Why Dominant Parties Decline: Evidence from India s Green Revolution
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1 Why Dominant Parties Decline: Evidence from India s Green Revolution Aditya Dasgupta Abstract How does economic growth impact dominant party regimes? This paper draws lessons from a historical natural experiment: the impact of agricultural economic growth due to the green revolution on single-party dominance in India. Fixed effects and instrumental variable analyses exploiting sub-national variation in the local adoption of high-yielding variety (HYV) crops together with data on 22,000 state assembly and 3,000 parliamentary election races between 1957 and 1987 show that the green revolution accounted for half of the dominant Congress party s long-run decline. Tests of competing channels utilizing rainfall shocks and digitized legislator biographies show that, contrary to modernization theory, income increases on their own strengthened the dominant party and that the green revolution did not cause a shift in the caste, education, or occupation of elected politicians. Instead, the democratizing effect of the green revolution was due to the rise of opposition parties representing the interests of agricultural producers and motivated by the increasing value of state-controlled agricultural subsidies. The findings provide within country evidence that economic growth can contribute to democratization, not by raising incomes or eroding traditional social hierarchies, but by providing economic incentives for regime outsiders to mobilize politically in order to capture valuable state resources. For sharing data, I thank Robert Evanson and James McKinsey and their co-authors, Lakshmi Iyer, Christophe Jaffrelot, Seema Jayachandran, and Francesca Jensenius. For valuable feedback, I thank Sam Asher, Rikhil Bhavnani, Dipak Dasgupta, Daniel Esser, Devesh Kapur, John Marshall, Nathan Nunn, James Robinson, Prerna Singh, Steven Wilkinson, George Yin, Daniel Ziblatt, Adam Ziegfeld and seminar participants at Harvard, Yale, and the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, For financial support I thank the US-India Fulbright Scholar Program and IQSS. All errors are my own. PhD Candidate, Department of Government, Harvard University Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA, Website: dasgupta@fas.harvard.edu. 1
2 1 Tables and Figures Figure 1: Decline of Congress Party Dominance Across States ANDHRA PRADESH ASSAM BIHAR GUJARAT HARYANA KARNATAKA Congress In Power at State Level KERALA MADHYA PRADESH MAHARASHTRA ORISSA PUNJAB RAJASTHAN TAMIL NADU UTTAR PRADESH WEST BENGAL Year Notes: Points represent state-years between 1951 and 2015 across India s major states. Each point indicates whether the state was controlled by a Congress state-level government. Vertical dashed lines represent estimated structural break points, and horizontal solid lines represent estimated average Congress control probability for a segment of time. Minimum segment size is fixed at 15 years and structural breaks are estimated via the method of Bai and Perron (2003) adapted to binary outcome data (see Dasgupta (2016) for details). 2
3 Figure 2: Mean HYV Crop Adoption Across Districts, Notes: Districts shaded according to quintile of mean share of agricultural land under HYV crop cultivation between HYV crops were first widely adopted in Darker shades indicate greater HYV crop adoption. Districts defined by 1961 boundaries. Un-shaded districts are missing data. 3
4 Figure 3: Change in Congress State Assembly Seat Share by District, Pre-Post 1967 Notes: Districts shaded according to quintile of percentage point difference in share of assembly constituencies with a Congress legislator, subtracting the the pre-1967 period average from the post-1967 (inclusive) period average. HYV crops were first widely adopted in Darker shades indicate a larger loss of Congress seat share. Districts defined by 1961 boundaries. Un-shaded districts are missing data. 4
5 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Major Variables in Analysis Variable Mean Mean Mean SD Within-SD Panel A: State Assembly Constituency-level Congress Win Congress Vote % Agrarian Win Agrarian Vote % Non-Agrarian Win Non-Agrarian Vote % Panel B: Parliamentary Constituency-level Congress Win Congress Vote % Agrarian Win Agrarian Vote % Non-Agrarian Win Non-Agrarian Vote % OBC caste Lower caste Agriculturist University Panel C: District-level HYV Rainfall Yield Wage Crop Price Fertilizer Tractors Irrigation Aquifer Notes: Within-SD is within-district standard deviation after partialing out district fixed effects. Panel A and B: Win is a binary indicator of winning the seat, multiplied by 100. Vote % is vote share, multiplied by 100. See text and appendix for coding of agrarian vs. non-agrarian opposition parties. See text for definitions of OBC caste, lower caste, agriculturist occupation, and university education based on legislator biographies. Panel C: HYV is share of agricultural land under HYV crops. Yield is agricultural productivity measured in terms of Rs./Ha for the top 6 major crops: rice, wheat, sorghum, millet, maize, sugarcane. Wage is the daily wage of a male agricultural laborer in Rs./day. Crop Price is a revenue weighted average of the price in Rs./quintal of the top 6 crops. All monetary amounts are deflated by state-specific consumer price indices to obtain real prices, base year Fertilizer usage is measured in terms of Kg./Ha. Tractors is number of tractors per 1000 hectares of agricultural land. Rainfall is measured in ln(annual mm) Irrigation is share of agricultural land with irrigation access in Aquifer is an indicator for the presence of a naturally occurring thick aquifer. 5
6 Figure 4: HYV Crop Adoption vs. Change in Congress Seat Share by District State Assembly Elections Mean HYV Adoption, Percentage Point Change in INC Seat Share Parliamentary Elections Mean HYV Adoption, Percentage Point Change in INC Seat Share Notes: Points represent districts. Horizontal axis measures mean share of agricultural land under HYV crop cultivation between Vertical axis measures percentage point difference in share of assembly constituencies with a Congress legislator, subtracting the the pre-1967 period average from the post-1967 (inclusive) period average. HYV crops were first widely adopted in Line represents fitted bivariate OLS regression line. For state assembly elections, slope of line is (standard error: 9.8). For parliamentary elections, slope of line is (standard error: 19.4). 6
7 Table 2: OLS Estimates: Effects of HYV Crop Adoption on Congress Performance in State Elections Dependent variable: Congress Win Congress Vote % (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) HYV (6.124) (5.854) (5.039) (2.298) (2.439) (1.818) Opposition Fractionalization (2.040) (0.917) INC Presence (1.458) (0.550) Hindi Belt Year FE Y Y Y Y Direct Rule Year FE Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Observations 21,907 21,907 21,906 21,907 21,907 21,906 Adjusted R Clusters Notes: Unit of observation assembly constituency-year for election years between Outcomes: Congress Win indicates whether Congress won seat and Congress Vote % indicates Congress vote share, both multiplied by 100 so that coefficients have a percentage point interpretation. Explanatory variables: HYV crop adoption is district-level share of agricultural land with HYV crops (0-1). Opposition Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of opposition party vote shares (0-1). INC Presence is an indicator variable for the presence of a Congress party candidate. Hindi Belt is an indicator variable for location in a Hindi-speaking state. Direct Rule is an indicator variable for historical exposure to direct British colonial rule. Analysis estimated by OLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01 7
8 Table 3: OLS Estimates: Effects of HYV Crop Adoption on Congress Performance in Parliamentary Elections Dependent variable: Congress Win Congress Vote % (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) HYV (12.385) (12.333) (10.991) (4.036) (3.891) (2.683) Opposition Fractionalization (5.292) (1.658) INC Presence (4.712) (1.435) Hindi Belt Year FE Y Y Y Y Direct Rule Year FE Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Observations 2,953 2,953 2,953 2,953 2,953 2,953 Adjusted R Clusters Notes: Unit of observation parliamentary constituency-year for election years between Outcomes: Congress Win indicates whether Congress won seat and Congress Vote % indicates Congress vote share, both multiplied by 100 so that coefficients have a percentage point interpretation. Explanatory variables: HYV crop adoption is district-level share of agricultural land with HYV crops (0-1). Opposition Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of opposition party vote shares (0-1). INC Presence is an indicator variable for the presence of a Congress party candidate. Hindi Belt is an indicator variable for location in a Hindi-speaking state. Direct Rule is an indicator variable for historical exposure to direct British colonial rule. Analysis estimated by OLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01 8
9 Table 4: OLS Estimates: Pre-treatment Determinants of HYV Crop Adoption Dependent variable: HYV IADP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) State Assembly INC Seat Share (%) (0.0004) (0.001) Parliamentary INC Seat Share (%) (0.0002) (0.0004) 1966 Irrigation (0.032) (0.065) Aquifer (0.030) (0.048) Constant (0.030) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (0.044) (0.029) (0.019) (0.014) Observations Adjusted R Notes: Unit of observation is district. Outcomes: HYV Intensity is mean district-level HYV crop adoption, (0-1). IADP is an indicator for whether a district was selected for the Intensive Agricultural Districts Program. Explanatory variables: INC Seat % is percentage point Congress seat share before 1967, for state assembly and parliamentary elections, respectively irrigation is pre-treatment share of agricultural land with access to irrigation in 1966 (0-1). Aquifer is an indicator for the presence of a naturally occurring thick aquifer. Analysis estimated by OLS. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01 9
10 Table 5: IV Estimates: Effects of HYV Crop Adoption on Congress Performance in State Elections Dependent variable: Congress Win Congress Vote % (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) HYV (16.629) (19.831) (17.791) (5.650) (6.423) (5.151) Opposition Fractionalization (2.030) (0.919) INC Presence (1.531) (0.570) Hindi Belt Year FE Y Y Y Y Direct Rule Year FE Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y First-stage 1966 Irrigation Post (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) F-statistic Observations 21,907 21,907 21,906 21,907 21,907 21,906 Adjusted R Clusters Notes: Unit of observation assembly constituency-year for election years between Outcomes: Congress Win indicates whether Congress won seat and Congress Vote % indicates Congress vote share, both multiplied by 100 so that coefficients have a percentage point interpretation. Explanatory variables: HYV crop adoption is district-level share of agricultural land with HYV crops (0-1). Instrument for HYV crop adoption is an interaction term between a time variable indicating the introduction of HYV crops in 1967 and a cross-sectional variable indicating the share of agricultural land with access to irrigation in Opposition Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of opposition party vote shares (0-1). INC Presence is an indicator variable for the presence of a Congress party candidate. Hindi Belt is an indicator variable for location in Hindispeaking state. Direct Rule is an indicator variable for historical exposure to direct British colonial rule. Analysis estimated by 2SLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<
11 Table 6: IV Estimates: Effects of HYV Crop Adoption on Congress Performance in Parliamentary Elections Dependent variable: Congress Win Congress Vote % (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) HYV (31.551) (36.024) (33.339) (9.252) (10.760) (7.700) Opposition Fractionalization (5.197) (1.659) INC Presence (4.805) (1.489) Hindi Belt Year FE Y Y Y Y Direct Rule Year FE Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y First-stage 1966 Irrigation Post (0.055) (0.057) (0.056) (0.055) (0.057) (0.056) F-statistic Observations 2,953 2,953 2,953 2,953 2,953 2,953 Adjusted R Clusters Notes: Unit of observation parliamentary constituency-year for election years between Outcomes: Congress Win indicates whether Congress won seat and Congress Vote % indicates Congress vote share, both multiplied by 100 so that coefficients have a percentage point interpretation. Explanatory variables: HYV crop adoption is district-level share of agricultural land with HYV crops (0-1). Instrument for HYV crop adoption is an interaction term between a time variable indicating the introduction of HYV crops in 1967 and a cross-sectional variable indicating the share of agricultural land with access to irrigation in Opposition Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of opposition party vote shares (0-1). INC Presence is an indicator variable for the presence of a Congress party candidate. Hindi Belt is an indicator variable for location in Hindispeaking state. Direct Rule is an indicator variable for historical exposure to direct British colonial rule. Analysis estimated by 2SLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<
12 Figure 5: Correlation between Pre-existing Irrigation and Congress Performance Over Time Outcome: Congress Win Coefficient on Pre existing Irrigation T 2: T 1: T: T+1: T+2: T+3: Time Period Outcome: Congress Vote Share Coefficient on Pre existing Irrigation T 2: T 1: T: T+1: T+2: T+3: Time Period Notes: Unit of analysis assembly constituency-year for election years between Outcome is either Congress win or Congress vote share in percentage points. Vertical axis range represents zero plus and minus an in-sample standard deviation of the outcome variable. Points represent estimates of coefficient on time period dummy variables interacted with the cross sectional measure of suitability for HYV crop adoption based on pre-existing irrigation coverage in HYV crops first widely adopted in Regression also controls for year fixed effects. Analysis estimated by OLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. Dashed bands represent 95% confidence interval. 12
13 Table 7: OLS and IV Estimates: Effects of HYV Crop Adoption by Opposition Party Type Dependent variable: State Assembly Elections Parliamentary Elections Agrarian Opposition Parties Non-Agrarian Opposition Agrarian Opposition Parties Non-Agrarian Opposition Win Vote % Win Vote % Win Vote % Win Vote % (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Panel A: OLS HYV (5.801) (3.425) (5.048) (3.306) (9.182) (4.963) (8.969) (6.013) Panel B: 2SLS HYV (12.361) (8.288) (14.306) (7.834) (12.993) (7.711) (25.761) (14.803) Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Observations 21,907 21,907 21,907 21,907 2,953 2,953 2,953 2,953 Clusters Notes: Panel A is OLS specification. Panel B instruments for HYV crop adoption with interaction term between a time dummy variable indicating the introduction of HYV crops in 1967 and measure of pre-existing irrigation coverage in See text and appendix for coding of the top 20 opposition parties as agrarian or non-agrarian. Win is binary indicator of winning the seat and Vote % is vote share, both multiplied by 100 so that coefficients have a percentage point interpretation. HYV crop adoption is district-level share of agricultural land planted with HYV crops (0-1). Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<
14 Table 8: OLS and IV Estimates of Economic Effects of HYV Crop Adoption Dependent variable: Yield Wage Crop Price Fertilizer Tractors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Panel A: OLS HYV ( ) (0.288) (5.210) (5.444) (1.566) Panel B: 2SLS HYV 1, ( ) (0.655) (9.897) (6.785) (2.108) Year FE Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Observations 8,364 8,370 8,364 8,370 8,370 Clusters Notes: Unit of observation district-year for years Panel A is OLS specification. Panel B instruments for HYV crop adoption with interaction term between a time dummy variable indicating the introduction of HYV crops in 1967 and measure of pre-existing irrigation coverage in Outcomes: Yield is measured in terms of rs./ha for the top 6 major crops. Wage is the daily wage of a male agricultural laborer in rs./day. Crop Price Index is a revenue weighted average of the market price in rs./quintal of the top 6 crops. Fertilizer usage is measured in terms of kg/ha. Tractor usage is measured in terms of tractors/1000 ha. All monetary amounts are deflated by state-specific consumer price indices to obtain real prices, base year Explanatory variable: HYV crop adoption is district-level share of agricultural land planted with HYV crops (0-1). Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<
15 Table 9: OLS Estimates: Effects of Rainfall Shocks on Congress and Opposition Party Seat Shares Dependent variable: State Assembly Win Parliamentary Win Congress Agrarian Opposition Non-Agrarian Congress Agrarian Opposition Non-Agrarian (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Rainfall (ln mm) (2.506) (2.208) (1.845) (4.456) (3.045) (3.588) Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Observations 21,907 21,907 21,907 2,953 2,953 2,953 Clusters Notes: Unit of observation constituency-year for state and parliamentary elections, respectively. Outcomes: Vote % indicates vote share and Win indicates whether or not party won the seat, both multiplied by 100 so that coefficients have a percentage point interpretation. See text and table A2 for coding of opposition parties as agrarian or non-agrarian. Explanatory variable: Rainfall is measured in ln(annual mm). The inclusion of district fixed effects means that the effects of rainfall are identified from within-district deviations from long-run mean i.e. rainfall shocks. Analysis estimated by OLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<
16 Table 10: OLS Estimates: Economic Effects of Rainfall Shocks Dependent variable: Yield Wage Crop Price Fertilizer Tractors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Rainfall (24.678) (0.062) (1.258) (0.795) (0.371) Year FE Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Observations 8,332 8,337 8,332 8,337 8,337 Adjusted R Clusters Notes: Unit of observation district-year for years Outcomes: Yield is measured in terms of rs./ha for the top 6 major crops. Wage is the daily wage of a male agricultural laborer in rs./day. Crop Price Index is a revenue weighted average of the price in rs./quintal of the top 6 crops. Fertilizer usage is measured in terms of kg/ha. Tractor usage is measured in terms of tractors/1000 ha. All monetary amounts are deflated by statespecific consumer price indices to obtain real prices, base year Explanatory variable: Rainfall is measured in ln(annual mm). The inclusion of district fixed effects means that the effects of rainfall are identified from within-district deviations from long-run mean i.e. rainfall shocks. Analysis estimated by OLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<
17 Table 11: OLS Estimates: Impact of HYV Crops on MP Caste, Education, and Occupation Dependent variable: Caste Socioeconomic Lower caste OBC caste University Agriculturist (1) (2) (3) (4) Panel A: OLS HYV (0.135) (0.134) (0.115) (0.118) Panel B: 2SLS HYV (0.801) (0.569) (0.270) (0.311) Year FE Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Observations 1,330 1,330 2,384 2,2384 Adjusted R Clusters Notes: Unit of observation parliamentary constituency-year for years Outcomes: Indicator for intermediate or other backward class caste and for lower caste and/or religious/ethnic minority. Caste data from Jaffrelot (2003) dataset. Agriculturist indicates whether MP self-reports as an "agriculturist". University indicates whether MP self-reports a university degree. Socieconomic variables coded through natural language processing of digitized Who s Who MP biographies. Explanatory variable: HYV crop adoption is district-level share of agricultural land planted with HYV crops (0-1). Analysis estimated by OLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<
18 Appendix State Table A1: States and Election Years in Analysis Election Year Panel A: State Assembly Elections Andhra Pradesh 1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1978, 1983, 1985 Bihar 1957, 1962, 1967, 1969, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1985 Gujarat 1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1975, 1980, 1985 Haryana 1957, 1962, 1967, 1968, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987 Karnataka 1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1978, 1983, 1985 Madhya Pradesh 1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1985 Maharashtra 1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1978, 1980, 1985 Orissa 1957, 1961, 1967, 1971, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1985 Punjab 1957, 1962, 1967, 1969, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1985 Rajasthan 1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1985 Tamil Nadu 1957, 1962, 1967, 1971, 1977, 1980, 1984 Uttar Pradesh 1957, 1962, 1967, 1969, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1985 West Bengal 1957, 1962, 1967, 1969, 1971, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987 Panel B: Parliamentary Elections All States Above 1962, 1967, 1971, 1977, 1980, 1984 (Punjab in 1985) Notes: Karnataka and Tamil Nadu are the states of Mysore and Madras before The districts that comprise Haryana were a part of Punjab before the 1967 elections. In the 1957 elections, the districts that comprise the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat were part of Bombay state. Districts in all major states except Assam and Kerala are included in the analysis, covering 85% of India s land area. 18
19 Table A2: Coding of Top 20 Opposition Parties Party AC/PC Agrarian Notes Sources Seats TPS 0/12 No Telangana Praja Samiti: Telangana separatist party. Weiner, 1971 RSP 77/12 No Revolutionary Socialist Party: socialist party. Sinha, 1965 NCU 82/7 No Congress (Urs): split from Congress in Manor, 1980 GP 87/4 No Ganatrantra Parishad: conservative party supported by Bailey, 1959 landlords. Joined SWP in PWP 109/8 No Peasants and Workers Party of India: left-wing party formed Srinivas, 1957 in FBL 127/12 No Forward Block: left-wing nationalist party, formed in 1939 by Sinha, 1965 Subhas Chandra Bose. NCO 166/21 No Congress (Organisation): conservative wing which split from Hardgrave, 1970 the Indira-Gandhi led faction of the Congress party in TDP 203/31 Yes Telugu Desam Party: regional party founded in Leadership Kohli, 1988 and support drawn considerably from the Kammas, a prosperous farming caste. BKD 212/1 Yes Bharatiya Kranti Dal: pro-rural, anti-urban party founded in 1967 by INC dissident Charan Singh Duncan, 1988 SAD 235/19 Yes Shiromani Akali Dal: Sikh-Punjabi sub-nationalist party Kumar, 2004 founded in Leadership drawn significantly from prosperous farming communities. LKD 247/289 Yes Bharatiya Lok Dal: founded in 1974, descended from BKD. Brass, 1981 SSP 249/26 No Samyukta Socialist Party: split from PSP in Fickett, 1973 BJP 357/2 No Bharatiya Janata Party: Hindu nationalist party founded in Jaffrelot, , descended from BJS. ADK 385/35 Yes All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam: split from DMK in Wyatt, 2009 DMK 400/66 Yes Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam: Dravidian sub-nationalist Wyatt, 2009 party. Populist platforms consisted significantly of subsidies for farmers. PSP 460/24 No Praja Socialist Party: socialist party formed in Fickett, 1973 SWA 505/78 No Swatantra Party: conservative party founded in Erdman, 2007 BJS 569/70 No Bharatiya Jana Sangh: Hindu nationalist party founded in 1951 by Syama Prasad Mookherjee. Jaffrelot, 1999 CPI 691/75 No Communist Party of India: India s first communist party, founded in CPM 885/103 No Communist Party of India (Marxist): split from CPI in Kohli, 1983 JNP 1716/79 Yes Janata Party: merger of several opposition parties in 1977, Rudolph and Rudolph, 1980 with large support base amongst farmers. IND 1780/83 No Independent: independent candidates were typically local notables without organized party ties. Chhibber and Kollman, 2009 Notes: Table contains top 20 opposition parties by seats won. Party is classified as agrarian if it received significant political support from and/or advocated programs oriented around interests of agricultural producers. 19
20 Figure A3: Matching Assembly and Parliamentary Constituencies to 1961 Districts Panel A: Split of 1961 Shahabad District Panel B: Assembly Constituencies Panel C: Parliamentary Constituencies BRAHMPUR SHAHPUR BARHARA ARRAH BHOJPUR BUXAR JAGDISHPUR DUMRAON SANDESH BUXAR ARRAH RAJPUR PIRO RAMGARH SAHAR BIKRAMGANJ DINARA MOHANIA KARAKAT BIKRAMGANJ ROHTAS CHAINPUR NOKHA CHENARI DEHRI SASARAM BHABHUA SASARAM Notes: Panel A: The 1961 District Shahabad subsequently split into two constituent districts, Rohtas and Bhojpur. Panel B: Post-1976 delimitation assembly constituencies comprising Rohtas and Bhojpur. Assembly constituencies fit contiguously within district boundaries. Panel C: Post-1976 delimitation parliamentary constituencies matched to Rohtas and Bhojpur districts. Note that Bikramganj was matched to Rohtas district and Arrah to Bhojpur district, despite partially intersecting with adjoining districts, because the majority of their constituent assembly constituencies fell in those districts. All matching of 1961 districts to assembly and parliamentary constituencies was done on the basis of tables in the Administrative Atlas of India and the 1956, 1961, 1967, and 1976 Delimitation Commission Reports. 20
21 Figure A4: Example of Automated Coding of Digitized Legislator Biography Notes: Who s Who biography of Chaudhury Charan Singh Member of Parliament, kisan (farmer) mobilizer, and leader of the Janata party scraped from Occupation coded as Professional and Career Politician based on detected keywords lawyer" and "political worker". Coded as possessing a university education based on keywords "b.sc.", "m.a.", and "ll.b.". Caste coded as OBC/Intermediate based on Jaffrelot (2003) dataset. 21
22 Table A5: IV Estimates: Effects of HYV Crop Adoption on Congress Performance in State Assembly Elections using Aquifer Instrument Dependent variable: Congress Win Congress Vote % (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) HYV (37.283) (47.444) (43.745) (10.037) (12.141) (11.828) Opposition Fractionalization (2.114) (0.929) INC Presence (2.145) (0.724) Hindi Belt Year FE Y Y Y Y Direct Rule Year FE Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y First-stage Aquifer Post (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) F-statistic Observations 21,843 21,843 21,842 21,843 21,843 21,842 Adjusted R Clusters Notes: Unit of observation assembly constituency-year for election years between Outcomes: Win indicates whether Congress won seat and Vote % indicates Congress vote share, both multiplied by 100 so that coefficients have a percentage point interpretation. Explanatory variables: HYV crop adoption is district-level share of agricultural land with HYV crops (0-1). Instrument for HYV crop adoption is an interaction term between a time dummy variable indicating the introduction of HYV crops in 1967 and a cross-sectional variable indicating presence of a naturally occurring thick aquifer. Opposition Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of opposition party vote shares (0-1). INC Presence is an indicator variable for the presence of a Congress party candidate. Hindi Belt is an indicator variable for location in a Hindi-speaking state. Direct Rule is an indicator variable for historical exposure to direct British colonial rule. Analysis estimated by 2SLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<
23 Table A6: IV Estimates: Effects of HYV Crop Adoption on Congress Performance in Parliamentary Elections using Aquifer Instrument Dependent variable: Congress Win Congress Vote % (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) HYV (38.147) (48.588) (44.619) (10.016) (11.729) (11.568) Opposition Fractionalization (2.185) (0.704) INC Presence (2.458) (0.669) Hindi Belt Year FE Y Y Y Y Direct Rule Year FE Y Y Y Y Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y First-stage Aquifer Post (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) F-statistic Observations 2,940 2,940 2,940 2,940 2,940 2,940 Adjusted R Clusters Notes: Unit of observation parliamentary constituency-year for election years between Outcomes: Win indicates whether Congress won seat and Vote % indicates Congress vote share, both multiplied by 100 so that coefficients have a percentage point interpretation. Explanatory variables: HYV crop adoption is district-level share of agricultural land with HYV crops (0-1). Instrument for HYV crop adoption is an interaction term between a time dummy variable indicating the introduction of HYV crops in 1967 and a cross-sectional variable indicating presence of a naturally occurring thick aquifer. Opposition Fractionalization is one minus the Herfindahl index of opposition party vote shares (0-1). INC Presence is an indicator variable for the presence of a Congress party candidate. Hindi Belt is an indicator variable for location in a Hindi-speaking state. Direct Rule is an indicator variable for historical exposure to direct British colonial rule. Analysis estimated by 2SLS. Standard errors adjusted for clustering within districts. p<0.1; p<0.05; p<
24 References Bai, Jushan and Pierre Perron Computation and Analysis of Multiple Structural Change Models. Journal of Applied Econometrics 18(1):1 22. Bailey, Frederick G The Ganatantra Parishad. Economic Weekly 24: Brass, Paul R Congress, the Lok Dal, and the Middle-peasant Castes: An Analysis of the 1977 and 1980 Parliamentary Elections in Uttar Pradesh. Pacific Affairs pp Chhibber, Pradeep and Ken Kollman The formation of national party systems: Federalism and party competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States. Princeton University Press. Dasgupta, Aditya How Dominant Parties Survive, Decline, and Shape Democracy: Lessons from India PhD thesis Harvard University. Duncan, Ian Party Politics and the North Indian Peasantry: The Rise of the Bharatiya Kranti Dal in Uttar Pradesh. The Journal of Peasant Studies 16(1): Erdman, Howard L The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism. Vol. 5 Cambridge University Press. Fickett, Lewis P The Praja Socialist Party of India : A Final Assessment. Asian Survey pp Hardgrave, Robert L The Congress in India Crisis and Split. Asian Survey pp Jaffrelot, Christophe The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of Identity-building, Implantation and Mobilisation. Penguin Books India. Jaffrelot, Christophe India s silent revolution: the rise of the lower castes in North India. Orient Blackswan. Kohli, Atul Parliamentary Communism and Agrarian Reform: The Evidence from India s Bengal. Asian Survey pp Kohli, Atul The NTR phenomenon in Andhra Pradesh: Political change in a South Indian state. Asian Survey pp Kumar, Ashutosh Electoral Politics in Punjab: Study of Akali Dal. Economic and Political Weekly pp Manor, James Pragmatic Progressives in Regional Politics: The Case of Devaraj Urs. Economic and Political Weekly pp Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber and Lloyd I Rudolph The centrist future of Indian politics. Asian Survey pp
25 Sinha, Lalan Prasad The Left-Wing in India, Vol. 1 New Publishers. Srinivas, Mysore Narasimhachar Caste in Modern India. The Journal of Asian Studies pp Weiner, Myron The 1971 Elections and the Indian Party System. Asian Survey pp Wyatt, Andrew Party System Change in South India: Political Entrepreneurs, Patterns and Processes. Routledge. 25
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