Connecting Development Partners with Poverty in Nigeria: An Explanation into Ownership Model

Transcription

1 Connecting Development Partners with Poverty in Nigeria: An Explanation into Ownership Model Abstract Eugene N. Nweke (Ph.D) Department of Political Science Ebonyi State University The objective of this paper is to present the relationship between Development partners and extreme poverty in Nigeria. The paper argues that extreme poverty is a challenge Nigerian state can resolve to eliminate if the National Poverty Reduction Plan is owned by the state and found on the peculiarities of the nation rather than specific policy conditions imposed by development partners. Upon discussion, the paper sets out to discuss a significantly new approach to building a successful partnership for poverty reduction, focusing on ownership model. As in any relationship, ownership model as the paper argues notes that an aid partnership should be based on open dialogue, with rights and responsibilities on both sides. Each partner should take account of the views and concerns of poor people. On this premise, the paper notes that development partners attitude of imposing conditions negates the principles of ownership and compliance required to attain policy success. As a consequent, extreme poverty in Nigeria has continued to increase. The paper concludes with the recommendation that adoption of national ownership of pro-poor strategy eliminates imposition of conditionality but encourages policy harmonization with development partners to extreme poverty. The paper notes essentially that ownership of policy provides an enabling environment for both government and citizens to accept or reject or modify policy interest should be encouraged by development partners. Key words: Development partners, Extreme poverty, ownership 1

2 Connecting Development Partners with Poverty in Nigeria: An Explanation from Ownership Model Nweke Eugene Ndubuisi * Introduction Poverty as destitute phenomenon has a location and population of affected persons. As such requires the participation of the poor, their state and Government to drive the cause of getting rid of extreme poverty. This is essentially achievable if there is ownership in the process, system and policy propensities that guide poverty alleviation. This is crucial given that every polity is endowed with peculiarities of life as well as socio-economic culture for survival. These variables for survival and sustainable livelihood determine ownership in pro-poor programme. Therefore efforts, supports and aids geared towards reduction of poverty and inequality either by state or development partners is expected to revolve within these variables for survival. Unfortunately poverty has increasingly worsened from 1980 to 1996 (Federal Office of Statistics of Nigeria (FOS, 1999) and has improved since the introduction of NAPEP.The incidence of poverty rose from 28.1 percent in 1980 to 46.3 percent in 1985, but dropped to 42.2 percent in 1992 from where it rose sharply to 65.6 percent in 1996.This continued to rise to 70 percent in 2001(Canagarajah, Ngwafon, and Thomas (2002). Similarly, the data from National Bureau of Statistics of 2005 puts poverty incidence at 54.4% at estimated population of million and million living in poverty. In addition poverty has increased to 69.0 % representing million Nigerians in estimated population of 160 million persons. (National Bureau of Statistics, *Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki-Nigeria 2

3 HNLSS 2010). This purview attracts increasing criticisms from Nigerian nationals and Nigerian governments on the contribution of development partners in reducing poverty and inequality. In this consideration, we note that their interests meet around one main question; What can be done today to maximize the development partners contribution to poverty reduction in Nigeria? As response this study examine ownership model as explanation. However let us understand the concept of development partners, and ownership in the next session. II. Development Partners and Ownership of Poverty Reduction Strategies Development partners in the context of this study refer to international partners both government and non-governmental organizations that support Nigerian governments efforts towards eradicating extreme poverty.thy include; World Bank, International Monetary Fund(IMF) United States Agency For International Development,(USAID) and European Union,(EU).Others are United Nations Industrial Development Organisation,(UNIDO) United Kingdom's Department and For International Development(UKAID), German Development Cooperation and others. The partnership component of development, as Maxwell, S. and R. Riddell, (1998) notes means something very different from the relationship between a horse and rider, or servant and master. It carries with it a strong sense of equity. It represents an attempt at counteracting the inequalities in terms of power and access to information that normally are found in a relationship between funder and funded. Therefore development partners are the funders while developing countries are funded, In this relationship, Nigeria is a junior partner and based on low resources both human and capital is provided with policy,technical,human and financial assistance to engage in poverty reduction and inequality. 3

4 As a contribution to eradicate extreme poverty, the development partners, comprising mostly International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and other associated international nongovernmental organizations(ingos) have undoubtedly for over two decades provided aids targeted at reducing poverty and inequality in developing countries. The support reflects concern on human, financial and technical aids. In the light of this, the development partners (IMF and World Bank) prepared the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) for adoption by highly indebted countries as an approach for poverty reduction and inequality. The Nigerian Governments adopted and domesticated the PRSPs in the form known as National Economic Empowerment Development Strategies (NEEDS) and National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP). In addition is the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with the focus to halve extreme poverty and hunger as goal by The increase in extreme poverty besides these programmes has brought concern over the stalemate in the fight against poverty and this has prompted in recent years an intense reexamination of development and poverty reduction strategies. National governments, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations agencies, regional development banks, nongovernmental organizations, and church groups have all been actively involved in this exercise. In operational terms, this dilemma presents itself in the discussion on conditionality in aid. Does the donor look at its development goals as a condition for entering a partnership, or as objectives of the partnership itself? This corresponds to choosing between what has been labelled ex ante and ex post conditionality. With ex ante conditions the donor declares that aid will not be given until certain conditions are met in the recipient country, while ex post means that certain conditions should be met during the time a programme is carried out and, implicitly, that future support depends on the quality of outputs the end-result. There has 4

5 definitely been a move towards ex post conditionality in recent years, including by IMF and World Bank. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). initiative, which came in 1999, was clearly influenced by a number of studies that basically concluded that ex ante conditionality did not work. The purpose is to provide a framework, at national level, for strong partnership. The explicit aim is that the recipient government takes the lead in formulating a medium-term, comprehensive (i.e. involving both economic and social policies) strategy for poverty reduction, based on which donors will make multi-year financial commitments. This brings us to the question; Who owns this strategy? Let us therefore examine the concept of ownership as a model for explaining a strategy that reduces poverty. III. The concept of Ownership as a model of analysis Ownership is an indefinite concept in development policy. It is perceived and interpreted differently by people and institutions.however, Ownership in whichever perspective is a relation among stake holders in development, particularly their respective capacity, power or influence to set and take responsibility for a development agenda, and to muster and sustain support for policy or otherwise. Three main groups of such stakeholders are identified by Nkombo (2008:1); governments of developing counties, communities and organization in those countries, outside the government: donors or multilateral development agencies and financial institutions. This confirms the variety of perceptions and explanations associated with ownership that dissolve into different aspects such as control and stakeholders interest. Accordingly, Johnson and Wasty (1993:2) further describe ownership using a four dimensional variables; locus of initiative; namely, who had the initiative in formulating and implementing the programme, the degree of collaboration in working out the programme, and whether or not the funding for the programme was extended despite certain reservations of the authorities (disagreements and 5

6 reluctance to implement some aspects of the programme). The second dimension is the level of intellectual conviction among key policymakers namely, the degree to which there was consensus among policymakers on the nature and causes of the problem, the choices open for its resolution, and the approach to be taken. The third dimension is the expression of political will by top leadership: as reflected, for example, in up-front actions and public statements. The fourth dimension comprises efforts toward consensus-building among constituencies, for instance, by eliciting broad participation in the programme design and in launching a broad-based public campaign to elicit support for the programme outside the central government.all these combine to achieve national ownership which Klick et al (1998:87) describe as when the political leadership and its advisers, with broad support among agencies of state and civil society, decide of their own volition that policy changes are desirable, choose what these changes should be and when they should be introduced, and where these changes become built into parameters of policy and administration which are generally accepted as desirable In a similar view, Omotunde, (2005:3) notes that this form of ownership include the (i) the right of the country representatives to be heard in the process of diagnosis and programme design, (ii) the freedom and ability of the country to choose the programme to be implemented, without coercion, than about (iii) who designs the programme. From the perspective of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, signed in March 2005, ownership is described as developing countries exercising effective leadership over their development policies and strategies and coordinating development actions, that strengthen the impact of their common efforts on poverty reduction (Renzio, P, et al 2008:3). In the view of International Monetary Fund (IMF) ownership is a willing assumption of responsibility for an agreed program of policies, by officials in a borrowing country who have 6

7 the responsibility to formulate and carry out those policies, based on an understanding that the programme is achievable and is in the country's own interest (World Bank and IMF, 2001C:3).This is the point on which the concept of ownership is debated as well as the bane for poverty reduction in Nigeria. The perspective of IMF advocates in this regard means that, to own a policy, it is not necessary that government official think up the policies themselves or that the policies be independent of conditionality. This is far from the desired ownership for poverty reduction. Therefore considering these arrays of definitions, policy ownership is examined from the perspective of conceptualizing or understanding a vision both by policy planners, implementers and beneficiaries. It hinges on the premise that policy ownership is associated with different perspectives and explanations but united primarily in the context of common belief that the state through the government acts on behalf of the country as a whole. In the same vein the non-stateactors with their multiple parties and heterogeneous interests influence the outcome of the policy thereby exercising their ownership rights in public policy process. Hence external or international bodies such as IMF are expected to buy into the harmonized interest of government to realize national ownership of state policy. The import of this reflects concern on explaining how external agencies sway the state authorities to embrace their version of policy reform. This framework is derived from two models, the theory of veto players within government and theory of special interest group (SIG). The theory of veto player was developed by George Tsebelis (2001a). It likens decision in policy making process of various political organizations as veto players within a domestic government. As such there are different principal who must agree on a given policy or policies based on their interests. On the other hand, Special interest group theory (SIG) developed by Wolfgang Mayer and Alex Mourmoras (2002), refers those whose 7

8 interests are separated from those of the people at large and use their power to influence government policy choices. Essentially the argument is that policymakers and external organization as IMF should build national ownership in policy process to avoid weakness that goes with failed policies. It is then expected that multiple objectives and interests pursued by governments and strong individuals should be harmonized as their policy choices reflect the concern of diverse constituencies inside and outside of government. Those within the government argue for the needs to achieve a common agenda in the policy process including the parliament, regional and local authorities and other constitutionally recognized actors both state and non state actors in policy process. Others considered relevant and should be taken into account in public policy process are international players, active domestic SIG labour, industry, professional bodies and nongovernmental organizations. In addition, the outcome of common agency model where applied, as Boughton and Mournouras (2002:7) note is the need to achieve equilibrium of a noncooperative game. However where the state is captured by SIGs be it IFIs or domestic, the policy of such state mostly do not achieve the policy desire that make positive impact on the generality of the citizens. Furthmore,while this model takes for granted that government must lead the process of building ownership, it must however consult a broad group of stakeholders from among political parties, NGOs, community organizations, media, academia, etc in order to foster true ownership.in addition true (national) ownership entails having sufficient political support within a country to implement its developmental strategy, including the projects, programs, and policies for which external partners provide assistance. It equally requires that government achieves sufficient support for the strategy among stakeholders within and outside of the government. This likely 8

9 includes line ministries, parliament, sub-national governments, civil society organizations, and private sector groups. National ownership therefore extends beyond the government: it requires the active participation of non-state stakeholders. Participation by actors outside national governments functions as an end in itself by promoting accountability and also greatly improves the design and effectiveness of development interventions. This argument derives from the belief that policies that originate from society and whose content reflects popular assessment, aspirations and needs, are more likely to be successfully implemented.(mukandala, 2006:3). Complimenting this requires that a country has sufficient institutional capacity for defining and implementing a national development strategy. In the case of Poverty reduction strategy, it means that decision-making processes should be mainstreamed, or institutionalized, into those of the executive, parliament, local governments, and country stakeholders.. IV. Application of Ownership model in Poverty Reduction in Nigeria Achieving poverty reduction reflects concern on ownership of vision. This is because as Akash (1998:96) argues ownership of vision is important.if the vision is conceived and imposed by an external force, then the degree of commitment or the quality of support at home is likely to be weak.on the other hand, a domestically owned vision generally reflects a higher degree of commitment through a more realistic concentration of the vision. To this end, we review the extent ownership principle is applied in poverty reduction strategy of Nigerian governments. Beginning from the national level, the National Poverty Eradication Programme(NAPEP) Blueprint (2001) has the National Poverty Eradication Council (NAPEC) as the apex organ for policy formulation, coordination, monitoring and review of all poverty eradication activities in the country. The council is chaired by the President while the Vice-President is the Vice Chairman. The Secretary to the Government of the Federation is the secretary of the organ, while 9

10 13 ministers whose ministries are involved in poverty alleviation activities are members. The participating ministries in the scheme are those of agriculture and rural development, education, works and housing, women affairs and youth development, industry, science and technology, solid minerals development, water resources, health, power and steel, employment labour and productivity, environment and finance. The Chief Economic Adviser to the President and the National Coordinator of NAPEP are also members of the council. This apex body possesses the entire authority that determines the nature and manner in which resources are allocated as well as the beneficiaries. Be that as it may, the compositions of this body are national executives which qualify the NAPEP as a product of the executive with contributions from Development partners from whom the strategy is adopted. While other state actors as the parliament or parliamentarians that represent(s) the entire citizens are excluded at this important aspect of poverty reduction policy process. Similarly other non-state actors as labour and civil society organisations are equally debarred from making direct input in poverty reduction policy process at the national level. At the regional level (state governments), the ownership status of the poverty reduction strategy merely reflects concern on consolidating what is obtainable at national level. The state government is expected to facilitate the implementation by existing as a coordinating unit headed by State Coordinator. It has its highest decision making organ, State Poverty Eradication Council (SPEC) with the Governor as the chairman. Like the national, the members of the SPEC include the relevant commissioners responsible for state poverty eradication programmes and the State coordinator of NAPEP.The body is expected to submit quarterly report to the NAPEC to update NAPEC of the activities. 10

11 At local government base, what exists as the structure for the national poverty eradication reduction programme is the Local Government Monitoring Committee. The responsibility of the committee is to facilitate effective implementation of NAPEP intervention initiatives. While these efforts and structures are put in place, it is observed that it is devoid of the essential ownership principles that could drive the fight against abject poverty. The NAPEP blueprint notes that the failure of previous pro-poor strategy is a function of lack proper targeting and input of beneficiaries. In as much as this is acknowledged in NAPEP design, it is not reflected in its formulation and implementation, the blueprint only recognizes executive state actors and the special interest of the IFI s to the exclusion of non-state actors. This therefore explains that poverty reduction strategy (NAPEP) is government owned driven by the interest World Bank and IMF and accepted by SIGs who have captured the state rather than allowing the national interest to propel the fight against poverty. In this line we note that pro-poor programme ought to be owned by three main actors the State, Civil society (including traditional civil society groups and social movements beyond the NGO phenomenon like labour, students organizations, rural and community based groups),and market (the private sector) Taken for granted that the prerequisite for reducing poverty in any country is to ensure that the process of poverty reduction strategy is people-driven, with broad-based participation of civil society and other relevant stakeholders. The level of participation and agreement of the executives, civil society, political parties and Parliaments in the governing process of poverty reduction in Nigeria does not reflect the true dimension of national ownership. V. Conclusion The key lesson that emerges from application of ownership model to explain how development partners are connected to poverty in Nigeria lies in the fact that the process propensity of poverty 11

12 reduction strategy of Nigerian state is alienated from the citizens in favour of strong Interest Groups and development partners. This follows that National ownership which guarantees a deep appreciation and commitment to the policies as well as their better understanding is not available in NAPEP and other pro-poor policies sponsored by development partners. For the reason that pro-poor policies are initiated, owned and managed by the citizens enables prospect that improves the chances of success through an injection of historically derived practical realities in that ensure success of other policies Nigerian government have implemented. As Dahl (1971:8 ) adds, what determines public policy is actually the net effect of the pressures of interest groups, which are usually so many and balanced that no single one wields excessive power. Therefore, there is need for the participation of interest groups in pro-poor policy to allow individuals to be more effective by forming a critical mass that aggregates and articulates interests since poverty reduction strategy requires that interest groups and civil society organizations should effectively supplement the role of state actors. Consequently, a Poverty Reduction Strategy that actually seeks to reduce poverty must essentially be a world of interest groups, together with parties, the government, donors and others, coming together for talking, negotiating and forging a consensus. In sum we note down that lack of national ownership is variously attributed to incongruities between divisions and heterogeneity within recipient countries and development partners one size fits- all approach towards eradication of extreme poverty. To this end, development partners rigid rules and regulations hamper national participation and increasing poverty. This view is shared by Commission on Human Security which notes that, human security starts from the recognition that people are the most active participants in determining their well-being (CHS 2003:68). It is therefore obvious that interventions aimed at reducing poverty are bound to 12

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