countries could play an important role in promoting democratic standards. This process would enable the development of direct contacts between people and would help various societies to become better acquainted. Poland and the Nordic states may contribute to promoting democracy in Eastern Europe by supporting the implementation of the Council Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU s External Relations and by monitoring the activities of the European External Action Service and of the European Commission and by supporting these institutions with appropriate expertise. At the level of bilateral relations, they could try to develop regular exchanges of information on development policy and to coordinate their actions as well as to share their experience in the implementation of the principles of supporting democracy in different areas of foreign policy.

2 2 How to support democracy in Eastern Europe? Recommendations of the 2 nd Polish-Nordic Forum After the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and 2007, which included, among others, countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the process of promoting democracy by the EU has declined. It turned out that the model used successfully in the ten post-communist countries did not necessarily work well in other regions. The prospect of EU membership has not been an effective democratisation tool in the Western Balkans where the results it yields are rather limited. A question remains on what incentive could be used to encourage the countries of Eastern Europe which do not have any membership perspective in the short term. The democratisation progression in these countries is minimal. The fault lies both in the social and political situation of the East European countries as well as the weakness of the EU in promoting democratic standards. From the point of view of the EU and its Member States, until recently, it was the United States that was perceived as a guarantee of support for the democratisation process in Eastern Europe. In the wake of Barack Obama coming into power and the USA adopting a rather low-key policy of democracy support, many European politicians began to worry that the region of Eastern Europe might have lost its main advocate at the political level as well as the accompanying significant financial support. On the other hand, European expert circles are rather sceptical about the policies of active support for democratic transformations. One of the reasons for that has been the US policy during the George Bush administration, which has led to the discrediting of the concept of promoting democracy. Today this slogan is mainly associated with the Iraq war 1. In this context, the weaker involvement of President Obama in this area is not altogether surprising 2. One of the factors that contributes to this weakening of the democratisation trends is the appearance of development models as an alternative to democracy, which can be described as modernisation without democracy. A symbol of this model is primarily China, and, also, to a lesser extent, Russia. The democratic model of development must now compete with the authoritarian one, which includes some elements of the free market, without, however, being based on human rights and political pluralism. The above applies also to some countries of Eastern Europe. Russia, trying to build its own sphere of influence in the region, openly negates the democratic model. Donors focus their programmes in the region on involving Russia in multilateral cooperation with other countries of the region. The practical experience, however, shows that Russia is not interested in such cooperation, mainly because it is not willing to adjust to the requirements of the donors. The lack of uniform policy of support for democracy on the part of Western European countries makes the strength of their influence weaker than that of China or Russia. 1 Jacek Kucharczyk, Jeff Lovitt, Democracy s New Champions. European Democracy Assistance after EU Enlargement, Prague 2008, PASOS, p It is worth mentioning, however, that according to statistics, the American aid to democracy supporting programmes, both on a global scale and in the region of Eastern Europe itself, has been growing. According to the 2009 data of the Government Accountability Office, even excluding the significant increase in expenditure in Afghanistan and Iraq, the funding allocated for democracy support in the years increased by 20%. Whereas for the year 2010, the administration of Barack Obama applied for a 9% increase (additional 234 million USD). According to the data of the Freedom House, in 2009, in Europe and in Eurasia, the United States spent USD on democracy supporting programmes, and in the budget for 2010, the amount 20 million USD higher has been allocated, and the increase applies to every East European country except Georgia. Institute of Public Affairs Analyses & Opinions, 15/114

3 How to support democracy in Eastern Europe? Recommendations of the 2 nd Polish-Nordic Forum 3 The process of democratisation of East European countries is characterized by great instability. According to Freedom House 3 classification, in 2010, only Ukraine can be recognized as a free country, whereas Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia are classified as states that are not free, and Armenia, Georgia and Moldova as partly free. Analyzing the Freedom House data from 1991 to 2009, one can notice, that even after certain periods of clear improvement in that respect, the situation has often deteriorated. An example of that can be Russia, which in the nineties used to be classified as a partly free country, and where since 2004 the situation has deteriorated significantly. Another example can be the current changes in the political situation in Ukraine, where in the wake of President Viktor Yanukovych taking power in 2010, limitations in the area of freedom of association or freedom of the media have been noted. 4 Moldova is currently quoted as a positive example, where after coming into power of Vlad Filat, a pro-democratic course has been adopted, although, because of ongoing political instability, it is difficult to predict how long this democratic trend will prevail. This publication addresses the following questions: to what extent the European Union is currently involved in the policy of supporting democracy in the countries of Eastern Europe; whether enough resources are devoted to this priority; whether its assistance instruments are effective; what are the prospects and the challenges for the Brussels democratisation activity? The paper includes opinions and recommendations collected during the 2 nd Polish-Nordic Forum Prospects for democracy in Eastern European countries 5, supplemented with some in-depth analysis carried out by the authors. The European Union and the promotion of democracy in Eastern Europe The support for the promotion of democracy in the European Union can be looked upon from the point of view of EU assistance instruments and the policies of individual Member States. The funds from the EU budget allocated for the promotion of democracy are small in the strict sense. As part of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights they constitute only 2% of all EU external assistance. 6 Since projects under this instrument are funded via both regional and global budget lines, the European Commission does not publish any statistics showing how much funding from this instrument is received by individual countries. This makes it impossible to determine the level of financing granted to individual states in Eastern Europe. The low level of funding allocated strictly for the promotion of democracy shows the lack of political will on the part of the Member States to see the EU involved in democratisation activities. On the other hand, the funds from the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, coming mainly from the priority Support for democratic development and good governance, may also be treated as funding for 3 Freedom House is an independent watchdog organisation, which supports the development of democracy and human rights all over the world. It monitors the level of democratic freedoms in individual states. 4 Balázs Jarábik, Natalia Shapovalova, Ukrainian democracy on hold?, FRIDE, The 2 nd Polish-Nordic Forum was held on 10 June 2010 in Warsaw. The subject of the debate were the programmes supporting democracy addressed to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. In the text, by the countries of the region of Eastern Europe the above countries are meant. 6 Youngs Robert, Trends in democracy assistance What has been Europe doing?, FRIDE, Analyses & Opinions, 15/114 Institute of Public Affairs

4 4 How to support democracy in Eastern Europe? Recommendations of the 2 nd Polish-Nordic Forum the promotion of democracy, which increases the overall expenditure of the EU for the this purpose. In the case of Ukraine, the funds earmarked for this priority constitute 30% of all ENPI assistance, amounting to m Euro. 7 As it is the governments of the East European countries that actually spend the money, there are no clear statistical data that would make it possible to assess the actual level of financing for projects promoting democratic standards. It is still in the competences of individual EU Member States to play a more active role as a promoter of democracy. The burden of supporting democracy is, however, assumed by only some Member States, such as the Nordic states: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden as well as Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and, increasingly, by the states of the Visegrad Group. 8 An important aspect of assuming the role of a promoter of democracy is the credibility of those EU Member States that themselves follow democratic standards they are not always examples of ideally-functioning democracies. This, however, does not mean that their own weaknesses may provide an excuse for avoiding involvement in the promotion of democracy in Eastern Europe. It is true that in the Nordic countries or in Poland there are still problems in the area of the freedom of the media, some imperfections in electoral laws, problems with the financing of political parties, etc. However, these problems cannot be compared with those that occur in the countries of Eastern Europe, where the violations of human rights and democratic freedoms are much more serious. 9 The support for democratisation programmes at the Member States level is very volatile, both in the area of priorities and the amount of financing. The support of donor states for political reforms is often reduced once a little progress has been achieved. In countries such as Ukraine and Georgia, the support for political reforms was quickly reduced once it had been determined that both countries had achieved a sufficient level of democratic freedom. Such withdrawal results in the lack of continuity of assistance and leads to sudden deterioration in the situation of democratic freedoms. In addition, as a result of the economic crisis, budgets available for external aid in Western European countries are being reduced. A decline can be noticed, on the part of some Western European countries, in the interest in supporting democratisation of Eastern European states. For instance, Sweden and Denmark are reducing their assistance programmes for Russia. 10 In the years , funding from Sweden transferred to Russia accounted for 13 20% of the budget of the priority Democratic governance and human rights under the Swedish development aid. In 2008, the level of funding for Russia dropped to 7% of funds under that priority, and in 2009 only 2%. The details are presented in Table 1. In addition, it is often noted by experts that EU Member States are very often inconsistent in their actions within EU strategies of democracy support. Such double standards render a real problem for long-term policies and their successful implementation. Another 7 Access at See Jacek Kucharczyk. Jeff Lovitt, op. cit. 9 An example may be the long-term imprisonment of Mikhail Chodorkovsky or the unexplained death of a journalist, Anna Politkovskaya, in Russia. Other examples in 2008 the head of the Armenian Helsinki Committee, Mikael Danielian, was shot in the street; in 2007, Georgian police attacked the Imedi television station, owned by an opposition politician; in 2009, an Azerbaijani journalist Novruzali Mamedov, died in prison in Baku deprived of medical treatment. 10 Access at e/countries/russia, Institute of Public Affairs Analyses & Opinions, 15/114

5 How to support democracy in Eastern Europe? Recommendations of the 2 nd Polish-Nordic Forum 5 problem on the EU level is the lack of reliable data concerning both the existence and implications of democracy-related programmes. The traditional evaluation and assessment process is not particularly successful in determining the impact of democracy support projects and would require improvement. Considering, on the one hand, the instability of EU democracy assistance projects, and on the other hand, the instability of the priorities of individual donors, it should be stated that it would be most effective if appropriate funding for the promotion of democracy was provided from the EU budget. Table no. 1. Swedish support for Russia as part of development aid Total Aid Russia New stimuli in the EU policy of promoting democracy Some actions, including the most recent programming documents as well as institutional solutions, indicate that the European Union has started to consider strengthening its position as a promoter of democracy. In this context, it is appropriate to invoke last year s Council s Conclusions on Democracy Support in EU s External Relations 11, the European External Action Service currently under formation, the mid-term review of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) as well as the creation of the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) in Conclusions of the European Union on Democracy Support Democratic governance and human rights Russia Source: SIDA data ( ooperation+administered+by+sida&path=../database/sadev/bilateralt/&lang=1, ) The Work Programme of the Swedish Presidency in 2009, included the following statement: It is important to strengthen EU support for democracy-building in external relations because democratisation contributes to reducing poverty in all its dimensions. The Presidency s ambition is to create a coherent and uniform framework to make EU 11 Council conclusions on Democracy Support In the EU s External Relations, Brussels, Analyses & Opinions, 15/114 Institute of Public Affairs

6 6 How to support democracy in Eastern Europe? Recommendations of the 2 nd Polish-Nordic Forum support for democracy-building throughout the world more effective. 12 Indeed, under the Swedish Presidency, while earlier initiated by France and Czech Republic, the Council Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU s External Relations 13 during the meeting of the Council on 17 November 2009 were adopted. Even though the Conclusions do not propose any specific solutions or detailed actions, they are an important document defining the place for the promotion of democracy in the EU s external policy and stating what the EU understands by democratic principles. 14 The Nordic states and Poland have welcomed the fact that such a consensus has been achieved. The Conclusions clearly define the development and consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, respecting human rights and the fundamental freedoms as one of the objectives of the EU s external action. At the same time, they refrain from forming a new EU policy aimed at fulfilling the democratisation task. The exact opposite is the case support for democracy is to be realised through all the existing policies and instruments under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and development policy, including such tools as: various financial instruments, election observation missions, European Security and Defence Policy missions and action in multilateral fora. There is a need for a broader and more coherent approach to the promotion of democracy, including and combining all the above mentioned elements. The Conclusions are not expected to result in the introduction of any additional conditionality in the EU policy towards third countries. The Conclusions were accompanied by the EU Agenda for Action on Democracy Support in EU s external relations, the progress in its implementation is to be reported to the Council as early as in The Agenda contains a list of principles, that the EU will follow while promoting democracy. The most important one, worth mentioning here, is that the EU recognises that democracy cannot be imposed from the outside. Democratisation based on locally driven processes may only be supported with financial and political instruments (the principle of ownership of development strategies). That is why the EU action for democracy support must be based on a deep understanding of the local context of a given state while avoiding generalisation. The implementation of the Conclusions and the Agenda is expected to lead to greater coherence and better coordination of all the actions undertaken by individual actors as well as the thematic and geographical instruments. 15 European External Action Service (EEAS) The formation of a uniform EU diplomatic service can be recognised as an important effort from the point of view of democracy promotion by the EU. This new institution has raised hopes that the EU external relations will indeed be based on democratisation and the promotion of human rights. 12 Work programme for the Swedish Presidency in the UE, 1 July 31 December 2009, , p Council conclusions..., op. cit. 14 It is worth noting that no definition of democracy has appeared in the Conclusions. 15 See Ekaterina Bogdanova, Carlos Hernandez, Jacek Kucharczyk, Jeff Lovit, A new beginning? Democracy support in EU external relations under Lisbon Treaty, PASOS (Policy Association of an Open Society), Policy Brief No. 1, 2010, p. 8. Institute of Public Affairs Analyses & Opinions, 15/114

7 How to support democracy in Eastern Europe? Recommendations of the 2 nd Polish-Nordic Forum 7 The reform creates high expectations of better coordinated EU action in third countries and a more united EU voice in the international scene. It also carries risks and difficulties, which may emerge and negatively influence the implementation of such reform. In spite of forming EEAS and appointing Catherine Ashton as the High Representative, it still not clear what support will be forthcoming from EU Member States and to what extent the EEAS led by Baroness Ashton will be able to coordinate EU foreign policy. It is also difficult to predict to what extent the issues of democracy support and human rights will really be a priority for the new service and the EU diplomatic missions in third countries. Although the developmental issues will remain within the remit of the European Commission (the Commissioner and the Directorate General responsible for these areas), some of its experts are expected to join the EEAS. In addition, a question arises concerning proper coordination and complementarity of the actions of the European Commission with the actions of the diplomatic missions of the EU Member States. 16 It is also worth mentioning that EEAS is supposed to begin its operation in early December 2010, which means that it will not be the institution responsible for the implementation of the above mentioned Council s Conclusions. The progress in their implementation is to be reported to the Council earlier in That is why, at least at the first stage, this task will need to be fulfilled by other EU institutions or by the Member States. 17 The already mentioned Council s Conclusions do, however, offer a chance that promotion of democracy will rank high on the list of priorities of the EU external policy. Time will show whether the EEAS will become an institution guided by such principles and whether it will be able to implement them on the ground. European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) Another element, constituting the set of EU tools for promoting democracy, is the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. The reform of this instrument, carried out in 2007, has brought new opportunities for financing democratisation activities and more flexibility in supporting the non-governmental sector. Even though, according to experts, not all possibilities offered by the reformed instrument are fully utilised (because of the lack of practical experience both on the part of the EU and the beneficiary states as well as the limited expertise of the third sector) 18, the changes have gone in the right direction and they show considerable potential for effective practical application. The first EIDHR strategic document covered the period The next, concerning the years , will, however, include the same priorities: to increase the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; to strengthen the role of the non-governmental sector in the promotion of democracy and human rights; to support action for human rights and democracy in the areas covered by the EU Guidelines; to support and enhance the international and regional framework for ensuring respect for 16 See Ibid., p See Ibid., p Vera Rihackova, Walking the tightrope of democracy. The long and winding road towards flexible, well-targeted EU funding for democracy and human rights, PASOS Policy Brief No. 3, Analyses & Opinions, 15/114 Institute of Public Affairs

8 8 How to support democracy in Eastern Europe? Recommendations of the 2 nd Polish-Nordic Forum human rights, democracy and the rule of law; to monitor elections. 19 From 2007 to April 2010 contracts were signed for implementation of approx. 400 projects, of which the majority are implemented by local civil society organisations. 20 A lot of hopes are also raised by the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD), created in April 2008, an independent European foundation, bringing together the efforts of EU Member States government administrations and non-governmental organizations aimed at supporting democracy outside the European Union. EPD has been created by a group of organisations active in the field of democracy support and is designed to operate as a network grouping such organizations, supporting democracy all over the world. Its mission is to advocate for a stronger presence of democracy support on the EU s agenda and to support partner organisations that implement democratisation tasks 21. EPD s activity is based on three pillars: expertise, advocacy and grants. According to the original design, EPD, following the model of the American National Endowment for Democracy (NED), was to be a foundation offering grants, funded from the EIDHR budget and contributions of the Member States that support the idea, which would give it the nature of an EU institution. However, due to numerous controversies accompanying its establishment, the idea of creating such an institution gradually lost the support of the interested states. Eventually, EPD was registered as a private foundation. 22 Challenges and problems of promoting democracy in Eastern European countries Lack of uniform standards in promoting democracy The European Union s external policy and its activities aiming at promoting democracy lack uniform standards. The EU position differs depending on the interests of the Member States and the international position of a given third country. One example is seen in a greater emphasis on human rights issues in contacts with Belarus than with Azerbaijan. 23 Even in relations towards a single state it is difficult to perceive a coherent EU policy. The EU s policy towards Belarus is a policy of sanctions interwoven with periods of warming. That is a consequence of the lack of consensus among the EU Member States on the extent to which pressure should be exerted on President Aleksander Lukashenko and on how the specific conditions of the EU s dialogue with Belarus should be presented to him. While the countries such as the Netherlands are pushing for a democratisation agenda in relation to Belarus, Italy or Austria are more willing to accept the current government regime. As a result, the President of Belarus can enjoy considerable latitude in his dialogue with Europe. The adoption of a road map whose 19 See European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) Strategy Paper , p Ibid. p See 22 Vìra Øiháèková, European Union: Democracy verso Bureaucracy [in:] Jacek Kucharczyk, Jeff Lovitt, op. cit., pp An illustration of the problem may be the fact that the European Parliament accepted the membership of the Azerbaijani parliament representation in the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly of the Eastern Partnership and refused to accept the membership of Belarusian parliamentarians. Institute of Public Affairs Analyses & Opinions, 15/114

9 How to support democracy in Eastern Europe? Recommendations of the 2 nd Polish-Nordic Forum 9 implementation would not be questioned by any of the Member States, would enable effective monitoring and accountability for the assumed obligations. Another clear example seems to be migration policy. For instance, in the re-admission agreements with Ukraine, certain specific requirements have been included concerning observance of human rights. In relation to Russia, such provisions have been worded in a rather more general manner. 24 A solution that would enable uniform treatment of different countries would be the introduction of at least minimum standards linking the granting of aid and various preferences with progress in the implementation of international democratic standards in EU external policies, particularly in development policy, trade policy, macro-financial aid, justice and home affairs policy, while respecting the rule of joint ownership. 25 On each occasion, the undertaken measures should take into account the conditions of a given country. Applying conditionality is justified, especially in relation to the states which have signed international conventions on human rights and are members of the Council of Europe. Most of the Eastern European countries are members of this organisation (only Belarus is excluded from it) and thus accept the principles of the rule of law and the protection of human rights; most of them have also ratified the European Convention on Human Rights. However, applying the principle of conditionality is burdened with a number of dilemmas. First of all, the EU is placed in a difficult situation because the non-democratic states, such as Russia or China, offer their financial assistance without exerting any pressure in the area of democratisation. Secondly, in the case of some policies, it is difficult to impose conditions because of the specific nature of the area in which the assistance is given. For instance, in the area of humanitarian aid, if too much emphasis is placed on the fulfilment of certain criteria, there may be a risk that the aid will not be used by the beneficiaries at all. On the other hand, however, it often happens that certain situations, in which assistance could be made conditional, are not properly utilised. An illustration is the situation in Georgia, where the government was granted considerable financial assistance without the imposition of any conditions. As a result, the Georgian government decided to postpone the adoption of the new constitution, even though significant technical aid resources had been allocated for that purpose. 26 Thirdly, there is no clear-cut, tested and reliable system of providing incentives that would ensure the effectiveness of the conditionality, so that the conditions imposed by the donors were clearly met. In relation to different countries, different sets of incentives may prove effective. For instance, for Moldova, a sufficient incentive to improve good governance standards is the macro-financial aid, trade preferences or Governance Facility funding 27 granted by the European Union. 24 Florian Trauner, Imke Kruse, EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements: Implementing a new EU security Approach in the Neighbourhood, CEPS Working Document N. 290, April Joint ownership is a rule according to which, the EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners. Basing on the awareness of shared values and common interests, the mutual interests in addressing a set of priority issues are recognized. On the other hand the ambition and the pace of development of the EU s relationship with each partner country depend on its degree of commitment to common values, as well as its will and capacity to implement agreed priorities. 26 Richard Youngs, How to revitalise democracy assistance: Recipients views, working paper, 15/06/ Governance Facility is an instrument providing additional EU support, apart from the ENPI funds, for the states that have achieved the greatest progress in the implementation of the reforms agenda defined in their action plan. Analyses & Opinions, 15/114 Institute of Public Affairs

10 10 How to support democracy in Eastern Europe? Recommendations of the 2 nd Polish-Nordic Forum Development of contacts between people and seeing democracy with one s own eyes The countries of Eastern Europe have little experience of democracy from a historical perspective, some of them have none at all. Since the beginning of the nineties, the emergent liberal-democratic political groups in these countries have not been able to gain long-lasting public support. For example, in Russia, the politicians affiliated to such groups have not been able to win the trust of the public in 1990s because of their inability to deal with the economic crisis in 1998 and to ensure stability in Russia. Similarly in Ukraine, President Viktor Yushchenko was not able to retain public support after the victory of the Orange Revolution. Research results show, however, that the citizens of those countries sympathise with democratic values. The results of the European Values Study 28 indicate that most Eastern European societies support democracy. The proportions of people who agreed with a statement Democracy may have its problems but it is the best form of government were the following: Georgia 96,3 %, Azerbaijan 92,6%, Belarus 89,1%, Armenia 87,7%, Russia 80,9%, Ukraine 76, 8%, Moldova 72,4%. According to experts from East European countries who attended the 2nd Polish-Nordic Forum, the societies of East European countries often do not understand, however, what the democratic principles mean. That is why more emphasis should be placed on educational programmes for citizens and for support of independent media, developing their understanding of democracy. In this field, the non-governmental sector is the appropriate intermediary since, by acting locally, it has better chances of reaching its public. In addition, its better organisational capacity could be a decisive factor. In spite of the fact that the non-governmental sector in Eastern Europe is not very well developed, support for it should not be stopped. Just the opposite is needed. The programmes developing institutional capacity of non-governmental organizations should receive funding. It is important to allocate appropriate resources to the analysis of local conditions in order to adjust the support programmes to the reality. Obviously, the support for the creation of proper institutional and legal solutions as well as to activities implementing those solutions at the government level, also play a very important role. As a FRIDE study of shows, supporting civil society organisations is not currently a priority for a number of donors in the region of Eastern Europe, who re-focused their assistance from the support of the third sector to the support for government administration. In Ukraine, after the Orange Revolution, funding for civil society supporting programmes was directed towards government institutional capacity building programmes. In Georgia, after the Rose Revolution, funding provided by many donors for the development of independent media stopped because the donors decided that there was no need any more for such subsidies. Now such programmes have to begin from square one. Increased support for the non-governmental sector and for an independent media is a way to educate the Eastern European societies on democracy from within. A way from outside based on emulation can be realized by more frequent personal contacts with 28 Access at Richard Youngs, How to revitalise democracy assistance: Recipients views, Working Paper, FRIDE, 15/06/ Institute of Public Affairs Analyses & Opinions, 15/114

11 How to support democracy in Eastern Europe? Recommendations of the 2 nd Polish-Nordic Forum 11 citizens of EU Member States with those from Eastern Europe. However, the key problem remains that EU is rather closed to the societies of Eastern Europe. The visa policy of the European Union is often criticised. It is accused of being excessively restrictive which leads to new divisions in Europe and divides its citizens into the better ones, those who can travel over almost the entire continent, and the worse ones, who find it very difficult to cross the border. Liberalisation of the visa policy is of key importance for the promotion of democracy. It makes it possible for people who live in Eastern European countries to visit the states with stable democratic systems thus contributing to the spreading of the knowledge about the real influence of democracy on the life of citizens. For countries such as Poland that joined the European Union in 2004, the key condition that influenced their visa policy was joining the Schengen Agreement in 2007 r. 30 In some such countries, a clear and sudden fall in the number of visas issued could be noticed. That applies especially to those countries such as Poland, Lithuania or Latvia, that prior to entering the Schengen area, had tried to maintain a relatively liberal visa policy towards their Eastern neighbours. The reduction was most acutely felt in Ukraine and Belarus. According to research carried out, among others, by the Stefan Batory Foundation, 31 the number of visas issued to Belarussians decreased after Poland and Lithuania joined the Schengen Agreement, by 73% and 54% respectively. The number of visas issued by Poland to Ukrainians has dropped by 60%. What is interesting, the number of visa refusals did not increase in the same period, so the fall in the number of the visas issued results rather from a decrease in the number of visa applicants. The difficulties connected with obtaining a visa discouraged potential applicants. They include: longer queues, insufficient information resulting in the necessity to make more visits in the consulate and produce more and more documents, longer time of waiting for the visa, a deteriorating opinion of the efficiency of the entire visa application process. In the opinion of the authors of that study, the blame for such a state of affairs can be put both on the very fact of joining Schengen and, related to that, the necessity to unify the procedures and criteria of visa granting as well as simply on the bad organisation of work in some consulates. 32 Support for political pluralism in Eastern Europe The European Union, to only a limited extent, supports political pluralism in the countries of Eastern Europe. In the programmes of the main donors, support for political parties and politically oriented civil society organizations does not play any important role. The donors focus more on supporting respect for human rights, including social rights, for example access to courts, women s rights or fighting corruption. 33 Only in 30 Schengen Agreement, signed in 1985, abolished border control on the borders of the signatory countries, at the same time intensifying the cooperation on security and visa policy. Currently, the members of the Agreement include all the EU Member States except the United Kingdom and Ireland and Cyprus, Bulgaria and Romania, they also include Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. 31 Joanna Konieczna-Sa³amatin, Zmiany w politykach wizowych jako efekt cz³onkowska w Schengen, [in:] Zmiany w polityce wizowej pañstw UE. Raport z monitoringu, Warsaw 2009, Stefan Batory Foundation, pp Ibid., p Richard Youngs, How to revitalise..., op. cit. Analyses & Opinions, 15/114 Institute of Public Affairs

12 12 How to support democracy in Eastern Europe? Recommendations of the 2 nd Polish-Nordic Forum Ukraine does a multi-party system exist. In the other countries of the region, one political party plays the dominant role. 34 On the part of the European Union, a significant part of the funds from the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights is spent on election observation missions. In the years , approximately 23% of the whole budget of this instrument was spent on that purpose 35 ; the support for political groups however still remains insignificant. The flagship tool for the promotion of democracy, i.e. the election observation missions in the authoritarian countries, is strongly criticised. The idea of an observation mission is based on the conviction that elections are the foundations of democracy and are also an element that is most often the object of manipulation by authoritarian regimes. Therefore, the criticism against observation missions goes in two directions. Firstly, the exclusive focus on the stage of casting and counting the votes does not reveal the real condition of democracy in a given state. The electoral process starts much earlier than on the day of voting. It also includes many more aspects of democracy: equal access for all competing actors of the electoral process to the media, their freedom to act, promote and publicise their demands. The observation missions, that begin monitoring on polling day, have no way to assess those elements. Another requirement for elections to be considered free, one that is impossible to assess during a short-term mission, is a requirement of an actual influence of the voting on the political process. One negative example invoked in this context in a FRIDE report on the EU s support for democracy was the parliamentary elections in Morocco in They had been generally considered transparent and fair, but the voter turnout was very low, which reflected the lack of any real impact they had for the division of power and the decision-making process. Electoral monitoring is also criticised because of a connection between the assessment of the fairness of the elections and the political interests of those who make the assessment. Even if it was justified in a given situation, it does not contribute to building the credibility of a given state or institution that can be easily accused of hypocrisy. In reference to the above mentioned elections, the Portuguese Presidency of the EU expressed its satisfaction and the Moroccan authorities received congratulations, among others, from President Sarkozy and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Javier Solana. 37 It is often argued that the reports produced by the election observation missions are not adequately evaluated and its recommendations are rarely implemented or taken into account for further planning. The real elections monitoring must therefore include an element of long-term involvement of independent observers as well as permanent support for independent media and non-governmental organisations that are able to carry out day-to-day observation of the political process on site. 34 In Armenia it is the Republican Party of Armenia, in Azerbaijan the New Azerbaijan Party, in Georgia United National Movement, in Moldova currently an alliance of liberal-democratic parties Liberal Party, Democratic party, Liberal-Democratic Party and the Our Moldova Alliance, in Russia United Russia. 35 Access EIDHR Financial Allocations , Kristina Kausch, Marocco, [in:] Richard Youngs (ed.), Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in its Neighbourhood?, 2008, FRIDE, pp Ibid., p. 19. Institute of Public Affairs Analyses & Opinions, 15/114

13 How to support democracy in Eastern Europe? Recommendations of the 2 nd Polish-Nordic Forum 13 Chances for Polish-Nordic cooperation in the area of promoting democracy in Eastern Europe Coordination of donors and the Group of Friends of the EU s Eastern Partnership The coordination of programmes funded by different donors in a given country or region is very difficult not only because of different rules of granting aid but also the varying priorities that often change. An example of the coordination of Nordic states assistance to the region of north-western Russia and Belarus is the cooperation at the level of the Nordic Council of Ministers. Within this body, a Belarus group operates that consists of representatives of foreign ministries of the five Nordic states. Coordination with other states consists in supporting multilateral projects for which organisations from Poland and Lithuania may also apply. For instance, the TV Belsat project receives support, which in 2009 amounted to EUR. Another example is the joint participation of representatives of the Polish and Danish ministries of foreign affairs in a training project for Belarussian journalists. In order to make aid coordination possible, it is necessary to specify which countries of Eastern Europe lay within the sphere of common interest. The Nordic states and Poland support Eastern European countries to a different extent. According to the data of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) OECD, the main donors in Belarus, taking into account the volume of the funds transferred,are: Poland, Sweden and Norway, in Georgia and Moldova Norway and Sweden, and in Ukraine Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Poland. 38 The areas of interest for the Nordic states and Poland are illustrated by Table 2, showing the amount of funds transferred in Table no. 2. The amount of development assistance in USD granted to countries of Eastern Europe by Poland and the Nordic states in 2008 Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Georgia Moldova Ukraine Denmark 2,09 1,19 1,84 0,21 5,70 Finland 0,31 0,20 0,17 4,18 1,40 0,32 Sweden 3,31 3,90 3,32 13,12 4,92 4,68 Norway 2,67 1,03 14,84 27,25 13,54 21,50 Poland 0,50 0,33 18,31 2,88 2,31 13,95 Source: DAC data, 2008, What is important, both Poland and the Nordic states allocate a great percentage of their assistance for supporting democracy. Among the Nordic states, the ratio of bilateral assistance for programmes classified by DAC under the category Government and civil society in 2008 was: 27.7% for Finland, 38.4% for Denmark and as much as 43.7% for Sweden and 51.4% for Norway, whereas the average for all DAC countries is 25.7%. Poland is not a member of DAC, which makes it impossible to make an accurate 38 This data does not apply to Russia because DAC does not take into account the countries members of G8 as beneficiaries of development assistance. Analyses & Opinions, 15/114 Institute of Public Affairs

14 14 How to support democracy in Eastern Europe? Recommendations of the 2 nd Polish-Nordic Forum comparison. However, in 2006 Poland allocated 7% of development assistance to the promotion of democracy. 39 The coordination of programmes between the Nordic states and Poland should be preceded by an exchange of information on the activities undertaken at the ministerial level. Such an analysis should be based on individual areas of support in particular states. There certainly are some common points. For instance, in the area of migration policy, the sphere inviting more coordination could be the support for voluntary returns of immigrants to Georgia, which is a priority country in development cooperation for several Nordic states, Poland and the Baltic states (Estonia, Lithuania). There is room for increasing an exchange of information and cooperation here. The Danish Refugee Council has already started cooperation with Poland, Estonia and the Netherlands in this respect. More interest on the part of the other Nordic states would be welcome. Another option may be to undertake joint projects under the auspices of the Group of Friends of the Eastern Partnership. It is an informal group of countries from outside the EU which are interested in co-financing projects under this initiative. The establishment of the Group was announced during an informal summit of the ministers of foreign affairs in Sopot in The members of the Group include: Turkey, Switzerland, Norway, United States, Canada, Russia and Japan. The Nordic states and Poland should encourage those states to take part in joint projects. On the other hand, an EU state whose involvement would be desirable is Germany, usually ranking among the top ten donors in each of the East European states. Including the principles of promoting democracy into various areas of foreign policy Poland and the Nordic states can share their experience in the implementation of the democracy support principles in various policy areas, such as development assistance or trade policy. The activity of Sweden may serve as an example of promoting such practices in the area of development assistance. The Swedish International Development Cooperation SIDA promotes the combination of support for democracy with the reduction of poverty. For example, through the programme Democracy supports well-being, which promotes freedom of speech, freedom of association and political pluralism, they start from the assumption that poverty often goes hand in hand with a lack of democracy. Another example is the Nordic Council of Ministers. Even though it does not apply directly the rule of making assistance conditional on progress in democracy, good governance, yet, some elements of democracy support are embedded in their assistance programmes, e.g. gender equality or increasing institutional capacity in the spirit of democracy. 40 In the area of trade policy, promotion of good governance is implemented by Norway, in its activities, for instance, in Azerbaijan. The Norwegian government promotes the principles of corporate social responsibility in the form of zero tolerance for corruption. 39 Jacek Kucharczyk, Jeff Lovitt, op. cit., p For instance, The Knowledge Building and Networking Program, EHU, The NGO program. Institute of Public Affairs Analyses & Opinions, 15/114

15 How to support democracy in Eastern Europe? Recommendations of the 2 nd Polish-Nordic Forum 15 The above examples are only an illustration of the possibilities that should be further developed by intensifying the diplomatic contacts between the Nordic states and Poland in the area of democracy support and by sharing experience in this respect. Conclusions and recommendations for Poland and the Nordic states One should appreciate the new stimuli in the promotion of democracy by the EU, and especially the Council s Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU s External Relations. Now, the most important task is the implementation of this document. It is not only the EU Member States that have an important role to play here, but the EU institutions as well: the European Commission and especially the new bodies, the High Representative and the European External Action Service. The latter two have raised a lot of hopes that, with their appearance, EU foreign policy will be based on the principles of democracy and respect for human rights. The role of the EU as the leader in promoting democracy in the world will, to a great extent, depend on how the new institutions will deal will the challenges they face. Poland and the Nordic states, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland, have an important role to play in the area of the promotion of democracy by the European Union in the countries of Eastern Europe. They should use their connections with the region and their experience in development policy in order to provide the EU institutions with expert support with regard to the activity in the Eastern Partnership countries. They should also monitor the activity of the above mentioned institutions from the point of view of their effectiveness in supporting democracy. In this context, the implementation of the Council s Conclusions should be supported so that they really become the foundation of the EU activities in external relations. It is also important to undertake efforts to review and reform the EU assistance instruments. This is why Poland and the Nordic states should initiate a debate concerning, for example, the way of improving the election process monitoring, to increase assistance supporting the rule of law, the civil society, the independent media, political pluralism and educational activity related to democracy. It would also be desirable to promote, within the EU, the liberalisation of the visa regime in relation to the countries of Eastern Europe. In relations between Poland and the Nordic states, a regular exchange of information should be initiated concerning the activities undertaken in Eastern Europe; that applies to information about individual assistance programmes and the most important projects. In the case of the similar priorities, it would be desirable to coordinate and harmonise the activities, which, indeed, is one of the guidelines included in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. 41 In addition, sharing of information would also be welcome, between the Nordic states and Poland, on the implementation of the principles of promotion of democracy in the areas of external policy such as development or trade policies. 41 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, OECD, Analyses & Opinions, 15/114 Institute of Public Affairs

16 Authors notes Aleksander Fuksiewicz Re se arch Scho lar, la ter Pro ject Co -or di na tor and Re se a r cher in the Eu ro pe an Programme, Institute of Public Affairs; Masters Graduate in European Affairs, Jagiellonian University, Krakow. He specializes in European Union institutional issues and development cooperation. El bie ta Kaca political scientist, researcher and project coordinator of the European Programme in the In sti tu te of Pu b lic Af fa irs. She spe cia li zes in ex te r nal re la tions of the EU, no ta b ly with co un tries of Ea stern Europe (Eastern Partnership, European Neighbourhood Policy, development cooperation, democracy as si stan ce). In addition, she carries out research on European Parliament issues. Ana lyses & Opi nions No. 15/114 Analyses & Opinions is a series of policy briefs highlighting pressing issues and presenting policy recommendations. Se ries is pre pa red with the sup port of Trust for Ci vil So cie ty in Cen tral and Ea stern Eu ro pe. This policy paper was published within the framework of the IPA research project entitled II Polish Nordic Forum: Prospects for Democracy in Eastern Europe which was realized in cooperation with the Embassies of Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden in Poland and with support from the Nordic Council of Ministers and the European Union: Support for organizations active at the European level in the field of active European citizenship in the framework of the Europe for Citizens Programme. Se ries Edi tor: Dr. Ja cek Ku cha r czyk Series Coordinator: Rafa³ Za³êski *More issues of Ana ly ses & Opi nions are ava i la b le in the Po lish ve r sions at Co py right Fundacja Instytut Spraw Publicznych Non-commercial reproduction of this publication or its excerpts is permitted only with the acknowledgement of the source. With questions and comments please write to publikacje@isp.org.pl Institute of Public Affairs Address: 5 Szpitalna St., # 22, Warsaw, Poland Analyses & Opinions, 15/114 isp@isp.org.pl;