PRESENTER: JOHN CHEN Ph.D LEAD CONSULTANT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ELECTION SOLUTIONS CONSULT NIG. LIMITED

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1 PAPER PRESENTATION AT THE NIGERIAN ARMY SCHOOL OF MILITARY ENGINEERING (NASME), AS CAPACITY BUILDING ON ELECTION SECURITY TO OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE COMMAND PRESENTER: JOHN CHEN Ph.D LEAD CONSULTANT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ELECTION SOLUTIONS CONSULT NIG. LIMITED TOPIC: ELECTION SECURITY IN NIGERIA: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY DATE: THURSDAY 27 TH, JULY, VENUE: NIGERIAN ARMY SCHOOL OF MILITARY ENGINEERING BARRACKS, NORTH BANK, MAKURDI, BENUE STATE. TABLE OF CONTENTS HEADINGS PAGE 1. Overview Definition of Terms

2 a. Elections b. Electoral violence c. Election d. process Military e. Security The Scope of elections in Nigeria Introduction a. Transition Election b. Consolidation Election The Nigeria Police Legal Frame work a. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Amended) b. The Nigerian Army Act c. The Electoral Act The Role of the Military Types of Security in an election process: i. Static Security ii. Mobile Security iii. Reserve Security

3 Security Strategies a. Protection and safeguarding of human rights - 17 b. Security objectives and strategy c. Impartial, neutral and non-intimidating conduct 18 d. Communication mechanism between the military command and the election management body - 18 e. Details of the electoral laws and the offences against these law Issues arising from the involvement of the military in providing election security i. The issue of constitutionality and legality ii. The issue of command and control iii. The issue of Finance iiii. The issue of partiality Conclusion and 10. Recommendations References ELECTION SECURITY IN NIGERIA AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY:PAPER PRESENTED BY JOHN T. CHEN Ph.D. AT THE NIGERIAN ARMY SCHOOL OF MILITARY ENGINEERING MAKURDI AS CAPACITY BUILDING ON ELECTION SECURITY FOR OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE COMMAND ON THE 27 TH JULY, 2017 AT NASME BARRACKS, MAKURDI, BENUE STATE. 1. 0VERVIEW: Violence and security threats to lives and property has been a recurring feature of elections in Nigeria since the first post-independence elections were held in In their quest to win electoral contests at all cost, politicians have resorted to the perpetration of violent methods in the electoral process, rendering the elections to inadvertently in the words of Anifowose, to become something that is used by groups seeking power, by groups holding power and by groups in

4 the process of losing power (Anifowose, 1982:1). There are two major dimensions of electoral violence namely; psychological and physical. While psychological violence relates to acts that affect the psyche of the electorate such as propaganda and intimidation, physical violence involves structural and material damages, and this is the component that constitutes the greatest threat in the electoral process. This physical components of election violence includes; physical assault on individuals during campaigns, elections and when election results are released, Assassination of political opponents or people perceived as a threat to one s political ambition, Burning down of public property or opponents properties, Partisan harassment by security agents, arrests, forceful dispersal of rallies, or shooting, wounding or killing of people, Destruction of ballot boxes and ballot papers by thugs or partisan security agents, Armed raids on voting and collation centres, and snatching of ballot boxes and papers from polling agents. These election security threats and actions demonstrate the desperate attitude of politicians who are bent on winning electoral contests at all cost with a do or die mind-set. This desperate attitude of politicians has heightened since the restoration of democracy in In the words of Etannibi Alemika ( Alemika 2011) Politicians turn electioneering and elections into warfare in which violence and ethnic, religious and other forms of primordial sentiments and prejudices are employed In such circumstances where the ferocious nature of election violence and insecurity manifestly becomes an existential threat to the sovereignty of the nation and threatens public peace, the involvement of the military in containing or nipping the threats in the bud becomes an inevitability. And it is on this note that this paper is premised. 2. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS a. Elections: The Wikipedia defines election as a formal decision-making process by which a population chooses an individual to hold public office, while the Webster Marriem dictionary defines election as the act or process of choosing someone for a public office by voting. Elections can therefore be said to be the formal process of selecting a person or persons to occupy public office for a period of time. Nnadozie describes elections as the modern and universally accepted means through which, by voting, individuals and groups are openly and methodically chosen to represent a body or community (Nnadozie U.O 2004). In this light therefore, elections can be considered as the basis for democratic legitimacy. b. Electoral violence: Nwolise while quoting Albert, defined electoral violence as all forms of organised acts or threats physical, psychological, and structural, aimed at intimidating, harming, blackmailing a political stakeholder before, during and after an election with a view to determining, delaying, or otherwise influencing an electoral process (Nwolise, 2007: c. Election Process: This is the interconnectivity of all the actions leading to an election, the main components being; Pre-election activities, Election Day activities and post-election activities. d. Military: The military refers to the armed forces of a country. military, generally consisting of an Army, Navy and Airforce, and are authorized to use lethal or deadly force and

5 weapons to support the interests of the state and some or all of its citizens ( The Wikipedia) e. Security:The Merriam Webster dictionary (1828) defines security as a state of being secure such as freedom from danger, freedom from fear and anxiety and protection from crime, sabotage or attack. 3. The Scope of elections in Nigeria: The scope of elections in Nigeria is quite enormous taking into consideration the size of, the demography and peculiar geographical terrain. a. Size: 923,768 km2 b. Population (2011) million c. Registered voters million d. State constituencies 36 (+FCT ) e. Local Government Areas (LGAs) 774 f. Registration Area ( Council Wards ) 8,809 g. Polling units 119, 973 h. Senatorial districts 109 i. Federal Constituencies 360 j. State constituencies INTRODUCTION: For the outcome of election contests to be acceptable to the generality of the electorate, the security of the election environment during the electoral process should be the overriding factor in, organising such elections, if the elections are to be adjudged as free, transparent and fair. Such an environment can only manifest where the provision of effective security is key to the election process. Election security essentially refers to the security of election officials, materials and infrastructure, and this has over the years become the formidable challenge in the conduct of elections in Nigeria. This is because elections in Nigeria have assumed the semblance of warfare thereby requiring the provision of security to remain a fundamental factor in the electoral process. According to Ibeanu and Mbah ( Ibeanu and Mbah, 2012:17), Elections in Nigeria are akin to war as it requires the assemblage of thousands of people composed of poll workers, election observers and election materials. Securing the electoral process has therefore remained a major challenge in election management in Nigeria over the years. To conceptualise election security in Nigeria, it is necessary that we understand the nature of violence associated with elections in this country. Electoral violence is any random or organized act that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced protection, blackmail, destruction of property, or assassination (Fischer 2002: 8). The target of electoral violence can be people, places, data, or things. In an attempt to influence the electoral process, perpetrators of electoral violence may attempt to delay, disrupt, or derail a poll and determine the winners of competitive races for political office (UNDP 2009: 4).

6 Three key elements in the above definition of electoral violence are worthy to note. The first is that like any other form of violence, electoral violence manifests in physical forms (kidnapping, killing, and destruction of property) as earlier mentioned, and non-physical forms (psychological ) threats such as intimidation and blackmail, (Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance 2011: 15). Secondly, the main goal of electoral violence is to influence the electoral process, either by changing the outcome of elections or by disrupting the electoral process. Thirdly, electoral violence can occur at different periods in the election cycle; that is, before, during, or after election. Therefore, what distinguishes postelection violence from other forms of electoral violence is the fact that it occurs just after polling, usually during or after collation and announcement of election results. To get a good grasp of how electoral violence plays out at the different phases of the electoral cycle, it is important to first gain a detailed understanding of the three stages of the election cycle, namely pre-election, election, and post-election phases. The pre-election phase includes the long run-up to elections specifically, the party nomination and campaign processes (Sisk 2008: 14, UNDP 2009, Adoke 2011). Election violence at this stage usually manifests in intra-party and inter-party clashes arising from struggles over party nomination and access to the electorate (Ladan 2007). Violence at the pre-election stage would usually take the form of inflammatory rhetoric, attacks on politicians, and party supporters (Sisk 2008). Most of the precipitating factors for postelection violence begin at this stage. Statements and comments made by politicians could become potentially volatile, and could be construed by followers or supporters as a call to violence before, during and after elections (Ofili 2011: 14). The election phase includes activities around the polling such as distribution of election materials, accreditation of voters, and actual voting. These activities normally take place on the polling day. Acts of violence at the election phase often involve voter intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes or ballot papers, ballot stuffing, and attack on election officials and observers. Violence at the election phase would normally begin from the polling centers and may tend to spread thereafter. The post-election phase usually starts from the collation and announcement of election results to litigation and settlement of election disputes. Violence at this phase is usually triggered by issues emanating from the pre-election and election phases. Post-election violence manifests in several ways including attacks on rival candidates, party officials and supporters; as well as violent street protests (UNDP 2009: 22). They could also include shooting, killings, arson, wanton destruction of property, usually perpetrated by officials and/or supporters of different political parties (Adoke 2011). The extent of violence in elections in Nigeria depends on the type of election, and there are basically two types; Transition and Consolidation elections. a. Transition Election: Transition elections are the general elections organized by a departing political authority, which include those organized by the departing colonial authorities in 1954 and 1959, and those organized by military regimes in 1979, 1993 and Transition elections are relatively more peaceful than consolidation elections.

7 b. Consolidation Election: consolidation elections are general elections organized by a civilian regime and are intended to consolidate civil rule. These include the 1964/65, 1983, 2003, 2007, and 2011 elections6 (Agbaje and Adejumobi 2006: 37).Consolidation elections are more prone to violence. This is probably because the political forces with stakes in the elections have more diverse interests and some of these forces are actually in control of state resources and election machinery. The following table best illustrates the sheer magnitude of election violence in the period of conducting consolidation elections in Nigeria; SHAMSUDEEN KABIR BELLO POLITICAL AND ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA: MAPPING, EVOLUTION AND PATTERNS (JUNE MAY 2014) Table 1: Ranking of states from highest to lowest prevalence of political/electoral fatalities ( ) RANKING STATE NUMBER OF FATALITIES 1 PLATEAU KADUNA NASARAWA RIVERS KANO DELTA OYO BENUE KOGI BAYELSA AKWA IBOM NIGER BORNO EDO LAGOS BAUCHI TARABA FCT OSUN ONDO CROSS RIVER KWARA OGUN ADAMAWA IMO ANAMBRA KATSINA GOMBE EKITI YOBE 29

8 32 ZAMFARA ENUGU KEBBI ABIA EBONYI SOKOTO JIGAWA 10 TOTAL The Nigeria Police: In most countries of the world, the provision of security during elections is the responsibility of the police. In Nigeria, the Police Force, being the nation s primary civil force, has the following wide responsibilities in elections or the electoral process: a) guaranteeing safety and peace throughout the election process; b) restoring peace and safety after disorder that may be engendered by delimitation of constituencies; c) safeguarding the security of personnel, materials and venues for voter registration; d) safeguarding the security of the life and property of citizens during voter registration, political campaign and voting; e) ensuring the safety of electoral officers before, during and after elections; f) providing security for politicians during campaigns; g) ensuring and preserving a free, fair and safe atmosphere for election campaigns by all parties and politicians, without discrimination; h) maintaining peaceful conditions, law and order around the polling and collation or counting centres; i) Ensuring the security of sensitive election materials at voting and collating or counting centres and during transportation. The Police have responsibility for ensuring that election materials are not hijacked, destroyed or fraudulently altered by any group or person; j) ensuring that politicians do not intimidate, corruptly induce or manipulate the electorate at voter registration and polling centres, and k) Maintaining security around the election petition tribunals. In some countries especially in advanced democracies like in the USA, UK and Western Europe, the military is prohibited from involvement in elections and the electoral process. But even in these advanced democracies, the new threat from insurgents and militant fundamentalist has made the involvement of the military in their elections a necessary element. An example that quickly comes to mind is the recent elections held in Britain and France.

9 In the Nigerian context, the nature of our politics and the attitude of politicians and the electorate towards the outcome of electioneering and elections is akin to a situation of warfare as earlier pointed out. According to the Justice Uwais (2008) report, the politicians have become more desperate and daring in taking and retaining political power; more reckless and greedy in their use and abuse of power, and more intolerant of opposition. It is these belligerent attitude of our politicians that has made the involvement of the military to become an integral part of our election process. It is also on these basis that the Uwais Panel recommended not only the participation of the police, Armed forces and other security agencies in elections, but also suggested that the political education of such security personnel be institutionalised in the routine training of such agencies to strengthen the democratic system in Nigeria. For instance, following the announcement of Goodluck Jonathan as the winner of the presidential election held in 2011, the chaos that ensued in some states in the North of the country so overwhelmed the Nigeria Police force that the Armed Forces had to be drafted to restore peace and order. The drafting of the Armed forces to quell these riots underscores the persistent weakness of the police to contain security during elections. In the process of drafting the Armed Forces to provide security in the electoral process, the security apparatus or architecture so deployed is expected to encompass the entire electoral process which must include the pre-election, Election Day and post-election components of the election. Professor Jega captured this essence in his key note address at the workshop on election security organised by the Electoral institute Abuja August 29 th 2012 where he noted that whether we are talking of electoral staff, voters or other stakeholders such as candidates and their agents, parties, civil society organizations domestic and international observer groups and security agents themselves, security is critical in the protection of electoral personnel, locations and processes in ensuring that voters exercise their civic duties without fear or hindrance. Election security is therefore very crucial in creating the proper environment for electoral staff and all agencies involved in the electoral process to carry out their functions. And since the magnitude of electoral violence often overwhelms the Police Force, the involvement of the Army in providing security during elections has become necessary. However, the involvement of the military in providing security during elections has over the times been very contentious and controversial to the extent that litigations have been instituted by certain politicians in the attempt to prohibit such participation of the military, and opinions have become varied as to the legality or otherwise of such involvement. In a Premium times newspaper report of March 23 rd, 2015 captioned Court bars the use of soldiers in election, the paper reports that A Federal High Court in Lagos has ruled that the Nigerian Armed Forces have no role in the conduct of elections in the country. The court relied on a recent Court of Appeal ruling that barred the use of soldiers in the conduct of elections, stating that it was a violation of section 217(2c) of the Constitution and section 1 of the Armed Forces act. The Appellate court had also relied on a judgement by a Federal High court in Sokoto last January also barring use of Armed forces in the conduct of elections. It is these contentious issues that this paper seeks to address. And in addressing these issues, an understanding of the legal and constitutional framework

10 requiring the involvement of the military in election security and the issues arising from such involvement will be examined. In understanding the legal framework, we must examine some legal statutes namely: The Constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended, the Nigerian Army act and the Electoral act as amended. 6. LEGAL FRAME WORK Legal framework refers to the rules that govern or regulates decision making. ( Marriam webster dictionary 1828). So what are the rules or portions of the rules that require the participation of the military in providing security during elections? a. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Amended ) i. Section 14(2b): The security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of Government. ii. Section 217 (1): There shall be an armed forces of the Federation which shall consist of an army, a navy, an air force and such other branches of the armed forces of the Federation as may be established by an act of the National Assembly. iii. Section 217 (2a): Defending Nigeria from external aggression iiii. Section 217 (2b): Maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air. v. Section 217 (2c): Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authority to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an act of the National Assembly. vi. Section 218 (1): The power of the President as the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Federation shall include power to determine the operational use of the armed Forces of the Federation. b. The Nigerian Army Act: i. Section 1. (1): There is hereby established for the Federation an Armed Forces which shall be maintained and administered as set out in this Act and comprise the Nigerian army, the Nigerian Navy and the Nigerian Air Force ( in this act referred to as the Army, Navy and Air Force ) respectively. ii. Section 1 (3): The Armed Forces shall be charged with the defence of the Federal Republic of Nigeria by land sea and air with such other duties as the National \assembly may, from time to time prescribe or direct by an act. iii. Section 8 (1): The President shall determine the operational use of the Armed Forces, but may, under general or special directives, delegate his responsibility for the day-to-day operational use- (a) of the Armed Forces, to the Chief of defence staff; (b) of the Army to the Chief of

11 Army staff; (c) of the Navy, to the Chief of Naval Staff; and (d) of the Air Force, to the Chief of Air Staff. iiii. Section 8 (3): In this section Operational use of the Armed Forces includes the operational use of the Armed Forces in Nigeria for the purpose of maintaining and securing public safety and public order. c. The Electoral Act: The electoral act as amended has taken into cognisance the importance of security in the electoral process by making ample provisions to guarantee security of election personnel, material, voters and environment. i. Section 26 (1): Where a date has been appointed for the holding of an election and there is reason to believe that a serious breach of the peace is likely to occur if the election is proceeded with on that date the Commission may postpone the election. ii. Section 129 (1) No person shall on the date on which an election is held do any of the following acts or things in a polling unit or within a distance of 300 metres of a polling unit: iii. 129 (1) (f) : Be in possession of any offensive weapon or wear any dress or have any facial or other decoration which in any event is calculated to intimidate voters; iiii. 129 (1) (j) : Snatch or destroy any election materials. 7.The Role Of the Military: a. Having examined nature of violence in our elections and the legal statutes that have justified the involvement of the Military in election security, it is now pertinent to understand the nature of security and the role the military is expected to play while providing security during election. Broadly speaking, election security involves securing the entire electoral process which includes the security of personnel, materials and infrastructure during the election and electoral process. The focus on security is therefore directed towards the electorate, the electoral personnel, contestants, agents, observers election materials, polling stations and collation centres, buildings and communication facilities. b. Types of security in an election process: In situations where the military is involved in providing election security, there are usually three basic types of security to be provided namely; Static, Mobile and Reserve security. i. Static security: This type of security involves mainly the protection of infrastructure and property that are prone to mob attacks in an event of the breakdown of law and order. Things to be protected under static security include roads, bridges, broadcasting and communication infrastructure, other sensitive public buildings like premises of the election management body which in this case will include the national, state and local government office premises of the Independent National Electoral Commission(INEC).

12 ii. Mobile Security: Mobile security is the security provided to electoral personnel, the voters, contestants, election observers, election materials, polling units and the entire paraphernalia during the election. iii. Reserve Security: This is the aspect of the security arrangement that is set aside during the election to serve contingency purposes of supporting either the static or mobile forces as the case may be. d. Security Strategies: Prior to deployment to provide security for an election, the military is expected to produce its own threat analyses, operational security guides and manuals and deployment strategies as a framework for their election action plans. The risk assessment of the entire election environment particularly of specific geographical flashpoints should be identified. It is by doing so that vulnerable areas can be mapped out and the level of security that is required can be planned. Factors to be considered while doing the risk assessment should include: i. The existing nationality based conflict issues that are thrown up during the campaigns; ii. The history of acceptance of adverse election results in certain areas; iii. The commitment of political participants to an open and transparent election process; iiii. The existence and locations of active groups and individuals who may be nursing the tendency to disrupt the election process; v. The existence and locations of private militias under the partisan control or influence of political participants; vi. The internal analysis of the integrity and impartiality of certain elements in the armed forces who might have an alignment with political participants. The operational security guides and manuals for men and officers should detail the overall responsibilities of the forces in assisting to ensure free and fair election processes by adopting the following measures; a. Protection and safeguarding of human rights. One of the most fundamental human rights of a citizen is the right to take part in the government of one s country and the rights to vote and be voted for. It is therefore important not to subvert these rights while providing security during election. Security protocols designed to restrict movement of persons on Election Day should not be fashioned in a way that could infringe on the civil and human rights of the electorate in their attempt to exercise their civic responsibility of voting. b. Security objectives and strategy: As noted by Sean Dunne (Ace project on Google) Elections do not avoid confrontation, but rather focus on its management, so as to retain the participants

13 confidence and commitment. It is therefore important to do a security threats and risks analyses of the election before the deployment of security forces into the field. The security threats and risks usually depend on the stakes in the election, and the stakes depend on the type of election. For instance, the security risks in a presidential, Governorship and Local government chairmanship election significantly vary. The security strategy must also factor the emerging trends of international terrorism and insurgency like the ones posed by Boko Haram in Nigeria. It is as a result of the carrying out of threat analysis that resulted in the delay for the conduct of the general elections scheduled to commence in February 2015 on the advice of the then National Security adviser Rtd. Col. Dasuki. c. Impartial, neutral and non-intimidating conduct: The involvement of the armed forces in elections should not be aimed at intimidating politicians and the electorate or construed to suggest that only the ruling party should be voted for. While providing security, the military must be seen to be fulfilling their mandates with a sense of utmost impartiality and neutrality. They must avoid the perception that they are favouring a particular candidate or political party. d. Communication mechanism between the military Command and the election management body: An enhanced and effective communication system between the military command and the election management body is vital in the election process particularly on Election Day. For the purpose of enhancing security through effective communication, the communication centres established during the election process must link all the security bases of the operational command of the armed forces with the leadership of the election management body, and be tailored to give priority to emergency situations. e. Details of the electoral laws and the offences against these law : While the military often outline their policies in what they term as Rules of engagement to guide the actions of their personnel, it is important that men and officers on election security assignments are conversant with the electoral laws formulated by the election management body. The Specific roles of security agents as prescribed by INEC include; i. provide security at the Polling Units/Polling Stations and Collation Centres to ensure that the Polling Units, counting of ballots, collation and declaration of results are conducted without any disturbance; ii. take necessary measures to prevent violence or any activity that can threaten to disrupt the elections; iii. comply with any lawful directive(s) issued by, or under the authority of, INEC; iiii. ensure the safety and security of all Election materials, by escorting and guarding such materials as appropriate;

14 v. protect Election Officials at the Polling Stations/Units and Collation Centres, especially in the course of their movement from one point to the other until the process is completed; vi. arrest, on the instruction of the Presiding Officer, or any other INEC official, any person(s) causing any disturbance, or preventing the smooth conduct of proceedings at Polling Stations/Units as well as at the Collation Centres; vii. on the instruction of the Presiding Officer, stand at the end of the queue of voters at the Polling Unit, if any, at the official close of Accreditation, to prevent any person from joining the line; viii. accompany the Presiding Officer to deliver the election results, ballot boxes and other election materials safely to the RA/Ward Collation Centre; ix. Accompany Collation Officers to deliver election results to the Returning Officer and, subsequently, to the Resident Electoral Commissioner, or Electoral Officer, as the case may be, for the handover of election materials and reports. 8. Issues arising from the involvement of the military in providing election security: As earlier noted in the overview to this presentation, the issue of military involvement in Nigerian elections is now very contentious with varied opinions. Even among those who hold the opinion that military involvement is necessary, many still differ on what should be the facets and methods of such involvement. This paper is however restricted to the involvement of the military in providing election security as opposed to the concept of the notion of the involvement of the military in the conduct of elections. Having clarified the different notions, let us now examine the issues arising from the provision of election security by the armed forces. i. The issue of constitutionality and legality: The effective involvement of the military forces in the electoral process requires, for its legitimacy, an adequate legal framework; a quality legal framework means a legislative framework as well as comprehensive and adequate rules and regulations to monitor the involvement of the armed forces in the process which has adequately been captures in the relevant Statutes mentioned in section 5 of this paper. The mentioned statutes have patently justified the constitutionality and the legality of the military in the provision of security in the entire election process, be it pre-election, Election Day or postelection phase. Section 8 (3) of the Armed forces act: includes the operational use of the Armed Forces in Nigeria for the purpose of maintaining and securing public safety and public order. The use of the Armed forces in

15 providing security during election is therefore an invocation of this statute. the aberration or contradiction of these statutes could only arise in the event where the military is involved in the conduct of elections, whereby they serve as members of the election management body, contest elections as candidates or render administrative support to INEC. It is therefore important to distinguish between the concept of providing election security with the concept of participating in the conduct of elections. ii. The Issue of command and control: The question to ask while attempting to resolve this issue is whether the military while providing election security should be considered as an agent of the election management body during the election process, or we could further broaden this question by asking whether in any given situation where the military is deployed to maintain peace and order, the military should become an adjunct of the entities where it is carrying out this assignment. The answer to this question lies in our statutes. Section 218 (1) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria states that The power of the President as the Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Federation shall include power to determine the operational use of the armed Forces of the Federation, while Section 8 (1) of the Armed Forces Act states that The President shall determine the operational use of the Armed Forces, but may, under general or special directives, delegate his responsibility for the day-to-day operational use- (a) of the Armed Forces, to the Chief of defence staff; (b) of the Army to the Chief of Army staff; (c) of the Navy, to the Chief of Naval Staff; and (d) of the Air Force, to the Chief of Air Staff. These statutes leave no doubt as to the command structure of the armed forces during an operation including the provision of election security. The provision in section 1.3 of the INEC manual for the 2015 election which states that the security agent on election duty can arrest, on the instruction of the Presiding Officer, or any other INEC official, any person(s) causing any disturbance, or preventing the smooth conduct of proceedings at Polling Stations/Units as well as at the Collation Centres does not include members of the Armed forces. While the election management issues can be addressed with expertise by the election management body, security priorities during the election may not fall under the competence of the election management body, and therefore it will be inappropriate for security command and control to be under the purview of the election management body during elections. To underscore this point the 2015 general elections schedule to hold on February 14 th of that year had to be postponed by INEC on the urging of the national security adviser who said the army could not guarantee security if the elections were to be held as scheduled. However it is

16 appropriate and advisable that there should be very close coordination between security forces and the election management body during the election process. Therefore, whatever the circumstances of the security situation might be, there should always be a good measure of planning and cooperation between the election management body and the armed forces. It is on this understanding that the INEC has established the Inter Agency Consultative Committee on Election Security (ICCES ) as a joint state election security committee made up of INEC officials, the police, the Armed Forces, the Department of State Security and para military organizations. iii. The issue of Finance: the financial arrangements for the provision of security in an election could also become a matter of contention. This contention occurs between the election management body and the security command as to whether the security cost should be borne as part of the election management body s budget, or be borne by the military as part of their security budget. Given that the security command and structures are in the control of the Army while providing election security, it is useful if the security is treated technically, whereby budgetary needs for security are drawn by the security forces and included in the election budget. iiii. The issue of partiality: The Armed Forces, while providing election security, are expected to be republican, i.e. totally apolitical, neutral, objective so as to ensure that their actions are not tainted with self-interest or partisanship. The Nigerian army expects its men and officers to demonstrate the utmost sense of discipline and commitment while carrying out assignments including the provision of security during elections. A breach of the rules of engagement usually attracts stringent sanctions. In discussing the issue of partiality of the Armed Forces while providing election security, the 2014 Governorship elections in Ekiti and Osun States present a case study. There were allegations of unprofessional and partisan conduct levelled against some officers and men who were drafted to provide security during the elections. According to a report by the premium times of 11 th November, 2016, one Captain Sagir Koli, a Captain from its Intelligence Corps, exposed through video recording, plans by his commanding officer and top officials of the Goodluck Jonathan administration to rig the June 21, 2014 election in Ekiti State. According to the same premium times report The video recording revealed the connivance between Mr. Koli s commanding officer, Aliyu Momoh, a General, and former Minister of State for Defence, Musiliu Obanikoro, a former Minister of Police Affairs, Jelili Adesiyan, Governor of Ekiti State, Ayodele Fayose, chieftains of the Peoples Democratic Party: Andy Uba and Iyiola Omisore, to rig the 2014 election in Ekiti State. This, coupled with petitions and allegations of unprofessional and partisan

17 conducts against men and officers in the Ekiti and Osun States Governorship elections, the Nigerian Army set up a high powered board of enquiry chaired by the then General Officer Commanding (GOC ) 1 Division Kaduna Major General Adeniyi Oyebade to investigate the allegations. At the end of its assignment, the board of inquiry recommended the compulsory retirement of two officers from the army. It also recommended that three officers should lose their commands and another recommended for prosecution for collecting financial gratification. The board further recommended the placing of 15 officers on watch list while nine others were to be handed over to the Economic and Financial Crime Commission for further investigations following allegations of corruption against them. Six officers were to face an audit committee and 62 officers (mostly of the rank of Majors-below) were to be given letters of displeasure and to appear before their respective General Officers Commanding for counselling, the board also advised. The army praised Mr. Koli s non-partisanship and professional conduct during the election period. 9. Conclusion and Recommendations: From the foregoing, it is my conviction that this paper has advertently cleared the doubts and contentions surrounding the involvement of the military in election security. This paper has in addition manifestly brought to fore, the intrinsic difference between the concept of election security and the concept of the conduct of elections. I believe it is clear to any discerning mind now, that while there are legal statutes justifying the involvement of the military in providing security during elections, and the electoral process, there are no provisions in our legal statutes that allow the military to be involved in the conduct of elections. It is also clear that it is the belligerent attitude or do or die posturing of our politicians in their quest to win elections at all cost that creates the security challenges necessitating the deployment of the armed forces to provide security during the electoral process. The emerging trend of militancy and insurgency whereby the electoral process presents soft targets for terrorist attacks has also thrown up fresh challenges requiring the involvement of the military for security in the electoral process. Having justified military involvement in the electoral process, the question, or overriding issue that quickly crops up is; what should be the facets of such security involvement? It is in answer to this question that I seek to recommend a clearly defined role for the military in our legal statutes with respect to the provision of security in the electoral process.

18 In my considered opinion, Section 217 (2c) of the 1999 constitution which addresses this issue seems to me to be too omnibus a provision. It states among the functions of the army to include Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authority to restore order when called upon to do so by the President. It is the absence of this clearly defined role in our legal statutes for the involvement of the military in the electoral process that gives rise to situations of unprofessional conducts of officers and men as witnessed in the Governorship elections of 2014 in Ekiti and Osun States resulting in the setting up of the board of inquiry by the Army command to address the allegations of misconduct by the Officers and men. In conclusion, this paper aligns itself with the recommendations of the Justice Uwais political reforms panel which recommended the following clearly defined roles for the armed forces in the electoral process: a) The armed forces should provide assistance to the electoral body in conveying electoral officials, registration and voting materials, when necessary. b) The leadership of the armed forces should not make statements that may be seen as intimidation of opposition political parties and the electorate. c) The armed forces personnel should not be deployed to polling centres or stations. d) The armed forces should discontinue acts of psychological warfare, including show of force through patrols in convoys of armoured personnel carriers and lorries, days prior to or on the eve or day of election, which may be construed as intimidation of opposition parties. e) The air force may provide assistance in the form of aerial surveillance to assist the police to detect sites of disorder during elections. f) The Navy may assist in conveying electoral and voter registration materials and officials in difficult or dangerous areas. g) The Armed Forces may offer assistance to the electoral body and the police force. However, they should be professional and impartial in doing so. h) Other than exercising their individual rights to vote, members of the Armed Forces should not be involved in the conduct of elections. i) As Commander-in-Chief of Nigeria s Armed Forces, the President should take concrete steps to ensure the neutrality of security forces during the election period. The begging question is: Are these recommendations far reaching enough? We can now discuss. THANKS FOR LISTENING.

19 1 10. References i. The Merriam Webster Dictionary ii. Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution 1999 as amended: Lagos, Federal Government press 1999 iii. Report of the Electoral Reform Committee(The Uwais Report) Abuja December 2008 iiii. The Merriam Webster Dictionary v. The Wikipedia: App 2016 vi. The Nigerian Army Act: online Google search vii. electoral act, 2010 (as Amended): federal republic of Nigeria Official Gazette; Abuja 2010 viii. Manual for Election Officials: INEC, Abuja, 2015 ix. Election Security in Nigeria: Matters Arising; Lai Olurade; FES, Abuja 2013 x. The Role of Security Forces in the Electoral Process: The case of six West African countries: Mathias Hounkpe, Alioune Badara Gueye; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Abuja, 2010 xi. Premium times online newspaper of 11 th, January 2016 xii. Vanguard newspaper of 2 nd December, 2016 xiii. Dictionary of Military and associated terms, 2001 xiiii. Etenibi Alemika. Post election violence in Nigeria: Emerging trends and lessons Lagos: CLEEN Foundation, 2011 xv. Sean Dunes: Focus on Elections; Online google search. xvi. Agbaje, A. and Adejumobi, S Do Votes Count? Travails of Electoral Politics in Nigeria, Africa Development, XXXI(3): xvii. Agbambu, C. and Ajayi, A US Rates Nigeria s Elections High, Says Country made History with April Polls Nigerian Tribune [Ibadan], 29 April xviii. R. Anifowose, : Violence and politics in Nigeria, the Tiv and Yoruba experience; 1982, Nok Publishers xix. O.B.C Nwolise,2007: Electoral violence and Nigeria s 2007 Elections; Journal of African elections, 6 (2) (2007) xx. Shamsudeen Bello: Political and Electoral Violence in Nigeria; Mapping Evolution and patterns (June May 2014.

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