NIGERIA SITUATION REPORT

Transcription

1 NIGERIA SITUATION REPORT SPECIAL FOCUS ON THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS Report No. 1 / 26 January 2015 ~ 0 ~

2 Table of Contents Executive Summary... 2 Introduction 4 Antecedents of the two Leading Presidential Candidates. 4 State of Play in the Forthcoming Contest... 6 State of the Main Political Parties. 7 Major Areas of Concern.. 8 General Insecurity and Boko Haram Insurgency. 8 INEC and the Conduct of Credible Elections 10 Election-Related Violence State of the Economy and Corruption 12 Nigerian Power Centres and the February 2015 Elections.. 13 Possible Outcomes of the Elections. 14 Reactions to the Announced Results of the Elections 16 Conclusion. 16 ~ 1 ~

3 JKS & Associates Ltd. Nigeria Situation Report No January 2015 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In a few weeks from now, Nigerians will go into crucial elections to elect their President, Governors in 28 of the 36 States of the Federation and members of the National and State Legislatures. Although Nigerian elections are usually fiercely contested, there is apprehension that the 2015 elections will be accompanied by violence, before, during and after the elections. The violence will not only be between the parties but also within the parties as a result of the selection processes for the contestants for the various elective offices. While the latter has resulted to large movements of politicians from one party to another and may not continue to generate too much violence, inter-party violence continues and may spill over to the post-election phase. 2. The general insecurity in the country, especially the insurgency in the North-East States of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, and threats by supporters of leading Presidential candidates that their candidate must win or there will be violence, are considered a real cause for concern. The Boko Haram insurgency, rather than being contained by the military, is escalating and there are doubts as to whether elections could be held successfully in those States. What effect this will have on the Presidential, gubernatorial and legislative elections and the ability of the contestants to meet the constitutional requirements of having 25% of the votes of two-thirds of the election space is still an unanswered question. Whereas there are a few voices asking for postponement of the election because of these questions, the majority view is that the elections should and will hold as scheduled. 3. Questions are also being asked with respect to the Independent National Electoral Commission s (INEC s) preparedness to conduct free and fair elections all over the country. While it is generally agreed that INEC has greatly improved in its performance, there are still questions as to its ability to resist pressure, from all sides, to freely operate and act independently. Yet, the elections will be considered free, fair and credible, to the extent that INEC is considered an unbiased umpire. 4. Eleven Presidential candidates have emerged from the 27 registered political parties. However, the two main contenders are the People s Democratic Party (PDP) candidate and current President, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, and the All Progressives Congress (APC) candidate, former military Head of State, Major General Muhammadu Buhari. They were the main candidates in the 2011 election when the PDP candidate won by over 10 million votes. Buhari had contested in the three elections and lost. Nigerians wonder if he will be lucky this fourth time. 5. That question would appear to be legitimate in view of a number of factors, including the fact that, PDP s dominance has been eroded with many former PDP stalwarts now in the main opposition party, APC, which is an amalgam of several opposition parties. It is also apparent that Buhari has, through his selection by the APC as its Presidential candidate, extended his support base far beyond the narrow confines of the North to include the South West where he did poorly in the 2003, ~ 2 ~

4 2007 and 2011 Presidential elections. While President Jonathan s administration does have credible achievements to its credit, the current state of the economy and the inability of the Federal Government to successfully quell the insurgency in the North-East of the country will count against him. The influence of the power centres in the country is crucial but it can be used to its advantage by either party. 6. Predicting the possible outcome of elections is a challenge anywhere and is particularly so in Nigeria. There are three possible outcomes: either the President wins outright in the first round with majority of the votes and 25% of the votes in twothirds of the 36 States, or his opponent does so, or neither meets the criteria for a first round win, necessitating a run-off. 7. From our analyses, it is possible for one of the two candidates to emerge in the first round since they could each just obtain the 25% of the votes from 24 States. Thus, for either President Jonathan to win or General Buhari to do so, all the factors referred to earlier will need to be substantially in their favour. Apart from the power of incumbency, this will mean that the PDP is able to correct the serious internal crisis it has had, the war on insurgency is substantially addressed, the economic situation greatly improved and the government is able to better portray its achievements than it has so far. Equally, the party needs to be able to play up the baggage that both the APC and its candidates have. There is not much time for all this to happen before the election and the momentum the APC and its candidate seem to have gained may tilt the result in their favour. But, as the saying goes in this country: 24 hours is very long in Nigerian politics. 8. The nation must be ready to deal with the likely reaction of a Jonathan loss or win or a Buhari win or loss, as either result is likely to provoke violent reactions from their supporters. Moderation on the part of the leaders of both parties could help reduce the intensity of violence as would be the fairness of the security forces in managing the violence, as well as how well INEC is perceived to be free and fair. 9. From our analysis, we assign ELEVATED as the risk rating for election violence. ~ 3 ~

5 JKS & ASSOCIATES LTD. NIGERIA SITUATION REPORT NO. 1 SPECIAL FOCUS ON THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS INTRODUCTION In less than a month, Nigerians will go to the polls to elect their President, some State Governors and members of the National and State Legislatures. It is a very crucial and massive exercise as it involves not just the election of a President but also that of the Governors of as many as 28 out of the 36 States of Nigeria. Of this number, ten will be contesting for a second term and eight will be contesting for vacant seats. There will be no election in eight States whose Governors are still enjoying their first or second terms in office. Nigerians and their friends are, therefore, apprehensive about what would happen before, during and after the elections. 2. Already, one of the important exercises that preface elections in Nigeria has been concluded: the selection of Presidential and Governorship candidates by all the parties. So far, eleven Presidential candidates have emerged from the 27 registered parties. Expectedly, the ruling People s Democratic Party (PDP) has selected the incumbent President, Goodluck Jonathan, as its Presidential candidate, while the main opposition party, the All Progressives Congress (APC), has selected a former Head of State, General Muhammadu Buhari, as its Presidential flag bearer. ANTECEDENTS OF THE TWO MAJOR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY 3. President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan is the PDP candidate for the 2015 Presidential Elections. Born on 20 November 1957, he has been the President of Nigeria since 2010 when he succeeded late President Umaru Yar'Adua to complete the latter s tenure in accordance with the Nigerian Constitution. Prior to being President, he served as Governor of Bayelsa State from 2005 to 2007 and as Vice - President of Nigeria from 2007 to And before this, he was a University lecturer in the University of Port Harcourt. Elected President in 2011, he is seeking a second term. ~ 4 ~

6 ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS 4. General Muhammadu Buhari is the APC Presidential candidate. He was born on 17 December A retired Major-General of the Nigerian Army, he was the military Head of State from 31 December 1983 to 27 August In March 1976, the then Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo, appointed General Muhammadu Buhari as the Federal Commissioner (position now called Minister) for Petroleum and Natural Resources. When the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation was created in 1976, Buhari was also appointed as its Chairman, a position he held until He later served as the Chairman of the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF), a body created by the government of General Sani Abacha and funded from the revenue generated by the increase in price of petroleum products, to pursue various developmental projects around the country. He has thrice contested, unsuccessfully, for the office of President in 2003, 2007 under the platform of the All Nigeria People s Party (ANPP) and with the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) in 2011, moving from one political party to another in his quest to be President. 5. Many have argued that the antecedents of candidates have never made a difference in the outcome of elections in Nigeria. The question is whether the 2015 election will be an exemption or put differently, will it be a new beginning for democratic political competition in the country? Will the electorate with information on the antecedents of the two major Presidential candidates, for example, be swayed by their perception of the ability of the Presidential candidates to address the major issues in the country s political and economic scene effectively and quickly? Some have posited that Jonathan has had a longer experience at State and Federal levels than Buhari and therefore created more room for scrutiny and criticism. On other hand, others have maintained that Buhari has "defected" from one party to another in pursuit of his ambition to democratically govern Nigeria and that his short tenure as military Head of State had its liabilities. In this connection the overthrow of the democratic government of President Shehu Shagari in December 1983 and long detention of suspects of corrupt practices of that regime have been cited as liabilities. The protagonists have defended the overthrow of the Shagari Government on the ground that military coup was the vogue in Africa during that period. How all ~ 5 ~

7 these positions and arguments play out will be manifest on 14 February STATE OF PLAY IN THE FORTHCOMING CONTEST 6. The selection of President Jonathan by the PDP as its presidential candidate throws up a number of concerns that the PDP needs to iron out before the elections. One of them is the degree of support the President can expect to garner from some PDP Governors, particularly from the Northern part of the country. It is pertinent to recall that some of them had aspired to be the PDP s presidential candidate on the premise that President Jonathan had committed to serving only one term and thus it was the turn of the North to produce the next President. Others had also claimed that Jonathan had not fulfilled his 2011 promises to the North. It is quite manifest that the attitude of some of the PDP Northern Governors to Jonathan s campaign effort at moment appears less than enthusiastic and can appropriately be characterised as lukewarm. 7. Although most of the PDP Governors are required and indeed expected to support Jonathan, the fact that two of the PDP s major opponents are APC candidates from the North East and North West could adversely affect the number of votes some of the Northern Governors can mobilise in his favour. Besides, Buhari is from Katsina. His support base stretches across the entire North and has witnessed an increase in momentum recently. It should also be noted that in the 2011 elections, Jonathan s performance in most of these States was not stellar. It is very unlikely that he would improve on this performance, particularly as Buhari has now become a stronger political adversary, having increased his support base not only in the North but also in other parts of Nigeria. 8. The expectation during the APC Presidential primaries was that the contest would be between Buhari and former Vice President Atiku Abubakar. However, Buhari won with a convincing margin, trailed by Governor Rabiu Kwakwanso of Kano State. Atiku Abubakar was a distant third. One of the reasons for Buhari s victory is that he is a founding member of the APC, while Atiku defected from the PDP to the APC after its formation. Kwakwanso is also a new comer to the APC, having been elected Governor on the PDP platform. 9. The emergence of Presidential candidates is, however, not a measure of their popularity but a result of political calculations by the parties, and political expediency. In this regard, Jonathan s strength lies in incumbency and continuity, while Buhari s lies in the desire for change by a cross section of the country, especially his supporters. 10. To complete the picture is the selection of Vice Presidential candidates. Vice Presidential candidates hardly influence votes in Nigeria. It is not surprising, therefore, that the PDP Vice Presidential candidate, Namadi Sambo, who has been Jonathan s Vice President since 2011 is not generally considered a political heavyweight in the North. The fact that Jonathan has kept faith with his Vice President is likely to have whittled down the enthusiasm of some Northern Governors who had nursed the ambition to replace him (Sambo) as the Vice Presidential candidate. On the other hand, the APC vice presidential candidate, Femi Osinbajo, a lawyer and Christian from the South West, might prove an exception to the rule. A product of religious compromise, he could erode Jonathan s votes in the ~ 6 ~

8 Christian parts of the North and extend the Christian votes in the South West for Buhari. The PDP will, therefore, need to work harder this time than it did in 2011 to win 25% of the votes in the North, as well as, in the South West. STATE OF THE MAIN PARTIES: PDP AND APC 11. One of the pointers to upholding democratic practice and ideals is the mode of emergence of candidates for elective offices, which should conform with, and underscore adherence to, the electoral laws and tenets of credible democratic processes. It is instructive that long before the Abuja PDP convention of 8 December 2014, the PDP Governors had agreed to prevail on President Jonathan to seek a second term in office. They subsequently "endorsed" his sole candidature which the PDP National Working Committee "ratified". Thus, the Party Convention of 8 December 2014 was a mere exercise "to confirm" the unopposed PDP Presidential candidate. Attempt by one or two party members to object to the procedure was snuffed out. This, in fact, should have been an advantage to PDP because it should have portrayed it as a united and strong party. It also would have reduced cost to party members as there would be no need to expend resources on chasing an elusive Presidential ticket. It must be recognised that this happens even in the most advanced democracies where parties may decide to go on to the next election with an incumbent President. 12. However, the PDP seems to have been torn apart as a result of bickering over the selection of the party candidates for the Governorship positions, Senate and House of Representatives and State Assemblies. Almost without exception, there have been interminable disputes in all the States with accusations of imposition of candidates from the PDP Headquarters over popular and preferred choices at the local level. Some States had held multiple primaries with various candidates emerging from each. The result is that there is great dissatisfaction within the party. This has led to a gale of prominent PDP members moving to other parties, particularly the APC. While the party leadership is making efforts to engage in reconciliation and fence-mending, the question is whether such efforts are not too late. It is possible for some dissatisfied members to remain in the party to sabotage it or act as agents for the opposition from within. 13. In contrast, the APC has, from all indications, demonstrated openness and fairplay in the conduct of its primaries at all levels. Indeed, there were five presidential aspirants namely Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, former Vice President to President Olusegun Obasanjo; Alhaji Rabiu Musa Kwakwanso, Governor of Kano State, Governor Rochas Okorocha of Imo State, General Muhammadu Buhari and Sam Nda Isaiah. In the keenly contested primary, General Muhammadu Buhari emerged winner, followed by Governor Rabiu Musa Kwakwanso with Alhaji Abubakar Atiku in third place. The contestants had agreed, prior to the convention to accept the outcome of the primary. Some have cast doubt on the failure by General Muhammadu Buhari to decide and announce his running mate immediately as a pointer to his weak decision-making capacity. It does not appear that the criticism has been a hot cake for Nigerians. Thus, while President Jonathan is being criticised over his indecision to crush Boko Haram insurgency, a national challenge with consequences on national survival, criticism of the selection process of a running ~ 7 ~

9 mate by a thriving opposition party, pales into insignificance. The selection processes for the APC candidates for Governorship positions, Senate, Federal and State Assemblies have also had its own challenges. Nevertheless, APC has been characterised by less rancour. Consequently there has been more orderliness in the party resulting in less defection of party supporters. MAJOR AREAS OF CONCERN 14. Nigerians, friends of Nigeria abroad and some foreign investors are apprehensive that the 2015 elections could be very difficult for the country. The major areas of concern include, but are not limited to, the following: i. General Insecurity in the country, particularly the insurgency of Boko Haram; ii. The conduct of the credible elections by Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC); iii. Violence during and after elections; iv. State of the Economy and Corruption; and v. Reaction of Nigerians to the announced election results. a. General Insecurity and Boko Haram Insurgency 15. One of the major issues that will feature prominently during the election campaign and may play a major role in determining how Nigerians vote is the prospect of a quick resolution of the security challenges facing the country. Unfortunately, the activities of Boko Haram terrorists have lingered longer than expected. The early successful operations of the military when a state of emergency was first declared have evaporated and the insurgents seem to be operating with impunity in many parts of the North East of Nigeria. Worse still, the whereabouts of the over 200 Chibok school girls abducted by the insurgents almost a year ago remain a mystery. 16. Governor Kashim Shettima of Borno State once claimed, to the chagrin of the Federal Government, that Boko Haram insurgents were better armed and motivated than the Federal forces. This was corroborated by some soldiers recently courtmartialled for their refusal to go into combat operations against Boko Haram insurgents. These soldiers disclosed during the trial that they disobeyed military orders because they lacked the weapons to face the sophisticated weaponry of the Boko Haram insurgents. 17. Nigerians are questioning the seriousness or even capability of President Jonathan s government to combat and eliminate the insurgency of Boko Haram. His Administration cannot show any visible success. Instead of a decline in the activities of Boko Haram insurgents, Nigerians are witnessing the spread of the activities of Boko Haram farther afield to other States like Gombe, Bauchi, Plateau, and Kano. Abuja, the Federal Capital and its environs recorded three bomb explosions in 2014 (two in Nyanyan and once in Banex Plaza in the heart of Abuja). Nigerians, therefore, wonder about the ease with which Boko Haram insurgents move about and operate for hours with little, if any, resistance by Federal forces. This has prompted many to ask the following questions, among others: i. From where does Boko Haram get the arms it uses for its operations? ii. Who fuels the over 50 vehicles Boko Haram uses to conduct its attacks? iii. How does Boko Haram manage to travel in a convoy of over 50 vehicles ~ 8 ~

10 and motor cycles in States which were under a state of emergency without being detected? iv. Why is Boko Haram able to comfortably operate for over five hours, even whole days, without response from vigilant security forces? v. How does Boko Haram feed its hundreds of fighters as well as the over 200 girls kidnapped by them? vi. Who provides Boko Haram with internet facilities to upload videos of over 30 minutes on YouTube? vii. Why is it difficult for Nigeria to jam or break into Boko Haram s communication network? viii. Why do foreign media seem to know more about Boko Haram than our Government and local media? ix. Is Nigeria still an end user of proactive intelligence from CISSA and other friendly services to forestall terrorist attacks and protect Nigerians, and how well does the government use the intelligence its Security and Intelligence Services provide it? x. What help is the international community, in particular, the US, Britain, Israel and France giving Nigeria to successfully bring the Boko Haram crisis to an end? 18. These are indeed critical questions. Credible answers to these questions will determine the Federal Government s ability to resolve the conflict before the commencement of elections in February. Regrettably, the security situation in the North East has gotten worse, to the extent that Boko Haram has now acquired more territories there, including 20 out of the 27 Local Governments in Borno State. Essentially, Boko Haram is no longer fighting a guerrilla warfare per se. It has gone conventional and operates guerrilla warfare where and when it deems appropriate. Nigerians wonder aloud why it is so difficult for the Nigerian military to combat and terminate Boko Haram insurgency and drive them from the large territories they are currently occupying. 19. There are other implications of the Boko Haram insurgency that compel other pertinent questions: Can elections be held successfully in the three North East states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe without the Military first quelling the Boko Haram insurgency, by taking back and securing all lost territories, as well as, the safe return of Chibok girls and all other people being held by the terrorists? If elections are not held in those States, how will they be governed after 29 May 2015? What effect will the non-holding of elections in those States have on the Presidential election, bearing in mind that for a candidate to win in the first round, he must have the largest number of votes and at least 25% of the votes in two-thirds of the 36 States in the country? What effect will the insurgency have on the electoral chances of the President Jonathan of PDP and that of Buhari of APC, not only in those three States but also throughout the country? 20. It is quite obvious that the military will not be able to quell the rebellion in those three States before the elections in February as the insurgents have continued to ~ 9 ~

11 capture more territories. The effect of this development on the forthcoming elections is aptly captured by Professor Ibrahim Gambari, the former United Nations Under Secretary General when he asserted in a recent interview that the insurgency and terrorism there are not sectoral issues, nor are they regional issues, because the impact is not going to be limited to the North East. 21. This notwithstanding, the Federal Government has promised to do all that it can to ensure that elections take place all over the country. It has additionally pledged to work with INEC to respond to the electoral needs of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from the conflict areas. The Governors of the three States are also of the same view. Accordingly, INEC has undertaken that as part of its policy of political inclusiveness, it will make provisions for designated and secure centres for IDPs to vote without interference. 22. This is an important issue that needs further elaboration. In the first place, even if INEC makes adequate arrangements for IDPs to vote, it is estimated that IDPs constitute only about 10% of the eligible voters. In any case, how will the Governors, Senators and Federal and State Assemblies representatives be able to meet the constitutional requirement of securing 25% of the votes in two-thirds of the electoral coverage area? Some have suggested that a solution is for the Federal Government to initiate action urgently to invoke Section 135, sub-section 3 of the Constitution which empowers the President with the concurrence of the National Assembly to delay the holding of elections for a period of six months when the country or any part thereof is involved in a war and it is not possible to conduct election in such places. The challenge in this suggestion is that such a proposal is not likely to be approved by the National Assembly, bearing in mind the current composition of parties in the House of Representatives. Even if the military were able to fully liberate all Boko Haram-held territories now and with elections less than four weeks, it will be impossible for all the IDPs and refugees to return home and for INEC to conduct elections successfully in those areas. Whether or not the Nation will take advantage of Section 135 of the Constitution in order to avoid the prospect of a constitutional crisis is a huge challenge for the President and Federal Legislators. b. INEC and the Conduct of Credible Elections 23. The conduct of elections in Nigeria has always been a source of controversy in terms of the credibility of the results. It is worth recalling that the controversy that surrounded the 1964 and 1965 elections contributed to the first military coup in the country. Therefore, the capacity and ability of INEC leadership to conduct credible nationwide multiple elections simultaneously has raised some concern. There are indications that INEC has greatly improved its capacity to conduct national elections. The successful conduct of Governorship elections in Ekiti and Osun States in 2014 seems to lend credence to this position. These elections were, however, at State level; and were conducted only in the two States and at different times. The 2015 elections are quite different because they will not only be nationwide but will include Presidential and Governorship elections in 28 States, as well as, the election of Federal and State legislators. 24. According to INEC, one of the steps it has taken towards the conduct of credible elections in February 2015 has been to evolve a policy of political and electoral inclusiveness and the reduction or elimination of lull periods. These are periods of ~ 10 ~

12 little or no activity after majority of the voters would have cast their ballots, and when multiple registration/voting and ballot box snatching are usually perpetrated. It will also vet election officials and observers/monitors well ahead of the voting exercises, and has created a Unit to monitor party campaign funding and expenditure. Furthermore, INEC has revealed that there is now improved relationship between it and the political parties through periodic meetings with party Chairmen. 25. INEC has also insisted that it will deploy the Police and Military personnel during the elections to prevent and eschew violence, as was the case in Ekiti and Osun States. Again using the Ekiti and Osun 2014 elections as examples, INEC Chairman, Professor Attahiru Jega, recently noted that the deployment of military personnel during elections, rather than being characterised as militarisation of elections or disenfranchisement of the electorate, should actually reassure voters scared of possible violence and embolden them to freely exercise their democratic rights and cast their votes during the various elections. It may therefore be argued that INEC s capacity to organise free, fair and credible elections has greatly improved since the 2011 elections. The size of the security personnel deployed for both the Ekiti and Osun elections was about 1000, which means that this can be successfully replicated in all 36 states of the Federation for the forthcoming elections. But, it is also fair to say that there is tremendous room for improvement. Successful distribution of the Permanent Voters Card (PVC) to all who have duly registered is one of such areas. By INEC s admission, up to 40% of registered voters are yet to receive their PVCs. That is a large number that will be unable to vote should the status quo remain by election day. How INEC resolves this type of issue will surely impact on the conduct of credible elections in February. 26. Questions have also been raised as to whether INEC will be truly independent in its operations. Some states, especially Osun and Oyo, have raised concerns about some Resident Electoral Commissioners. INEC itself has had to suspend the plan to have 150,000 additional voting booths to ensure easy access in some remote parts of the country. Some political parties are concerned that it is the government in power that can check any attempt to rig, manipulate the results or use crude power of incumbency, such as deploying the security agencies, the military, the Customs, the Navy, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps to the polling centres as is the practice in several African countries. INEC has acted on some of these fears by, for example, moving around some Resident Electoral Commissioners and insisting on the deployment of the military to strategic parts of towns but away from the polling areas. An assertive and independent INEC is what will ensure credible elections. c. Election-Related Violence 27. There is serious apprehension that, apart from the violence in the North East of the country caused by Boko Haram insurgency, the insecurity in other parts of the country including Plateau, Taraba, Kaduna, Katsina, Benue and Nassarawa States, as well as in the Niger Delta area, widespread insecurity and violence might occur before, during and after the elections. There is evidence from both the Police and the Nigerian Customs Service that there has been an influx of illegal firearms into the country in the recent past which might be for use by various political leaders who feel dissatisfied with the way their fortunes are going either within their parties or in the elections. ~ 11 ~

13 28. One can also identify a number of potential hotspots where the risk of violence is very high. These include Rivers State where the rivalry between Governor Rotimi Amaechi of APC and PDP s Nyesom Wike has frequently resulted in violence; Kano State known for its volatility and host to ardent supporters of Buhari; Ondo State where the defection of Governor Olufemi Mimiko from the Labour Party to PDP has caused a lot of rancour within the State; and the Niger Delta area, should the election go against their son. Already, the President s campaign convoys have been attacked in Katsina and Bauchi States and, while in Rivers State, APC campaign rallies have been allegedly attacked by PDP thugs. Other incidents have been reported in other parts of the country leading one to conclude that some more violence could be expected as election day approaches. 29. There is, nevertheless, some hope that, with the accord signed by all political party leaders including the PDP and APC candidates, and with the external pressure being brought to bear on Nigeria s leaders from ECOWAS, the African Union, the European Union, the US and others, to eschew violence and ensure a free, fair and credible election, violence might be reduced before election takes place. As for election day itself, INEC seems prepared to minimize the chances of violence on polling day, and in this, it will be assisted by Nigeria s security forces, including the military. If the latter carry out their duties with fairness, violence will be further reduced. d. State of the Economy and Corruption 30. The crash in the price of oil from over US$100 per barrel to about US$50 is worrisome for the Government and all Nigerians. It is not a development for which the opposition can seek undue advantage. However, questions would arise over efforts by the Federal Government to anticipate and invest in advance for the rainy days. It is more likely that the undenied regular theft of crude oil, the undisclosed outcome of forensic audit of the alleged missing $20 billion oil revenue and the comatose oil refineries would resurface. The recent reduction in the pump price of PMS has been welcome by most Nigerians but they do want more as the current economic situation has impoverished many. President Jonathan has stabilised the steady supply of petroleum products and pump price of petrol and diesel. However, the management of the petroleum resources and industry, mainstay of Nigeria's economy, and crusade against pervading corruption in the sector are sources of major criticism against the President for lack of results. 31. The devaluation of the Naira in Nov 2014 and the continuing decline in exchange rates of the Naira vis-a-vis major foreign currencies have dire consequences for the economy. First, it impacts all manufacturers negatively as most of the raw materials are imported. That means they need more Naira for their imports. And, there is a limit to how far these companies can increase the prices of their products, especially in light of declining purchasing power of the average Nigerian. Second, many consumer products including what has become the national staple, rice, are imported. How much will this impact on the standard of living of Nigerians as inflation is bound to accompany the devaluation? There are many other thresholds of impact that the devaluation will have on the national economy which will continue to unfold in What is worrisome is how long Naira will continue to decline. Many operators in the economy doubt whether monetary policy alone can checkmate such decline. ~ 12 ~

14 32. Corruption across the nation, which essentially is the abuse of entrusted power, is very manifest and being executed with impunity. That in itself fuels illicit financial flows. Now that the banks and financial institutions of Western countries are unwelcoming to such illicit funds, those involved have found new destinations to park such illicit funds. Yet the Jonathan Administration is perceived to be lukewarm to all matters related to corruption in spite of the elaborate infrastructure in place to checkmate such practices. 33. Whether the state of the economy and corruption will be prominent during the electioneering campaign and indeed influence the voting pattern of Nigerians is doubtful. What is not in doubt is that these are issues that will need urgent attention, no matter who wins the February Presidential elections. NIGERIAN POWER CENTRES AND THE FEBUARY 2015 ELECTIONS 34. Many countries have varied and sometimes influential power centres. These power centres could exert influence on the outcome of major issues of national importance, especially when they touch on the survival of the nation as an entity or where it can lead to wholesome centrifugal tendencies. These power centres are informal and unstructured, and sometimes have conflicting interests. Nigeria is no exception and leads Africa in this regard. Some of such power centres in Nigeria include State Governors (current and former), former Heads of State and Government, respected traditional rulers, esteemed religious leaders, former high ranking military officers and some former Federal Bureaucrats. Both candidates are known to be reaching out and indeed assiduously courting these power centres. The reality is that these power centres often work at cross purposes and their influence on political events are uneven. The degree of the success achieved by each in mobilising the support of some of these power centres may be crucial in determining who emerges as President in the 14th of February elections. 35. While the vast majority of traditional rulers in the North and perhaps most States in the South West are suspected of giving their support to the Buhari/Osinbajo ticket, their counterparts in the South East and South South zones are thought to be sympathetic to the Jonathan/Sambo ticket. It is known also that the traditional rulers are influenced by their Governors and who they give their support to may depend on their relationship with their State Governors. A key factor that could minimize the influence of traditional rulers is the decision of INEC to move electoral polling stations away from the palaces of traditional rulers where all manner of electoral malpractices were alleged to have taken place in the past. In spite of the lacuna alluded to above, the support of some traditional rulers does play a major role in election outcomes in some parts of the country. 36. The influence of religious leaders has always varied with each election in the country. Both tickets are balanced in terms of Christian/Moslem package. Religion has shot to the fore of Nigerian politics in the last ten years. It was very sublime in the 1999 elections. The portrayal of Buhari as an Islamic fundamentalist, which was thrown at him and seemed to hang on him like a scarlet letter in 2011 and the wholesome support of the Pentecostal Churches for Jonathan in 2011 may have ~ 13 ~

15 played a critical role in the support or lack of support of each candidate in different parts of the country in The Nigerian political environment seems to have evolved since The diminution in the influence of this segment of the power centres in the country may remove emotion from the electoral process and thus make the elections more competitive. 37. The long presence of the military in the governance of the country has created a platform for former high ranking Military officers to continue to influence events in the country. They have the unique position of having many former Heads of State and Government in this group. There are, of course, a number of them who have joined politics and are holding high political offices in both parties. It can thus be argued that they cancel themselves out. Such a position ignores the fact that there are a number of them who are not currently active in politics but who strongly believe that it is their duty to defend the national integrity and corporate existence of Nigeria, and may want to play a prominent role, perhaps behind the scene, to influence the outcome of the February elections. 38. Overall, and indeed on an aggregate basis, the candidate that commands the greater support from these amphibious power centres stands a better chance of a successful outing at the February elections. POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF THE ELECTIONS 39. Predicting the possible outcomes of elections anywhere is a challenge. It is even more of a challenge in Nigeria where a period of 24 hours is a long time in its politics. Factors that usually influence outcomes include the incumbency factor where the rule of thumb is that incumbents running for office win 85% of the time, and typically with over 60% of the votes as was the case in 2011 in Nigeria. The political scene in 2015 is, however, quite different from what it was in 2011, due particularly to the spate of decamping from one party to the other that took place in 2014, and the emergence of the All Progressives Congress which has unified several opposition parties. 40. It is worth recalling that PDP went into the 2011 elections controlling 27 of the 36 State governments. At present it controls only 21 States and can count on the APGA-controlled Anambra State. Even that control could play different in the various elections. It could for instance be different between the Presidential and Governorship elections. The APC, on the other hand, currently controls 14 States. It is important to note that the Presidential elections will take place before the Governorship elections this time around. This may favour the party with more States under its control as Governors are influential in directing which way their supporters cast their votes. 41. One other point of interest is how the electorate will act on Election Day. Will they come out in large numbers to vote for their candidates or will there be considerable apathy? The quality of the two main presidential candidates, PDP s Jonathan and APC s Buhari, suggest that voters will come out in large numbers, except in the North East because of the ongoing insurgency there. It has been suggested that a larger voter turnout will not favour the incumbent but favour Buhari as those who want change are often more determined to vote than those supporting the incumbent ~ 14 ~

16 who might feel complacent. Will this be the case in the Nigerian Presidential elections? 42. There are three possible scenarios on the outcome of the Presidential election, viz: i. The PDP candidate wins outright in the first round of voting; ii. The APC candidate wins outright in the first round of voting; iii. There is no outright winner, prompting a run-off. 43. It should be noted however that the number of States currently controlled by each of the parties and the inroads made by the opposition will play a big role in determining the results of the elections. The current conventional wisdom is that the PDP may score the minimum 25% of the votes in many of the States of the South West, the South-South, North Central and South East geopolitical zones, and some of the States of the North Central, and North East geopolitical zones. This could translate to Jonathan scoring the required 25% minimum of the votes in about 24 or 25 of 36 States. This will be less than what he got in 2011 and a reflection of the changes that have taken place in the political scene since then. 44. The APC, on the other hand, is expected to score the minimum 25% of the votes in all the States of the North West, South West, North East and North Central geopolitical zones and a few states in the South South, and the South East geopolitical zones. Buhari could therefore score the statutory 25% minimum of the votes in 27 to 28 of the 36 States. If this happens, it will be a vast improvement on his 2011 performance when his support base was limited to the North with little support from other parts of the country. 45. Should this scenario hold, it means that one of the two candidates with largest number of votes could sail through in the first round as each of them would have met the constitutional requirement of 25% of the votes in 2/3 of the States. What then could determine which of the two candidates could win in the first round? We have already looked at some of them including such factors as the state of insecurity, the capacity of INEC to conduct credible elections, the candidate that commands the support of the most of the power centres, the absence of violence and upheaval during elections process and most importantly the perception of Nigerians as which of the two candidates can lead the nation to address the critical issues of the state of the economy, corruption and general insecurity. 46. Although we do not think that there will be a stalemate in the first round, it is necessary to highlight an important point should that indeed happen and there is need for a second round. According to Section 134, sub-section 4 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic, INEC is obliged to organize an election between the two candidates leading in the poll, within seven (7) days of the result of the first round being announced. It is considered that this will be almost impossible for INEC to pull off as it will need more than one week to print and distribute ballot papers with the names of the two leading candidates, as well as put other logistics in place for a credible election. That raises a constitutional matter of what happens if the re-run election is held outside the constitutionally prescribed seven days. This will be a new experience for Nigeria as it has never had to go for a second round of elections in its history. ~ 15 ~

17 REACTIONS TO THE ANNOUNCED RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS 47. What can one expect if President Jonathan were to win the election during the first or second round of voting? It is feared that supporters of APC candidate, Buhari might react violently as happened in On the other hand, it is also feared that the militants of the Niger Delta would react violently were Jonathan to lose to Buhari. However, were the defeated candidate to accept the outcome gracefully, the intensity of the violence, if any, could be greatly defused. 48. Is military intervention possible if a major crisis arising from political competition were unresolved? In the past, it would have been considered the first order of business. Currently it is believed that the military is not in the position to stage a coup as the current command structure, the seeming breakdown in the once solid esprit de corps in the military, as well as, the breakdown in military discipline will engender mutual suspicion and make military take-over extremely unlikely. 49. What all this means is that only good statesmanship on the part of the political leaders will ensure that the polity does not boil over. The general perception of the conduct of credible elections by INEC will also determine how the outcome would be received by Nigerians. Thus, only a free, fair and credible February election will determine whether Nigeria will move rapidly to transform its society and build a solid template for development and growth or whether the country will be plunged into a prolonged crisis and chaos. 50. From the ongoing analysis, we assign ELEVATED as the risk rating for election violence. CONCLUSION 51. From the foregoing, the forthcoming political duel between PDP and the newly amalgamated opposition party, APC, will be a major event in Nigeria. The Presidential election will be keenly contested, and its outcome, as to whether President Jonathan will retain his seat or General Buhari will strike a strategic blow to win the Presidency on his fourth attempt, is too close to call. However, it seems that the odds are in favour of Buhari if the current surge in momentum is sustained. But, as the saying goes in the country: 24 hours is very long in Nigerian politics. JKS & Associates Ltd. Abuja 26 January 2015 ~ 16 ~