inflation but also an international situation of widening war in southeast Asia and hostile relations with the two communist superpowers.

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1 Two Frozen Decades Between 1949 and 1969, China and the United States were almost completely isolated from each other. In the aftermath of World War II, hostilities between Chiang Kai-Shek s Nationalist Party and Mao Zedong s Communist Party erupted into a civil war. The United States backed Chiang Kai-Shek. On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong, the Chinese communist revolutionary, claimed Mainland China as the People s Republic of China, while Chiang Kai- Shek fled to Taiwan, naming his island stronghold the Republic of China. For the next twenty years, the United States recognized the Republic of China in Taiwan as the sole legitimate government of China and imposed sanctions on the mainland People s Republic of China. In 1950, the United States and the People s Republic of China (PRC) took opposing sides in the Korean War, further straining relations between the two nations. A decade later, when the US entered the Vietnam War in 1961, China and the US again backed opposing sides, hindering the possibility of developing relations between the two nations. Since 1949, China had extended its political influence to many of its neighboring countries. In the 1950s, China supported North Korea in its battle with South Korea and US-led peacekeeping forces, and supported Vietnamese forces in their attempt to expel France from Indochina. When revolution exploded in Vietnam in the 1960s, China supplied weapons and technology to the Vietnamese communists as they fought the Diem regime and the United States. As China continued to expand its influence beyond its borders, the US pursued a policy of counteracting and hampering China, fearing the domino effect : if one country fell under communist influence, so would other countries surrounding it. The United States placed an embargo against China and tried to convince other countries to do the same. The US even considered a nuclear attack on China when they found out that China had begun developing nuclear weapons in In May 1970, Nixon carried the war against North Vietnam into Cambodia, with the intention of inflicting heavy damage on the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (Viet Cong), who were using the neutral territory of Cambodia as a base of operations to strike at South Vietnam. In addition to bombing Cambodian territory, US intelligence also engineered the deposition of Cambodian leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and his replacement by pro-american General Lon Nol. These actions were designed to facilitate the American policy of Vietnamization and the ultimate withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam. China was outraged by Nixon s Cambodian campaign. On May 20, 1970, Mao staged a mass meeting of half million people in Beijing (Peking) and delivered his May Twentieth Declaration. He called for people around the world to unite to fight the American imperialists and their running dogs, saying that China would support a world-wide revolution against America. 1 In the 1960s, China witnessed its most dramatic developments, both domestic and foreign. Mao Zedong implemented his Great Leap Forward economic plan from 1958 to This was a disastrous program, which ultimately brought on an economic collapse and claimed an estimated 30 million lives in China, mostly due to starvation. 2 The central government moved quickly to replace the Great Leap Forward policy with a more workable economic plan, and from 1961 to 1965, the PRC readjusted and recovered. Shortly after, in 1966, Mao Zedong launched 1

2 the Cultural Revolution which lasted until This period was one of the most turbulent China has seen. Administrators and officials from every level of government were ousted or purged from their offices. Over sixteen million middle school and high school students ( educated youth ) were sent to the countryside for reeducation. 3 With his passionate speeches, Mao created a de facto army the Red Guards to carry out his vision of continuous revolution. The young Red Guards campaigned and rallied around the country, seizing power from the established bureaucracy. 4 Revolutionary Committees replaced the old organs of state power 5 and took over the functions of government at all levels from communes to provincial governments. Physical violence was prevalent as families, communities, factories, schools, armies, workers, and farmers were divided into factions according to class struggle. Clashes between these factions dominated Chinese society for years. Traditional Chinese culture was disrupted and replaced by revolutionary slogans. Industry and agriculture stalled. The majority of the Chinese lived in absolute poverty. This internal turmoil only increased following a border dispute with the Soviet Union in The following constant military clashes between the two nations made the whole country live in an atmosphere of war and fear. 6 Besides exporting revolution and supporting the independence movements of some developing countries, China was isolated by its own continuous revolution. The United States faced its own set of domestic and international challenges in the 1960s. President Kennedy narrowly averted war with the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis in Lyndon Johnson began to implement his liberal domestic policy, the Great Society, but was soon swept up in the Indochina conflict. In 1964, Johnson used a confrontation between North Vietnamese PT boats and a US destroyer in the Tonkin Gulf as a reason to commit US troops to an ever-increasing involvement in the Vietnam War. While troops were building up in Vietnam, racial tensions took the spotlight in the US: freedom riders promoted black voter registration in the South, federal troops were sent into southern states to enforce civil rights laws, and northern cities erupted in riots was the most tumultuous year of all. In January, on the Vietnamese Lunar New Year, North Vietnamese forces staged coordinated attacks across South Vietnam, including the US Embassy in Saigon. Although the attacks were finally beaten back, the Tet Offensive convinced most people that the US would never win the war in Vietnam. The American public reacted so violently to the demoralizing losses of Tet that President Johnson realized he could no longer lead the nation. On March 31, he shocked the nation by stating that he would not seek another term as president. From that point on, American leaders focused on finding a way of getting out of Vietnam without hurting America s prestige. The assassination of civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. on April 4 th sent the nation once again into a state of violence as urban neighborhoods around the country exploded in rage and frustration. 7 On June 5 th, Robert Kennedy was assassinated as he campaigned for the Democratic nomination for president. Violent public demonstrations and confrontations about the war and civil rights continued to sweep the country. In August, anti-war demonstrators in Chicago turned the 1968 Democratic National Convention into a police riot. In November, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who was associated in many voters minds with Johnson s Vietnam policies, lost the presidential election to Richard Nixon. Many Americans voted for Nixon in the hope that he would be able to stabilize a country that seemed to be spinning out of control. Nixon claimed to be the representative of the silent majority of American people 8 and promised that he would bring law and order to a troubled country. 9 As he moved into the White House, Nixon inherited not only domestic economic problems including soaring unemployment and unchecked 2

3 inflation but also an international situation of widening war in southeast Asia and hostile relations with the two communist superpowers. Although both the United States and China faced many difficult dilemmas during the 1960s and consistently condemned each other s policies in public, they both recognized the political reality and necessity of establishing diplomatic relations. The world s most populous country and the world s most powerful country could not be isolated from each other forever. Between 1955 and 1970, 136 meetings were held at the ambassadorial level between the US and China. These meetings did not necessarily bring about the most productive outcomes from Dwight Eisenhower to Lyndon Johnson, the Sino-U.S. Ambassadorial Talks made no progress in improving bilateral relations but the effort was made in an attempt to keep the door ajar. What finally drew the two countries together was mutual fear of a third force: the Soviet Union. Aggressive expansionist Soviet policies around the world and the border clash between China and the Soviet Union forced the leaders of China and the United States to think and act differently. After two frozen decades between the US and China, icebreakers emerged. Mao, Nixon, Kissinger and Zhou (Chou): Assessing the Principals America s opening to China offers a good case study of the role of personalities in the conduct of foreign policy. In this quotation from Kissinger s book, Diplomacy, Kissinger acknowledges that even though both China and the US were ready for some sort of mutual agreement, the specific negotiations and the ultimate shape of the China operation depended on the character and personalities of the four primary participants. 10 When Richard Nixon won his dramatic comeback election in 1968, he appointed Henry Kissinger as his National Security Advisor. As a strategist, Richard Nixon had formulated a presidential agenda, including a China initiative, even before he was elected to the presidency. He planned his strategies on a global scale. Nixon was also a man who cared greatly about details, as evidenced by the fact that he spent the plane ride to China discussing last minute minutiae with Kissinger. 11 Henry Kissinger was intelligent, ambitious and practical. He impressed acquaintances with his wit and charm. In discussions, he usually won people over to his side through his acute intellectual assessments and practical grasp of political dynamics. All these qualities made Jeremy Suri remark in Henry Kissinger and the American Century that Kissinger s genius was not his originality but his ability to recognize the changed circumstances around him and take advantage of them." 12 In modern American history, Nixon and Kissinger can be characterized as a dynamic duo. As partners in power, Nixon set the overall strategic direction for the United States, and Kissinger worked out the tactics. 13 Mao Zedong was as much of a strategist as Nixon and had a vast agenda on both domestic and international fronts. He saw opportunities in crisis situations and was able to position the Chinese Communist Party advantageously during the Sino-Japanese War ( ). He established his personal cult through constantly removing or neutralizing his opponents and enemies. Mao was 3

4 an adventurous experimenter with great successes such as the Long March and the Civil War, and great failures such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Mao Zedong was a unique, independent figure, following no designated direction. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was a compelling figure. After Mao purged the upper ranks of the Communist Party, Zhou alone remained as Mao Zedong s last loyalist. He became Mao s indispensable mediator in China s politics. He had a personality that impressed many foreigners who met him; they described him to be not only delightful but also deeply civilized. Kissinger was completely entranced by Zhou at their first meeting and said that Zhou had the ability of filling a room not by his physical dominance but by his air of controlled tensions, steely discipline, and self-control, as if he were a coiled spring. 14 Kissinger expressed hearty approval of Zhou: He was equally at home in philosophy, reminiscence, historical analysis, tactical probes, humorous repartee. 15 Zhou exemplified a perfect balance of kindness, compassion and moderation. Zhou was the man who kept a grasp on all aspects of political issues. He worked for endless hours, remaining at his post, always within reach of Mao Zedong. Many saw the relationship between Mao and Zhou with Mao as the radical and Chou as the moderate; Mao as the one who caused the damage with his wild policies and Chou who picked up the pieces. 16 Zhou was also known to be a great negotiator. He had the capacity of subtle deception, having the ability to get what he wanted by changing and shifting his line with such delicacy that it was often hard to notice what he was doing. 17 According to Henry Kissinger, Mao dominated any gathering; Zhou suffused it. Mao s passion strove to overwhelm opposition; Zhou s intellect would seek to persuade or outmaneuver it. Mao was sardonic; Zhou penetrating. Mao thought of himself as a philosopher; Zhou saw his role as an administrator or a negotiator. Mao was eager to accelerate history; Zhou was content to exploit its current. 18 Mao and Zhou s relationship endured for forty years; a perfect balance of similarities and differences. Nixon-Kissinger Initiatives Nixon formulated his China concept during his years out of public office ( ). In 1966, Nixon told his patron, Elmer Bobst, that his profoundest dream was to bring China into the world. 19 Nixon s first public statement regarding the importance of reestablishing a relationship between the United States and China appeared in an article in Foreign Affairs in October 1967: Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation. 20 Two years later, in his inaugural address, Nixon referred indirectly to the concept of a China initiative when he said, After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation. Let all nations know that during this administration our lines of communication will be open. We seek an open world open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation. 21 If Nixon s intention was 4

5 to attract Mao s attention with this statement, he succeeded. Mao took the unprecedented step of allowing a translation of the full text of Nixon s inaugural address to be published in the People s Daily. 22 On February 1, 1969, two weeks after his inaugural address, Nixon wrote Kissinger a memorandum urging the possibility of rapprochement with China. 23 Nixon and Kissinger discussed the necessity for deliberate progress between the two countries for the benefit of both nations. They agreed that the relationship between the People s Republic of China and the United States had to reach a point of agreement. Thus, they began brainstorming action plans on the China initiative. In his first Foreign Policy Report to Congress in February 1970, Nixon wrote, The Chinese are a great and vital people who should not remain isolated from the international community.... It is certainly in our interest, and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world, that we take what steps we can toward improved practical relations with Peking. 24 This was Nixon s first step in promoting his China initiative to the US Congress. On October 26, 1970, Nixon hosted a state banquet to welcome Romanian head of state, Nicolae Ceausescu. Reversing Cold War precedent, Nixon for the first time referred to China by its official name, the People s Republic of China, as opposed to the more usual Red China or Communist China. 25 Again, Nixon was sending signals to Beijing through his choice of words. When Ceausescu visited Beijing in 1971, he could give firsthand messages to Mao and Zhou. In an interview with Time magazine in October 1970, Nixon made his intentions even plainer by saying, If there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China. If I don t, I want my children to. 26 Nixon s desire to open the door to China was escalating. Nixon s desire and intention for rapprochement had been clearly stated. But after two decades of minimal contact, there was still no trust between China and the United States and no open lines of communication. The one hundred-plus Warsaw talks had been completely unproductive. Nixon searched for diplomatic avenues to open the door to China and deliberately chose Pakistan, Romania, and France as possible intermediaries. Pakistan was a nonaligned friend of China. Romania, a member of the Warsaw Pact, desired some independence from Moscow. And France was a NATO member committed to strategic political independence. 27 Eventually, Pakistan became the channel through which a US-China relationship was brokered. Reciprocal Initiatives from Mao and Zhou The steps China and the US took towards each other evolved slowly over three years. While the statements Nixon made in his 1970 Foreign Policy Report and his interview with Time Magazine were fairly straightforward, the Chinese moves, orchestrated by Mao and Zhou, were subtler. When the People s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party s mouthpiece, published Nixon s inauguration speech of January 20, 1969, it sent a message to the Chinese people: China is opening its ears to hear what the American president has to say. 28 Nixon could see that the Chinese public was being informed of Nixon s intention to improve relations with China. 5

6 The next signal indicating that Mao may be open to establishing contact with the US occurred on October 1, 1970, when Mao invited American writer Edgar Snow to the National Day celebration in Beijing. As a young journalist, Edgar Snow had been the first American to report on the activities of Mao Zedong and his young communist followers. He wrote about his experiences in Red Star Over China, which was published in the US in Now, the world could see Mao standing with the American writer Snow as they reviewed the National Day parade from the top of Tiananmen Square, symbolizing to the United States that China was willing to improve relations with the United States. Subsequently, Mao granted Edgar Snow an interview on December 18, In this interview, which was published in Life magazine several months later, Mao said, If Nixon wishes to come to Beijing, please tell him he should do it secretly, not openly just get on a plane and come I am ready to hold talks with Nixon if he is willing to come. It doesn t matter if the negotiations succeed or fail, if we quarrel or not, if he comes in the capacity of a tourist or the President. 29 Mao and Zhou s oblique approach to icebreaking continued, resulting in the move that would be labeled ping-pong diplomacy by the press. In the spring of 1971, the US Table Tennis team was in Nagoya, Japan, playing in the 31 st World Table Tennis Championship. On April 6, 1971, the US team received a surprise invitation to visit China. Mao Zedong had waited until the last moment to extend this invitation. The American table tennis team landed in Beijing on April 10, On April 14, Zhou Enlai held a banquet in the Great Hall to celebrate the arrival of the athletes. In his remarks to the American athletes, he said, Your visit has opened a new chapter in the history of the relations between Chinese and American people. With you having made the start the people of the United States and China in the future will be able to have constant contacts. 30 This form of proxy diplomacy was a Chinese strategy. Ping pong diplomacy became a catch phrase around the world, with the assessment: A small ball (a ping pong ball) levered a big ball (the earth). Kissinger s Secret Visit Less than two months after the ping pong diplomacy incident, the White House received a message from Zhou Enlai through the Pakistan channel, inviting a special envoy of President Nixon to visit China to pave the way for a Nixon visit. Zhou s message said that the Chinese government reaffirms its willingness to receive publicly in Peking a special envoy of the President of the United States (for instance Mr. Kissinger) or the U.S. secretary of State or even the President himself for a direct meeting and discussion. 31 To implement the China initiative, an American envoy would have to make arrangements for the summit. At first, Nixon wanted to visit China himself, but realized that would be too much of a risk. If he failed to secure a meeting with Mao Zedong, it would jeopardize his role as President of the United States. After excluding candidates from a long list, both Nixon and Kissinger concluded that the only competent candidate for this mission would be Kissinger himself. Although Nixon was hesitant to make this decision, due to Kissinger s growing popularity among the press and the people, Kissinger was the man for the job. Kissinger had studied the history of China and the Chinese people, and most importantly, he knew the mind and thought processes of Nixon himself. 32 With Kissinger as his envoy, Nixon would be more 6

7 assured that any discussions and negotiations would also have his imprint. Before authorizing the visit, Nixon emphasized that Kissinger s visit must be a secret. Although most major foreign policy decisions benefit from public discussions and win greater public support if developed in an open way, the China initiative was compared to the Manhattan Project by Mike Mansfield, the Senate Majority Leader: Secrecy was absolutely essential to the success of each. 33 Without secrecy, Nixon believed that We will kill this child before it is born. 34 There were three strategic reasons for keeping Kissinger s visit to China secret. First, secrecy would maximize the surprise at home when the visit was announced, and he did not want other Americans, particularly Democratic leaders, to upstage him (Nixon) with earlier visits. 35 Nixon wanted to get the edge over the Democrats on the opening to China, believing that success with China would help his re-election campaign: The Nixon White House wanted an exclusive franchise on visits to China. 36 Second, keeping the China initiative secret would circumvent the resistant bureaucracy of the State Department. So many vested positions existed within the State Department that paralyzing demands would have been made each step of the way. According to Kissinger, A public mission would have set off a complicated internal clearance project within the U.S. government and insistent demands for consultations from around the world, including Taiwan. 37 Third, secrecy could also avoid a paralyzing public and congressional debate. Once news of the mission leaked, conservative opposition from groups such as the China Lobby would mobilize quickly and scuttle the whole effort. 38 For Kissinger, the trip to China was a dangerous risk. If it ended badly, it could lead to further straining of the relationship between the US and China, as well as jeopardizing Kissinger s career. Kissinger believed that in order to get what he wanted he would have to keep all other hindrances and obstacles out of the way. Kissinger relished the idea of dramatic surprises and liked to keep matters in his own hands without involving others. 39 In June 1971, the White House received this message: Premier Chou En-lai welcomes Dr. Kissinger to China as the U.S. representative who will come in advance for a preliminary secret meeting with high level Chinese officials to prepare and make necessary arrangements for President Nixon s visit to Peking. 40 Kissinger told Nixon, This is the most important communication that has come to an American President since the end of World War II. 41 Kissinger s visit to China would be an official secret. In Beijing, Kissinger forestalled Chinese fears of controversy by constantly reassuring Zhou that Washington and Beijing could come to an agreement on the Taiwan problem. Reversing twenty years of US policy regarding Taiwan, Kissinger disavowed the independence of Taiwan and stated that the United States was committed to withdrawing its troops from Taiwan once the Vietnam War ended. The negotiations between Zhou and Kissinger were viewed as a win-win (or at least neutral) success for both. They did not falter under the pressure of their roles in the negotiations. By the end of the trip, Kissinger stated that it was a complete success on his part. Kissinger s secret China visit resulted in the world-shaking announcement released by Nixon s press secretary on July 15, 1971: Premier Chou En-lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon s Assistant for National Security Affairs, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, Knowing of President 7

8 Nixon s expressed desire to visit the People s Republic of China, Premier Chou En-lai, on behalf of the Government of the People s Republic of China, has extended an invitation to President Nixon, who has accepted the invitation with pleasure. The meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides. 42 Politicians and diplomats around the world were stunned by this announcement, which was the first public disclosure of Nixon s China initiative. Once the announcement of the visit had been made, both sides stepped back, not wishing to appear as though they were too willing to negotiate with the enemy. Americans could hardly believe that their government would deal with a nation of fanatical communists, even more alien-seeming than the Russians. For the Chinese public, America was the foremost imperialist power, always seeking world hegemony who could have invited the head of the most imperialist country in the world to visit China? Each side wanted the other to look more eager, according to Kissinger. 43 Many commentators decided that it was all about face. 44 The wily Zhou employed the phrase, knowing of, to creatively distance himself from the event. According to this interpretation, it became known that Nixon wanted to visit China, and although he was not particularly encouraged to come, he was not particularly discouraged either, and so he came. With knowing of Nixon s desire to visit, the issue of who initiated it was skirted with a passive, vague word. 45 No matter how it came about, Kissinger s visit to China paved the way for Nixon to turn a page in history. 46 Triangular Geopolitics On February 21, 1972, Nixon arrived in Beijing. A new global order based on triangular geopolitics began to unfold. After World War II, a cold war between the United States and Soviet Union divided the world into two blocs: West and East. The ideological clash between capitalism and communism resulted in many hot wars and skirmishes around the world as each side tried to gain an advantage over the other through espionage, diplomacy, or brute force. Guerilla wars dragged on for years in Africa and Latin America. Cold war politics divided nations by walls and lines such as East Germany vs. West Germany, North Korea vs. South Korea, Mainland China vs. Taiwan, and North Vietnam vs. South Vietnam. Although the Soviets liked to portray the communist countries as a monolithic bloc, with themselves as the undisputed leaders, cracks in the communist bloc became apparent in the 1960s with the China-Soviet ideological disputes and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. On September 26, 1968, the Brezhnev Doctrine was enunciated in Pravda to justify the Soviet crackdown in Czechoslovakia. It held that The Soviet Union has the right to interfere in the affairs of other socialist states if, in the judgment of the Soviet leaders, socialism is in danger of being removed as a country's ruling system. 47 The Chinese perceived the 1968 Czechoslovakia invasion by the Soviet Union as a small scale dress rehearsal for some future invasion of China. 48 Soviet leaders confirmed China s fears by stating that... the Chinese leadership has betrayed socialism and the working class of the Chinese People's Republic and [even that] the Chinese People s Republic has abandoned Communism for some kind of bloody Fascist rule. 49 From the Chinese perspective, it was only a matter of time until the Brezhnev Doctrine would be exercised on China. 8

9 The ideological dispute between the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Communist Party started in the early 1960s. The Chinese Communist Party blamed the Soviet Communist Party for betraying Marxist-Leninist ideals. The Soviet Communist Party denounced the Chinese Communist Party for being unruly and belligerent. Sino-Soviet political differences turned into Sino-Soviet border conflicts at the Ussuri River and on Damansky (Zhenbao) Island in March More small-scale warfare occurred at Tielieketi in August. After that, both China and the Soviet Union believed that war with each other was more likely than war with a Western power. 50 In the Communist Summit Conference held in Moscow in June 1969, Brezhnev called for a mutual defense pact against Chinese expansionism and imperialism. 51 Moreover, China s emergence as a nuclear power in 1964 was a direct challenge to the Soviets. Mao and his Communist leaders came to believe that an attack from Soviet Union was imminent, and that China s fledging nuclear arsenal was being targeted by the Soviet Union. 52 Immediately after the 1969 border clashes between China and the Soviet Union, Mao appointed four marshals (Chen Yi, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen and Ye Jianying) to assess the international challenges facing China. In September 1969, their study generated two reports on international affairs: Preliminary Assessment on the War Prospective, and Viewpoints on the Current World Situation. The main concept emerging from these two reports was that a great triangular relationship had come into being among China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. According to this triangular-relationship theory, the conflict between China and the Soviet Union was more serious than the conflict between China and the United States; and the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was more serious than the conflict between China and the Soviet Union. Both the United States and the Soviet Union saw an advantage to themselves in playing the China card. This put China in an advantageous position strategically. 53 Marshal Chen Yi made a further recommendation to reestablish relations with the United states, to open a dialogue with no preconditions, and to deal with the issue of Taiwan on a step by step basis while the overall talks on strategic issues went ahead. 54 It was not just the Chinese marshals who had arrived at this assessment of global politics. At a National Security Council meeting in August 1969, Kissinger was present as Nixon expressed his belief that the Soviet Union was more dangerous to the US than China and that it would be against American interests if China were crushed in a China-Soviet war. 55 Kissinger went on to say, In case of conflict between the Soviet Union and China the United States would adopt a posture of neutrality, but within that framework tilt to the greatest extent possible toward China. 56 In his book, Diplomacy, Kissinger commented, The Soviet Union and China were more afraid of each other than they were of the United States an unprecedented opportunity for American diplomacy would come into being. 57 Although China s position in international affairs was limited in the 1960s, people recognized China s potential for influence, due to its huge population, large size, and geographic location. Nixon and Kissinger understood that international stability depended on US accommodations with the Soviet Union and China. But in the spring of 1971, better relations with the communist states remained more a hope than a reality. After the China-Soviet border clash, China dropped the designation of the United States as China s principal enemy and described the Soviet Union as an equal threat. Kissinger concluded that the fundamental precondition of triangular diplomacy had been fulfilled. 58 One significant result of Nixon s China visit was to firmly establish the US-China-USSR triangle. In 9

10 historical terms, the search for a viable balance of power frequently overrides ideological considerations. From the United States point of view, the triangular relationship was asymmetric: It was that the United States was far less threatened by China than it was by the Soviet Union, whose nuclear arsenal was second only to America s and whose leaders were literally pouring money into an increasingly threatening navy and a frightful forest of missiles. 59 This is the assessment of former New York Times chief correspondent, Patrick Tyler. Tyler remarks, The whole Chinese operation was about the Russian Game using the thaw with China to shake up the Russians. 60 Triangular Relationship with Two Thorny Issues However, even though the relationship was asymmetric, it still broke the bipolar balance of power between East and West. 61 Kissinger recognized the potential advantages of this situation as far back as May 1968 when he included the following statement in a campaign speech he wrote for Nelson Rockefeller: In a subtle triangle with communist China and the Soviet Union, we can ultimately improve our relations with each as we test the will for peace of both. 62 Kissinger also wrote, We moved toward China to shape a global equilibrium. It is not to collude against the Soviet Union but to give us a balancing position to use for constructive ends to give each Communist power a stake in better relations with us. 63 In this triangular relationship, Nixon would do his best to play China and the Soviet Union against each other. From China s point of view, the US was in a central position to be a conduit to the developed Western bloc. Once the United States was in play, the whole game would be active for China. China understood that the United States was the only useful leverage for reducing the pressure from the polar bear 64 (the Chinese nickname for the Soviet Union). Nixon made a point of reassuring China that the United States tilted in their direction, but also emphasized that the US wanted to reduce tensions with both China and the Soviet Union. Nixon told China that the US was ready to back China in the event of rising Sino-Soviet tensions, and would help to oppose Soviet aggression against China, saying, We believe that it 10

11 is in our interest, and in the interest of preserving peace as well, world peace. 65 Still, the United States was more interested in improving relations with both the Soviet Union and China, rather than engaging in hostilities with the Soviets, and Nixon and Kissinger continued to tell the Chinese that the United States had no desire to clash openly with the Soviet Union or any other aggressor to China. To demonstrate his willingness to partner with the Chinese, Nixon stated that he would keep China updated on the progress of the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the US and USSR that had begun in Twin Thorny Issues: Taiwan and Vietnam The Chinese and American leaders who negotiated the opening to China were well aware that the Taiwan issue and the Vietnam issue were the primary obstacles to normal China-US relations: The unusual aspect of the secret visit was that, in the absence of any contact for twenty years, there were no day-to-day problems to clear away except two, which were recognized as insoluble in the short term: Taiwan and Vietnam. 66 When Nixon was visiting China, he made a note to himself: 1. Taiwan most crucial; 2. V Nam most urgent. 67 Taiwan had been a central issue in Chinese domestic politics since In relation to Vietnam, China had positioned itself as North Vietnam s comrade plus brother. 68 There were constant campaigns in China to liberate Taiwan 69 and support Indochina. 70 The greatest concern for China was regaining control of Taiwan, while for the United States the greatest concern was extricating itself from Vietnam with honor. The United States wanted to see action in regard to Vietnam, while China wanted to see action in regard to Taiwan. But the American presence in Vietnam made it increasingly difficult for action to be executed by the Chinese, and the American establishment, which saw Taiwan as the legitimate representative government of China, opposed handing over Taiwan to the PRC. Going into the negotiations, Kissinger and Nixon understood that the only acceptable outcome for the Chinese was for the United States to withdraw American troops from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. Nixon recalled, As a condition of restoration of the relations, Zhou mentioned only the withdrawal of American armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait by far the least contentious issue and omitted the reversion of Taiwan. 71 For Zhou Enlai, If this crucial question is not solved, then the whole question will be difficult to resolve. 72 In response to the Chinese proposal on Taiwan, Nixon made the withdrawal of our military forces from Taiwan conditional on the settlement of the Indochina war. 73 Nixon proposed that the agenda should be broadened to include all of the important issues between the two countries, not just the single Taiwan issue. 74 Kissinger s preliminary discussions with Zhou during his secret visit had softened China s toughest stance and began the delicate process by which the United States has step by step accepted a one-china concept, and China has been extremely flexible about the timing of its implementation. 75 During Kissinger s visit, much of the discussions revolved around the issue of Taiwan, despite the fact that Zhou and Kissinger had agreed that the debate over Taiwan should be reserved for Nixon s trip. Kissinger hoped that by showing himself to be flexible on the subject of Taiwan, he could at least ease the current standoff between the two nations. Before the trip, Nixon told Kissinger that the success of the trip depended on conveying the understanding that the United States was not committed to two Chinas, or a one-china, one-taiwan solution. 11

12 Just as Nixon avoided domestic political interference with his China initiative by keeping Kissinger s preliminary visit to China a secret, he was also careful not to stir up domestic political controversy over the Taiwan issue before his historic visit to Beijing. The dramatic statement of July 15, 1971, announcing Nixon s intention to visit China, did not mention Taiwan at all. Taiwan and all other possibly divisive topics were covered by the bland phrase questions of concern to the two sides. A Chinese diplomat named Ji Chaozhu noted that this omission of specific reference to Taiwan was a compromise from the China side. 76 During Nixon s face-to-face negotiations in China, China affirmed that the liberation of Taiwan was China s internal affair in which no country had a right to interfere, and demanded that all American forces and military installations be withdrawn from Taiwan. 77 In order to accommodate the normalization process with China, Nixon admitted a number of US concessions on Taiwan, including a one-china policy, no support for Taiwan s independence, and support for a peaceful resolution between Beijing and Taibei. However, even if Nixon was willing to disengage the US from its historic support of the Taiwan government, he could not afford the political cost of appearing to cave in to China completely. Nixon had to oppose the use of military force by Peking to bring Taiwan under Communist rule. 78 And he acknowledged the ultimate objective of withdrawing American troops from Taiwan but did not put any final date on it. 79 The US agreed to reduce [its] forces and installations on Taiwan progressively as the tension in the area diminishes. 80 In other words, as Robert Dallek observed in Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, America s withdrawal rested on an implicit Chinese Communist commitment to avoid a military resolution of its differences with the Nationalists in Taipei. 81 While Taiwan was the primary consideration for the Chinese, Nixon and Kissinger were focused on Vietnam. Vietnam was Nixon s and Kissinger s greatest frustration. It had become a national disaster, a constant irritant, and a divisive force in American life. 82 In British historian Alistair Horne s opinion, Vietnam has become the black hole of American historical memory. 83 Both Nixon and Kissinger saw a visit to China as not only transforming relations with Peking but also creating a diversion from Vietnam in this country for a while. 84 They placed great hope in using their opening to China to put pressure on North Vietnam to make greater compromises in the never-ending Paris peace negotiations to end the Vietnam War. 85 Nixon urged the Chinese to use their influence with Hanoi 86 to bring about a satisfactory end to the war. Although China claimed it did not want to get involved in the Vietnam War, it continued to support North Vietnam. 87 China s ideal solution was a US military withdrawal from all of Asia. 88 But for the US, ending the war must be a peace that did not undermine America s world position. 89 China faced a great conundrum on the matter of Vietnam. As an international revolutionary leader, withdrawing its support from North Vietnam would damage its revolutionary credentials. Also, the Soviets were competing strongly with China to extend their influence in Indochina, and China could not afford to retreat. China needed a Chinese-friendly Vietnam on its south border to counterbalance the Soviet Union to its north. However, because North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh sought assistance from both China and the Soviets, Vietnam also became a liability for China because it involved China in a competition with the Soviet Union. 90 The Vietnam issue became so complex for the Chinese that China even preferred the United States to remain in South Vietnam as a strategic counter to the Soviet Union

13 Nixon s opening to China did manage to undermine some of Hanoi s international support. 92 However, due to various factors, China was not in a position to help the US achieve a satisfactory end to the Vietnam War. Nixon essentially had to bomb the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table, where he won enough concessions from the North Vietnamese to sign a peace treaty with them in January, 1973, enabling the US to bring its troops home from Vietnam. Although the Vietnam War ended for the US in 1973, the North and South Vietnamese continued to fight each other for two more years until the North Vietnamese army finally overwhelmed South Vietnamese forces. It can be said that Nixon s China visit was more directly beneficial to China, in regard to the Taiwan issue, than it was beneficial to the US, in terms of resolving the Vietnam problem. In the short term, China was not particularly helpful about Vietnam, leaving Nixon and the American public to face the consequences of US actions in Vietnam. In the long term, however, the benefits to the US of improved relations with China have been substantial, and continue to validate the efforts Nixon and Kissinger made to accommodate China in regard to Taiwan. The Shanghai Communiqué The pinnacle of Nixon s China visit was the signing of the Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and People s Republic of China, also known as the Shanghai Communiqué, on February 28, In China, the Communiqué stands as the pivotal document in establishing relations between China and the United States and is still relevant in its implications for policy makers and historians. Aspects of the Shanghai Communiqué are worthy of special notice: Parallel Statements: The Shanghai Communiqué is a joint communiqué, but it includes clauses wherein each side contradicts the other. One glaring example of different world views surfaces in the statements regarding individual freedoms: The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world free of outside pressure or intervention. 93 China did not stress the rights of individuals these were always subordinate to the will of the collective. The Chinese side states: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution this has become the irresistible trend of history. 94 Liberation and revolution had not been part of the American vocabulary since the War for Independence. Other areas in which the two nations went their separate ways included settlement of the Vietnam War and relations with the two Koreas. The US supported the eight-point peace plan proposed by the US and South Vietnam in Paris; China supported the seven-point plan proposed by the Vietcong. The US kept close ties with South Korea; China supported North Korea s plan for unification. Strategic Ambiguity: The Shanghai Communiqué states: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. 95 Taiwan is the most important issue in the relations between China and the United States. A One China policy was reaffirmed in the Shanghai Communiqué, but which China? Nationalist China or the People s Republic of China? This question hangs in the air and must be answered, but not at the 13

14 moment when the Shanghai Communiqué was signed. The Shanghai Communiqué was not intended to state definitive solutions to the multitude of differences between China and the US. It was intended to symbolize the new world order established by the new relationship between the US and China. Balance of Power: The United States and China agreed that neither party would engage in hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region: Each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony, 96 which implied that both the United States and China would oppose efforts by the U.S.S.R. or any other major power to dominate Asia. 97 During Nixon s visit, the Chinese concerns were exclusively strategic, focusing on the growing military power of the Soviet Union. 98 The formulation of the Shanghai Communiqué put an antiexpansionist constraint on both China and the United States. More importantly, it was clear that the Soviet Union was also subject to this anti-expansionist constraint, a heavy stroke for triangular geopolitics. From this point on, the United States, the Soviet Union and China were effectively in a triangular relationship with checks and balances. Immediate Consequences of the Beijing Summit Nixon strategically embedded his visit to China into his reelection campaign. Normalization of the relationship between China and the United States was projected by Nixon and Kissinger to take place during Nixon s second term. Nixon s China visit all but guaranteed Nixon s reelection, transformed superpower politics, opened China to the outside world and dazzled the media. 99 Images of Nixon shaking hands with Mao and standing on the Great Wall produced a most impressive effect on TV. Nixon transformed long-standing hostility into successful negotiations between the big powers. Nixon won a landslide victory in the 1972 election. The announcement of Nixon s visit to Beijing produced an immediate improvement in US relations with the Soviet Union. Nixon and Kissinger found they could use the China initiative to apply political pressure on the USSR. The beneficial impact on US-USSR relations was perhaps the single biggest plus obtained from the China initiative. 100 In the wake of the Shanghai Communiqué, a summit meeting between Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev was arranged. Triangular politics had worked. From the Soviet Union side, the fear of improved relations between China and the United States forced the Soviets to better their relations with the United States. At the 1972 summit meeting, a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and an Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty were signed between the United States and the Soviet Union. This was another tremendous landmark in Nixon s presidency, an accomplishment of Nixon s doctrine of détente. After Nixon s visit to China, it was reported, A few leaders close to Communist Party boss Leonid Brezhnev had begun to urge him to take a softer line toward Peking. 101 In China, the tense atmosphere of preparing for war against the Soviet Union, which had reached almost paranoiac proportions, was lessened. The overwhelming pressure on China by the Soviet Union was mitigated by China s new, warmer relationship with the United States. Suddenly, Soviet aggression was less of a threat to both China and the United States due to their new relationship. The international political landscape had changed. 14

15 Nixon s China initiative returned China to the international community, which had been his intention from the beginning. On September 29, 1972, China and Japan normalized their diplomatic relations in a quick response to the improved relations between China and the United States. On the same day, China and West Germany announced their own joint Communiqué, establishing a diplomatic relationship. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Spain and two-dozen other countries established diplomatic relations with China in By 1976, the number of countries that had formed relationships with China increased from 49 to The Chinese had achieved their goal: to build up their world credentials. 103 Other outcomes of Nixon s China initiative were not popular with American politicians. In October 1971, during Kissinger s follow-up trip to China to arrange Nixon s February 1972 visit to China, the People s Republic of China was admitted to the United Nations, and Taiwan was expelled. Although the US supported an effort to keep Nationalist China as a UN member, it failed. This outcome was also a consequence of the Nixon-Kissinger China initiative. History will show the Nixon initiative to Peking is the thing that lost the U.N. vote, wrote George H.W. Bush. 104 Implications for China-US Relations Diplomatic relations between countries are shaped by communication in the form of traditions, culture, economic trade, and even military interactions. Nixon s establishment of diplomatic relations with China was geopolitically based and had the result of forming a new international order. In his book on American presidents and China, Patrick Tyler emphasizes, Over the course of the next two decades, never again would an important international decision be made in Moscow, Beijing, or Washington without the leaders of those capitals factoring in the consequences for all three. 105 The triangular geopolitics constructed by Nixon s opening to China is significant. The big powers became increasingly connected, and checks and balances arose in world politics. In the area of diplomatic relations, Kissinger s assessment is that the American approach is more pragmatic and case-by-case, 106 while the Chinese approach is more conceptual and strategic. When each country s national interests and desire for international peace were met, these two approaches aligned. After Nixon s presidency, every subsequent US president continued to reaffirm the one China policy of the Shanghai Communiqué. Each US president has progressively deepened relations with Beijing while creating conditions in which Taiwan s economy and democracy have flourished. Successive Chinese leaders, while vigorously insisting on their perception of one China, have not pushed it to a showdown. 107 In other words, the equilibrium formula created by Nixon, Mao, Kissinger and Zhou has continued. There was an artistic skill in the one China formulation which enabled China-US relations to develop while leaving the Taiwan issue unsettled. The Chinese government continued to define and reaffirm its one China policy as a core interest in all diplomatic negotiations following the Shanghai Communiqué. On January 1, 1979, The Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and the US reaffirmed The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. On August 17, 1982, the Joint 15