Iranian Nuclear Negotiations. Chair: Adam Hemauer PO/Vice Chair: Lauren Crawford

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1 Iranian Nuclear Negotiations Chair: Adam Hemauer PO/Vice Chair: Lauren Crawford 1

2 Table of Contents 3. Letter from Chair 4. Members of Committee 7. Topic A: Transparency and Restrictions on Iran s Nuclear Program 12. Topic B: Establishing a Timeline for the Removal of Sanctions 2

3 Letter from the Chair The date is October 15, Delegates from the P5+1 nations and Iran are meeting to discuss Iran s nuclear future for the first time since early April, when talks fell apart. With a new president, Hassan Rouhani, in power for Iran, both sides are optimistic that these talks will be much more constructive. It all hinges on what the delegates assembled in Geneva are able to accomplish Because this cabinet is focused on creating a deal between two conflicting groups, the P5+1 nations and Iran, delegates will not be restricted to debating one topic at a time, as this would hinder the flow of debate. An idea from topic 2 may be brought up as something to be given in exchange for agreeing to a deal on topic 1, and vice-versa. As a result, delegates should expect to debate extensively on both topics. Additionally, delegates may notice from the bloc positions that the delegates present are split evenly between Iranian negotiators and representatives of the P5+1 nations. While working as a team within each of these groups is obviously important and encouraged, the chair would also like to see deals made across these enemy lines. This can be done openly by hashing out details of the deal through debate, or through under-the-table deals, trading support on one topic in order to gain more personally favorable terms for the next one. Delegates on both sides should not only be trying to get the best deal for their group, but for their own selves as well. The committee will not be passing one comprehensive resolution at the end of a topic like many committees often do. Rather, multiple shorter resolutions and/or directives will be passed throughout the day. These resolutions can add or remove material from a cumulative document that will be updated throughout the day. This document will be The Deal, and will outline the nuclear future of Iran, as well as addressing the current sanctions. In order for any resolution to be passed and added to the deal, it must receive 50% of votes from each side (3 out of 6 delegates), and receive over 50% of votes from the committee as a whole (7 out of 12 delegates). I look forward to seeing you all at the conference! Sincerely, Adam Hemauer If you need to contact me to ask questions, my is hem500002@student.lths.net 3

4 Members in Committee: Iran: Mohammad Javad Zarif Current Minister of Foreign Affairs for Iran, he is the highest ranking diplomat present at these talks for Iran. Zarif has a history of attempting to ease tensions and promote dialogue between Iran and the Western world, and is part of a group of Iranian diplomats known as the New Yorkers, who have studied and worked in the US for most of their lives. He has served in many roles promoting communication between Iran, the UN, and Western powers. He also served as Head of the UN Disarmament Committee for a time, implying that he may be more open than most to curbing Iran s nuclear capabilities. Ali Shamkhani Shamkhani currently serves as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran. He has an extensive military background, and has previously served as Minister of Defense and is military advisor to the Supreme Leader. Shamkhani has often been guarded towards the West, and has shown a desire to have Iran work with P5+1 nations only as much as necessary. Though he is not associated with any reactionary groups, he is one of the most conservative Iranian voices at these talks. Seyed Abbas Araqchi Deputy of Legal and Foreign Affairs for Iran, Araqchi is one of the chief negotiators in these talks. Araqchi is unique among the negotiators because he is not political, and is not one of the New Yorkers like Zarif. Because of this, he is expected to be one of the main intermediaries between the P5+1 and Iranian delegates. However, Araqchi also has a reputation for being a hard negotiator, and most likely will not be very willing to cave to Western opinions on key issues. Majid Takht Ravanchi Ravanchi is the Deputy for European and American Affairs, and is another of Iran s chief negotiators at the talks. Ravanchi has been very skeptical about the outcome of talks. Of all the negotiators present, he is the least willing to give in to the demands of the West. He has stated several times that he believes Iran should be treated as any other member of the IAEA would, with little to no additional restrictions. 4

5 Hossein Fereydoun Fereydoun is the brother of President Hassan Rouhani, and serves as his representative at these talks. His job is to inform the President on the progress of these talks, and then report the President s opinion. As such, what Fereydoun says carries significant weight. Much lie his brother, Fereydoun s main goal in the talks is to reach a deal so that the sanctions on Iran can be lifted as soon as possible. Morteza Sarmadi Sarmadi is the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Zarif s second-in-command. Sarmadi has long been in favor of increasing transparency to cut down on sanctions, and has stated many times that it is his goal to reach a long-standing deal as quickly as possible. He has also encouraged Western Nations not to look at Iran as an enemy, but to instead look for common ground P5 +1: John Kerry (USA) The United States wants to get the possibility of Iran getting nuclear weapons out the window as soon as possible. The United States has a particularly rocky history with Iran, and with diplomatic ties to Iran s regional enemy, Israel, it is of the utmost concern for the US to protect their allies through this diplomatic opportunity. That being said, the US sanctions are the strongest overall, and for that reason might be the last to come off. Philip Hammond (UK) The United Kingdom has been another loud voice in rallying the international community against a nuclear Iran. However, the UK has also focused on other problems with Iran, such as human rights abuse and support of terrorism. Additionally, the United Kingdom has made several unilateral proposals to try to curtail Iran s nuclear program, as well as many with the rest of the E3 group (UK, France, and Germany). Wang Yi (China) China is different in that it has a thriving trade relationship with Iran. About a tenth of China s petroleum imports come from Iran, and Chinese businesses are heavily invested in the Iranian oil and natural gas fields. For this reason, a significant amount of frozen Iranian funds are locked into Chinese banks. China s commitment to a nuclear-free Iran is debatable. Above the table, the Chinese government supports nuclear restrictions. However, China has been caught several times providing the Iranian government with weapons, engineers, and even nuclear weapons and expertise. 5

6 Sergey Lavrov (Russia) Russia, like China, has strong economic ties to Iran. As sanctions from the West have increased, Russia has invested more and more in Iran s government. In particular, Russia has invested several billions of dollars in the Iranian gas and oil industries. In addition, the two nations have, since 2010, signed an agreement to cooperate in developing their energy sectors, including a joint oil exchange. In addition to this, Russian companies hold a rather large stake in the Iranian nuclear sector, even owning some of the nuclear plants in the country. Laurent Fabius (France) To the surprise of many, France has been very hardline with its response to Iran. The French have been very clear that they would not accept a nuclear deal that did not have certain components to prohibit Iran from developing its nuclear program. Key among these ultimatums was the right of the UN, through the IAEA, to search Iranian military sites to investigate illicit nuclear developments. Appeasing France may prove a difficult task in these talks. Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Germany) Germany and Iran have quite icy relations, but at the same time the economic ties between the two are undeniable. Iran s statements toward the nation of Israel and denial of the Holocaust have long been an issue for the German government, causing them to be largely in favor of sanctioning Iran. However, German business is very important to Iran, and many banks and businesses have branches there. The most noteworthy of these is Siemens, whose operating system is necessary to run the centrifuges and other equipment required by Iran s nuclear program. 6

Topic A: Transparency and Restrictions on Iran s Nuclear Program Background: Iran s nuclear program began in the late 60 s as part of a US-endorsed deal with Shah Reza Pahlavi to create nuclear

7 Topic A: Transparency and Restrictions on Iran s Nuclear Program Background: Iran s nuclear program began in the late 60 s as part of a US-endorsed deal with Shah Reza Pahlavi to create nuclear energy. This program continued to expand, with grand promises of its future in providing cheap energy to the people of Iran, until the Iranian revolution in With the seizure of the US embassy and subsequent damaging of relationships with the most of the Western world, imports of uranium ceased and the nuclear program was halted. The program was late revitalized when Tehran received schematics on building a P-1 gas centrifuge from Pakistani nuclear physicist Abdul Qadeer Khan. This device allowed Iran to begin enriching its own uranium, allowing the nuclear program to continue. After signing a deal with Argentina in 1993 guaranteeing annual uranium imports, Iran once again became an officially nuclear capable nation. Beginning of Nuclear Troubles: In 2002 the National Council of Resistance of Iran, and Iranian opposition group, revealed in a press conference that two undeclared nuclear enrichment sites had been built in Natanz and Arak. The clandestine nature of their development, as well as their high grade of potential enrichment, led the rest of the world to believe that the plants has been built in order to produce weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. This prompted the IAEA to demand a complete halt to enrichment activities a year later. The IAEA also mandated that Iran declare all material relevant to its nuclear program and allow IAEA to access and check all nuclear sites within the country. While at first, Iran seemed to comply completely with all IAEA requirements, it was soon denounced for failing to cooperate with investigations, and soon after 7

8 Iran began producing enriched uranium again. This enrichment was shortly halted as part of negotiations with France, Germany, and the UK, but restarted when the talks fell apart less than a year later. In 2006, the IAEA formally informed the UN Security Council of Iran s failure to comply with its regulations, thus starting the legal process that led to the excessive sanctions seen today. The same year, Iran announced that it would stop complying with international regulations regarding its nuclear program, and that it had produced its first enriched uranium as part of a pilot project. Iran s nuclear program has continued since that point to expand in capabilities toward weapons-level development, despite multiple attempts from both sides to reach a substantive deal. Issues to be Discussed: The following are aspects of Iran s nuclear program that must be addressed in the nuclear deal made by Iran. Delegates may bring forth their own issues in addition, but the all those listed here must be addressed and will generally be given priority in debate. Restrictions on Enrichment: This is the biggest and most contentious issue that must be debated. Iran has many times affirmed its dedication to nuclear power for its people, describing its nuclear program as peaceful. In order to continue pursuing this energy policy, Iran needs to continue enriching its uranium so as to provide an energy source for its plants. The issue is th at the same process for enriching uranium for energy can be used to create weapons-grade materials, though weapons material needs a significantly larger amount of time to be enriched. This amount for time is referred to as break-out time. The goal of most of the P5+1 nations is to extend Iran s breakout time as much as possible. The US has targeted 1 year as optimal breakout time for the deal, while other nations have not yet set a specific goal. The US goal would mean Iran would have to cut its number of operational enrichment centrifuges by over 50%. This would also mean strongly limiting nuclear research and development, in order to ensure Iran does 8 Iranian Nuclear Centrifuges

9 not increase the efficiency of its centrifuges. Iran, on the other hand, wishes to keep its enrichment potential as high as possible so as to increase nuclear power supply. Another issue to be included in any restrictions is the transparency of Iran s nuclear program, past and present. Historically, Iran has often failed to comply and cooperate with IAEA inspections at its nuclear sites. Though Iran has signed and ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, this does raise significant questions about its pursuit of nuclear weapons. In addition to standard IAEA investigations, past attempts and agreements have indicated that Iran would have more stringent requirements to meet with regards to transparency. Measures should also be put in place to make sure the deal made in committee is followed. Length of Restrictions: Much as some may wish it, restrictions on Iran s nuclear program most likely cannot last indefinitely, and certainly must be diminished over time. All clauses passed that restrict Iran s nuclear development or set transparency requirements must have some time frame attached to them. For some restrictions, this may be indefinite, but most of the most restrictive elements should have some gradual reduction. Otherwise, the deal risks permanently crippling the Iranian economy. Access to Military Sites: The main goal of the deal is to ensure that Iran is not able to turn its uranium resources into weapons. As a precaution, many from governments of P5+1 nations have stated that they want to be able to search Iranian military bases as well as nuclear ones. This has raised significant backlash, as many in Tehran believe this would give the rest of the word too much information about its military. Especially given the hostile relationship between Iran and several other countries, including Israel (which many believe already has nuclear weapons), this poses a significant security risk to Iran. A middle ground must be found. 9

Supply for Bushehr plant: Iran s nuclear plant at Bushehr raises a problem regarding production. Currently, the plant receives enriched uranium from Russia, as part of a long-standing investment.

10 Supply for Bushehr plant: Iran s nuclear plant at Bushehr raises a problem regarding production. Currently, the plant receives enriched uranium from Russia, as part of a long-standing investment. However, this deal is scheduled to end in Iran has stated that it plans to boost its production of enriched uranium by enough to supply the reactor on its own once the deal ends. This would be a ten-fold increase in production, and would shorten Iran s break-out time for producing a nuclear weapon to only a few weeks. However, Russia has recently invested in building two more nuclear plants in Iran, and may be inclined to extend its deal supplying the Bushehr plant, thus eliminating the need for Iran to increase its nuclear capabilities. The outcome remains to be seen. Questions to Consider: What restrictions should be lifted from Iran s nuclear program? What issues should be kept in place? How long should these restrictions continue? How should investigations of Iran s nuclear sites be conducted? Who should conduct them? How often should they be conducted? Which sites should the international community have access to? Should the international community be able to investigate all military sites, or just those with nuclear capabilities? How should current and future nuclear energy projects in Iran be treated? Should they be allowed to continue, and if so, what restrictions or oversight will they have? 10

11 Useful Sources: Iran Primer Iran s Nuclear Program ( Nuclear Threat Institute Iran ( World Nuclear Association Nuclear Power in Iran ( Iran Watch Iran s Nuclear Timetable ( Iran Tracker Nuclear Program ( 11

Topic B: Establishing a Timeline for the Removal of Sanctions Background: Sanctions against Iran began in late 2005.

12 Topic B: Establishing a Timeline for the Removal of Sanctions Background: Sanctions against Iran began in late In September of that year, the IAEA published a resolution that declared the Iranian government to be noncompliant with international nuclear regulations. It called upon Iran to cease its illicit nuclear activities, as well as to return to the negotiating table to resolve questions about its nuclear program. In response to this continued noncompliance, the international community was drawn into action, imposing swift economic sanctions upon Iran. These sanctions have continued until this day, and have provided a severe handicap to Iranian business. Nature of the Sanctions: The goal of the sanctions is to make it incredibly more expensive for Iran to advance nuclear program, as well as its ballistic missile program. These sanctions have been slowly increased over time, and are binding for all member states of the UN. The first round of UN sanctions, passed in 2006, set an embargo on all nuclear enrichment and ballistic weapons equipment and technology. Additionally, it blocked any monetary investment into any Iranian nuclear or ballistic programs. This blocking of foreign investment was expanded in 2007 to include all nonhumanitarian financial assistance. Stricter protocols were enacted in 2008 mandating that UN states inspect all cargo sent to Iran suspected of containing prohibited materials. Essentially, the UN can control what is and is not sent to Iran. The last update of international UN sanctions occurred in 2010, when Iran s oil and banking sectors were added to the list of sanctioned entities, giving them the same embargo that the nuclear and missile programs had. 12

Various nations have also set their own independent sanctions in addition to those mandated by the UN. While many nations have done this, the most notable are the United States and the European Union.

13 Various nations have also set their own independent sanctions in addition to those mandated by the UN. While many nations have done this, the most notable are the United States and the European Union. The United States restrictions are generally seen as the strictest. They prevent any financial institution that deals with Iranian banks from doing any deals in the US, with US companies, or using the US dollar. This has been deemed a death penalty for international banks, and as a result is arguably the harshest sanction against Iran. Additionally, several sanctions target Iran s oil sector by limiting firms that would invest in Iranian oil. As a result of this, Iranian oil sales have fallen by half since Additionally, many Iranian institutions, including most major banks, have been named supporters of international terrorism by the US, resulting in a complete freeze of all assets. Sanctions put in place by EU nations are only slightly less harsh. All European assets of those involved in Iran s nuclear program were frozen in This stood as the only major European measure until 2010, when the all financial institutions within the EU were banned from doing business with Iranian banks, as well as from investing in key economic areas such as energy and transportation. The final sanction push from the EU came in 2012, when a complete embargo on Iranian oil was issued. This was a crushing blow to the Iranian economy, as the EU had previously been the largest import of Iranian oil. Without a doubt, this embargo is one of the main reasons that Iran has come to the bargaining table. 13

14 Issues to Consider: Timeline for Removal: It is extremely unlikely that all sanctions against Iran will end up being lifted at once. While it is expected that at least some will be eliminated in good faith once the deal has been completely made, it is up to this group to determine what schedule the rest of the sanctions will follow. These can be time-based (after a certain amount of months or years), or they can be milestone-based (once Iran returns to certain levels of complicity with the IAEA). Whatever these may end up being is up to the committee. All clauses in the deal addressing a removal of sanctions should at some point address this timing. Rebuilding the Iranian Economy: This economic war has taken a great toll on Iran. Almost all major international trade ties have been severed, and oil production has struggled to maintain steady growth. Without a doubt, the Iranian economy is much below its potential. While by no means necessary, it may be in the best interest of either party to try to step in and help rebuild the Iranian economy once sanctions are removed. This does have both pros and cons for both sides. For the Iranians, their economy will receive a jump start as it comes out of its sanctioned isolation. However, it gives a rather large amount of power to Western nations who the Iranian people generally resent. For the P5+1 nations, the beneficial relations that this action would promote are offset by the risk of providing Iran with the resources to once again begin covertly funding a nuclear program. Unfreezing Iranian Assets: As a result of international sanctions, upwards of $100 billion of Iranian money is in some way frozen in foreign accounts. Some of this money belongs to the government, while other parts of it belong various banks, companies, and private citizens. It is important that these assets are addressed in this deal as well, as this is a very large amount of money to have suddenly flooding the global economic system. Additionally, Iranian property in foreign lands at the time of the implementation of the sanctions has been confiscated, and in many cases sold or rented out, bringing about questions of who that income belongs to. Just like with the other sanctions, a 14

15 specific timeline should be addressed, most likely focusing on the different types of investments that remain frozen in foreign banks. Questions to Consider: How much of the sanctions should be removed? Should any be kept in place permanently? For those sanctions that will be removed, when will they be removed? Will they be removed immediately, after a set amount of time, or when a certain milestone has been reached? Should any steps be taken by the international community to rebuild the economy of Iran? Or should it be allowed to find its own way through the international markets? How should Iranian money in foreign banks be unfrozen, so that the money and assets are returned but they do not overflow the international economy? Does revenue earned by Iranian assets during the time of the sanctions belong to the property owner, or those who confiscated the property? Useful Sources: BBC News Iranian Sanctions ( US Department of Treasury Iran Sanctions ( Congressional Research Service Iran Sanctions ( Business Insider Iran s Frozen Assets ( billion-in-frozen-assets ) George Washington University Iran s Deteriorating Economy ( 15

GR132 Non-proliferation: current lessons from Iran and North Korea

GR132 Non-proliferation: current lessons from Iran and North Korea The landmark disarmament deal with Libya, announced on 19 th December 2003, opened a brief window of optimism for those pursuing international