PAKISTAN: NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS FEBRUARY Report by Bror Gevelt

Transcription

1 PAKISTAN: NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS FEBRUARY 2008 Report by Bror Gevelt NORDEM Report 5/2008

2 Copyright: the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights/NORDEM and Bror Gevelt. NORDEM, the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights, is a programme of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), and has as its main objective to actively promote international human rights. NORDEM is jointly administered by NCHR and the Norwegian Refugee Council. NORDEM works mainly in relation to multilateral institutions. The operative mandate of the programme is realised primarily through the recruitment and deployment of qualified Norwegian personnel to international assignments that promote democratisation and respect for human rights. The programme is responsible for the training of personnel before deployment and reporting on completed assignments, and plays a role in research related to areas of active involvement. The vast majority of assignments are channelled through the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. NORDEM Report is a series of reports documenting NORDEM activities and is published jointly by NORDEM and the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. Series editor: Siri Skåre Series consultants: Karin Lisa Kirkengen, Kenneth de Figueiredo, Christian Boe Astrup The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the publishers. ISSN: ISBN: NORDEM Report is available online at:

3 Preface Due to the political circumstances prevailing in Pakistan in late 2007, the European Union (EU) initially prepared for a limited mission for observation of the national and provincial assembly elections scheduled to be held on 8 January Following the lifting of the emergency rule and the subsequent postponement of the elections until 18 February, the EU decided to launch a full scale Election Observation Mission (EOM) in Pakistan. Michael Gahler, a Member of the European Parliament, led the Mission as Chief Observer. The core team based in Islamabad was made up of 12 experts, while 46 longterm observers (LTOs), mainly deployed on 26 December, 30 short-term observers (STOs) and 25 locally recruited STOs (LSTOs) formed the main observation body and were deployed throughout the country. Also 12 members/staff members of the European Parliament contributed on election day. For the first time in an EU EOM, the core team s security cell was strengthened with five security liaison officers, who were deployed to all four provinces. 1 On election day the mission consisted of 119 observers recruited from 23 EU nations, Canada and Norway. Norway contributed with one LTO, deployed on 3 February, three STOs and five LSTOs, mainly for election day observations. All were assigned to the Punjab province. The LTOs covered 65% of the constituencies. On election day, 38 LTO/STO teams visited 445 polling stations in 115 of the 272 single-member national assembly constituencies in Pakistan. The pre- and post-election findings in this report are primarily based on the observations of the Norwegian LTO Bror Gevelt (based in Muzaffargarh), while election day findings also are based on reports from the three Norwegian STOs, Ingunn Sofie Aursness (Lahore), Lorenz Stavrum (Lahore) and Tor-Hugne Olsen (Faisalabad). The findings correspond with those of the EOM as summarised in the preliminary statement annexed to this report. Some of the background information draws on the EU EOM information provided to the LTOs by the core team. The Norwegian observers were all recruited by the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR) Stand-by force NORDEM. The report has been written by Bror Gevelt and the opinions expressed in the report are the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of NCHR. The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights / NORDEM University of Oslo April EOM activities were conducted under a strict security regime: Observers were working with police escort. And no movement was allowed for EU EOM members without United Nations Department of Safety and Security approval, which should be obtained two days in advance. All observers attended a series of detailed security trainings before and upon arrival in country. EU EOM members followed a strict reporting scheme which allowed for continuous monitoring of personnel movement. A preventive security warden system and emergency communication instructions were implemented and regularly tested, for the mission to be able to swiftly respond to any crisis situation.

4 Contents Preface Contents Map of Country Introduction...1 Political Background...2 The Legislative Framework...3 The Electoral Administration...5 Voter and Civic Education...6 Voter Registration...7 Candidate Registration...7 The Election Campaign...8 The Media...8 Observation on Election Day...8 Observation of the Opening...9 Observation of the Polling...9 Observation of the Closing and Counting Observation of the Tabulation The review of Complaints Process Conclusions and Recommendations Appendix EOM s Preliminary Statement

5 Map of Country

6 PAKISTAN: NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS Introduction On 20 February 2008 the EU EOM to Pakistan released its preliminary statement based on findings and observations since an EU election assessment team was deployed on 9 December Regular reporting covered observations in 65% of the national assembly constituencies. 2 The preliminary statement was released under the heading: Pakistan holds competitive elections, despite significant problems with the election framework and environment. Despite several positive aspects of the election process, the EOM concluded that: These elections fell short of a number of international standards, including the right to stand as a candidate, freedom of expressions and assembly, and the right to an effective remedy. The statement further raises major concerns with regard to the legal framework, election administration, voter registration, registration of candidates, campaign environment, media environment, complaints and appeals, participation of women, participation of minorities, civil society, and also some concerns with respect to voting, counting and results compilation. The observations presented in this report are generally in line with the preliminary statement. It should be noted that the findings are mainly based on observations in the rural Muzaffargarh district, 3 while observations from the election day include findings from urban areas in Punjab provided by the Norwegian STOs. The main findings were as follows: Pre-election phase Essential laws and regulations did not appear to be accessible to most of the electorate, candidates and even the judiciary and the election administration. There was a lack of confidence in the independence of the judiciary. There was a lack of confidence in the election administration, in particular with regard to impartiality, misuse of governmental resources, registration of complaints and follow up measures. 2 Observation of the provincial assembly elections were included in the mission. However, due to limited resources, the main focus of the EU EOM was the national assembly election. 3 Muzaffargarh district includes five national assembly constituencies and 11 Provincial Assembly constituencies in Southern Punjab. The district represents typically the rural Pakistan: Poverty is prevailing, unemployment rate is high (less than 25% are economically active of which nearly half is employed in agriculture), literacy rate are low (less than 30%), and social problems are many. The feudal system is dominant and very apparent in the district, and most political leaders represent traditionally political families, mostly landlords.

7 PAKISTAN: NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS The voter register was inaccurate and the ID-cards that were required for voting were not available for all registered voters. Both factors disfavoured female voters in particular. The candidates positions in society were not representative of most of the electorate. Involvement of Nazims (mayors) and government officials in the election process at all levels was favourable for the incumbent regime. Issues related to women and minorities were absent during the election campaign. Election day General enthusiasm and eagerness to vote outweighed a lack of voter education, staff training and lack of discipline in polling stations. Shortcomings in staff training and procedural conduct was most apparent in female PSs. Voter registration deficiencies were apparent in some PSs. No attempts at organized election fraud were observed. The presence of party agents and observers ensured transparency during the opening, the voting and the counting. The transparency was less than satisfactory during compilation and consolidation of results. Post-election period Most voters and candidates expressed satisfaction with the conduct of the elections. The lack of transparency in the compilation and consolidation process caused some allegations of fraud. Political Background Since independence in 1947, Pakistan has had four military coups. The last took place in October 1999 and brought General Pervez Musharraf to power. The country has never experienced a democratic transfer of power. An elected parliament was installed in 2002, but army influence remained strong. While relations with India have improved over the last years, Musharraf s war against terrorism has sparked considerable unrest in Pakistan, in particular in areas bordering Afghanistan. The prevailing difficult security situation has had a substantial impact on the environment of these elections. So have the political developments since the spring of 2007, including the suspension, detention and replacement of the Chief Justice, members of the Supreme Court and other prominent lawyers; the 3 November proclamation of emergency rule and the introduction of a Provisional Constitutional Order; the announcement of elections; the 18 November highly contested and also legally controversial appointment of Musharraf as president for a five-year period; the 15 December lifting of the emergency rule; and not the least, the assassination of the well known opposition politician Benazir Bhutto.

8 PAKISTAN: NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS While the diversity of the numerous political parties is considerable, most of them are elitist, weak on internal democracy and structured around the personality of their main leader. Political parties are considered to have failed in providing the country with honest and lawful governance when in power. The Main Political Parties Name Brief description Leader National assembly seats Pakistan People s Party: PPP/P Pakistan s Muslim League: PML/Q Pakistan,s Muslim League: PML/N Mohajir Quami Movement: MQM Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal: MMA Rural and secular. Stronghold: Sindh. Conservative and pro Islamisation. Stronghold: Punjab. Ideologically similar to PML/Q, but Anti-Musharraf. Stronghold: Punjab. Party of migrants who fled India in Stronghold: Urban Sindh. Coalition of Muslim parties (some boycotted the 2008 elections). Stronghold: NWFP. Bilawal Bhutto Zardari Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain Navaz Sharif 19 Altaf Hussain 17 Qazi Hussain Ahmed 63 The Legislative Framework In its preliminary statement, the EOM assessed that: Elements of the legal framework were problematic, including restrictions on fundamental rights of expression, assembly and movement, essential to a genuine democratic process. There were also restrictions on candidacy and lack of transparency in results tabulation. The electoral law framework in Pakistan presents a complex picture and is composed of many acts, orders and regulations. These include the 1973 Constitution and numerous 4 Results include affiliated independent candidates and representatives of the separate female and minority lists.

9 PAKISTAN: NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS laws and regulations from 1974 and to the present. The framework is largely outdated and incomplete. The electoral law does not meet international standards in many regards. Pakistan is not a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Pakistan is a state party to the UN conventions on racial discrimination and crimination against women, however with the following reservation: accession is subject to the provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The current election process started during the 3 November 15 December period of state of emergency. The Provisional Constitution Order of 3 November suspended fundamental rights within the Constitution and contributed significantly to the erosion of the independence of the judiciary. The judiciary plays a key part in the running of elections in Pakistan. Pakistan is a federal state, headed by a president who is elected by secret ballot through an Electoral College (consisting of members of the Senate, the national assembly and the four provincial assemblies) to a five-year term. The government is led by a Prime Minister, who is appointed by the president from members of the national assembly. The Parliament is bicameral, the two houses being the national assembly and the Senate. The former has 342 members, of which 272 are directly elected from single seat constituencies (2008 elections). 60 seats are reserved for women and 10 seats for religious minorities. Both groups are elected indirectly based on the parties respective strength in the four provincial assemblies. The members of the Senate are indirectly selected by the provincial assemblies through a proportional representation for a six-year term. Pakistan s four provinces enjoy considerable autonomy. Each is lead by a governor and has a provincial assembly. The provincial assemblies vary in size in accordance with the province s population. Most members are elected through single seat constituencies for a five-year period (2008 elections). The provincial assemblies also have reserved seats for minorities. The following shortcomings were apparent to the LTO team: The predominant part of the election administration is recruited from the judiciary. At the district and constituency level the district returning officer (DRO), the returning officers (ROs) and the assistant returning officers (AROs) were all from the district s judicial ranks, hence, by civil status, outranking the district election officer (DEO). A rather arrogant stature often underlined the difference. This created ambiguities with regard to interpretation of the legal framework as well as to authority. It was particularly apparent with regard to registration, forwarding and follow up of complaints. The accessibility of the legal framework was inadequate; hampered in particular by complexity (see above) and by linguistic limitations. Laws, rules and regulations were widely accessible in English only - not so in Urdu. The team assessed only one of the district s five ROs to have sufficient language skills to read and understand the legal framework in English. Most candidates, officials and members of the electorate expressed a lack of confidence in the independence of the judiciary. The most recent dismissal and replacement of prominent lawyers, added to the scepticism already present.

10 PAKISTAN: NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS The Electoral Administration According to the EOM: There is a lack of confidence in the independence of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) among election stakeholders. Technical preparations ( ) were generally undertaken efficiently and on time. ( ) The ECP lacks transparency in some areas of its working practices and has not taken sufficient responsibility for key aspects ( ) including supervising the work of returning officers, enforcing the Code of Conduct for Parties and Candidates, staff training and voter education. On the federal level, elections are administered by the ECP. The ECP is a five member body chaired by the Chief Election Commissioner, who appointed by the president. The other members are representatives of the Provincial High Courts. The ECP has permanent subordinate structures at provincial, divisional and district level, with extensive authority given to the lower tiers (4 Provincial Election Commissioners, 26 Assistant Election Commissioners at division level, and 125 District Election Officers). The ECP also appoints the DROs, the ROs and the ARO. The electoral administration recruits members exclusively from the judiciary and civil servants working for the government at all levels and for institutions controlled by the authorities. The system not only creates absolute loyalty to the incumbent regime, but also results in a variation in the practicing of the electoral framework. As the ECP has the power to order assistance and to requisition property from authorities, the possibility of misuse of state property to favour a particular party, is apparent. The DROs and the ROs have a prominent position in the electoral administration at the district and constituency levels. The duties and functions of the DROs are: To liaise with the ROs and the Election Commission; To coordinate and supervise the work of ROs; To approve the final list of PSs, and appoint Presiding Officers (PrOs), Assistant Presiding Officers (APO) and Polling Officers (POs) prepared and proposed by the ROs; To arrange training for polling staffs. The duties and functions of ROs are: To receive and scrutinize nomination papers from candidates; To identify PSs; To enlist and train polling staff; To allocate symbols and draw a list of contesting candidates for symbols for ballot paper printing; To collect PS results and aggregate them for the preliminary results for the constituency; To do a consolidation of results for the official results of the constituency. The PrO is responsible for the procedural conduct at the PS. (S)he is in particular responsible for the opening and closing of the PS, and also for counting ballots and bringing the results to the RO. Other members of the polling staff conduct normal PS functions like queue control, registration, issuing ballot papers etc.

11 PAKISTAN: NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS The lack of confidence in the independence of the election administration was apparent and commonly expressed by all candidates other than those representing the ruling party, the PML/Q. This was particularly the case in regard to handling complaints (see chapter on complaints). Training and coordination of the different elements of the election administration was inadequate, in particular in the rural areas. Lack of unambiguous instructions was also apparent. The only training program the team was aware of was an UNDP administered training program for PrOs conducted in December and January. The PrO s ability to hand over his knowledge and instructions to the polling staff was limited as he was performing his duties in a PS located in an area other than his area of residency. The PrOs and their respective polling staff only met the evening before election day. Comprehensive, illustrative and user friendly working manuals for ROs, PrOs and polling staff members were distributed and represented a good basis for training. Election staff training and distribution and use of the working manuals was reported as an area of significant improvement since the 2002 elections (also noted in EOM s statement). Apparently, the level of training varied from area to area, and often mirrored rural/urban differences. Voter and Civic Education The EOM stated that: ( ) civic and voter education was significantly improved, but with international assistance. The ECP had little involvement, leaving concerns about sustainability. The ECP was assisted through the Support to National Elections in Pakistan (SNEP), a donor supported project which was conceived after a Needs Assessment Mission conducted by the United Nation Development Program (UNDP). The objective was to focus on improved electoral administration and management, citizens who were better informed about the electoral system, particularly women and underprivileged, improved engagement of all partners and effective coordination, management and facilitation of electoral support. The ECP has used this support mainly to focus on training of election officials (i.e. working manuals for DROs, ROs, PrOs), provision of technical support and procurement of materials needed for election day. Neither the local administration, the media, nor the political parties seemed to focus on voter and civic education. Some NGOs, including the Free and Fair Election Network (a network of 40 civil society organizations), were involved in this issue. However, their endeavour seemed inadequate and rudimentary. Some so called NGOs (i.a. Social Youth Council of Patriots and Women s Development Organisation) were supported by the government and appeared biased.

12 PAKISTAN: NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS Voter Registration The EOM assessed that: ( ) shortcomings in the voter registration process resulted in the inclusion of a significant number of duplicate entries and inaccuracies. The 2006 enumeration (56 million) conducted by the ECP fell short of an estimated 80 million eligible voters. Hence 26 million names were added to the enumeration, primarily from the 2002 elections voter list. Women were underrepresented on the Final Electoral Roll (FER) (44%). A significant number of the registered 81 million voters, in particular women, did not have the ID cards that were required in order to be able to vote. Consequently a considerable number of eligible voters were unable to take part in the elections (estimations show as much as 50% of the female voters). In the pre-election period, deficiencies in the FER, in the Voter Lists (VL), and also in the locations of the PSs, were main complaint issues. Several written complaints were handed over to the team. The inadequate procedures for registering and tracing complaints made a follow up by the observers difficult. However, as the team received the voter list on a CD, one complaint follow up showed 200 voters being registered at two polling stations within the same constituency. The District Election Commissioner (DEC) claimed not to have received the complaint. Furthermore, he stated that if he had received it, he was not authorized to change the VL at that late stage. Candidate Registration According to the EOM: The right to stand as a candidate is breached by the requirement for a BA degree or madrassa qualification, which excludes the overwhelming majority of the population. Given the high levels of illiteracy, the requirement for a BA or a madrassa certificate from one of many religious schools (in accordance with a 2002 Legal Framework Order), prevents an estimated 96% of the population from running for office, of which a majority are women. It also ensures an unfair advantage to candidates from religious parties as such certificates easily can be produced. Also disqualifications due to outstanding debts, ambiguous moral restrictions, and other limitations of dubious legality, restrict the choice given to voters. The team met with most candidates in the constituencies of its AOR. They were all highly educated and/or belonging to the secular and religious elites of Pakistan. When asked about candidate registration, no candidates expressed any concerns; neither did party workers or voters.

13 PAKISTAN: NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS The Election Campaign The EOM concluded that: The campaign was low key and subdues, but saw a broad range of views expressed, including criticism of the government. ( ) Nazims were directly involved in campaigning activity and the misuse of state resources in their areas, mostly on behalf of PML-Q candidates. There were credible reports of police harassment of opposition party workers and agents. The election campaign was interrupted by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, an event that marked the pre-election period. It never reached a high level of activity. Most campaigning was confined to small meetings. Nazims, leaders of the three tiers of local government, were involved in campaigning, using their resources (offices, vehicles, employees) in favour of the candidate of their taste or party affiliation. In the team s meetings with candidates, in particular candidates of PML-Q, Nazims were often present, either as supporters, family members or most likely both. This largely mirrors Pakistani politics, which is characterised by close family relations between politicians at all levels. The team also noted several instances of family members contesting seats in different constituencies, and, in one instance, even the same seat. The campaign was marked by inter-party allegations of fraud and restrictions on human rights. There were also allegations of harassment and intimidation. They were all hard to substantiate as observers were not allowed to observe political rallies due to security restrictions. The Media The EOM stated that: Restrictions and pressures were placed on the media before, during and after emergency rule, and limited freedom of expression during the election period. Nonetheless, private media outlets provided candidates and parties with pluralistic coverage. In contrast, the public broadcasters, the main source of information for most of the population, failed to live up to their responsibility to maintain balance. The team s observations were limited to newspapers only. In general, reporters seemed uneasy about forwarding any complaints about freedom of expression. However, one correspondent the team talked to confirmed the strict government control. It was difficult to substantiate the few allegations of restrictions, harassment and intimidation of journalists that the team received. Observation on Election Day The EOM concluded that:

14 PAKISTAN: NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS ( ) voting was assessed as positive on the whole, although some disorder and procedural irregularities were noted. On the whole counting was well conducted in the stations observed, although statements of the count were not always issued to agents and were generally not displayed. Observers and candidate agents were not granted sufficient access to results compilation at constituency level. The four teams with Norwegian LTO/STO participation observed in three districts; Lahore, Faisalabad and Muzaffargarh, all in the Punjab province. All districts were ethnically homogeneous with no significant minority issues. Some 35 PSs, male and female, in 12 National Assembly constituencies were visited, representing a mix of urban and rural areas. The areas observed mirrored the diversity of the Punjab province with regard to welfare; from a very rich to an extremely poor population. In general, the areas visited were traditionally PML/Q strongholds. A shortage of maps where PSs were depicted, and also lack of locally recruited police and drivers, hampered their localization. Hence, considerable time was wasted. Due to security concerns, transport arrangements were cumbersome and time consuming. Procedures on Election Day Prior to the opening (0800 hrs.), the presiding officer (PrO), in the presence of the polling staff and party agents, checks the material, equipment and documents needed for ballot casting. (S)he then seals the translucent ballot boxes and has the party agents sign the proper opening form. PSs could be separate male/female or mixed, and comprised of several polling booths, each with its own voter list, ballot papers and ballot box, The maximum number of voters per PS is 2000, 500 for each ballot box. After showing IDs, voters are marked off in the voter list and inked. The voter then thumbprints the ballot counterfoil and the signed ballot paper, which are both stamped. At the time of the closing (1700 hrs.), those in line are allowed to vote and the ballot box is closed. The PrO conducts one count for all the booths in the PS. Ballot paper account forms need to be completed and carbonized statement of the counts are displayed and distributed to party agents, candidates and observers. The results are subsequently brought to the returning officer (RO) for aggregation and announcement of preliminary results. Upon written announcement of the arrangement for the official consolidation of results, which are to be held as soon as possible after election day, the RO opens all the polling bags, considers the invalid and postal votes and makes the final tabulation for his/her constituency. Observation of the Opening Overall, procedures were followed and PSs opened on time or within 20 minutes of opening hours. Urban polling staff seemed to be better trained and performed better than rural. The same tendency was observed with regard to male compared to female staff. No major irregularities were reported. This concurs with the overall reporting from the EOM. Observation of the Polling Generally the conduct of the polling was assessed as positive. Despite some irregularities, such as unauthorized persons present, campaign materials in or near the PSs, breaches of secrecy (caused by the voters themselves), a failure to check and apply

15 PAKISTAN: NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS ink, women not unveiling themselves for identification, disorder and lack of discipline (in particular in female PSs), the polling was implemented with a great deal of enthusiasm. Procedural shortcomings seemed to be due to lack of experience and training rather than bad will or desire to influence the process unduly. No reports of female PSs being inferior to male PSs were received. PrOs using the illustrative working manuals were observed more frequently in urban than rural areas. According to EOM statistics, 23% of the female PBs had male polling officers. Voter registration deficiencies were apparent in some PSs. This slowed down the voting process and caused some disturbances in the queue, but did not result in major setbacks in the polling. Only one grave irregularity was reported from Norwegian observers: At one polling station, the voters were chased away upon the team s arrival. According to the head of the local council (who was not authorized to be present in the PS) and the PrO, the voters (present at a distance) had all voted and were now waiting for the counting to start. Upon revisiting the PS shortly afterwards, the team discovered that more than 20 persons had cast their votes in the meantime. An apparent lack of polling agents other than the representative of the PML/Q, was explained by the fact that no opposition was present in the village. Unsubstantiated allegations of harassment and intimidation were also reported, but not to an alarming extent. Observation of the Closing and Counting Procedures were largely followed. Shortcomings were usually due to inadequate training, rather than deliberate attempt at fraud. Small and overcrowded offices made the overall picture look somewhat chaotic. However, transparency was in most cases ensured by party agents and observers. In one PS, party agents were not invited to follow the count and to sign the results. In no cases were the results displayed outside the PS. Control of the transport of results from the PS to the RO s office was hampered by the crowds of people and by the general traffic situation. All transport observed was escorted by armed police. Observation of the Tabulation Despite irregularities, the overall conduct of the compilation and consolidation of results was satisfactory. However, the candidates confidence in this part of the electoral process was rather low. Lack of transparency in some cases harmed the credibility of the aggregation. Sufficient transparency was hindered by infrastructure, overcrowding (inside and outside the RO s office), traffic and the RO s poor procedural skills. More serious deficiencies were also noted: PrOs not carrying ID caused unrest, allegations of fraud and formal complaints. Some PrOs delivered their results very late (with a delay of up to 12 hrs) or did not show up at all before they were brought in by the police at the request of the RO. In one case, the PrO simply did not manage to get through the crowd of people at the courthouse, and decided to go home and get some sleep instead. His polling material and protocols were later brought in by the police. The most significant incident, however, was reported from one constituency where four PrOs were abducted, allegedly by PML/Q supporters. They were later rescued by the army. Although the results were recovered, the sealed ballot bags were still missing.

16 PAKISTAN: NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS In its post election observation, the LTO team was confronted with a case illustrative of lack of transparency as well as of deficiencies in the complaint system: An independent candidate running for a seat in the PA told that he had tried to file a complaint to the RO of alleged fraud. However, the RO refused to provide necessary details from the compilation process and also refused to receive his complaint, leaving the candidate with no evidence of a complaint being submitted. The candidate claimed that at an early stage, the RO had unofficially informed the independent candidate that he would win with a margin of 245 votes. Later the RO asked the independent candidate and his supporters to leave his office. Reportedly, the PML-Q candidate then arrived, and subsequently the results were changed in favour of that candidate. Information from the press and the ECP s web site confirmed the change in the results. The team was shown copies of the result from three particular PSs (Form 14) and compared them with the compiled results from the RO s office (Form 16). It turned out that there was a discrepancy which favoured the PML/Q candidate by 291 votes. The candidate filed a petition and the LTO team forwarded the case and necessary documents to the core team for further follow up. The review of Complaints Process According to the EOM: The complaints and appeals framework fails to provide an effective remedy for violations of electoral rights. The law provides for judicial appeals on two issues only, candidate nomination and results. The former is dealt with by an appellate Tribunal, while the latter is heard by an Election Tribunal if a candidate files a petition within 45 days. Petition decisions could be appealed to the Supreme Court. High Court judges in both tribunals are appointed by the Chief Electoral Commissioner (CEC). Complaints not falling under the above mentioned categories are dealt with by the ECP. Hence, the election commission is significantly involved both in administering the elections and in managing the complaints against their administrative decisions. This undermines the independence of, and the confidence in, the ECP. The team received numerous verbal allegations of election fraud and abuse of power by the election administration and the ruling party. Written statements and complaints were asked for and in some instances, provided. Many candidates, party workers and agents, stated that there was little use in forwarding written complaints as the election administration often refused to collect and register their documents. This neglect could be confirmed in conversations with the election administration at the district level, both the permanent, the DEO, and the temporary, the DRO. Areas of responsibility between the two institutions are blurred and neither had a system for registering and tracing complaints. Complaints found baseless by the DRO were rejected unregistered on the spot. The only complaints showed to the team were those submitted to the DRO by the central ECP for investigation. None of these were resolved during the LTO team s deployment to Muzaffargarh. A DRO statement is somewhat representative for the attitude with regards to complaints: If the people do not trust the judiciary, who should they then trust?

17 PAKISTAN: NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS Conclusions and Recommendations The national and provincial elections in Pakistan were announced while during the state of emergency and took place in a difficult security environment, staged in particular by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and by the ongoing military operations in the Western areas of the country. Hence, political constraints as well as an atmosphere of fear affected the campaigning as well as the conduct of the elections. Under these circumstances, the elections were deemed competitive and the results largely to be in line with the will of the electorate. Major concerns regarding most areas of the electoral process - the legal framework, election administration, voter and candidate registration, media and campaign environment, complaints and appeals - remain. In this respect, little has been achieved since the 2002 elections, other than small improvements in the media situation and also with respect to civil society involvement. The EOM s recommendations are therefore comprehensive but also, in particular, focused on improvements in the electoral framework and on removing the undue education qualification that restricts some 95% of the electorate from standing as candidates. Improving the electorate s confidence in the judicial system is another area of priority. Appendix (Not available in the web edition) EOM s Preliminary Statement